Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160 - 171)

TUESDAY 20 JANUARY 2004

THE PEOPLE'S LOTTERY

  Q160  Michael Fabricant: Do you think there is any merit, if you like, in the argument that, for the Olympic Games at least, that Lottery should be run by a separate company?

  Mr Burridge: In a sense it is a question of what are the advantages of a separate company running it. If a separate company has a better game and a better retail structure then you could say "Yes", but then they are not effectively running it because they are using it through Camelot's infrastructure. One of the issues about the Lottery since it started is that every week we have a debate on how to spend the money and only every seven years do we have a debate on how to raise it and, self-evidently, what Camelot, or any operator, needs to do is come up with better games which capture more the public's imagination. If someone can do that for the Olympic Games then that is fine under the Section 6 licence, and could go ahead under the current constitution.

  Q161  Michael Fabricant: You have been a good advocate for the status quo so I simply ask you one final question: is there anything that Camelot should be doing that they are not doing now?

  Mr Burridge: I have not intended to be an advocate for the status quo because I do not think the status quo is right. I looked at the status quo versus the proposed alternative. Michael Grade was saying that South Africa had gone to Camelot's advantage but actually it was an unfortunate choice because, if you look into it, a decision was made to give it to someone else and then there were happenings behind the scenes and the decision was reversed outside the South African Parliament, so it was not necessarily a triumph of logic. Almost all lotteries in the world should be run with all profits going to good causes, and I think there should be a National Lottery Commissioner as distinct from the National Lottery Commission who would be the chief executive, effectively, appointing the various people to run it, and that everyone including the operator is chosen on a regular basis. I do not know if you remember that, before the last licence award, there was a glitch with some of the software which meant that a number of players were not being paid their full amount, and elements within Camelot decided to cover that up. One of the problems with the current system is that the National Lottery Commission has effectively no power to deal with that; they can either say "You are fit" or "You are not fit", and if they say that you are not fit then the whole Lottery closes down and good causes will be the primary loser.

  Q162  Chairman: On the other hand, when we had a National Lottery commissioner it was believed that he had too much power, and it was alleged that he misused it.

  Mr Burridge: Not a commissioner in the sense that he is a regulator. Effectively the State should appoint people to run the National Lottery who are replaceable, accountable, where the State should own the various infrastructure and pay the costs, and then you would have a system where people could apply to be operators, apply to be advertising, security printers or whatever, and that would be changeable and you would get competition on that basis because people would be competing on the basis of their specialist skills.

  Q163  Chairman: Do you think then, as I certainly do, that the government ought to revert to the commitment in the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, namely that the Lottery would be a not-for-profit system in the public sector?

  Mr Burridge: I do.

  Chairman: I cannot ask for a better answer!

  Q164  Mr Flook: From your perspective can you give reasons why you think the government is therefore pursuing the route it is, as announced last July?

  Mr Burridge: There are two reasons. One is they realise there are unlikely to be any competitive bids next time round unless something changes—

  Q165  Mr Flook: So just to develop that, if that were the case and there were no competitive bids—

  Mr Burridge: That Camelot would effectively have the licence in perpetuity, which is a "bad thing" and therefore one needs to inject competition. I am not sure that they have, in the way that this has been drafted, a realistic sense of what competition within this market place is. Competition is very effective at providing people with alternatives with which they can compete and drive the price down or whatever. If anything, with the National Lottery, there is a vested interest in driving the price up because the amount per play will gradually be eroded over time. It is an issue all lotteries face rather than a plea for huge increases in prices, but what competition should do is provide better services, better marketing, better games, better infrastructure, better retailer training and so on, but those are not best achieved by just creating more competition to run the various bits. You could argue that if we had a general election every six months that would provide an increase in competition but not necessarily an increase in the effectiveness of government, and that seems to be the model that these proposals are heading towards in that we are creating competition but not anything more effective as an operating mechanism.

  Q166  Mr Flook: The subject of what goes on in Europe has come up several times, and Camelot also came up with their operating costs of 4.5% against a European average of 14%, and most of that European average, particularly in Belgium, presumably comes from State and government run lotteries.

  Mr Burridge: Yes.

  Q167  Mr Flook: So just to go back, I know the People's Lottery had its own way of answering this but, to take the Chairman's view and the 1997 Labour manifesto view, it would effectively increase the cost—that is the evidence we have from elsewhere in Europe—and therefore deliver less to good causes?

  Mr Burridge: Yes, but what you are not doing is comparing eggs with eggs. Most of the Lottery jurisdictions around pretty much everywhere in the world are much smaller than in the United Kingdom and over a much greater land mass, so if we were not the best we would be doing worse than we are. We are a natural Lottery jurisdiction with over 55 million adults in a relatively small geographical area with a predilection for gaming that previously existed, so it was always going to be the ideal Lottery jurisdiction. Richard Branson's first bid, called the United Kingdom lottery foundation, correctly identified through all the modelling we did that it was going to be much more and Oflot, as I think they were then, said we were over-ambitious, but we were much nearer the results that Camelot came up with, so it is wrong to assume that comparative efficiency versus, say, Belgium and maximising returns for good causes in the United Kingdom is necessarily the same.

  Q168  Chairman: We have already seen that one myth, though still propagated, has been exploded—namely additionality—and certainly, quite apart from other considerations, the Olympic Games has ended that for good. What about the revenue neutrality rule? Do you think that that has been demonstrated to be observed in any way whatsoever?

  Mr Burridge: Not particularly.

  Q169  Chairman: Do you think it is a good rule? Do you think that the advantages that were conferred in the original legislation on the Lottery ought still to be maintained? It was one thing to protect the Lottery when it was first launched because nobody knew how it was going to go and the then government, justified in my view when launching a Lottery, had wanted to make sure it had the best possible start, but now that it is established and it is a future in our lives, is there any justification for going on and giving it the exceptional protection, advantages and privileges of which it takes advantage?

  Mr Burridge: In my view, there are two aspects to that: firstly, what leads to the efficiency claim is that it is a monopoly and, therefore, if you want to go in for this sort of thing you have to do it via the National Lottery, and added to that is the size of prizes, and therefore the critical mass that you can create is a fantastically important motivator, and you can see that with the jackpots; but, secondly, the danger of it is that it is not sufficiently compelling to Camelot to examine themselves through anything other than rose-tinted glasses. In my view, and this is a personal view, they have not marketed well, their games have been overcomplicated and not particularly well thought through, they have managed to lose the winnability and the fun elements out of Lottery which are compelling, and the reason they have allowed that to happen is they have not internally established the size of the problem they are facing, and part of their cosiness would be down to the fact that there is a degree of protection within which they operate.

  Q170  Chairman: Obviously you have what I might call technical criticisms of Camelot which one takes seriously but, on the wider view, there is nothing to criticise Camelot for, is there? They are doing what they are entitled to do. They are conducting a Lottery in which, and I do not criticise all of this, their prime objective is not to provide money for good causes: but to get as many people as possible to play the Lottery so they can make as much money as possible, and as long as you have a system in which the Lottery is, in my view anomalously, run by a private sector company, it is their perfect right to conduct themselves in this way.

  Mr Burridge: Absolutely. Nevertheless I think, even allowing for that, they still could have done better and therefore made themselves more money.

  Q171  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Burridge. It is nice to see you, and thank you very much for the evidence you have given. The fact that I happen to agree with a very great deal of it in no way undermines our pleasure in having you!

  Mr Burridge: Thank you very much.





 
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