Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-185)

29 JUNE 2004

STEPHEN IRWIN QC AND ANDREW HALL QC

  Q180 Mr Clappison: I do not want to lose this point about this top half dozen or top ten cases. What are they? Are they serious fraud prosecutions or customs prosecutions? Are they confined to those cases?

  Mr Hall: They tend to be either fraud or customs. They are multi-handed and they are frequently conspiracies involving a number of defendants. The reason we know about them now whereas we did not have the hard evidence before is that the Legal Services Commission has now completed, as one might imagine, a number of contracts and the data is available. The Bar's economist, amongst its other people, has analysed the data and what has struck him with enormous force, and I think also it has had resonance in the Legal Services Commission, is how few cases we are talking about and how the unit cost increase that worries everyone is focused on as few as half a dozen to 10 cases a year, completely distorting the picture.

  Q181 Mr Clappison: If you have done your own analysis of that, that would be quite valuable for us to have, apart from the Legal Services Commission analysis.

  Mr Irwin: I think our statistician is a bit concerned as to the extent of the detail base he has got so far, so we may give it to you, but then renew it as he gets more figures.

  Q182 Mr Soley: Although we have had an interesting diversion, on the question of QCs' fees, how much does the Department accept your argument that it is all stereotyped and seriously exaggerated?

  Mr Irwin: Well, I went to see Mr Boateng, so never mind the Department, I went to the Chief Secretary and he said that he was not going to take the stereotype and he accepted that there was a stereotype and that was not his business. What the Department accept privately may be very different from what they accept to me publicly across a table, so I am not sure I can help you terribly much. They still go on about fees, but the energy and enjoyment with which they used to mount this charge is diminishing.

  Q183 Ross Cranston: Could I move on to a different subject and ask you how you would respond if you were expected to be partially responsible for the collection of contributions. Is that a runner or not?

  Mr Hall: No, it would be a complete disaster for the reasons I have spelt out in the note. I do not know whether I need to expand on those. It is really a question for the barrister of having absolutely no control, no mechanism by which contributions can be enforced by the advocate and probably no knowledge of what has gone before and a code of practice prohibiting in any event a barrister handling clients' money, so you can have no effect on it. The notion that a barrister who is paid £70 for doing a plea of mitigation should discover two or three weeks later that that is going to be taken away because the client did not pay their contributions is, we think, unreasonable and grossly unfair.

  Ross Cranston: So it is a complete non-runner?

  Mr Hall: I think it is a complete non-runner.

  Mr Irwin: There is another reason which is that the whole point of having a barrister coming in very often, particularly in the criminal context, is to persuade the clients that they are getting an independent voice, advising about plea, advising about how the case is going. If you then land that person in a one-stage wrangle about whether the defendant has made the contributions he should, you rob the whole relationship of its authority and of its independence; you completely destroy that relationship.

  Q184 Mr Soley: If the LSC were to bear the risk, what incentive would there be for solicitors or barristers to encourage clients to pay contributions if they covered the risk of non-collection?

  Mr Irwin: Well, the barrister cannot encourage the client to pay the contribution. As we have just said, there is no opportunity for us to exercise that control. Presumably the LSC would be able to monitor the patterns of collection in the hands of a given firm of solicitors. You would have to be careful about that, but subject to being careful about it and thinking about differences of culture and different places, if you found that a particular solicitor was a terribly bad collector, then that would be something which could be raised. You would not do it on a case-by-case basis, but on a pattern. That is the only way that you can tie together the solicitor's interest and the success in collection.

  Q185 Mr Soley: Are there any other matters which you would like to raise or put before us?

  Mr Hall: Only this: that we do want to emphasise that to place that administrative burden upon hard-pressed criminal solicitor practitioners might prove to be the straw that broke the camel's back. They are under enormous pressure, financial, overwhelmed by bureaucracy, and this is another step in that direction which makes all the practitioners I know absolutely despair.

  Mr Irwin: We are seeing real pressure on criminal solicitors and it is not a matter of our interest, but a matter of seeing recruitment now being very difficult, seeing the provider base really under pressure on the ground with the solicitors dealing with crime. I think this could be, as Andy says, the final twist for some of those people giving up in despair.

  Mr Soley: Thank you very much indeed.





 
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