Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 66 - 79)

TUESDAY 20 JANUARY 2004

NATIONAL LOTTERY COMMISSION

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for attending this meeting. It is very nice to see you again.

  Q66  Derek Wyatt: Do you think in a sense that we are losing the plot with regard to the Lottery? Do you think that it is too confusing and that the confusion is affecting sales?

  Ms Black: I do not think there is probably a huge amount of evidence for that, although I think people have been raising that as a potential issue. If we were to move to multiple licences, I think people have been raising it as a potential issue. No, we have lots of games now. I think we have games that probably tend to attract different types of people, although clearly Camelot can perhaps comment more than I can on that.

  Q67  Derek Wyatt: We shall ask them, no doubt. Do you feel that in a sense the public are not playing as much because that is what happens after the first five years in every lottery, and that therefore we should get used to the fact that that is going to happen and we should reduce our expectations? Do you think that is an acceptable position for you?

  Ms Black: It is often said that people tend to play less. I think that we should not forget that we have a much higher proportion of our population playing here than other countries, although they tend to play a little bit less in terms of spending more. I am not sure I can really add very much. Probably Camelot are better able to answer.

  Mr Harris: Certainly the evidence tells us that the Lottery was very successful when it was launched. As for maintaining the high degree of sales, there was considerable enthusiasm in the build-up to the Lottery. Over a period of time, it is likely that people, because they do not win, start to question whether or not they should continue to play. The critical thing is to have both a reasonably broad portfolio of games, not one that is so broad that it is confusing and all the games eat into one another but one that meets a range of different players' needs, and then to put real effort into maintaining the games and making sure that they are revitalised from time to time, and that is what we look to the operator to do.

  Q68  Derek Wyatt: Do you think it is the games themselves, the jackpots, that make it successful rather than any structural changes underneath? Are we back to front here in trying to change it? Should it be the type of game played as opposed to bringing in a third lottery operator or changing the structure or whatever?

  Ms Black: There is a lot of evidence that a big jackpot attracts a lot of people. You have to look to the Big One in Spain and the other very large ones around the world, which attract huge numbers of people. I do not think, moving on to the last point you made there, we would expect to have more than one operator, if we were given the opportunity to award multiple licences, offering a very big jackpot. That could well be counter-productive.

  Mr Harris: I think there is evidence that certainly in Lotto games high jackpots are an important part of those games. Equally, there is evidence that increasingly one reads people saying that perhaps there should be games offering lower prizes. There are such games, games such as Thunderball, and they have a very loyal following and a following that is very consistent and does generate substantial returns for good causes. They are not as big as the jackpot game but they are a separate part, just as scratchcards and other games are separate parts, of the whole portfolio that represents a range of choice for players.

  Q69  Derek Wyatt: Do you think that the National Lottery Commission can both award and regulate licences effectively? Are you happy with that role?

  Mr Harris: Yes. We believe it is important that those functions are kept in the same regulator and we think that there are real risks if those functions are separated.

  Ms Black: If I may expand, it is very important to remember that we do not just award a single licence at the beginning after competition; we are continually awarding licences for other games throughout the period of the main licence. We are also continually amending licences based on the regulation that we do as a result of issues that come up. It is an integrated process.

  Q70  Derek Wyatt: Given the changes to gambling per se, you do not feel that you should be wrapped into the Gambling Commissioner, so that there is one body and the public knows where to go?

  Ms Black: Given our third duty, admittedly our subsidiary duty, which is to maximise the returns to good causes, and that informs everything we do, not just the licensing but the regulation and the amendments to the licences, we do genuinely believe that there would be conflicts of interests if we were within the Gambling Commission, assuming of course that that duty to maximise returns to good  causes was retained, because the Gambling Commission will also be licensing other bodies that do not have that requirement. We do not quite see how they can work even-handedly, on the one hand maximising duties to good causes for the Lottery and, on the other hand, with commercial operators not really in a sense caring what they do in that area. We feel that however you try to split out, put Chinese walls around the bit that did the Lottery and the returns to good causes, there is always going to be the perception of bias within that. We do see that as a real problem.

  Q71  Chairman: If I may just intervene there, in the nicest possible way, may I say to you that people might say, "Well you would say that wouldn't you?" I am not arguing the case one way or the other but it could be said that there was a very strong case, first of all for Oflot, and now for your Commission, when the Lottery was launched—clearly it was new, it was  sui generis and it had to go ahead, although there  were a number of problems, which is why the  Government decided to abolish Oflot—nevertheless, that was made, understood and accepted. There is a contrary case and that case is that the existence of a separate commission simply for the National Lottery means that the Commission is a proponent of the case for the Lottery and that arguments put forward by other organisations, like the football pools for example, arguments relating to allowing people to bet on the Lottery, arguments relating to the curious relationship of the Lottery and the BBC whereby the BBC actually pays to be allowed to broadcast the Lottery results, all creates what is now not just an egregious but an anomalous situation and that if all of these things were under one commission, the Gambling Commission, then the cases that are made—again this curious thing of taxation neutrality and so on—would be looked at in a different way. I am not saying that that is my view, but I think that there are arguments to be considered about that.

  Ms Black: I think that is very fair. We do have to remember that the National Lottery is special; it was set up to be special; it was set up to raise funds for good causes; and it can be played pretty anywhere in your local high street, whereas gambling is quite different and it generally can only be played on licensed premises. Once the Gambling Commission has awarded a licence, they do not really care what the operator does on gambling. Obviously the other difference in the Lottery is that at the moment we have a single monopoly, private sector operator, which operates for a fixed term. It is very different from normal gambling.

  Mr Harris: I think that covers it well. As far as we are concerned, there is a policy that has been set up for the National Lottery, which is that the National Lottery should be put in a special and ring-fenced position to raise returns for good causes. That is why we have a duty to maximise returns. I think that it is quite proper that those policy debates happen at government level. We simply implement the legislation that we are given, whilst seeking to maximise returns to good causes, which is an important part of our functions.

  Q72  Derek Wyatt: Do you think that when the decision is made for the next licence, it would be best to follow the DTI's rather clever auction of the 3G licences, so that the Government can maximise the most amount of money up-front?

  Ms Black: I do not know the details of how that was carried out but it certainly has had a few interesting ramifications since. People clearly believe they paid far too much. I am not sure that is necessarily a good bet. Mark Harris has thought much more about auctions than I have as he was involved in the last licence.

  Mr Harris: We looked at it in the last licence round. We would certainly want to look at it again. I do not want to give the impression that we would be ruling it out. The problem with such an arrangement is that, in order to guarantee returns, an operator would have to be able to guarantee at the outset to put forward a very large sum of money. If you look at the amount that the Lottery raises, £10 billion or £11 billion over a licence period, that order of magnitude, in order for the operator to guarantee that amount of money and guarantee that amount of money in a way that is secure would actually be very costly. Ultimately, that would add to the cost of bidding and could well significantly depress returns to good causes, if indeed the operator could provide that level of guarantee. If, alternatively, they could not provide that level of guarantee, and we accepted that they should provide a fixed sum paid for out of revenues, you run the real risk that if sales are higher than you expect, the operator could make very substantial windfall gains. If they are lower than you expect and the operator cannot finance the payments that they have committed to under the auction, then the operator will probably withdraw from the licences and there would be a crisis and the money would not actually be raised.

  Q73  Derek Wyatt: I think there is a quid pro quo; the Government would say, "We are going to do it that way but we will not take the 12%".

  Mr Harris: That is not a matter for us.

  Ms Black: That is for the Government.

  Q74  Michael Fabricant: You said that the main criterion is to maximise money for good causes, but there is always, is there not, a compromise between the amount of legitimate profit that the operating company needs to make and of course the amount of money that the Government takes which, as you quite rightly say, is a matter for the Government. When you make that calculation as to how to maximise the income for good causes, while at the same time ensuring the viability of the operating company, do you do your own analyses or do you rely on the franchisee?

  Ms Black: I will pass that straight to Mark because he was involved at the time of the last competition.

  Mr Harris: In the last competition we looked very closely not just at what the bidders were offering, and what we asked them to offer was a proportion of sales after prizes had been paid, after retail and commission had been paid and after duty had been paid. The object of that was to make sure that they had every incentive to maximise returns to good causes. The more returns to good causes, the better off they were. We looked very carefully at their projections. We looked very carefully at their financial position. We also looked very carefully at projections that we thought that they were likely to achieve. You may remember, because we presented this to you before, that the Commission took the view that actually sales were much more likely to be in the order of around £5 billion, I think it was, a year rather that the £7 to 8 billion that the bidders were predicting. We looked at their financial structure on those sales forecasts and also on lower sales forecasts. We wanted to be sure that they were capable of financing themselves in lower sales situations. To sum it up, we looked very carefully at it. We did not just say, "That is what they forecast. That is great".

  Q75  Michael Fabricant: In opening his questioning, Derek Wyatt talked about the confusion that may exist in the minds of those people who play these games. Do you think we are getting to a stage now where there is a sort of gambling or good causes fatigue and that there is a natural decline now going to take place in the amount of Lottery money that goes into gambling in this way?

  Mr Harris: We do not take the view that the forecasts that we used last time are unachievable. We believe that sales can be stabilised. Certainly, if you look at sales across the whole portfolio—and it is important not just to focus in on an individual game—they can be stabilised and they can be grown. Part of the growth comes from the expansion in the portfolio; part of it comes from keeping the product alive in people's minds, selling the benefits of it, improving it where it is possible to improve it. That is very much what we are looking to the operator to do.

  Q76  Michael Fabricant: To talk about expanding the portfolio, do you do that with one operator or do you rather see there being a number of operators competing with each other?

  Ms Black: If we are given the flexibly to do so, we certainly see a number of operators potentially.

  Q77  Michael Fabricant: Would you welcome that flexibility?

  Ms Black: We would welcome flexibility. Perhaps I could explain why. We do not see more necessarily than two or three different operators. I think if there were any more than that you would potentially be running into the problems of operators competing with each other. "Do I put my Lottery money here or do I put it there?" That is not what we want. We want them to say, "I will put my Lottery money there and there". There is certainly evidence that some games are relatively independent of each other. People are likely perhaps to play one or the other type of game. We would very much welcome that flexibility because we see, as indeed you yourself have said in a previous report, that we run a serious risk, if we do not have the flexibility that we continue with a single monopoly operator. One of the arguments against that is the advantage of the incumbency just does not exist and there will be lots of people coming forward to bid. I sincerely hope they will. If we find they do not, and if we find that the incumbency advantage is huge, then by the time we get to that stage, it is going to be too late to do anything about it. If, having been given the flexibility, we find that we get to that stage and one company comes up with a bid that for everything that we are looking to license is the best, then we would expect to award the licences to that one company. Without flexibility, we think we may have trouble being able to maximise the returns.

  Q78  Michael Fabricant: If you decide, or you are given the power, to award these different franchises, if you like—and I come from a broadcasting background so I am looking at it as the old independent Broadcasting Authority would have done it—would you be saying, "We will allow free competition between these different franchises", or would you regulate it in such a way that you would say that the games have to be complementary, so that, for example, one franchisee would have to have one type of game, while another type of franchisee would have a different type of game so that there was not direct, head-to-head competition? What would you do about the infrastructure? Camelot has introduced I think a very effective infrastructure whereby you have retailers on-line. Would you order Camelot, or the owner of the infrastructure at any one time, to make it available to other franchisees or would you say, "No, there would have to be competing platforms", with duplication of that sort of technological infrastructure?

  Ms Black: A lot of the detail we simply cannot answer at the moment. We will expect to be able to answer the detail of that as and when we are able to do the research and consult and everything else, which is clearly a fundamental part of it. We clearly cannot do that until the structure of the Bill is at least a lot clearer by Second Reading. Having said that, we would not expect to enfranchise, in your terms, two people who were going to run competing games because that clearly is not going to be very sensible. There is certainly some evidence that, for example, the main on-line draw is a market that is relatively independent from scratchcards. We might envisage the main jackpot game being, one, licence, and perhaps scratchcards another. That is possible. We do not know and we have not got that far. In terms of infrastructure and other issues, that is clearly an issue. We would not expect to see in your local newsagent, and I am thinking of mine in particular, the terminals for the main on-line game going at one end of the counter and, well there is no room for the others. Clearly, there would have to be some commonality. Certainly, when thinking about technological developments, that is going to be very important. If you look at banking and ATMs, they can service a number of banks at the moment so why should not a single terminal be able to service a number of different operators? That again is further down the road. We are five years off the start of the next licence or licences. Technology will have changed hugely by then but it is already moving in the direction where people can work much more together within a single piece of hardware. Clearly, our regulation, the giving of the licences, is going to be focused on trying to avoid that counter-productive competition and getting people to work together, which may be a challenge.

  Q79  Mr Flook: When you regulate the operator, i.e. Camelot, how do you gauge how well it is doing financially? What sort of company or types of company might you look at? I am particularly interested in: do you think they make an excessive return on capital? I cannot see that they do. How do you look at it?

  Mr Black: We look at it directly, monthly, in terms of their sales, the various games. In terms of return on capital, that issue must have been addressed at the time of the licence because they effectively take a fixed element of the sales.

  Mr Harris: Effectively, the way the licence is structured is that we rely on the competition that took place for the licence to demonstrate that the good causes are getting the best possible proportion of the overall pot, if you like. What we have not done is put specific measures in place whereby if the operator is making a better return on capital than a set amount, we claw back funds in that way.


 
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