Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 160-179)

3 FEBRUARY 2004

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE COLLINS

  Q160 Keith Vaz: And clearly there has been a backlog that has developed over the years in your Tribunal, which has nothing to do with the way you have administered it but is due to the decision taken by the Home Office to send in more asylum cases than immigration cases?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes. What happened was, when I started in 1999, we had a backlog of about 5,000 cases. We were quite lucky because there was a slight lull and we managed to get rid of that backlog completely within about two years. It has built up again largely because we did not get the manpower to cope with the increase in numbers into the adjudicators—I think they are running at about 5,000 a month coming into the adjudicators.

  Q161 Keith Vaz: Do you have enough adjudicators at the moment?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Again, I am out of it now—

  Q162 Keith Vaz: But when you were last supremo?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I think about 500 now if you include part time and full time. The quality is not altogether even but that is not surprising and also, to be fair to them, there is a huge pressure. I may be wrong because I am a bit out of date but they used to do four cases a day—one day the hearing, the next day writing up—but as far as the Tribunal is concerned, when I left, we were getting I think about 700 applications for leave to appeal a week and now it is about 900.

  Q163 Keith Vaz: One of the problems I have experienced as a constituency MP, and I am sure it applies to people like Mrs Cryer and Mr Cunningham who have big immigration caseloads, is the lack of connection between the three agencies involved with an immigration case—the entry clearance officer, the file going disappearing into the black hole of the appeals section of the Home Office, we write to yourself or your clerk and we say, "Where is this case? When is the appeal coming on?"; you write back and say, "We have not received the papers, write to the Home Office"; we write to the Home Office and then the Foreign Office—what can we do about this endless problem?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I agree we have had problems with this and problems with it in judicial review too because we find unfortunately that a case is allowed by an adjudicator and the ECO does nothing and it takes or can take, and you have no doubt had such cases, a long time to get them to do something and I have had to threaten peremptory judicial review orders from time to time to get something done. You have also put your finger on an important point—that this new Bill is designed with asylum cases in mind but of course it covers all the other ones, and families who want to visit their families here or marriage cases or whatever are finding themselves kept out for longer than they should be in certain cases and, of course, they will suffer from the proposals as well.

  Q164 Keith Vaz: The Committee under chairmanship of my colleague, Mr Beith, has gone abroad and had a look at the posts abroad and the way in which these applications are made from the start. Would it help if there was a common reference number that was given at the start that is then followed through the entire system?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I think it might. The obvious problem at the moment is that the ECO is the Foreign Office and the Home Office deals with the decision, or when it gets here it deals with the appeal and so on, and that can create problems and, frankly, I think there should be a much more global approach by all the relevant authorities to these cases. The Home Office and the appellate authorities should liaise much more closely than perhaps they do, and that is partly why I am suggesting the involvement of the adjudicator at an early stage because one of the problems that certainly exists now is that an appeal is served on the Home Office and they can sit on it for weeks or months before it is put into the system, and sometimes they have a motive for doing so. An obvious example is where a situation in a country is a bit fluid and Kosovo in the past was a good example of this. When people came from Kosovo before the NATO takeover, as it were, most of them were refugees. Albanians were undoubtedly being persecuted by Serbs but if the Home Office had treated them all as refugees they would have given them indefinite leave to remain, since it appears for some reason which I have never understood since, that it is not required by the Convention to give indefinite leave, so what they did was to sit on the cases until the situation changed and then of course, when the situation changed, they were no longer refugees. This they have been doing quite regularly—and I do not blame them in one sense.

  Q165 Keith Vaz: Finally, if we change the procedure of the Tribunal itself and perhaps dispense with the presenting officer and get the adjudicator to cross-examine witnesses, would that help?

  Sir Andrew Collins: You could make an adjudicator more inquisitorial, I do not doubt, and that might have advantages, but so long as you have the Home Office properly represented it should not be necessary. It is only where you do not have the Home Office represented that the adjudicator is in a real difficulty.

  Q166 Keith Vaz: Would that have an impact on the need for legal advice and representation?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I think so. It is very difficult to substitute the person who has to decide for the lawyer. You should know that—you do need someone representing you who can discuss your account with you. The fact is that the vast majority of would-be asylum seekers are not good at English: they do need assistance—and they get it, of course. The whole Oakington system, for example, was said to work because there is a representative there who is able to assist. All I am suggesting is that, if you put the adjudicator in there, you have the appeal effectively starting immediately if there is a refusal and if there is a desire to appeal, or any grounds for appeal.

  Keith Vaz: Can I, for the record, declare my interest which I should have done at the start of my examination which is that I am a non-practising barrister and my wife holds a judicial appointment.

  Q167 Mr Soley: I do not have any declarations of interest other than to declare I have not got any! If I put to you whether you would prefer the system to be inquisitorial or adversarial, which would you choose?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Probably, if it had proper representation on both sides, adversarial but that is because I am a conservative old lawyer, I suppose, and am used to an adversarial system. Also inquisitorial does mean that you, I think, on the whole have to have a rather higher standard of judicial officer dealing with it; you have to ensure that you have a good one and someone who is going to be accepted, of course, and trusted by both parties.

  Q168 Mr Soley: And is that your main reason for not wanting an inquisitorial system?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes. I do not say I do not "want" it; I can see there could be advantages in it and I do not have, frankly, very strong views either way, but if you press me I suspect I come down in favour of adversarial because that is what I am used to.

  Q169 Mr Soley: Yes, but is it because that is what you are used to or is it because the inquisitorial system would need a higher calibre of adjudicators?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I personally think it would need a higher calibre and that is what worries me—that the calibre is not high at the moment, or not universally high. Of course there are some very good adjudicators, and I recognise that the problem lies more in pressure than anything else. It is the same with the Tribunal and that is why I think one needs, and I always have thought you need, some form of review which at the moment is statutory, because they do 120 leave applications a week which is pretty soul destroying, and by the end of the week you would not be surprised if the odd one goes wrong, would you?

  Q170 Ross Cranston: Could I ask you about the ouster clause? You make the point in paragraph 7 about the legal difficulties of this—

  Sir Andrew Collins: This was before, of course, the Bill and before I knew there was an ouster clause coming.

  Q171 Ross Cranston: You have referred to Anisminic and we could have a seminar about that, and you mention the interesting point about the judicial review on removal.

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes. You have sought to deal with that, have you not?

  Q172 Ross Cranston: Well, not us, but the government has.

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes, the government.

  Q173 Ross Cranston: You then make the third and, I think, convincing argument to lawyers that this is a point of constitutional principle but could I just ask you about the practicalities of it? My tentative view is that we have only just introduced this system of statutory review; why not let it run for a while and see how it goes?

  Sir Andrew Collins: I agree.

  Q174 Ross Cranston: The purist lawyer might say that judicial review is better because we can try again if we do not win with the first judge; we can have an oral hearing which we cannot have with a statutory review; but in answer to the first question from Mr Beith you seemed to be saying that your assessment is that the statutory review is working well and you are allowing 15% on average?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes.

  Q175 Ross Cranston: What are the merits of statutory review vis-a"-vis judicial review?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Speed.

  Q176 Ross Cranston: Are we doing any disadvantage to applicants by statutory review as opposed to judicial review?

  Sir Andrew Collins: Yes, in the sense that if you have the right of oral renewal and then you can go to the Court of Appeal you may be able to persuade other judges to grant you permission. You also achieve delay if that is what you want but, as I say, this was a problem, for example, which arose in the planning field with enforcement notices because people were taking ages or trying to spin out the process and so Parliament introduced a statutory review effectively—"Appeal to a judge, that is it". I perhaps ought to declare my interest in that the statutory review was my idea, and the Secretary of State was concerned that if statutory review was put in everyone would try it and it would lead to an increase. It has not done that and I do not think it will do that but, of course, it is not as good for applicants as a full scale judicial review process.

  Q177 Ross Cranston: Having declared the interest, can we still have your judgment on its operation in the sense of the question whether you think it has done fundamental injustices?

  Sir Andrew Collins: No—well, I would say that, wouldn't I, but no, I do not think it has and I do not think anyone thinks it has. It is there because of the pressure on the IAT in terms of numbers and it is necessary to have someone just to reconsider and it appears, as I say, to be working reasonably. All right, the numbers are small but it amounts to what, if it is 15% of 40, about seven a week? And do not forget that this jurisdiction can be life and death. It is all very well to talk about the problems of asylum and flooding in with bogus cases but the fact is there are some genuine ones and, if you make a mistake, you can be costing someone his life.

  Q178 Ross Cranston: Mr Justice Ouseley gave us some figures as well and he promised an additional note to bring us up to date, and I think he gave us the figure of 35 a week as well?

  Sir Andrew Collins: He told me that he had said 35 a month by mistake but he has corrected the transcript.

  Q179 Ross Cranston: That was my recollection.

  Sir Andrew Collins: It is about 35-40.

  Ross Cranston: It is more than I thought.


 
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