Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by ITN

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  ITN welcomes the Committee's inquiry on BBC Charter Review and is grateful for the opportunity to respond to what will be an important examination of what the BBC should be doing in future. We have a number of core concerns, in particular relating to the scope and remit of the BBC, the development of new services and governance and regulation.

  1.2   ITN is the BBC's main competitor in the provision of broadcast news in the UK. We compete predominantly through our television news services for ITV, Channel 4 and Five. For ITV, ITN produces national and international bulletins for ITV1, the 24-hour ITV News Channel and the ITV regional London news service. We produce Channel 4 News—both the News at Noon and 7pm bulletins. We will continue to produce Five News until the end of 2004. ITN also produces national and international news for Independent Radio News (IRN), providing news for over 260 commercial radio stations.

  1.3  ITN has diversified its business over the last few years in order to remain competitive and broaden the range of our activities into profit-generating commercial enterprises alongside our core news contracts. Each of these activities helps to underpin ITN as a healthy business and a strong competitor to the BBC.

  1.4  ITN Archive is now the world's largest commercial news and history archive and has recently expanded into non-news content, with representation deals to manage the clips archives of Channel 4 and Granada. In addition, ITN manages the British Pathe and Reuters archives, as well as ITN's own 49 years of news material and a range of other, smaller archives. This is the fastest area of ITN growth and we hope to further develop the business to make it's the world's largest commercial archive. It competes head-on with the BBC archive.

  1.5  ITN International has seen ITN lead the way in video news on mobile phones, with contracts to produce news bulletins for Vodafone, 3 and O2. These are important commercial relationships, which help us ensure that ITN content can continue to be available across a wide range of media platforms in the digital universe. This in turn helps to ensure that plurality is maintained across as wide a range of platforms as possible. ITN International is also the division that syndicates ITN content around the world, including relationships with CNN, NBC and Channel 9 in Australia.

  1.6  ITN Factual specialises in factual documentary production for a range of channels, including the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Five and Discovery.

  1.7  Competition with the BBC to provide choice and diversity of "news voice" is at the very heart of what ITN does. It is central to the regulatory obligations around ITV News in particular, with the Communications Act requiring ITV News to provide competition with other broadcast news services in the UK.

  1.8  We believe this policy objective should be carried forward throughout the life of the next BBC Charter. In order to be able to continue to do this, we need to be sure that the BBC will not behave unfairly or unduly limit our ability to compete and to develop into new and emerging markets. Our principle concerns therefore fall into the following core recommendations:

    —  That each BBC service should be subject to a clear, precise and measurable remit.

    —  That the BBC Charter should require the Corporation to be more transparent and accountable in all its dealings.

    —  That every proposed new BBC service should be subject to a rigorous approvals process, including a market impact test conducted by Ofcom.

    —  That Ofcom should conduct the public consultation for new BBC services.

    —  That the BBC should be subject to greater external scrutiny, either by Ofcom or a more independent and restructured Board of Governors.

    —  That Ofcom should be responsible for the regulation of all the BBC's commercial activities.

    —  That Ofcom should be responsible for the enforcement of the BBC Fair Trading Commitment, alongside its existing competition powers.

    —  BBC management and Board of Governors should publish discussion concerning proposed new services to ensure clarity about how decisions are reached about new services and whether or not they require separate approval.

    —  That the next Royal Charter should run for a period of five years to take account of analogue switch over.

  1.9  We will discuss these points in more detail below in response to the specific questions identified by the Committee.

2.   Given expected growth in digital TV and likely developments in the internet and other new media, what scope and remit should the BBC have?

  2.1  As we have described above, ITN believes it is important that competition between high quality, domestic news providers is maintained in the digital age. The public has come to expect a plurality of news provision in the analogue world, and this should be transferred into the digital environment across a range of digital and new media platforms, not just on linear television and radio.

  2.2  ITN does not oppose per se the BBC launching new services and seeking to deliver services across a range of media platforms, but it is critically important that it is not allowed to do so unfettered. Any proposed new service must be subject a rigorous approvals process to ensure that it is a legitimate use of licence fee funds, that the activity would not unduly damage competition and that each service has a clear, precise and measurable remit.

  2.3  The launch of BBC Online is the clearest example of how an ill-defined remit can have seriously damaging consequences on the market. The BBC launched BBC Online in 1997 to coincide with the General Election. Since then it has grown into a vast website carrying information across the full range of programme genres. It is one of the biggest and most popular websites in the world, costing somewhere between £75 million and £100 million in public funds. At the same time the BBC has on occasion sought to broaden the range of new media services running alongside its core website, www.bbc.co.uk.

  2.4  This has included making BBC content available on platforms such as mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), broadband portals, such as Freeserve and Video Networks, among many others. While BBC Online sought and was granted approval for BBC Online, the exact scope and remit was never properly defined. We hope that the Graf Review will seek to ensure that BBC Online is finally given a proper remit, but in its absence the BBC has been able to launch myriad new media services with little clarity about their approval for launch under a vague original remit. The terms of the approval failed to take any account of the outer limits of what the BBC was allowed to do and this has provided the rest of the market with little certainty about what the BBC is allowed to do through BBC Online. For example, nowhere does the remit specify whether the BBC was permitted to launch ancillary new media activities above and beyond its main website (bbc.co.uk), such as services on mobile phones and broadband all of which would have required investment to establish and operate the services.

  2.5  In the case of content on mobile phones, ITN has had direct experience of how the lack of a proper remit has damaged our business and our ability to compete.

  2.6  In late 1999 ITN became the first provider of a text news service to mobile phones in a commercial deal with Orange. A few months later the BBC launched a similar service with Cellnet—yet provided its content for free. Having taken the initiative to move into this market, ITN soon found that its business model was unsustainable with phone companies no longer willing to pay for content if the BBC would provide it at no cost.

  2.7  Recently ITN has again taken the initiative to lead the way in providing video news to mobile phones. We currently have contracts in place to provide news to Vodafone, Hutchison's 3 and O2, providing each with tailor-made news bulletins throughout the day in full audio and video. This is an important growth area for ITN, which helps to underpin the business. Yet if the BBC were to launch a similar service for free, we there is every likelihood that we would be forced out of this market, thereby reducing choice and destroying a major area of ITN activity. A properly defined remit would at least help us to understand what we can and cannot expect to compete with and help us operate with more certainty of business planning. This is only one such example, which serves to demonstrate how important a clear and measurable remit is for all BBC activities.

  2.8  If the BBC is to continue to expand the range of its activities it must do so by paying greater regard to the way it impacts on the rest of the market. The impact of the BBC's enormous investment in new channels—and in particular in online services—has been to leave little oxygen for commercial operators who might otherwise develop their own services. There is a serious risk that an unfettered BBC could stifle innovation and research and development across the media as a whole and in areas where the UK can—and should—be a world leader.

  2.9  In addition ITN also believes there needs to be more clarity about when and why certain services are put forward for approval through the DCMS. The approvals process itself has improved in recent years, with more emphasis on the market impact of new services, with BBC Three given a market impact test by the ITC prior to launch. Once a proposed service is put through the approvals service the system works relatively well. However, we still have some concerns about new services that are launched without approval, and the way in which the BBC decides whether to submit a proposed new service for approval. One such example is the BBC Creative Archive, which the BBC intends to create using vast amounts of public money. It has the potential to damage ITN's own archive business, yet has not been formally approved. We are unclear why this is the case and how such a decision is reached. Therefore we believe that the BBC management and Governors should be more transparent about how they demonstrate that they are launching services within the rules and explain why they believe any new service does not require approval. If they are unable to, then it should also be possible for industry to recommend that a service should be subject to the approvals process.

  2.10  The BBC is also responsible for the public consultation for new services. The BBC frequently cites widespread public support for proposed new services. Unsurprising then that these consultation exercises contain little rigorous questioning about the proposed service. Public consultations should be more objective and as such, we believe they should be conducted by Ofcom.

3.   In the context of scope and remit, how should the BBC be funded?

  3.1  ITN believes that the licence fee remains the most appropriate way of funding core BBC services. However, this is closely linked to the points we have made about the need for a clearly defined remit for the BBC and each of its constituent services. Any BBC service needs to be carefully considered to ensure that it serves the licence fee payer and does not compete unfairly in the market.

  3.2  We therefore hope that the forthcoming reviews of all the BBC's digital services will examine in detail whether the licence fee remains the best way to fund these services and whether they have added genuine value to licence payers. If any of these services are deemed to be inappropriate then we believe that subscription may offer an alternative funding model.

  3.3  We also believe that there is a case to look further at "top slicing" the licence fee, to redirect sums to certain public services provided by the commercial sector. At present we do not have a fixed view about this, but it is an option that we hope the Charter Review process will examine in detail over the coming months.

4.   How should the BBC be governed and/or regulated and what role should be played by the Office of Communications?

  4.1  The way in which the BBC is governed has been shown to be flawed on several occasions and we believe the BBC should be subject to more external scrutiny. This Charter Review provides the ideal opportunity to redefine the Board of Governors and transfer some of their responsibilities—if not all their regulatory functions—to Ofcom. We do not believe that the Board of Governors can continue to act as both judge and jury over the BBC's affairs.

  4.2  On several occasions we have found that the Board of Governors has not acted as a truly independent body from BBC management, and their responses to serious issues have not demonstrated what we would consider to be sufficient objectivity.

  4.3  One such example relates to a serious issue we raised with the Board of Governors about the distribution of the commercial BBC World in America. We learnt that the BBC's distribution arrangements did not appear to meet the terms of the Fair Trading Commitment which sets out the competition arrangements for the BBC's commercial activities. The Commitment states that the BBC's commercial activities should not damage competition, should reflect market practice, should cover all costs and should deliver a return to the licence fee arm of the Corporation.

  4.4  However, we had evidence that the BBC was not making a charge from a US public service station for the channel, which therefore appeared to breach the rules. In response to our query we were informed in a two paragraph letter from Baroness Young, then the Governor responsible for Fair Trading, that there was no problem with the arrangements and that she could not provide more detail as it was commercially sensitive. This did not reflect the level of detail that we would have expected from an independent regulator.

  4.5  This is only one example, but one which demonstrates that at the very least responsibility for enforcement of the BBC Fair Trading Commitment and regulation of all aspects of the BBC's commercial activities should be transferred to Ofcom, to sit alongside its concurrent competition regulatory responsibilities. This would also help ensure that there is more consistency in the way in which competition issues concerning the BBC's activities are handled.

  4.6  The Board of Governors should be established as a properly independent body, separate from BBC management and based in a different location to the BBC executive and staff. We also believe that the BBC Governors should be drawn in members with relevant professional, legal or regulatory expertise. The Board of Governors should also be more answerable to OFCOM through regular dialogue and publication of minutes and decisions taken in greater detail than those published at present. This would help to ensure more consistency across the Governors and OFCOM.

5.   In a changing communications environment, does a 10-year Royal Charter and Agreement with the Secretary of State, together, provide the most appropriate regime for the BBC?

  5.1  The next Royal Charter will come into force at an awkward time in the development of the broadcasting sector. If digital switch-over can be achieved as hoped by 2010-12, the Charter will only be half way through its normal 10-year period when the broadcasting landscape will change fundamentally. Switch over will have profound implications for the way in which the public accesses broadcast services and, potentially, for competition between broadcast organisations. We do not believe that it is possible to devise a Charter that can take into account the state of the market both before and after switch over. At the same time there is likely to be significant growth in the take up of broadband and other new media services. Yet at this stage it is too early to make an accurate prediction of take up across all platforms. ITN therefore believes that the next Charter should run for a period of five years, to be reviewed in 2011.

April 2004





 
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