Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 161-179)

29 JUNE 2004

STEPHEN IRWIN QC AND ANDREW HALL QC

  Mr Soley: Good morning. Thank you very much for your attendance here this morning.

  Q161 Keith Vaz: Mr Hall, Mr Irwin, how, if at all, do you envisage that these proposals will impact upon the Bar?

  Mr Irwin: It is difficult to predict until you know exactly what form of means testing comes along. I do not think they will have a particular differential effect on the Bar. If the interest of justice test is applied rigorously by whomever, it is likely to knock out cases at the bottom end of the range of seriousness rather than the top and so that probably will not affect the Bar very much. If on the other hand we get a position where solicitors are operating a means test and are taking the hit if contributions are not made—so that you have a series of failures because of the means test—then that obviously would affect the Bar. It might mean that the Bar has to drop out of cases or people have to act free. I do not think there is a particular differential effect on the Bar of the means testing provisions other than that.

  Q162 Keith Vaz: Do you agree with that, Mr Hall?

  Mr Hall: Yes, I do. I think if the proposal that advocates are penalised if contributions are not paid is to put into effect then it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to find any advocates to appear in those circumstances, because, as we indicated in our short paper, it is one thing to apply that sort of provision if you have some mechanism for controlling what the client does and how the process operates, but if you have no mechanism, if you are just the person asked overnight to go and represent someone in a back of a beyond magistrates' court, it is wholly unreasonable and quite wrong to impose a financial effect by virtue of someone else's default, and I think the junior Bar would run away furiously from taking the risk in those cases.

  Q163 Keith Vaz: The means test currently proposed would, in some circumstances, apply in the Crown Court as well as the magistrates' court. Should the proposal to reintroduce the means testing be restricted to legal representation in the magistrates' court only? If so, why?

  Mr Hall: I think the basic principle the Bar supports is that those who can afford to pay should pay. There seems to be a reasonably effective mechanism in the crown court for the more serious cases for financial orders to be made at the conclusion of the proceedings. It is much more difficult in the magistrates' court where the volume is much greater and just the mechanics of requiring evicted people to pay contributions towards costs is much more complicated. My view, instinctively, is that it is better in the lower courts, with the greater volume of cases, to have the payment, as it were, in front rather than following on behind, whereas one can have a follow-on-behind system in the crown court with the larger cases. It seems to work reasonably well and I am inclined to approach these things on the basis that if it is working reasonably well one ought not to interfere with it.

  Mr Irwin: Could I respond by making a slightly different point, which is that it would be rational, if introducing a means test, to have a bottom-end cut off. It is not really our business, but there is not much point spending quite a lot of money investigating means in a case where the actual quantum of fees is very small. I think somebody ought to draw a guideline at the bottom end to say, "Below this anticipated cost, we will not bother with the means testing system because on average you will spend more money on the process than you would get back in the contributions." I think that makes commonsense.

  Q164 Peter Bottomley: Therefore not charge.

  Mr Irwin: Therefore not charge—well, not attempt to get means testing or contribution or whatever because it is pointless.

  Q165 Ross Cranston: I was going to ask you about the effect on courts of the increasing number of unrepresented defendants, but in fact we got your submission this morning and you address that point, that often you are creating more costs by not having representation in terms of the way the court operates. I do not know if you want to say any more about that.

  Mr Irwin: Just to emphasise it. We have seen it again and again in the public funding of legal aid that you only look at this little segment of the budget. Before we make any changes we should be looking at Group 4, the prisons, the Home Office, the probation service, the cost of adjournments—all of it together. I think that if you do the accounting exercise you will find that representation pays for itself far more often than you think, but you have to get beyond the legal aid budget to see that usually. Only the Treasury can do that job.

  Q166 Ross Cranston: Our acting Chairman asked some of the previous witnesses about the Human Rights Act possibilities. I do not know if you have any thoughts on that, whether you see these proposals as being subject to challenges.

  Mr Hall: I think one can see the areas in which challenges are likely to arise. For example, in multi-handed cases, if three defendants go to one solicitor who awards legal aid and another three go to another who does not consider that the test is passed, you have inconsistency in the award, and if there is any cut-throating in that case people are going to raise the level playing field issue and say that they are not being given a fair hearing. It is one thing for a court to be seized of this essentially judicial task of deciding what is in the interests of justice; it is quite another thing to delegate that responsibility either to an executive agency, which might apply the tests with financial considerations driving that decision, or to groups of independent practitioners who may be influenced by all sorts of considerations, not least commercial considerations.

  Q167 Ross Cranston: I think I accept the argument but I am not sure I go as far as you do in your written submission to say it is a constitutional point. It is a Legal Services Commission point. I certainly accept the thrust of what you say. Somebody else is going to ask you about the drivers of high cost case, but you mention in your written submission the Effective Trial Management Project process and you say that you hope that will address some of the issues. It really follows on from the point I put to the Law Society and the solicitors about the proposals coming from judges about greater case management and whether that can have any effect on cost.

  Mr Hall: We think it is a complicated issue. We believe that some of the major drivers are those which are affecting trial length in the more complicated cases.

  Q168 Ross Cranston: Could I ask you about the case management side. Do you think that that can have a significant effect on reducing cost?

  Mr Hall: It has to be considered. Some of the cost increase may be lawyer-driven, some may be process-driven and we are concerned to look at every possibility for reducing cost including tighter control of cases by the judges.

  Mr Irwin: You know we have initiated this process with the bench. The results have not yet been published but in due course will be, I hope—a whole series of proposals on Chatham House rules to see what will really work. Because we have a common interest: the one thing everybody wants to do is to reduce trial length if possible because we will get paid more realistically if we can shorten the trials. It is a tool but I think all those who were engaged in the process emphasised it is far from being a single magic bullet. Trial management can sometimes go wrong, it can sometimes create problems but mostly it will help.

  Q169 Ross Cranston: I think it would be quite useful if we could be kept informed about the process.

  Mr Irwin: Yes.

  Q170 Mr Soley: Before we move on, may I ask Mr Hall, if, to minimise the dangers of a Human Rights' challenge, you would presumably accept that an appeal to either a court or a tribunal would reduce that danger.

  Mr Hall: Yes, I do.

  Q171 Mr Clappison: You mentioned one or two things about what you see as the drivers of cost. We have heard evidence from the Law Society and solicitors earlier on how they see things from their perspective. I notice that in fact you are a former solicitor yourself as well. Do you have anything further to add to what you see as the position you are in today, as to what are the significant drivers of cost?

  Mr Hall: No. We entirely agree with the submissions which were made earlier by the Law Society. We only add this: there is much talk about the top 1% of cases, the top 1,000 cases, absorbing half the budget. If you take the top 1% and then slice that 1% up, you will find that the top half dozen cases—the top half dozen—account for about 25% of the criminal legal aid budget. That is where the concern ought to be directed. Those cases which are now visible in the Legal Services Commission data which we have now seen, do reinforce the sort of points which were made earlier about half a dozen or 10 major frauds or cases of that sort completely distorting the funding picture for any one year. In terms of long-term control over finances, you can work on a number of fronts to drive down costs, but you only need to get a couple more cases prosecuted in anyone year and there is no way of telling whether you have succeeded because the global costs will simply go up, the unit cost will go through the roof, and we will all think that we have failed dramatically, and it will simply have been a charging decision, completely out of our control.

  Mr Irwin: It is 0.01% of the cases equals 25% of the cost in the crown court.

  Q172 Peter Bottomley: 0.01%? One in one thousand?

  Mr Irwin: No, one in 10,000.

  Mr Hall: One in 100,000.

  Q173 Mr Clappison: We are talking about the budget for crown court legal aid there?

  Mr Irwin: Yes.

  Q174 Mr Clappison: Looking at it globally, the legal aid budget as a whole but excluding asylum, the figures we have been supplied with suggest that the top 1% of criminal cases account for 16% of the total legal aid budget. That is the whole of the legal aid system except for asylum. That is also a growing figure. In the last two years, there has been a growth of £18 million and it is a growing proportion within the overall total.

  Mr Irwin: Two or three things on that. You have to be careful with these figures all the time. I have seen the Law Society's table—I do not know whether that is what you are looking at—where the proportion of the top crown court cases is shown as rising from 50.6% to 57.4% of the crown court budget, but all these figures leave out the fact that civil proceedings have diminished within legal aid. If you treat it as a proportion, it is not only a growth in crime and a growth in top crime, all personal injury has come out over the same period, clinical negligence has diminished greatly because of the rationalisation and narrowing, so the proportions do not always tell you very much.

    The absolute growth also does not tell you as easily what you might want to know because during the relevant period we have gone from entirely ex post facto payment, payment after the event, to a position where some of these big cases have been paid before they begin. So you are having a cashflow clump come into it, the older cases paid two years late and the newer cases paid before they begin or as you go along, so even in terms of the raw growth it is probably overstated. However, we all agree the underlying pattern which is that cases have got longer because of the Human Rights Act, the PII applications, disclosure, all sorts of causes like that, and we suggest, all of us, that that is the sensible explanation and changing patterns. But until somebody actually does the proper measure and gets beneath the skin of this, we will not know properly where it lies.

  Q175 Mr Clappison: The figures I was quoting to you were for the year 2001-02 to the year 2003-04 and, as I said, it was for the whole of the legal aid budget which showed a growth of £80 million. I have not got the figures going back any earlier than that to see if there was any distortion caused by the time in which payments were made, but perhaps that could be obtained for the Committee. Could I ask you about one other factor which I have to ask you about and which you did not mention in that list of factors which may explain the increase in the cost of the top 100%. What about the fees which are paid to QCs?

  Mr Irwin: Everybody focuses on this because of front pages and headlines. There is no evidence that the fees paid to barristers, including QCs, has risen in real terms over that time. Until the cost drivers are stripped out, I do not accept that. For most of that time you had exactly the same discipline, the level of fees paid to barristers in these big cases with increasing discipline as the contracting regime has bitten in. Even if there has been some growth in those fees, it is a matter of history now because as of last week we are into, as you probably know, the extension of graduated fees up to 40 days, we are into contracting for all of the biggest cases, including the top 0.01%, whatever that is, one in 10,000 or one in whatever, so if that factor is there, and it is unproven, it will not be there for the future because we have got control of that.

  Q176 Mr Soley: When you used the term "front page", you recognise in effect that there is public concern, even if some of it is exaggerated in some of the newspapers. Do you feel that it is wholly unfair, wholly unreasonable?

  Mr Irwin: Mr Soley, if I am not fed up with our own stereotype by now, I certainly will be by the end of this year. It is a stereotype.

  Q177 Mr Soley: But some stereotypes are based on some realities.

  Mr Irwin: Yes, and many are not. In this instance I do not know until I see all the figures whether there are some people who have earned more than anybody would expect, but I do know that when I have in the past seen lists of the 10 top earners, if you strip away what those 10 top people in the country in a year have earned, you find that they have got two or three years' income clumped into one year. You have to remember that these figures are the turnover of a business, not the income of a person, and in the end when you break it down, I have not yet found a situation where somebody in the criminal field is earning more than you would expect a top medical consultant to earn or a permanent secretary or whatever; you are in that sort of same group.

  Mr Hall: We have been through this exercise in the Fundamental Legal Aid Review where the whole comparative exercise with other people in the public funding sector, particularly hospital consultants, has been gone through in minute detail and where we have gone through that exercise, including in that venue, the figures for criminal barristers and other publicly funded barristers at a senior level come out at broadly the same as a medical consultant in the National Health Service. We do not think that is an unreasonable position. Of course if you ignore the overheads of barristers, if you leave the VAT in and you choose those barristers who for one reason or another have got two or three years' turnover received in one year because government pay is so slow, then you can make those silly "Fat Cat" headlines that we earn in the Bar quite so much and mislead the public.

  Q178 Keith Vaz: Are you saying that QCs are not paid enough?

  Mr Irwin: No, I am not saying that at all. I am defending the QCs, because it is always the QCs who get the attack, against this stereotype that they are fat cats. I have got a collection of cartoons at home which relate QCs to fat cats time and time again.

  Q179 Keith Vaz: But you know a lot of QCs and there are no fat cats?

  Mr Irwin: There are some fat cats, those in the private Bar, but they are not paid by you. If you break down even the top 10 earners in criminal and civil from public funds, you can explain why and I am not embarrassed by what they receive in the end. Three years ago the DCA, the LCD as it was, decided that they wanted to compare the top-earning silks with judges on the basis that the silks in front of the judges were paid far more but by the time they analysed the figures they had removed the comparison from the paper which they were making because the judges' package was better than what the silks were getting.


 
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