Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Commercial Radio Companies Association

CRCA

  The Commercial Radio Companies Association (CRCA) is the trade body for UK commercial radio. It represents Commercial Radio to Government, Ofcom, copyright societies and other organisations concerned with radio. It manages the Radio Advertising Clearance Centre which clears national and special category advertisements prior to broadcast. CRCA also jointly owns Radio Joint Audience Research Ltd (RAJAR) with the BBC and was instrumental in the formation of the Digital Radio Development Bureau, a company owned by UK digital radio multiplex owners.

  CRCA members include national commercial radio stations, as well as most commercial local and regional stations. They account for 45% of all the radio listening in the UK and around three quarters of local listening. CRCA promotes the importance of Commercial Radio and plays an active role in promoting conditions that will enable it to thrive into the future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  CRCA believes that BBC Radio's purpose, funding and regulation are the principal factors that should be taken into account when considering whether and how the BBC's Charter should be renewed.

PURPOSE

    —  We believe that BBC Radio's different funding ought to mean that it has a different purpose from that of commercially funded radio broadcasters. We accept that competition between the BBC and the commercial sector has value for both sides and thus listeners in the middle. But we think there is a significant difference between competition and mere imitation or duplication. Licences for BBC Radio services should include format descriptions that require BBC popular music stations to complement rather than imitate commercial popular music radio services both during peak-time (0600-1900) and outside it.

REGULATION

    —  Whatever arrangements are arrived at for the future regulation and funding of the BBC, they should be undertaken by an independent regulator able to respond to changing communications market conditions. If this is not done, the new arrangements should be for only five years or with a break for re-examination at five years.

    —  A BBC Board should be responsible to the regulatory body for the running of the BBC and the meeting of the relevant body's licence conditions and codes.

FUNDING

    —  BBC Radio should continue to be publicly funded but the decision and its justifications on how much money should be assigned to BBC Radio should be entirely transparent and should take into account factors outside the BBC including the success of, and provisions being made by, commercial radio.

    —  We do not think BBC Radio should have access to commercial funds of any kind, including those used to pay for BBC marketing activities or events whether or not broadcasts are made from them (eg the sponsorship by Renault of the Radio 2 Proms in the Park). In addition, the BBC should not broadcast the names of those sponsoring off-air events or things independent of the BBC (for example, the "RBS Six Nations Championship" should be merely "The Six Nations Championship" when mentioned or covered on BBC Radio).

CRCA'S ANSWERS TO THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS

  In answering the Committee's questions we have confined our remarks to radio.

QUESTION 1

What scope and remit should BBC Radio have?

  1.1  The shape, size, nature, funding and regulation of BBC Radio are important to UK Commercial Radio. Commercial Radio people admire and respect much of BBC Radio's output. Commercial and BBC Radio frequently co-operate in the interests of the entire radio industry via the Digital Radio Development Bureau (DRDB), the Radio Joint Audience Research Company (RAJAR) and the Radio Academy.

  1.2  Commercial Radio seeks greater predictability and precision of scope in BBC Radio activities; a proper balance between ratings and the kind of radio programming that is worthy of public funding; and greater accountability and effectiveness from BBC Radio's regulatory framework, whatever that may eventually be.

  1.3   We think it is reasonable to expect BBC Radio to be regulated no more lightly than Commercial Radio in both content and competition terms. In addition we expect BBC Radio's funding to respect the principles of the EU state aid rules.

BBC Radio's size and resources

  1.4  BBC Radio is huge. It dominates national radio in a way that its television services do not dominate terrestrial television. BBC 1 and BBC 2 face national commercial equivalents in the form of ITV, Channel 5 and Channel 4. Successful though the three analogue, commercial national radio stations are, only one is on FM. Not only are they fewer they are also much newer than the BBC's core national radio services. National services inevitably achieve the lion's share of national press attention and hence Westminster and Whitehall interest.

  1.5  Here are the key facts about BBC Radio's scale.

    —  It achieves 52% of all UK radio listening;

    —  owns 70% of available FM broadcast spectrum;

    —  regulates itself;

    —  has 5 of the available 8 national analogue radio services;

    —  has 4 out of the 5 available national FM radio services;

    —  owns 6 analogue services and five digital-only services audible in almost every part of the UK;

    —  receives around £348,000,000 from the television licence fee for its 54 national, regional and local analogue and digital radio services;

    —  employs an average of 200 people for each one of its services;

    —  enjoys the cross promotional support of the two BBC national television channels;

    —  owns all the services on its own national digital radio multiplex;

    —  and provides all its radio services via all digital platforms including Freeview, the national terrestrial television multiplex which is controlled by the BBC.

  1.6 None of these advantages is available or applies either to a commercial radio company or to Commercial Radio taken as a whole. In addition, BBC Radio is increasingly a vehicle for national commercial sponsors to publicise their brands and involvement in sporting and other activities.

  1.7 Commercial Radio does not seek a weak BBC Radio but submits that some radical reorganisation is now required. The notion expressed over recent years in some quarters of "fair" or "necessary" market distortion in order to ensure a strong BBC has, we believe, gone too far. It is beginning to act against the media interests of citizens and consumers by undermining the competitiveness and creativity of commercial broadcasters. Weakening that part of UK radio responsible for wealth creation is not helpful to the UK at large and does not enhance listener choice.

THE BALANCE BETWEEN BBC RADIO AND COMMERCIAL RADIO

  1.8 Commercially funded UK broadcast media are tightly regulated. The aims of the regulation are admirable: plurality of ownership and diversity of output. The end result has generally been regarded as better for citizens than the less regulated commercial broadcasting industries found elsewhere in the world.

  1.9  No other country has a publicly funded radio broadcaster to match BBC Radio in terms of its freedom of manoeuvre, size, cultural influence, resource, creativity or funding. These benefits are often described as key to a national asset but their protection, maintenance and development have a price.

  1.10  Much is made of the value of competition between the publicly and commercially funded UK media sectors. There is no doubt that much of BBC Radio's current provision has been derived from Commercial Radio ideas and Commercial Radio has benefited from the need to maintain creativity and investment in order to compete with the BBC (although it is worth noting that, following 13 years of brisk growth in numbers, Commercial Radio stations also compete fiercely with each other). However, the value of setting publicly funded radio services against commercially funded ones becomes eroded if peak-time output across the services becomes too similar or if one side begins to dominate too much through inequality of funding or regulation or if its remit becomes blurred. Balance is lost if there is too much financial support and regulatory freedom on one side and too little opportunity and/or too much regulation on the other.

COMMERCIAL RADIO'S VALUE

  1.11  Commercial Radio is a valuable national asset and a sounding board for opinion. It offers alternative voices to the BBC's and reflects life in the UK both at national and local level. It is especially valued by UK citizens between 18 and 45. The main points to bear in mind about Commercial Radio are as follows.

    —  Given the concentration by many of its services on younger listeners, it achieves a remarkable 45% share of overall UK radio listening and, less surprisingly, 62% of all listening by under 35s. Commercial Radio's share of children's listening is 76%. Local commercial radio has 77% share of all local radio listening (which itself comprises almost 50% of all UK radio listening).

    —  There are over 260 local analogue radio services which generate local employment for around 8,000 people.

    —  Over the last completed financial year alone, it has yielded approximately £30,000,000 in corporation tax to the exchequer.

    —  It has been the fastest growing medium over the last decade and despite falling revenues over the last difficult three years, has still managed to increase its share of display advertising expenditure.

    —  This is because its advertising works as the Radio Advertising Bureau's website demonstrates (www.rab.co.uk).

    —  It is a £600 million per annum business whose income has enabled it to invest in new digital and analogue services.

    —  It has invested over £40,000,000 in digital radio infrastructure and content.

    —  It pioneered charity broadcasts and auctions and continues to support local charities across the UK with fund raising and coverage every year.

    —  Commercial Radio continues to be innovative. It pioneered sports and general phone-ins, broadcasting to ethnic minorities, genre specific radio stations, and the mix of light music with current affairs and information which is now almost universal. All these initiatives have been imitated one way or another (and well) by BBC radio: the sincerest form of flattery.

  1.12  Commercial radio stations are vibrant, creative, closely attuned to the geographical or interest communities they serve. They are fiercely competitive, innovative and, most important of all, socially valuable, encouraging participation or interest in local life. The competitive power of a generously publicly resourced state broadcaster should not be allowed to undermine this because of regulatory or competitive advantage or access to excessive resource.

THE PURPOSE OF BBC RADIO

  1.13  There is no doubting the popularity of BBC Radio services. However, if the need for publicly funded radio is accepted, it follows that the need for the necessary public expenditure must be justified and its allocation must be transparently handled to meet the clearly defined need.

  1.14  A definition of the purpose of publicly funded radio that should then be met by BBC Radio services is sorely needed. We shall argue later that this needs to be arrived at and regulated independently from the BBC. At the moment, BBC Radio remits are often blurred and the behaviour of BBC Radio services is sometimes driven, it seems to us, by a desire to maximise audience share or exclude or price-out competition. This paper does not recommend a reduction in the number of BBC services but the scope and remit of the current ones require closer control than that currently applied and CRCA sees no reason why their number should be increased.

BLURRED REMITS

Commercial behaviour

  1.15  CRCA is concerned by the increasingly commercial approach being taken by the BBC. We submit that the appointment within the BBC of so many from the commercial media, marketing and advertising sectors and the creation of BBC Worldwide as a company with numerous commercial relationships and a growing repertoire of businesses, have substantially changed the way in which some elements of BBC Radio behave.

  1.16  BBC Radio's commercial behaviour narrows the commercial opportunities on which Commercial Radio relies. Part of BBC Radio's dominance in national event involvement and coverage flows from its ability to credit the sponsors of off-air independent events—the "Barclays Premier League" for example. Thus BBC Radio is offering not only large licence fee enabled payments for coverage rights that Commercial Radio is unable to match, but also free commercial exposure on powerful national services in a comparatively uncluttered programme environment. BBC coverage has become an important bargaining chip between third parties and sponsors, thereby disadvantaging commercial broadcasters who are unable to offer similar "solus" promotion to sponsors. This came to a head in radio recently with the proposal that BBC Radio 1 should broadcast the "Coca Cola Chart" because the list of record sales (which Coca Cola sponsors) is independent of the BBC's chart broadcast. Pressure from Commercial Radio has persuaded the BBC to row back from this but, we submit, the BBC should never have been in this position in the first place. Exposure of these sponsorships has no economic or other value to licence fee payers and serves only to provide rights advantages to BBC Radio and publicly subsidised benefit to advertisers.

  1.17  The subvention from the television licence fee is (and should be) sufficient for BBC Radio services to meet its obligations. There is no need for BBC marketeers, frequently recruited from the commercial sector, to arrange major off-air sponsorships of broadcast events such as Vodafone's involvement with Radio 1's "One Big Sunday" or Renault's involvement with "Proms in the Park". Such activities restrict the revenues available to Commercial Radio and colour the nature of the events themselves.

  1.18  The growing tendency for BBC Radio to come to exclusive deals with rights owners merits scrutiny. A recent example would be the four year exclusive radio coverage rights for the Scottish Premier League secured by BBC Radio Scotland. Apart from raising the price that other radio broadcasters must consider paying in the future, exclusive deals lock out competitors. CRCA does not believe this is a proper purpose for publicly funded broadcasters to pursue.

Pursuit of audience share

  1.19  In addition to developing commercial relationships with companies which wish to benefit from profile on BBC Radio services, we think BBC Radio is behaving increasingly like its Commercial Radio competitors in its broadcast content. In particular, we think there is a need to regulate independently the output of the publicly-funded popular music radio stations, BBC Radios 1 and 2.

  1.20  BBC Radio has engaged in a relentless drive to maximise its audience share, at the expense of commercial broadcasters. In the BBC's last annual report, the section devoted to radio opens with a statement about its market share. It has measured its success, and therefore its value, in terms of audience share achieved. We believe this is misguided as it misrepresents BBC Radio's true value (the provision of choice and excellence irrespective of audience share). The value of BBC Radio must be determined in more qualitative terms. These are about its core objectives as a publicly funded broadcaster—its contribution to the country's social and cultural development, its educational role, and its influence on national debate and discussion. Its success should be determined by how well it achieves these objectives rather than by how much audience share it has won from commercial broadcasters, particularly if that share has been won by replicating commercial services. Much of this cannot be quantified or measured, and it should be for external regulators to determine whether or not the BBC is achieving these goals. However, some public service objectives are both quantifiable and measurable. It is possible, for example, to determine how much of BBC Radio's specialised music output is played during peak daytime listening hours, or how much of Radio 1's daytime music output is of British origin. Only by determining what the BBC's true public service objectives are, and implementing a method of recording their success against those objectives, can we move away from the inappropriate situation of measuring the BBC's achievement by ratings alone.

  1.21  BBC Radios 1 and 2 provide both marketing and talent development devices for the music industry. We recognise that the UK record industry prizes its relationship with the only available nationwide FM popular music services and is pleased that those services are publicly funded. But just like Commercial Radio, BBC Radios 1 and 2 are principal broadcasters of current, recent and emerging hit records and the recorded music catalogue of all major popular music artists. During the 1996 Charter review, BBC Radio 1 developed and claimed a "public service" status in the interest of survival. It promised more documentary, more new, cutting edge music and more live music. Despite this, however, it continues to behave in the way Commercial Radio does by seeking ratings by day and reputation by night and at less popular parts of the weekend. Commercial Radio has to do this in order to gain the advertising revenue it needs to survive. The BBC does not and should make available more of the different fare made possible by different funding during peak hours (0600 to 1900) when more listeners are available to listen.

  1.22  The UK's most popular radio station is now BBC Radio 2. It is well managed and programmed and is home to the cream of the UK's radio personality presenters. In the late 90s, in a BBC document obtained by CRCA and sent by CRCA to DCMS, Radio 2 examined how it might move itself younger to regain the audience lost to Commercial Radio by BBC Radio 1 following the 1996 Charter review process. In the ensuing five years, Radio 2 has pursued this strategy, engaged the services of front-line entertainers popular with adults aged 25 plus and ensured a core of current and emerging pop hits and the recordings of major pop music artists throughout peak-time hours. This nationally available, warm, brightly presented, commercial mix of music without interruption by advertisements has proved hugely successful. Its audience share has risen to 16%, double that of Radio 1's. Almost single-handedly it has trimmed a vital 3% away from commercial radio's share of all UK listening. In doing so, it has most adversely affected the fortunes of medium and small scale local commercial radio stations which have traditionally adopted a similar classic and current hit/major artist music formula as the glue which cements their local news, information and audience interaction together.

  1.23  At present, the BBC's flexibility and control over its output is unfettered. It produces "Statements of Programme Policy" which, after initial approval by the Secretary of State, are then self-regulated and may be unilaterally amended at will. Thus, at present, Commercial Radio's principal competitor has the ability to change its formats to enhance its position in the market yet Commercial Radio has no equivalent right with its own stations. Not only can Commercial Radio not predict how BBC Radio services will change in the future, but it is also greatly restricted in its ability to respond when they do so. CRCA believes that BBC Radio should be subject to the same constraints as Commercial Radio, with externally regulated Formats ensuring that the BBC honours its commitments, thus enabling non-BBC radio services to operate in an environment of greater commercial certainty.

QUESTION 2

How should BBC Radio be funded?

  2.1  BBC Radio should continue to be publicly funded. Public funding should remove commercial considerations from programme making and provision. This lies at the heart of the differences between BBC and Commercial Radio and extends audience choice. It is the source of BBC Radio's freedom (and, we would argue, duty) to provide output that advertisers would be unlikely to fund. The licence fee seems to CRCA to be the least bad way of publicly funding BBC Radio as the process is at arms length from Government.

  2.2  In favouring the retention of the licence fee, however, CRCA suggests that an independent regulator should have broad oversight over how the licence fee should be determined and how efficiently it is managed and spent.

  2.3  Between 1998 and 2003, total BBC income increased by 42.4% but total programme expenditure increased at a lower rate: by 28.9%. It is sometimes difficult to compare figures in BBC Annual Reports because accounting categories appear to differ from one year to the next, but less seems to have been spent on BBC Radio in 2003 than was spent in 1998, despite the introduction of digital radio. £436 million was spent on BBC Radio in 1998 while £348 million was spent in 2003. We understand there are significant exclusions (eg newsgathering and copyright fees) from the 2003 figure and we note that, even so, it is higher than the total of the per-station figures in the DCMS Charter Review. In the same period, the number of people employed by the BBC's publicly funded services appears to have increased by 3,000. This increase has been accompanied by a 22.6% increase (£148 million) in salary costs for those working in all BBC publicly funding broadcasting. Taken together, reductions in programme spend and increases in staff and payroll suggest to us that the BBC has been investing more on non-programming staff and activity related to publicly funded services than on the quality and range of its output.

  2.4  We consequently believe that an independent body should be given the power to determine the level of the BBC licence fee on an annual basis. This body should have the interests of the licence fee payers themselves as its first priority. Since it cannot effectively perform this function without a broader involvement in the oversight and accountability of the BBC, it should be the same body that regulates the BBC's activities and output.

QUESTION 3

How should BBC Radio be governed and/or regulated and what role should be played by the Office of Communications?

  3.1  Our answers to questions 1 and 2 indicate that better regulation of BBC Radio is needed. We believe that better regulation should mean independent, external regulation. It is also needed to deal with other aspects of BBC competitive behaviour.

  3.2  Broadcasters are bound to behave in an aggressively competitive manner if left to their own devices irrespective of whether or not they are fulfilling a genuine public need in so doing. The BBC is so big and self-absorbed that it sometimes cannot see the damage it inflicts on those involved in commercially funded, wealth creating broadcasting.

  3.3  Here is an example of what we mean. Oneword Radio is a digital commercial national speech service. It provides plays, stories and comedy in a different style to that in which BBC Radio had previously done so. The idea was and is that Oneword will do for the accessibility of spoken word what Classic FM has done for the accessibility and popularity of classical music on radio.

  3.4  When it launched in early 2000 its most energetic shareholders were UBC and Chivers Press. At that point they each held approximately one third of the company's equity, the remaining stock being held by the Guardian Media Group and Heavy Entertainment, both of whom subsequently sold their interests to the remaining shareholders, leaving Chivers' successor and UBC as 50% shareholders.

  3.5  In July 2001 BBC Worldwide acquired Chivers Press except for their interest in Oneword which then passed to Chivers original owners, the Hong Kong based conglomerate USI Holdings. This initiative not only removed one of Oneword's most active directors, Chivers' MD Simon Gibbs, it also replaced an enthusiastic shareholder with one that was decidedly uncertain about radio investments in general and digital investments in particular.

  3.6  That same year the BBC announced its intention to launch `Network Z' (which became the national BBC digital service "BBC Radio 7") with a proposed schedule that sounded very similar to that being operated by Oneword. In the event, the only significant difference between BBC 7 and Oneword appears to be that whilst the bulk of BBC 7's output is BBC produced, most of Oneword's is licensed in.

  3.7  For two years after the departure of Chivers, UBC sought to encourage USI's faltering belief in the future potential of Oneword. Sadly this ultimately proved impossible and in 2003 USI stated their unwillingness to continue the same level of support for a loss making operation. At the end of last year the board reluctantly took the decision to drastically reduce the investment in Oneword whilst a restructuring of the business was investigated. UBC's intention was to seek to acquire control of Oneword and then to restructure the financing of the service and to investigate possible adjustments to the nature of the service.

  3.8  It is clear that the current weakness of Oneword's financial position as compared with its business plan is principally due to a slower take up of DAB radio sets than had initially been anticipated. It is equally clear, however, that the two moves by the BBC have significantly aggravated an already challenging situation.

  3.9  Whilst CRCA totally supports the opportunity for listeners to have increased access to the BBC's outstanding audio archive, we do not believe that the creation of a publicly funded competitive service to Oneword was the only way to achieve this. It may for instance, have been possible to license such material for broadcast by Oneword and or other commercially funded services. At the time of its creation, Oneword sought to serve a previously unserved market. At its inception there was no reason to believe that the BBC intended to launch its own service of all day spoken word entertainment. What has happened is that this market now splits its listening across two similar programme services thus diluting the number of hours that Oneword could reasonably have been expected to attract.

  3.10  In simple terms, CRCA is concerned that because of the way it is funded and constituted, the BBC is able to move without financial risk, into areas of direct competition with commercial broadcasting ventures. In this case, it was able to combine its commercial muscle through BBC Worldwide with its unjustifiably protective attitude towards its own archive and launch a publicly funded radio service to the disadvantage of a commercial radio endeavour.

  3.11  In June 2001 UBC made representations to the DCMS. These were unsuccessful. CRCA feels UBC should have been able to make its case to an expert, independent, external regulator.

  3.12  The reader might be inclined to wonder whether the Oneword case might not have been dealt with by competition authorities. Indeed, the BBC challenged CRCA to take this route when we sought to raise the matter with them at the time. We believe that this response was wrong. The generous 1996 Charter Review settlement allows the BBC's commercial arm to use its profits to purchase an audio books company. Thus public money was not being spent so competition powers were only relevant to whether or not the purchase represented abuse of a dominant position in the audio book market not to whether it disadvantaged a commercially funded broadcaster or advantaged a BBC publicly-funded service.

  3.13  Having noted why external regulation of the BBC is needed to create a more equitable regulatory balance between the publicly funded broadcaster and commercial broadcasters, we also believe that both the Government and the BBC would benefit from external, independent regulation of the BBC.

  3.14  Because neither BBC management nor the BBC Governors can provide an external view, the Government (specifically the DCMS) has been left holding the ring between the BBC and its commercial competitors. The relationship creates close links between Government and the BBC which are distrusted by commercially funded broadcasters and the media in general.

  3.15  Perhaps more significantly the current regulatory arrangements can undermine the BBC. It is difficult for the BBC to get on with its job while complaint handling is underway, because it has to deal with the complaint itself and take the consequences if its handling of the complaint is judged to be inadequate.

QUESTION 4

Do a 10-year Royal Charter and Agreement with the Secretary of State, together, provide the most appropriate regime for BBC Radio?

  4.1  Thanks to digitisation, UK broadcasting is undergoing swift structural and content change. Radio is no exception. For example, there are now more than 50 terrestrial digital radio services available in London alone, half of them digital-only. Whatever arrangements Government imposes on the BBC will become swiftly out of date. Given the speed of change, it would be sensible to provide for further reviews at set intervals.

  4.2  The BBC's Royal Charter and the self regulation that goes with it are no longer appropriate. The BBC is often unaware of the damage it sometimes causes to non-BBC broadcasters. Independent, transparent regulation would make it more accountable, lead to fair equality in the way both the commercially and publicly funded radio sectors are regulated, and enable independent examination of important issues or complaints. External controls are now required to ensure that BBC popular music services complement rather than imitate the commercial radio provision.

  4.3  Radio and television services and other sources of audiovisual entertainment have increased in number and fragmented hugely over the past decade. This process seems unlikely to decelerate and whatever arrangement is arrived at to fund and regulate the BBC from 2006 onwards is unlikely to be relevant to the communications environment of 2011 much less 2016. Single television (and to an extent single radio) channels will lose audience share. Viewers and listeners will gather and purchase their entertainment in a variety of ways from a variety of sources and providers that will make a universal licence fee difficult to justify. It follows that the new arrangements should either be for a short, say five year period only or should be in the hands of an external regulator with flexibility to change in line with communication developments.

15 April 2004





 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 16 June 2004