Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs First Report


2  A SUPREME COURT

16. Until the Devolution Acts, the highest court in England and Wales, Scotland (apart from in criminal matters) and Northern Ireland was the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Since then, case law of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on devolution matters (which may include important human rights convention questions) has had binding authority on all other courts including the House of Lords Appellate Committee. [17] Each jurisdiction regards the Appellate Committee as a court in its own jurisdiction, rather than as a United Kingdom court. The Government's proposals in its consultation paper describe its proposals for the establishment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the consequent reorganisation of the highest levels of the judiciary and the appointments procedure for judges at that level.[18] The primary objective is to separate the highest court of appeal in the United Kingdom from Parliament.[19]

17. There have been a number of calls for such a change in recent years, for example by the Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in his Constitution Unit Lecture in May 2002, in which he said

    "Our object is plain enough: to ensure that our supreme court is so structured and equipped as best to fulfil its functions and to command the confidence of the country in the changed world in which we live".

Mr Matthias Kelly, Q.C., the Chairman of the Bar Council, in an article in The Times on 2 April 2003, said

    "Judges should have no part of the legislature …. It is very difficult to understand why our Supreme Court (the law lords) should be a committee of the second house of Parliament".

18. The main argument for the change is that it is felt to be wrong in principle to have judges sitting as members of the legislature. The Consultation paper spells out this argument:

    "The Human Rights Act, specifically in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, now requires a stricter view to be taken not only of anything which might undermine the independence or impartiality of a judicial tribunal, but even of anything which might appear to do so. So the fact that the Law Lords are a Committee of the House of Lords can raise issues about the appearance of independence from the legislature."[20]

We note that this is a view based on the appearance of impartiality rather than the substance.

19. To some extent, this problem has been acknowledged and addressed by the Lords of Appeal statement that in view of the Human Rights Act they would refrain from commenting on matters of a partisan nature or which might disbar them from hearing appeals (referred to in paragraph 34 of the Consultative Paper).[21]

20. An argument based on the separation of powers (such as the reference to Article 6) cannot be conclusive in the United Kingdom, where it is a constitutional principle that ministers should be members of one or other House of Parliament. The evidence which we received in the form of responses to the consultation papers and in oral evidence showed a divergence of view among well informed commentators about the principle underlying the change. Although it was clear to most witnesses that it is desirable that judges should be wholly independent of the Government, since it is possible that the Government will be a party to an action before them, the same is not true of independence of the legislature. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick put it:

    "Since it is the judges who have to decide whether ministers are breaking the law or exceeding their powers or whatever it may be, it is obviously vital that the judiciary and the executive should be separate and distinct. But there has never been a reason—not one that I can see—why the judges and the legislature should be distinct and separate."[22]

In other words, freedom of the citizen in the United Kingdom is guaranteed by the Rule of Law, not the separation of powers.[23]

21. Evidence from the judges suggested that it was highly unlikely that any challenge to a decision made by the House of Lords under Article 6 would succeed. Certainly it did not appear to be the cause for changing the present arrangements in the view of Lord Cullen or Sir Robert Carswell.[24]

22. Is it necessary to change anything? Many witnesses commented (as did the Consultative Paper) on the excellence of the present system. The House of Lords is a well established court which is regarded as dispensing justice in an effective and efficient way. The Law Lords themselves commented:

    "…. it should not be thought that the Law Lords as a body support the proposal to establish a new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. A number of serving Law Lords[25] believe that, on pragmatic grounds, the proposed change is unnecessary and will be harmful. The present arrangements work well. They believe that the Law Lords' presence in the House is of benefit to the Law Lords, to the House, and to others including the litigants. Appeals are heard in a unique, suitably prestigious, setting for this country's court of final appeal. The 'House of Lords' as a judicial body is recognised by that name throughout the common law world. Overall, it is believed, it has a fine record and reputation. The Law Lords who do not support the proposed change consider these real advantages need not be, and should not be, put in jeopardy. They consider that the cost of the change would be wholly out of proportion to any benefit."[26]

Other Law Lords[27] disagree about the principle of the change and:

    "…. regard the functional separation of the judiciary at all levels from the legislature and the executive as a cardinal feature of a modem, liberal, democratic state governed by the rule of law. They consider it important, as a matter of constitutional principle, that this functional separation should be reflected in the major institutions of the state, of which the final court of appeal is certainly one."[28]

23. Both those in favour of the change and those against were united in emphasising that the present system was one which worked. The arguments for change were about principle and perception.

Jurisdiction

24. The Consultation Paper proposes that there be little change in the jurisdiction of the final court of appeal. It dismissed any radical changes such as introducing a US-style Supreme Court as inappropriate for the United Kingdom system—where in any case there is no written constitution or set of constitutional principles that can override statute. Jurisdiction to strike down Acts of Parliament would militate against parliamentary supremacy, which is a cornerstone of the United Kingdom's constitutional arrangement.[29] Likewise, any proposal that the United Kingdom should have a Supreme Court on the lines of the European Court of Justice, namely where matters of law are referred for a definitive ruling, would go against the principle of United Kingdom courts which decide law on the basis of particular cases before them. An arrangement which required the new Court to consider issues in the abstract "would sit very uneasily with our judicial traditions."[30]

25. One assumption which the consultation paper makes is that the new court would be a United Kingdom court. This is very different from the present position where the Appellate Committee is the final court in each jurisdiction separately. As Lord Hope of Craighead pointed out:

    "The problem is, I think, if you describe the court as a supreme court of the United Kingdom, it tends to suggest that there is a body of United Kingdom law. In a court which inevitably is filled with a majority of English judges there may be a temptation to say, "Well, we see differences between Scots law and English law on issues relating to property or other matters, what's the point of having a difference when we're sitting as a United Kingdom court?" The Scots may well feel that would introduce a drift away from their system of law into an English system, and there are signs in case law, even now, that there is a temptation along that line."[31]

26. The Lord Chancellor emphasised that there would be no change to the jurisdiction of the court:

    "It is not the intention to create some body of a new law called "UK law". It is still intended for there to be a Court of Final Appeal that deals with legal issues from all parts of the United Kingdom, including Scotland. That means, for example, a decision of the Supreme Court in relation to an English case will not be binding in Scotland, it will only be persuasive authority, which is the current position."[32]

27. The legislation establishing the new court will need to make clear the jurisdiction of the court. It will need to establish the extent to which it is a United Kingdom court as opposed to a final court of appeal serving each of the United Kingdom's three jurisdictions.

28. There are two further practical matters put forward for consideration: how devolution issues are to be dealt with; and the treatment of appeals from Scotland.

DEVOLUTION MATTERS

29. The Government has raised the question of whether to transfer the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council over devolution issues to the Supreme Court. The decision to refer devolution cases to the Judicial Committee rather than to the House of Lords was deliberate. The present arrangements are, of course, quite new. According to the Government, they are working well.[33] They have the added practical advantage that the panel of available judges for the Judicial Committee is wider than for the Appellate Committee and therefore that there are more opportunities to have Scottish and Northern Ireland judges sitting on devolution cases.

30. The Government proposes to transfer the jurisdiction on devolution cases from the Judicial Committee to the new Supreme Court with arrangements which enable additional Scottish and Northern Ireland judges to sit in cases raising devolution issues where that is appropriate.[34] The arguments in favour of this are: that there would no longer be any perceived conflict of interest in which the UK Parliament was apparently sitting in judgment over a case relating to its legislative jurisdiction; and that it would provide a single apex to the UK's judicial systems where all constitutional issues could be considered. It would ensure that there is no longer a danger of conflicting judgments arising, for example on human rights cases which might have come to the Judicial Committee as devolution issues and to the House of Lords as ordinary appeal cases.[35] This point was emphasised by JUSTICE in its policy paper "A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom"[36] in which it referred to a case[37] where the same human rights point was raised in separate cases that were simultaneously passing through the Scottish and English & Welsh Courts.

31. However, this apparently simple approach does not find favour with everyone. The Law Lords have said:

    "It would in our opinion be consistent with the role of a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom that it should be the final arbiter of devolution issues arising in the devolved jurisdictions. The Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, however, in giving jurisdiction to resolve devolution issues to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, permit such issues to be decided by judges drawn from the devolved jurisdictions who are eligible to sit in the Judicial Committee but are not eligible to sit in the House of Lords and, if our answer to Question 2 is accepted,[38] will not be eligible to sit in the Supreme Court. We would not wish, and we very much doubt if the devolved administrations would wish, to see this feature of the devolution settlement abrogated. If it is to be preserved, the choice lies between leaving matters as they are and making special rules to govern eligibility to sit in the Supreme Court when it is dealing with devolution matters. We do not regard this last possibility as satisfactory and accordingly, although with a measure of reluctance, favour preserving the status quo."[39]

32. This is clearly a sensitive matter which Parliament should decide on in the light of a clear understanding of the views of the Scottish Parliament and of the Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, though the matter will ultimately be one for the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. The Law Lords have raised a practical point of great significance which the planned Bill will need to address clearly.[40]

SCOTTISH APPEALS

33. Scottish appeals are dealt with in a different way from appeals from England and Wales and from Northern Ireland, partly for historical reasons and partly for practical ones. The Act and Treaty of Union 1707 guarantees the separation of the Scottish judicial system from that of England; the administration of the civil and criminal courts in Scotland is a devolved matter within the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Executive.

34. The basis for the criminal justice system is utterly separate from that in England and Wales. As Lord Hope of Craighead has said:

Until devolution in Scotland, there was no further appeal in Scottish criminal cases beyond the High Court of Justiciary. There is now, however, the possibility of appeal under the devolution settlement to the Privy Council in a criminal case if a Convention right is breached by actions by the prosecutor or other member of the Executive or in legislation made by the Scottish Parliament which are outside powers granted by the Scotland Act 1998.

35. Scottish civil appeals do lie to the House of Lords. A particular feature of the Scottish system is that in the great majority of cases there is no requirement to seek leave to appeal to the House of Lords: there is only a requirement for two Counsel to certify the reasonableness of the appeal.[42] Cases from the rest of the United Kingdom do require leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Only a small number of cases reach the House of Lords from Scotland and there is no reason to assume that this would change under the new arrangements.[43]

36. The Government's view is that:

    "There is no evidence that the Scottish criminal appeal system requires change. To the extent that a further appeal may be required after the first tier of appeal has been exhausted, there is the possibility of a reference back at any time to the court of appeal by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission."[44]

As far as Scottish civil cases area are concerned:

    "The Scottish Executive has indicated that it has no plans at present to alter the current arrangements and is in principle content for civil appeals to the new Court to be on the same basis as currently operates in relation to the House of Lords. There are benefits to the Scottish justice system in having important cases reviewed by judges with a different background, and indeed advantages to the larger jurisdiction also in drawing on the resources of a different legal tradition at the highest level."[45]

These views have some distinguished critics. Professor George Gretton[46] has written that this distinction between Scots criminal and Scots civil law is specious. He suggests that the Government's justification for excluding jurisdiction over criminal appeals is weak because it contradicts its justification for retaining jurisdiction over civil appeals. He states that, according to the Consultation Paper:

    "criminal cases don't go to London because English and Scots criminal law are so different. But in civil law, it seems, they are much the same, while simultaneously belonging to a 'different legal tradition'."[47]

37. The Government's view is:

    "The disadvantages of changing this are threefold. First, in respect of Scotland, the arrangement whereby Scottish civil cases currently lie to the House of Lords as of right is long established; there is no evidence that change is needed; and there are strong arguments for leaving the position unchanged. The second disadvantage, in all respects, is that it would mean that more of the work of the Court would be absorbed in deciding what cases to hear, rather than hearing them. It would lead, in practice, to fewer cases being heard or to cases taking longer to come before the Court. The third disadvantage is that it would mean that all those seeking the judgment of the Court would have to incur the cost of petitioning for the right to appeal."[48]

38. The Law Lords agree:

    "….subject to what we say in answer to Question 1,[49] we do not propose any change in the jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee on its becoming the Supreme Court. The Appellate Committee has never had jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals from Scotland. It is not a jurisdiction which the Supreme Court (save for its Scottish members) would be well-fitted to discharge. If there is any desire for change in this regard, we would not support it."[50]

They go on to say in answer to question 21 of the consultation paper (Should the present position in relation to Scottish appeals remain unchanged?):

    "There are two views. Some serving Law Lords[51] regard the absence of a leave requirement in relation to Scottish appeals as anomalous and capable, however rarely, of leading to unmeritorious appeals. They would take this opportunity to end this anomaly. Others[52], while recognising the anomaly, regard the requirement of certification by counsel as an adequate safeguard in all but a very few cases, and would not wish to disturb a long-standing procedure which gives rise to minimal difficulty in practice."[53]

39. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over Scottish appeals and any changes will require legislation or a resolution of the Scottish Parliament. These issues are significant to the maintenance of Scottish law as a distinct entity. They were not addressed when the Government first announced its proposals and the timetable for decisions on the Supreme Court needs to allow for proper resolution and discussion of them in the Scottish Parliament.

Judges

COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

Membership

40. At the moment there are twelve members of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. The first members of the new Supreme Court will be these judges. They hear most of the appeals, although they are able to call on a panel of reserves who are members of the House who are entitled to sit, if they need assistance because of the pressure of work or the need for particular expertise in an area of law. These supplementary judges must be holders of "high judicial office";[54] in other words: the Lord Chancellor; judges of the High Court; Court of Appeal; and Court of Session who are also members of the House of Lords. Since they must be Members of the House of Lords, obviously there is a limit on the numbers on the panel.

41. The Government's initial view is that the number of judges forming the core membership of the court "is about right".[55] It raises the question of how the core membership could be supplemented, as at present, by suitably qualified judges. In their response to Question 2 in the consultation paper, the Law Lords suggested that eligibility to sit on the new supreme court could be extended to the following categories (but should not be extended beyond these categories, unless the Court is to rule on devolution issues):

  • Those who have served as a British judge or Advocate-General of the European Court of Justice or
  • have sat in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords as Lord Chancellor or
  • hold office as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord President of the Court of Session, Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Master of the Rolls or Lord Justice-Clerk.[56]

42. The composition of the new court will not, in effect, be the same as before. As it functions now, it has a small membership which is able to sit in separately in panels of five or so judges but which still maintains a considerable degree of collegiality. To some extent, this comes from the fact that all the judges are members of the House of Lords. It will not be the same if additional members are co-opted from elsewhere, for example from among members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as the Government suggests.[57] Nor will it be the case for other temporary judges who may be selected to sit.

43. At present, there is a convention which ensures that two Scottish judges are appointed to the Appellate Committee.[58] Northern Ireland judges are appointed from time to time, although since they are from a much smaller jurisdiction with a less separate legal tradition this is less of a fixed practice. Necessarily, appointments to the Appellate Committee are rare events. The Law Lords in their response to the consultation paper firmly favoured keeping the convention flexible, on the basis that it was better to have the best candidate than an undeserving candidate who was there to fill a quota. They did not contemplate any reduction in the current level of representation of Scottish and Northern Irish judges and referred to the excellence of part members of the Appellate Committee from those jurisdictions.

44. In respect of the appointment of judges from the various United Kingdom jurisdictions, the Law Society (of England and Wales) did not support the idea of a quota expressed in legislation since it believes that a quota could cut across the overriding principle of merit. It noted that the Supreme Court Appointments Commission could be given an administrative guideline that, all other things being equal, it was desirable to have representation on the Supreme Court from all the jurisdictions in the United Kingdom.[59]

45. However, both the Law Society for Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates have suggested that at least three judges should be drawn from Scotland and the Law Society for Scotland has suggested that this should be set in statute as a minimum requirement.[60] The Law Lords commented :

    "The only purpose of a statutory rule would be to protect the smaller jurisdictions against the dominant English majority. To suppose that there is a need for such protection is to misunderstand the extent to which the continuing contribution of Scottish and Northern Irish members is valued and the pride which all members of the Court would take in its being a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom."[61]

The Law Lords went further, by noting that it was better to allow for an increase in the membership of Scottish or Northern Irish judges if the best candidate happened to be from either of those jurisdictions.[62]

46. This question is complicated by the fact that the Welsh part of the system in England and Wales is developing in tandem with devolution of powers to the National Assembly for Wales. As the consultation paper notes:

    "If the Court is to take on responsibility for devolution issues, some regard should also be had to ensuring that the Welsh dimension of the England and Wales judicial system is respected."[63]

This is not a fixed situation. The Law Lords noted that:

    "It would moreover be wrong to assume that the Welsh legal system will forever be indissolubly linked to the English; the devolution settlement is already leading to a revival of the indigenous legal culture which once existed in Wales."[64]

47. There are two aspects which need to be kept in mind when discussing the membership of the new court. The first is the need for special expertise in the laws and understanding of the society in all parts of the United Kingdom—this is particularly true of the distinction between Scottish law and the law in the rest of the United Kingdom. The second is the need for there to be an equal sense of ownership of the new court in all parts of the United Kingdom. The Constitutional Reform Bill will need to make clear provision for the arrangements relating to representation of the various parts of the United Kingdom. It will need to set out clearly the principles under which members of the new court are appointed.

SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT PROCESS

Method of selecting for appointment to the court

48. The present system of selecting members of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords is that appointment is by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister. (This system is also used for the appointment senior judges such as the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the President of the Court of Session). The Lord Chancellor plays a central role in consulting judges about such appointments, and, as the Government's Consultation Paper recognises, his special position in the constitution makes this process involving him different from the involvement of a Secretary of State.[65] In the absence of a Lord Chancellor a new method will need to be adopted that allows a reasonable degree of political accountability but that preserves judicial independence.

49. The Government raised the issue of transparency of the method of selection of members of the Supreme Court. Previously, the system has been based on what was commonly referred to as "secret soundings". In other words, because the group from which likely candidates for the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords has been small, it has been possible for the Lord Chancellor to consult other judges and advise the Prime Minister on the best people to appoint. (All appointments in recent years to the House of Lords Appellate Committee have been from the senior judiciary.) This informal system—which has its critics—has seemed to work well in that it has selected judges of merit and evidently has the confidence of the judges.[66] The Consultation Paper mentions the possibility of "open applications" (the meaning of which is unclear: we take this to mean advertised appointments[67]) to the Supreme Court, balancing the argument that this would be off-putting for candidates and of doubtful value given the inevitability that the pool of candidates will be sufficiently well known to allow the Commission or ministers to act without open applications against the requirement for openness and transparency and the prospect that this might contribute to increasing diversity.[68]

50. The Government's proposal is that there should be "some transparent process which leads to the identification of names, even if the final recommendations are still made by the Prime Minister following consultation with the First Minister or First and Deputy First Ministers as appropriate".[69] The Government put forward three possible models for the appointments commission which would recommend a limited number of names to the Prime Minister on the basis that the small number of appointments to the Supreme Court and the likely limited field of candidates mean that it would be sufficient for the Commission to present the names of only one or two candidates. The Prime Minister would then consult the First Minister for Scotland and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland.[70]

51. The Law Lords said:

    "An Appointments Commission, if established, should recommend one appointee to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. The Secretary of State should be authorised to invite the Commission to reconsider its recommendation, giving reasons. If so invited, the Appointments Commission should reconsider its recommendation and then recommend an appointee (whether the same appointee or another) to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State would then advise the Prime Minister of that recommendation, and the Prime Minister would advise The Queen accordingly. The Secretary of State would be bound to accept the Commission's recommendation (either initially or after reconsideration) and the Prime Minister would be bound to advise The Queen in accordance with the Secretary of State's advice."[71]

This approach was also advocated by other witnesses.[72]

52. The Bar Council noted that a:

    "….limited involvement of the PM provides a degree of political accountability which we regard as desirable…Rejection of a name by the PM would be an extreme step, but it could be taken if s/he thought it the only correct course. The element of political accountability is limited on this model, given the lack of choice, but it exists".[73]

It further stated that:

    "It is important to recognise that the executive does have an interest in the composition of the [Supreme] Court. Quite apart from anything else, it is important to avoid a situation where the judiciary can be portrayed by a hostile executive as an un-elected body answerable to no-one, should there ever be genuine constitutional conflict. The constitutional arrangements should reflect, in an appropriate way (i.e in a manner consistent with a guarantee of excellence in appointment and judicial independence) the legitimate interest that the Government does have".[74]

53. A further issue is the extent to which consultation should take place with the First Secretary of the National Assembly for Wales. It was the view of the former Counsel General of the National Assembly that the First Secretary should have equal rights to be consulted with the First Minister in Scotland and the First and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland.[75]

54. How is the Commission to be appointed? Clearly, whichever model were adopted, the Commission would have to be a separate body from the judicial appointments commissions in the separate jurisdictions (including any such body for England and Wales). However, as the Court would be the Supreme Court for the whole United Kingdom, it is important that its membership should be selected by those who are representative of all three of the legal jurisdictions within the country.[76] The Government's proposal is that rather than set up another new body to deal specially with the very small number of appointments, a Commission to advise on appointments to the Supreme Court could be drawn from all three commissions and boards;[77] the Commission would, however, nominate all members, rather than have each Commission nominate members from their respective jurisdictions.[78] There was some support for this from witnesses.[79]

55. The Law Lords thought that there should be an Appointments Commission made up of: the President and the Deputy President, assisted by the senior member of the Court appointed from Scotland, Northern Ireland and the two senior members of the Court appointed from the bench or legal profession of England and Wales (unless any of the latter are President or Deputy President).[80] In addition, there should be two lay members, one or both of whom might be legal academics, appointed (by an independent body) for substantial periods of time. This Commission should be charged with appointing members of the court and its President and Deputy President.[81]

56. There are clearly problems associated with a specially constituted commission which would meet so irregularly. How would the operations of the commission be administered? The Government told the Committee:

    "No final decision (on whether the recommending commission would have a permanent secretariat and, if so, where the staff would be situated) has been taken but for so few appointments it may be most practicable for the commission not to be a standing body but convened whenever an impending vacancy needs to be filled in the Supreme Court. It is envisaged that one or more of the commissions in the three jurisdictions will be asked to supply secretarial and other support on an ad hoc basis when a vacancy is to be filled."[82]

This is an insufficient answer. We see no need for a permanent bureaucracy to serve the Commission but there need to be arrangements for continuity of practice and the development of recruitment policy. Most importantly, the Government does not explain how each jurisdiction will have a role to play in this important activity.

57. Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the new court, the broad principles of appointment of judges will still apply: the process must be transparent; it must have the confidence of the Government, the judiciary, the legal profession and the public—it must be clearly merit-based and the independence of the judges must be assured; it must allow for an increase in diversity, where possible, although the small number of appointments makes this already difficult problem especially hard to resolve (particularly if the current practice of appointing only senior members of the judiciary is maintained); and there must be some level of democratic accountability in the process. It will not be easy for the Government to achieve this set of requirements; we look forward to reading their proposals.

Qualifications for appointment

58. There was some disagreement between the witnesses about the stipulated qualifications for membership of the court. JUSTICE thought that there should be no formal requirement that candidates have previous judicial experience.[83] Professor Stevens indicated in his paper that he believed that many of the more successful appeal judges had been promoted directly from the bar.[84]

59. This touches on what the court of final appeal actually does. Although the Government says that the role of the new court will emphatically not be one of deciding on the constitutionality of laws or acting in a way similar to, for example, the United States Supreme Court, Professor Stevens noted that:

    "When you come to the Court of Final Appeal, the new Supreme Court, then I think the new Supreme Court will inevitably be deciding cases which are on the periphery of law and politics and it therefore becomes very important to have judges of experience outside the courts."[85]

60. The Bar Council has acknowledged that there is a possibility that the appointment of an eminent academic would be an appropriate means of enhancing both the academic standing and the diversity of the court. It states, however, that:

    "Such an appointment is likely to be rare, even very rare. The argument that those who are appointed to the Court should have practical experience at the trial level is, in ordinary circumstances, compelling, and we would expect the Appointments Commission to recognise this in the appointments it made".[86]

The Law Society supported:

    "…..removing the requirement for two years holding of high judicial office. If the assessment procedures are sufficiently objective, candidates will have to demonstrate that notwithstanding their lack of judicial experience, they have the requisite skills to be an effective member of the Court in competition against applicants who do have this experience".[87]

61. Dame Brenda Hale[88] has indicated that:

    "The case for members of a first tier, error correcting, appeal court having had experience as a trial judge is much stronger than the case for members of a second tier, points of important principle resolving Supreme Court." [89]

Her reasons for this are that the Supreme Court justices do not need to have the same knowledge of what it is like at 'the sharp end', since by the time the cases come before them, the issues should have been refined into points of purest principle. On that basis, she considers that it might be thought even more important to have a court which reflects the diversity of the legal population, not only in professional and social background, but also in gender and ethnicity, than at its lower levels.[90]

62. The United Kingdom Association of Women Judges stated in its response to the consultation[91] that:

    "A second tier appellate court deals with matters of principle. Experience on the bench is generally not necessary for the work with which the Supreme Court will be concerned. The ability to formulate legal policy at high level is not confined to those who have served on the appeal bench. Academics, for example, may bring valuable but different perspectives. The more diverse the membership of the Supreme Court, potentially, the wider will be the debate. It is, therefore, desirable that appointment to the Supreme Court be available to a wider body of candidates than has traditionally been the case. People from walks of legal life other than simply the appeal courts should be eligible for appointment."

63. The reality of the situation affecting the new court is that the range of possible candidates is always going to be small. Increasing diversity depends on increasing the pool of available talent from which to choose. It is possible to envisage candidates being selected straight from practice or academic life, but we expect that the more productive route towards increasing the diversity of the membership of the new court will be by way of more broadly based appointments to the courts below. Once a person has sat frequently as a judge they will be in the same position as any other candidate.

64. Vacancies in the new Court should be publicised and open to application in line with most other public service appointments. It will still be necessary for some element of active searching for candidates to take place.

PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT

65. The Government's policy in the first instance is that the Presidency of the new court will be held by the serving Senior Law Lord. It has canvassed opinion on whether his successor should be chosen either on the basis of advice from the Prime Minister to the Queen after consultation or on the recommendation of a specially constituted Appointments Commission, whether directly to the Queen or through the Prime Minister.[92]

66. In the absence of the office of Lord Chancellor, there is a gap in the provision for appointments of this kind. Consultations by a Secretary of State will not be the same as a similar exercise carried out by the Lord Chancellor. It is impossible to be transparent about the process, because too few people are candidates. The present system is based on trust, which is a reflection of the esteem in which successive Lord Chancellors have been held in their capacity as defenders of judicial independence.

67. A further option which is not canvassed in the Government's Consultation Paper is that the members of the new court should elect their own President and Deputy President from among their own number. The President will be the public face of the new court and will have the duty of nominating judges to sit on particular cases.

68. The Law Lords saw a clear merit in having a Deputy President:

    "We are of the clear opinion that there should (adopting the terminology of the Consultation Paper) be a Deputy President who will (as now) almost invariably preside over the panel of which he is a member, participate in decisions on the composition of panels and discharge the duties of the President if he is for any reason unable to do so. The importance of these functions in our opinion requires that the office be underpinned by statute."[93]

69. We note that the Law Lords feel the need to have such an office provided for by statute.

Relationship between Supreme Court and Parliament

MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

70. The relationship between the Supreme Court and Parliament is a complex question and in many ways goes to the heart of the division of opinion between those who regard the system as needing to be changed and those who think that it should be allowed to remain essentially unchanged. Up to now, the office of Lord Chancellor has provided a formal and informal means of communication between the judiciary, government and Parliament. Membership of the House of Lords in the case of the most senior judges has ensured that on various levels the views of the judiciary have been provided with a forum within Parliament. With the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, the separation of the Supreme Court from the House of Lords and a bar on all judges from sitting in the House of Lords there will be no institutional connection between the judges and Parliament.

71. One aspect which makes discussion of this subject difficult is the unresolved issue of reform of the House of Lords. If the House of Lords were to become wholly elected then clearly membership for judges would be inappropriate. As Lord Hope of Craighead said:

72. Various witnesses referred to the work of the Law Lords in the House of Lords, in particular in chairing the Legal Sub-committee of the European Committee.[95] The government acknowledged in the Consultation paper that this had been valuable work, but pointed out that this was work which other eminent lawyers who were members of the House of Lords could carry out.[96]

73. The Law Lords thought that there was no doubt that, in the past, the House of Lords had valued and profited from contributions made, particularly on matters relating to the administration of justice, by holders of high judicial office.[97] Their opinion was divided as to whether there should be a continuing link between the new court and the House of Lords by virtue of some of the Supreme Court judges being members of the House. Some identified particular holders of judicial office as being candidates for membership of the House of Lords in order to give Parliament the benefit of their experience especially in matters relating to the administration of justice.[98] Others prefer to maintain the absolute independence of the two institutions.[99]

74. The Government's view is that :

    "On balance, [….] it would be better to sever completely any connection between the Court and the House of Lords. It therefore proposes that members of the Court should lose the right to sit and vote in the House while they are members of the Court. Any one who is a member of the House before joining the Court will retain the peerage and title, and will be free to return to the House when he or she ceases to sit on the Court. This will give the House the continued benefit, which it very much values, of the experience of the retired Law Lords."[100]

75. Future members of the new Court will not necessarily be able to retire as members of the House of Lords. It is the Government's intention to re-examine the:

    "present presumption that the holders of certain judicial offices should be granted peerages and thus be made members of the House of Lords."[101]

Further, it asks the question whether there should be a presumption that all former members of the new court be appointed as members of the House of Lords after they retire.[102] It goes further and questions whether all holders of high judicial office should automatically lose their right to sit and vote in the House of Lords while they sit as judges.[103]

76. Witnesses were split on this issue. For example, JUSTICE thought that members of the new court should cease to be members of the House of Lords and that there should be no presumption that retired members of the new court should be given peerages, although it recognised that the House of Lords might miss the expertise provided by the Law Lords, particularly in some of its committee work, and stated that it would be important that the Upper House retain access to senior and experienced lawyers.

77. The Bar Council has agreed with the consultation paper that the Law Lords make a valuable contribution to the work of select committees, identifying the European Communities Committee as an example, and also acknowledges the value of the judicial contribution to debates. It nonetheless suggests that there are other methods by which the views of the higher judiciary could be made known, and notes that awarding a peerage to a judicial office holder by virtue of that office, when he could neither sit nor vote during the currency of that office would create an anomaly.[104]

78. The Law Society also accept that there should be a bar on all holders of all high judicial office sitting and voting in the House of Lords. It has suggested that:

    "….. consideration should be given to a mechanism by which members of the Supreme Court could make their expertise available to the legislative process, but without engaging in the political debate or decision making of the day. This might be a mechanism by which the Government would seek the comments of the members of the Supreme Court on white and green papers on issues affecting the exercise of legal rights or the administration of justice in any way. The comment of the Court could be provided collectively and could be made available to Parliamentarians but would not be binding on the Government in any way".

79. The question of institutional links with Parliament and the Government is extremely important. As Lord Hope emphasised in his evidence to the Committee, the membership of a larger unit (i.e. Parliament) at present given to members of the Appellate Committee meant that he was able to keep in touch with a wider range of people, including Scots Members of Parliament.[105]

80. From the point of view of preserving the reality and appearance of judicial independence, there are dangers in introducing a system which involves exercising patronage in favour of specific individual judges. On balance we would prefer all judges in the Supreme Court to be made peers upon retirement, subject to the question of further reform of the House of Lords. However, if that option is not followed, then none of them should be made peers.

ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT

81. In addition to the need to maintain links and understanding between the various parts of the constitutional machinery, it will be necessary for the new court to be accountable to Parliament for the use of the public money given to it and for the general discharge of its duties. There needs to be some element of political accountability for the operation of the system as opposed to accountability for decisions. There is a wide range of possibilities for maintaining some institutional link between the new court and Parliament. As a minimum we would expect the new court to provide an Annual Report to Parliament of the use of the money in its budget and a description of its work over the course of the year. If necessary, Parliament should be ready to hold hearings relating to the financial support required by the new court. The general work of the Judicial Appointments Commission responsible for recommending appointments to the new court will also fall to be examined by this Committee (though not normally its conduct in relation to specific appointments).

82. The Department's Consultation Paper raised the possibility of enhancing the status of the members of the Court by establishing confirmation hearings before one or other of the Houses of Parliament. This could, it argued, help to ensure that Parliament had confidence in the Judiciary. This was the view of Sir Thomas Legg, former Permanent Secretary in the Lord Chancellor's Department[106] and of Professor Robert Hazell.[107]

83. The consultation paper dismissed this option, concluding that:

    'The Government sees difficulty in such a procedure. MPs and lay peers would not necessarily be competent to assess the appointees' legal or judicial skills. If the intention was to assess their more general approach to issues of public importance, this would be inconsistent with the move to take the Supreme Court out of the potential political arena. One of the main intentions of the reform is to emphasise and enhance the independence of the Judiciary from both the executive and Parliament. Giving Parliament the right to decide or have a direct influence on who should be the members of the Court would cut right across that objective'.[108]

84. In her paper on the Supreme Court, Dame Brenda Hale discusses the view on parliamentary confirmation hearings expressed in the Government consultation document. She argues that the paper states that the appointments should remain in the hands of a Minister accountable to Parliament and asks "what exactly does this mean". She goes on to state that:

    "So far as I am aware, neither the Prime Minister nor the Lord Chancellor is ever questioned in the House about individual appointments. The Consultation paper on judicial appointments is careful to refer to Ministerial accountability to Parliament 'for the judicial appointments process'. But it is only quite recently that the Lord Chancellor's department has had a Minister in the House of Commons, which is the true source of Parliamentary accountability unless and until the House of Lords becomes at least a partially elected body. It is even more recently that its work has become subject to select committee scrutiny in the same way as that of other departments. Yet I think it is important that the process of appointing judges, if not the individual appointments made, is subject to some sort of democratic accountability. Otherwise it will be more difficult to introduce innovation in criteria and procedures". [109]

85. We agree with the Government's view that confirmation hearings for judges would not be desirable.[110] That does not preclude a parliamentary Committee from seeking formal opportunities—from time to time—to meet Justices of the Supreme Court, including recently appointed ones. This Committee has done so. Following discussions with the Lord Chief Justice, we have been able to hold evidence sessions with members of the judiciary from almost every tier, including the Law Lords and the Lord Chief Justice. We have found these sessions very fruitful and we all believe that they are welcomed by the judiciary.[111]

86. The views of Judges on the role of the Supreme Court, approaches to broad questions of law, especially constitutional law and human rights and law reform are all matters of legitimate public interest. A constructive dialogue between Parliament and the UK's most senior judiciary need in no way undermine judicial independence. The Supreme Court itself has much to gain from such dialogue, especially if senior members of the judiciary cease to sit as peers in the House of Lords.

87. While we heard no convincing evidence to indicate that confirmation hearings would improve the process of appointing senior judges, we recognise the potential benefits to public understanding of the role of the new Supreme Court if a practice were to be adopted of inviting Judges, including recently appointed ones, to appear before an appropriate Committee from time to time (including this Committee).

Operational matters

CASE SELECTION

88. At present, appeals to the House of Lords from England and Wales and from Northern Ireland are by way of leave to appeal granted by the court below (rarely granted) or leave given by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords itself. The appellate Committee will hear civil and criminal appeals from England and Wales as well as Northern Ireland; as discussed above,[112] appeal from Scotland lies only in civil matters. The House of Lords also hears appeals from the Courts-Martial Appeal Court. Usually, the House of Lords chooses its own cases from among those appealed. Applications for leave to appeal are heard by the Appeal Committee, which is made up of three Law Lords. This Committee also considers any other interlocutory matters relating to the case.

89. The Consultation Paper invited views on whether the appeals procedure should be entirely a matter for the new court to determine. This would remove the right of the Court of Appeal to determine that a matter should be heard by the highest court of appeal. It would also remove the automatic right of appeal from Scotland in civil cases where two counsel certify that there is a suitable ground of appeal.

90. We have already discussed the matter of Scottish appeals above.[113] As far as removing the right of the Court of Appeal to give leave to appeal is concerned, the Consultation Paper sets out the argument for change as being that :

    "…such a general rule would give the Supreme Court the control it needs over its own caseload, and would enable it to develop its own policies and approach about the categories and importance of the cases on which it should rule. It would enable it to work out where it sees its greatest added value and concentrate on developing jurisprudence in the areas which most need it. It would also bring the Court broadly into line with other English-speaking Supreme Courts."[114]

91. The Law Lords opinion is:

    "The lower courts in England and Wales and Northern Ireland are very sparing in granting leave, recognising that the Appellate Committee is almost always better placed to decide whether leave should be given or not. But there are cases of obvious urgency when the lower court judges that an Appeal Committee is likely to grant leave, and in such a case leave may be given to avoid a needless waste of time. There are other cases where the lower court may have good reason to think that the final court should consider (or reconsider) a question. This is a valuable discretion. In our collective experience leave is very rarely given by the lower court in cases where the Appellate Committee feels it should not have been given. Appeals as of right are infrequent. The present system works well. We see no reason to alter it."[115]

ADMINISTRATION, FUNDING AND SUPPORT

92. The new court will be without precedent in the United Kingdom. It will require a completely new set of arrangements for its administration which recognise its absolute need for independence and its United Kingdom role. It is not an English court and the administrative and funding arrangements cannot be part of the English courts system, a danger pointed out by Lord Hope in the passage quoted above.[116]

93. It is vital that the administrative arrangements for the new court reflect the two priorities of judicial independence and the fact that it is a United Kingdom court. At the same time, the new court must be accountable for the public money at its disposal.

94. At present, the Appellate Committee is funded through the House of Lords and its administrative support is provided by the House's administration under the Clerk of the Parliaments. The new court will need a new funding system.

95. The Government's proposal is that the administration and resources should come within the responsibility of the Department for Constitutional Affairs.[117] It argues that, although the Department is responsible for the courts in England and Wales it is able to administer the United Kingdom responsibilities when circumstances demand it. It already administers some tribunals which have responsibility which goes beyond England and Wales. In addition, the Government points out that it is the Department which has a United Kingdom responsibility for constitutional matters. The Government argues that establishment of a United Kingdom court by statute would mean that the jurisdiction of the court would be sufficiently clearly defined for the separation of the Court from the English and Welsh system to be guaranteed, in compliance with the Act of Union.[118]

96. There are two problems with this solution. The first problem: this fails to address the concerns of those operating in Scotland and Northern Ireland. If the new court is to be a court which represents all legal traditions in the United Kingdom equally, it cannot be seen to be run by one (the largest) of the jurisdictions that make up the United Kingdom legal framework. Lord Hope of Craighead emphasised the concerns of those brought up on the Scottish legal tradition about anything that might tend to dilute the Scottish legal identity.[119] Lord Bingham was absolutely clear that the new court:

    "…which is not of course an English and Welsh court and therefore cannot be and should not be administered by the Court Service of England and Wales, should have its own staff and employees and should have its own budget."[120]

97. The second problem relates to judicial independence. An explanation of the reason for giving a Government department responsibility for administering the new court was given by Sir Thomas Legg, former Permanent Secretary at the Lord Chancellor's Department:

    "……….. resources come from the House of Commons. It is they—you—who vote them to the judicial branch of government just as you do to every other branch of government. Historically, for good reasons, I think, the House of Commons has never been willing to vote significant resources to the stewardship of people that it cannot in the last resort dismiss. Judges cannot be dismissible by the legislature except for good grounds, which one hopes will have nothing to do with disagreements about the way resources are used. Therefore, for the protection of the judges and not for any other reason I have always thought that we ought to be very cautious about entrusting significant resources to the judges alone. I think they should be in the hands of a minister accountable to Parliament."[121]

98. An alternative approach is that the new court should have an independent corporate status. This would mean that the Supreme Court would formulate its annual budget and present it to Parliament. It would receive its funds directly from the Consolidated Fund. Professor Ian Scott gave evidence to the Committee on this point:

    "….. if you look at the proposal in the consultation paper about the administration of the new court, it does not seem to me to be satisfactory because if you are going to be serious about having a Supreme Court which is independent, it pays to do everything you can, consistent with good government, to make it safe. My argument simply is that one way of making it so would be to make it responsible for its own administration. As I say in my paper ………..this is not accomplished entirely in one bound by arguments based on constitutional principle. You can argue forever on the basis of the concepts of separation of powers, rule of law and judicial independence and still not come to any conclusion as to how the court should be funded or administered. It is really a matter of good government, and good government is a matter of sustaining, sometimes just by image as much as by rules, independence of the court."[122]

99. The Law Lords unanimously regard it as essential that:

    "….a new Supreme Court should enjoy corporate independence in the sense used by Professor Ian Scott in his response to the Consultation Paper. The new court will be a United Kingdom court and cannot be appropriately administered by the Court Service of England and Wales. It must have its own budget, settled in a manner which protects the court from political pressure. It must have its own Registrar, answerable to the court, its own staff and its own IT facilities. The independence of the judges requires not only that they be free of extraneous pressure but also that the court be institutionally free of administrative pressure. In Australia, a one-line budget is agreed annually between the High Court's chief executive officer and the attorney-general, and a similar arrangement would be appropriate here."[123]

100. Clearly the new court must be seen to be independent. We take Professor Scott's point that the reality of day to day administration is as important for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary as any theory. The argument that Parliament should be able to dismiss all those to whom it votes money is ingenious, if theoretical—there is no prospect of a minister in modern political circumstances being dismissed by Parliament. The ordinary reality of having independence in managing the affairs of the new court is more important. Close attention should be paid to the Australian system, which preserves independence of the High Court within a parliamentary tradition similar to the one in the United Kingdom. The Department of Constitutional Affairs is not the appropriate organization to run the new court because it is too associated with the England and Wales court system and because giving the Government control over the administration of the new court could offend against the principle of judicial independence.

NAMES AND TITLES

101. A major aim of the proposed changes is an attempt to improve public perception of the judicial system and to increase general understanding of how the system works. If this is to be achieved, the title of the new court is not to be misleading. It is not a United Kingdom court, as far as its jurisdiction goes. The name "Supreme Court" is not a happy choice. Leaving aside the consideration that it partly replicates the formal title Supreme Court of Judicature of England and Wales, it also suggests that in some way it will act as a Supreme Court along the lines of the U.S. model or of other jurisdictions where the Supreme court is a constitutional court which may strike down laws that are held to be inconsistent with the constitution. This will not be the function of the new court.

102. We took some evidence on the titles of the members of the new court. The final choice depends to a great extent on personal taste, but again, the titles should be clear and distinctive from the titles of other members of the judiciary in each of the three jurisdictions. At the same time, they should reflect some of the joint traditions within the legal systems of the United Kingdom.

ACCOMMODATION

103. JUSTICE has indicated in its response to the consultation that it is extremely concerned at the issue of resources, since the severance of the Supreme Court from the Upper House would bring considerable additional cost. It states that:

It goes on to emphasise that:

    'Suitable accommodation will be costly and will need to be of a higher quality and extent than currently available'.

104. In a November 2002 paper,[124] JUSTICE complains that the current Appellate Committee of the House of Lords occupies a cramped corridor in the Palace of Westminster. It states that this accommodation is not conducive to public accessibility and that there is no room for any support staff, as is usually enjoyed by a court at such a level. It argues that the creation of a Supreme Court would with its own building would:

    'Afford a valuable opportunity to make the court system more open and transparent to the general public'.

105. This stance has been challenged. In a paper issued in January 2003[125] Lord Cooke of Thorndon states that:

    'Like most of the offices in the Palace of Westminster, the rooms of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are not spacious. But the accommodation, secretarial services, computers and so forth are not seriously inadequate. In any event grumbling about the facilities would seem in themselves hardly a sufficient reason for changing the constitutional functions of the Law Lords'.

106. The new court, as the Consultation paper recognises, will need new accommodation outside the House of Lords.[126] The Paper goes no further than this, apart from saying that the Law Lords will be consulted as to their precise accommodation needs and that:

    "There are a number of options which might be suitable, and a detailed business case will need to be drawn up and costed before any firm proposals can be made. This work will be undertaken in parallel with this consultation exercise".[127]

107. The court might have as its base a building in central London, or its base might be in a city outside the capital in order to reflect the United Kingdom nature of the court or it might even sit regularly in various parts of the Kingdom, while maintaining a permanent administrative base.

108. The Law Lords' view is that:

    "…we are at one in regarding it as essential that a new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, if established, should be properly accommodated and resourced, and equipped with the facilities it will need to discharge its public duties to the best possible effect. The Consultation Paper eschews any detailed consideration of this fundamental aspect. While some preliminary thought has, we appreciate, been given to the accommodation which a Supreme Court will require, no business plan has to our knowledge been prepared and no estimate of cost made. The building in which the Court is housed must reflect the importance of the rule of law in a modem democracy; and it must afford the judges (plus their librarians, secretaries, judicial assistants, law reporters, press officer, IT staff; doorkeepers and security staff) the resources and facilities they need."[128]

109. The argument of convenience, assuming that the new court judges remain members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy council, is that the court should be based in London. It will be necessary to give it a "proper building with proper facilities and support services, appropriate to the influence, both historic and continuing, of the United Kingdom's legal system in shaping the law and legal systems elsewhere in the world and our continuing economic and political standing."[129]

110. The choice of site for the new court will be very difficult. Of the two possible venues mentioned in evidence to the Committee, Middlesex Guildhall was flatly dismissed by Lord Bingham, the Senior Law Lord, as being unsuitable because of its layout which English Heritage would be unlikely to allow to be altered.[130] He said that he attached "very considerable importance" to the building in which the court is to be housed and that he wanted:

    "to preserve the ambiance of our existing hearings. In other words I would not want a court which sat half way up the wall with litigants in pews way below, as is the normal pattern of courts. I would want to preserve the horseshoe table with counsel very close and on the same level and a lack of formality, in dress at any rate, on our part, because I think it is an extraordinarily good medium for discussion".[131]

Lord Hope said of Somerset House that he was concerned about being drawn back to The Strand, closer to the Inns of Court, which would tend to strengthen the English link.[132]

111. Delay in finding and making available such accommodation has raised the possibility that the new Court might continue to sit in the House of Lords. Given that the principle argument is that the highest court should be seen to be separate from the legislature, it seems perverse to implement the change in a way which leaves many of the same judges sitting in the House of Lords doing the same job in the same place, possibly with the same staff seconded by the House of Lords. If more time is needed to establish the Court as a distinct body, the timing of its introduction should be adjusted accordingly. Such an important change should not be rushed.

112. In the nineteenth century the great reform of the courts system involved the removal of the courts from Westminster Hall, their historic home for centuries, to the Royal Courts of Justice in the Strand. The new court of final appeal for the United Kingdom requires a building which is functionally effective, but which also reflects its authority and significance.


17   See Scotland Act 1998, s.103(1), Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.82(1), Government of Wales Act 1998, Sched 8, para 32(b) Back

18   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, p 8 Back

19   ibid, para 34 Back

20   ibid, para 3 Back

21   HL Deb, 22 June 2000, col 419 Back

22   Q 204 Back

23   ibid Back

24   Qq 336ff; Sir Robert Carswell was appointed to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords since giving evidence to the Committee Back

25   Lords Nicholls, Hoffmann, Hope, Hutton, Millett, Rodger Back

26   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

27   Lords Bingham, Steyn, Saville, Walker Back

28   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

29   DCA Consultation Paper CP11/03, para 23 Back

30   ibid, para 24 Back

31   Q 296 Back

32   Q 561 Back

33   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 19 Back

34   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 21 Back

35   ibid, para 20 Back

36   Published in November 2002 Back

37   County Properties Ltd v Scottish Ministers 2000 S.L.T 965 and R (on the application of Holding and Barnes Plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23 (otherwise known as Re: Alconbury Developments), in which the House of Lords considered the legality of the system whereby the Secretary of State was entitled to call in applications for planning permission for his own determination Back

38   i.e. relating to the composition of the court-see para 40 below Back

39   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

40   Up to 28 January 2004, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council published judgments in twelve devolution hearings, all of them relating to Scotland: one in 2003; three in 2002; five in 2001; and three in 2000. A judge other than the Lords of Appeal of Ordinary sat in two of these hearings. In December 2000 Lord Kirkwood, a judge of the Second Division of the Inner House, sat in Stott (Procurator Fiscal) v Brown [2003] 1 A.C. 681 (on a panel including the two Scottish Law Lords). In July 2002 Lord McKay of Clashfern, the former Lord Chancellor, sat in Mills v HM Advocate (No.2) [2002] UKPC D2; [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1597 (on a panel including one of the Scottish Law Lords, the other-Lord Rodger of Earlsferry-being disqualified having sat in the case in the court below prior to his appointment as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) Back

41   R. v. Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Granada Television Limited [2000]2W.L.R.1, 5 Back

42   This is based on the 1689 Scottish Claim of Right, by which the right to appeal to the King in Parliament from the judgment of the Court of Session was established Back

43   The leave requirement was introduced for appeals from courts in England and Wales by the Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act 1934. Looking back at the parliamentary debates in 1934 on the Bill, it seems likely that Scottish civil litigation was excluded from the leave requirement not for any reason of principle, but through oversight or lack of parliamentary time in the House of Commons. Mr Milne, a Scottish MP, said: ". . . I scan the Bill and scan it vain to find any reference whatever to the Court of Session in Scotland. The compelling reasons which constrained the Committee [presided over by the Master of the Rolls] to make their recommendations apply with fourfold force to the case of the Court of Session" (Hansard HC vol 291 cols 1531-1533). The Solicitor-General indicated that the matter would be considered, but it is not clear whether this was done and if so to what effect. See A. Le Sueur, 'Panning for Gold: Choosing Cases for Top-level Court', chap 12 in A. Le Sueur, Building the UK's New Supreme Court: National and Comparative Perspectives, OUP, 2004 forthcoming Back

44   DCA Consultation Paper CP11/03, para 26 Back

45   ibid, para 27 Back

46   Lord President Reid Professor of Law, University of Edinburgh Back

47   Professor Gretton's response to CP 11/03  Back

48   DCA Consultation paper CP 11/03, para 56 Back

49   i.e. in respect of hearing devolution cases-see para 29 above Back

50   Law Lords' response to the CP 11/03 Back

51   Lords Nicholls, Steyn, Millett, Walker Back

52   Lords Bingham, Hope, Saville, Rodger Back

53   Law Lords' response to the CP 11/03 Back

54   Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, s.5 Back

55   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 31 Back

56   Law Lords' response to the CP 11/03 Back

57   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 32 Back

58   The current Scottish members are Lords Hope of Craighead and Rodger of Ealsferry Back

59   The Law Society response to CP 11/03, A Supreme Court of Stature and Independence, p 8 Back

60   The Law Society of Scotland's response to CP 11/03 Back

61   The Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

62   ibid Back

63   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 48 Back

64   The Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

65   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 39 Back

66   See e.g. Council of Circuit Judges and Association of District Judges response to CP 11/03 and Q 382 ; see also paragraphs [147 to 153] below Back

67   In evidence Sir Thomas Legg took it to mean "published" applications. Ev 117, para 10 Back

68   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 44 Back

69   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 40 Back

70   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 41 Back

71   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03, Question 11 Back

72   See e.g. JUSTICE's response to CP 11/03 Back

73   Bar Council's response to CP 11/03 Back

74   ibid Back

75   Q 329 Back

76   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 43 Back

77   ibid Back

78   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 38 Back

79   See e.g. JUSTICE'sresponse to CP 11/03 Back

80   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03, Questions 6, 11 and 12 Back

81   ibid Back

82   Ev 108 Para 3(b) Back

83   ibid Back

84   Giving Radcliffe, Reid and Mackay (during his period as a Lord of Appeal) as examples Back

85   Q 63; and see Q 177 [Lady Justice Hale] Back

86   Bar Council's response to CP 11/03 Back

87   The Law Society's response to CP 11/03 Back

88   When she gave evidence to the Committee Dame Brenda Hale had just been appointed to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Before she was appointed to the High Court she had been an academic lawyer in the University of Manchester for eighteen years Back

89   Dame Brenda Hale's response to CP 11/03, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom Back

90   ibid, p 9 Back

91   The United Kingdom Association of Women Judges' response to CP 11/03, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, p 1 Back

92   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 33 Back

93   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03, Question 5 Back

94   Q 283 Back

95   See e.g. Q 235; and see Report of the Wakeham Commission: "A House for the Future", January 2000 (Cm 4534) Back

96   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 57 Back

97   Law Lords' response to the CP 11/03, Question 8 Back

98   Lords Nicholls, Hope, Hutton, Hobhouse, Millett, Scott, Rodger, Walker Back

99   Lords Bingham, Steyn, Hoffmann, Saville Back

100   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 36 Back

101   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 37 Back

102   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 36 Back

103   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 37 Back

104   Bar Council's response to CP 11/03, paras 20 and 22 Back

105   Q 294 Back

106   Ev 117, para 13 Back

107   Director of the Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London; Ev 121-122 Back

108   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 45 Back

109   Dame Brenda Hale's response to CP 11/03, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, p 10 Back

110   This was also the view of various witnesses: e.g. Sir Colin Campbell, Q 56ff; and the Law Society and Bar Council Q 137ff Back

111   This Committee in relation to its present inquiry heard evidence from, among others, Dame Brenda Hale, Sir Robert Carswell, Lord Bingham, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. Another example of the appearance of judges as witnesses is in the Committee's inquiry into Asylum and Immigration Appeals Back

112   See para 29ff above Back

113   See para 29ff above Back

114   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 55 Back

115   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03, Question 20 Back

116   See para 25 above Back

117   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 64 Back

118   ibid Back

119   Q 296 Back

120   Q 449 Back

121   Q 250 Back

122   Q 246 Back

123   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

124   A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, para12, JUSTICE policy paper, November 2002 Back

125   'The Law Lords: An endangered heritage', Law Quarterly Review, January 2003 Back

126   DCA Consultation Paper CP 11/03, para 67 Back

127   ibid Back

128   Law Lords' response to CP 11/03 Back

129   Dame Brenda Hale's response to CP 11/03, p 1 Back

130   Q 454 Back

131   Q 453 Back

132   Q 279 Back


 
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