Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Written Evidence


Evidence submitted by Danny Simpson, Howells Solicitors

1.  REASONS FOR RISE IN GROSS CRIMINAL LEGAL AID EXPENDITURE

    (a)

    Expenditure under the CDS budget is bound to exceed that under the "Criminal Legal Aid" budget pre 1 April 2001 (before the introduction of contracting) because the contract re-defined work which had been counted as "civil" into the criminal contract. This includes advice and assistance to prisoners, which before contracting had been claimed as "legal help" and claimed under what is now the CLS budget. Likewise, applications to a High Court Judge in Chambers for bail and appeals by way of case stated. Therefore CDS expenditure will have increased over what was previously counted as criminal legal aid because elements of what was civil legal aid were now counted against CDS expenditure.

    (b)

    Because of abolition of the means test. In this regard it is to be noted that although the cost of collection of contributions under the old system outweighed the contributions collected, in many cases defendants with means would not apply since they were clearly ineligible. The abolition of the means test inevitably resulted in the grant of representation orders to persons with means who previously would not even have applied. Professional rules require that Defendants are offered the option of applying for legal aid rather than paying privately and this has resulted in a net decrease in income for solicitors as otherwise solicitors would have charged privately at higher rates.

    (c)

    Since the contract's introduction there as been a constant increase in the scope of CDS work to provide representation in proceedings which simply didn't exist previously notably:

      (i)

Representation in proceedings for ASBOs (where there has been significant pressure on local authorities and police forces to increase the number of applications).

      (ii)

Representation in proceedings for prison disciplinary offences before visiting District Judges.

      (iii)

Sex Offender Orders, Football banning orders etc.

2.  CHANGES IN "COST PER CASE"

  The introduction of the Criminal Contract produced an artificial rise in the statistical cost per case because:

    (a)

    Each attendance at a police station by a solicitor in the course of an enquiry would have been billed separately and not in a composite bill at the end of the enquiry. Additionally "advice and assistance" would be billed separately.

    (b)

    Thus under the old system a police investigation involving three separate attendances and a claim for advice and assistance would have counted as four "acts of assistance" where as under the contract arrangements it would be billed as one "investigation stage" bill. This has the effect on CDS statistics of reducing the number of acts of assistance and increasing the average cost.

    (c)

    Similar considerations applied in the proceedings case where previously there could be three separate claims , advice and assistance, early first hearings and the claim under a legal aid order, all of which under the contract are subsumed into one investigation stage bill.

    (d)

    Additionally some matters which were previously treated as separate cases for standard fee purposes are now treated as one—eg breaches of court orders which are disposed of at the same hearing.

3.  REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF REPRESENTATION ORDERS BY MAGISTRATES COURTS

    (a)

    The abolition of the means test resulted in people who were financially ineligible previously and who would not have been granted an order now receiving one.

    (b)

    Court computer software which generates a representation order for each case number, where previously manually generated representation orders would have included offences with more than one computer case number.

    (c)

    An increase of the likelihood of receiving custody. The risk of loss of liberty has risen substantially as is witnessed by the increase in prison sentences.

    (d)

    Human rights act considerations.

    (e)

    Greater awareness of victims has resulted in orders being granted to avoid cross-examination of alleged victims in person by the alleged assailant.

4.  OTHER COSTS DRIVERS

    (a)

    S51 CDA transfers to the crown court result in many cases being transferred which would previously have been discharged in the magistrates' court following a plea bargain, a discontinuance or discharge at committal. Increased costs result through the instruction of Counsel in the Crown Court.

    (b)

    Although recorded crime has fallen in many categories prosecutions for serious offences, particularly violence and sexual offences has risen.

    (c)

    Government policies eg over domestic assaults (insisting on continuing even where complainants retract) mean more prosecutions continue to trial. Similar considerations apply to "closing the justice gap" which results in pursuing prosecutions after someone has been sentenced to prison for a subsequent offence where previously this would not have been considered to be in the public interest.

5.  VHCCS

  LSC figures in the most expensibe 1% of cases which now account for over 50% of the budget. There are issues about whether:

    (a)

    They are appropriately prosecuted. The sentences on conviction for offences even of "serious frauds" (the costs of which to the CDS buget are in the millions) are well below the sentences imposed for eg street robbery and low level class A drug supply which cost only some hundreds of pounds per case. Some effort hast to be made to bring the costs of these prosecutions into line with the harm done and the likely loss of liberty. Much of the public interest in these prosecutions derives from the importance of maintaining the financial integrity and probity of the City of London—should there be a separate levy on financial institutions to pay for these prosecutions?

    (b)

    The introduction of the Serious Fraud Panel to maintain "quality" (with little evidence that it does) may have had anti-competitive results.

    (c)

    The manner in which a prosecution is conducted significantly effects the cost to the CDS eg by serving thousands of un-indexed unsorted documents, something for which the prosecution takes no responsibility. If the defence costs for SFO cases were financially attributable to the SFO would this result in less costly prosecutions?

    (d)

    Serious Fraud is more likely to achieve a higher category and thus higher rates of pay than murder where sentences on conviction are greater. These cases last longer whereas in most businesses the hourly rates would be discounted on a contract, which is longer (bigger).

    (e)

    Can it be justified that some individual QCs specialising in publicly funded fraud cases, where the risk of loss of liberty is at the low end of the scale, are paid many times the salaries/fees of senior surgeons, or Juniour Counsel representing street robbers?

6.  FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY DEFENDANTS

    (a)

    The previous contribution system was abolished because:

      (i)

It was disproportionately costly to collect contributions that were ordered. However, policy makers failed to take into account the fact that many defendants were deterred from applying because they new they would be disqualified or have to pay a contribution.

      (ii)

The means assessment was delaying case progression.

    (b)

    The mechanism of Defence Costs Orders in the Crown Court was designed to avoid delays in the grant of representation (and hence the progress of cases) and to be simple and workable. In our submission these objects have been achieved. However, due to a lack of training and guidance to Crown Court Judges, Defence Costs Orders have not been made to the extent that they should. This issue has been addressed, this year, and a rise in the number and value of orders can be expected.

    (c)

    It is unclear why similar provisions to those in the Crown Court were not made for the magistrates' court. We would suggest consideration is given to identical provisions being made with collection being enforced through the Magistrates' collection procedures for financial orders.

    (d)

    Proposals for solicitors to have to collect contributions are impractical—solicitors will not expose themselves to the risk of having to collect fees from a client after a case has concluded. Even if they had the inclination to take enforcement action costs of enforcement would be unlikely to be recoverable (under the small claims procedure). Additionally there are potential pitfalls under the proceeds of Crime Act. A clients' contribution would have to be paid "upfront" and this is likely to result in delay in case progression.

7.  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

    (a)

    Expenditure on prosecution agencies has gone up and the committee will no doubt have access to the figures for increases in expenditure on:

      (i)

The Crown Prosecution Service.

      (ii)

The Police.

      (iii)

The Prison Service.

      (iv)

HSE, DWP, Inland Revenue etc prosecutions.

      (v)

Local Authority-anti social behaviour officers etc.

      (vi)

Prison discipline.

    (b)

    Providing extra resources for prosecution agencies, is designed to increase the number of prosecutions for serious offences which, in turn increase criminal legal aid expenditure.

    (c)

    The Government has not required departments to cost the implications of their initiatives on the CDS budget eg the introduction of ASBO's. Yet these are the main driver for the CDS budget.

    (d)

    The rates of pay for solicitors have not gone up since 2001 for magistrates' court work and since 1998(?) for Crown Court work. The Costs audit procedures of the CDS and the National Taxing Unit are rigorous, we would say nit-picking.

    (e)

    If costs of the criminal defence service have gone up it is because more work is actually and reasonably being done. There is no other way for the budget to increase as rates have not gone up and audit will show up firms doing unnecessary work on cases.

8.  THE FUTURE

    (a)

    LSC experiments with a PDS have demonstrated just how cost efficient private practice is.

    (b)

    LSC funded "Legal Help" work has become so unprofitable that there are now well publicised advice deserts. This has not yet happened in Criminal Defence work because:

      (i)

Standard fees have meant that large and well-organised practices doing high volumes of work have remained profitable.

      (ii)

Older solicitors find it difficult to retrain and/or are tied down by large overheads and so accept a falling income. However there is clear evidence that young solicitors are not entering the field of Criminal Defence Work because of the low rates of pay.

    (c)

    If salaried "direct" services are introduced to replace private practice they will be more expensive as CDS data on the PDS and CLS data on "not for profit" contracts show clearly.

9.  CONCLUSION

    (a)

    Insofar as expenditure on Criminal Legal Aid has gone up on a like-for-like basis this is attributable directly to an increase in work the workload, driven directly by government initiatives.

    (b)

    Expenditure has in any event gone up far less than would be proportionate to increases in expenditure on prosecution agencies.

    (c)

    Criminal Defence Solicitors provide value for money but are in danger of being driven out of business in the same way as CLS providers of "Legal Help" in areas of family, housing and welfare benefits law.

    (d)

    Crown Courts have been slow to use the provisions relating to defence costs orders but headway is now being made and Judges are now required to consider an order in every case. Similar provisions could be applied in the magistrates court.

Danny Simpson

June 2004





 
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