Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
WEDNESDAY 15 SEPTEMBER 2004
RT HON
GEOFF HOON
MP, SIR KEVIN
TEBBIT KCB CMG AND
GENERAL SIR
MICHAEL WALKER
GCB CMG CBE ADC GEN
Q1 Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen,
can I apologise profusely, General, Sir Kevin, now hunting foxes
will be replaced by hunting regiments. We hope we can show the
same dedication as we have done for the last hour and a half.
Welcome, Secretary of State, Sir Kevin and Sir Michael. This is
the first session of our inquiry into the Government's proposals
for the future capabilities of our armed forces, a proposal that
you announced, Secretary of State, in the House on 21 July. Since
then there have been considerable comments, some criticism of
these proposals from a number of quarters, including parliamentarians
of both Houses. I understand, Secretary of State, that you took
part in a debate in Westminster Hall this morning which focused
on the future of the Scottish regiments. As you would expect,
the Defence Committee intends to subject your proposals to close
scrutiny. There can be few political responsibilities as important
as making sure that our armed forces have the capabilities they
need to defend the UK and its interests. Although this is the
first evidence session of this inquiry it builds on earlier work
that we have done and that the Committee of previous parliaments
have done, not the least our comprehensive inquiry into the 1998
Strategic Defence Review. More immediately, however, we are following
on from our inquiry into last year's Defence White Paper, Delivering
Security in a Changing World. Although we supported a great
deal of the analysis of that paper, we disagreed with some conclusions,
in particular we were concerned that too much emphasis was being
placed on capabilities which rely on so far untried high tech
equipment. As we know to our cost such equipment is rarely delivered
on time, and not infrequently fails to do what it says or pretends
it is going to do. We published our report in July and we have
received your reply to it, for which we are grateful; it will
be published very early next week. It will come as no surprise
to you, I am sure, that a number of the issues which were raised
in that report will make an appearance, also, in this afternoon's
session. I am sorry that because of our fox watch we have to terminate
our proceedings at 5.39. I understand, Secretary of State, you
will not be available after 6.00 anyway so we must terminate at
5.39. We will have to be as precise as is possible. Any initial
statement, Secretary of State?
Mr Hoon: No. I just want to emphasise
that Mike and Kevin are here because these proposals are the considered
collective view of the Ministry of Defence. They have been thought
through at great length and in great detail. They are not, as
I have seen some suggest, my views or the views of any particular
part of the Army or of any particular service. They are a carefully
considered response to the strategic challenges of the 21st century
drawn up both by the military and the civilians in the Ministry
of Defence.
Q2 Chairman: What will be the timescale
for the making of necessary decisions?
Mr Hoon: There are a number of
consequential decisions that are being taken, in a sense, as we
speak. The implementation of the proposals in a number of areas
will be going ahead following appropriate consultation. There
are a number of factors that affect the location of particular
units or capabilities but particularly as far as the restructuring
of the Army is concerned, for example, we have made it quite clear
that we want this to be something that is the considered response
of the Army. It will go to the Army Board. Ultimately, of course,
I will take the decision but it is something that is being done
in consultation with those that it affects and I hope the Committee
will welcome that.
Q3 Chairman: Perhaps you could accept
that we would like a degree of transparency as far as it is possible
rather than having an announcement and then be expected to endorse
or oppose. If it is possible, Secretary of State, as there is
a lot at stake, we would greatly appreciate as much information
as possible.
Mr Hoon: If the Committee has
particular views on what I said in terms of the structure of the
Army then obviously they will be taken into consideration. There
are certain aspects though of this I would hope the Committee
would accept as being necessary in the 21st century. If we are
dealing specifically with the restructuring of the Army, for example,
I would hope the Committee would welcome the end of arms plotting.
It seems to me that moving people and their families around every
two years might once have been something which was appropriate
but it no longer fits the kind of society that we have in the
21st century and no longer provides us with the operational capability
that we require. As General Jackson pointed out in an article
last week he cannot understand, neither can I, why anyone should
criticise a change which means that we will have 36 battalions
available rather than 26 or 27 as is currently the case. Now there
are certain consequential changes following ending arms plotting
and obviously the Committee would want to look at those but certainly
providing that principle is accepted we will look carefully at
any concerns the Committee have about how that should be implemented.
Chairman: Fine. We will return fairly
quickly to this subject. We will start off with Peter Viggers.
Q4 Mr Viggers: May we get an impression
first of the size of the Army of the future. The Future Capabilities
document states that the Army will have a strength of about 102,000.
What figure does that compare with currently?
Mr Hoon: We have an ambition of
achieving in the order of 108,000 but I think I would have to
recognise realistically that we have not satisfied that ambition,
something the Committee I know has taken up with me in the past.
The current size is in the order of 103,500 or thereabouts, it
fluctuates almost from day to day but it is in that sort of order.
As we have discussed on previous occasions, recruiting is quite
healthy at the present time. I think this is something which I
hope the Committee will look at very carefully because I think
it has been the subject of some rather misleading reporting. What
we are trying to do is to ensure that those who have been under
most pressure in recent operations—the logisticians, signallers,
other communicators, intelligence—that we look very carefully
at those people and how we ensure in future operations—given
almost inevitably that we will be supporting more than one operation
at a time and therefore that support chain is vital—that
when we have the ability of reusing some capacity freed from Northern
Ireland responsibilities. That should be our priority, making
sure that the people who are most under pressure are helped rather
than the people who are under less pressure. I am not suggesting
for a moment that our infantry battalions have not been under
pressure, that is certainly the case, but the real challenge in
recent years has been to supply the supporting elements to those
battalions when they have deployed, and that is precisely why
we judge it best to use the 2,500 posts freed from Northern Ireland
to assist in relieving the pressure on those who have been most
stretched in recent years.
Q5 Mr Viggers: The Army normally
runs with a shortfall below its establishment, does it not?
Mr Hoon: It has done in recent
times. I would hope that the Committee would welcome the fact
that we are recognising the reality of our current position. Again,
the real issue is not so much the size but the capability that
we have across the armed forces. Undoubtedly we could massively
increase, probably in quite a short space of time, the numbers
in the infantry with the right kind of inducements and the right
kinds of opportunities but that would not solve the problem. I
was asked this morning why would we not want to have more battalions
available for defence diplomacy, completely ignoring the fact
that a battalion if it was deployed in that way would still have
to have all of the logistics chain and support that is required
to sustain it in whatever operation it was involved in. You cannot
simply look at infantry battalions separate from the supporting
elements they require. I have an expert on my right hand side
on this subject, I am sure Mike would comment further on this
question.
General Sir Michael Walker: Would
you like me to?
Q6 Mr Viggers: The question that
an unsophisticated mind might address is this: bearing in mind
that there is overstretch in the Army how is this going to be
improved by a significant reduction in armed forces' strength?
General Sir Michael Walker: I
think the Secretary of State gave you the answer on that. One
of the problems we have had is that because we do arms plotting,
we put in baulk a number of units that cannot then be used for
anything else and that puts pressure even more so on those units
that are having to do the business. As we reach a situation where
the units have a home base, so to speak, they will be available
for use all the time and, therefore, your 36 battalions become
available for use so that is going to address that problem. I
would refer really to the Secretary of State's problem—and
you need to put these things in context—we do not go and
do operations with clean unsupported battalions who have no command
and control, no sustainability and no logistics. All we do is
we have a number of brigades and, by and large, our commitments
are based on a battle group, brigade or a divisional level of
effort. We have done nothing in this latest Defence White Paper
to prevent them deploying and producing the right number of boots
on the ground, in fact what we have done is we have made it rather
easier for them to do so. We are making sure now that the logistic
sustainability of a thing called a brigade with its infantry,
its engineers, its communications experts, all the ordnance and
driver experts is going to be able to do that rather better. To
argue this is a debate just about infantry manpower is quite wrong.
Q7 Mr Havard: You mentioned Northern
Ireland and the fact that troops are able to be released in Northern
Ireland effectively to increase the pool so you can relieve the
pressures and so on; this sort of quasi peace dividend, as it
were. Can you just clarify something: I thought there were four
battalions effectively coming back from Northern Ireland, is that
right?
Mr Hoon: That will be four battalions
relieved from the plot that we have to do. In fact many of them
have been rear based for a number of years so they have only been
available for Northern Ireland, in a sense, in emergencies. By
taking them off that plot then they are released for other duties
which we could not do confidently at the moment because we would
have to hold them in reserve in the event of there being a significant
deterioration.
Q8 Mr Havard: You mentioned a figure
of about 2,500, equivalence of bodies; I thought there was going
to be more than that. I am told by certain people that there are
about a thousand people who have got lost in the Irish Sea here.
The assumption of how many full time equivalents, if I could call
it that, who are going to be released by this process is about
a thousand less than what people originally anticipated from your
announcement about the number of people who are going to be released.
Have you anything to say about that?
Mr Hoon: I think strictly my brief
says up to 3,000, so I am being cautious in terms of 2,500.
Q9 Mr Havard: I have just found another
500 then.
Mr Hoon: I try and avoid "up
to" figures because it is rather like those figures in the
shops when it is sale time, I am always a little suspicious of
the headline targets. I tried to be as accurate to the Committee
as I thought was appropriate.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: To be precise,
Secretary of State, there are some reductions associated with
some of the reductions in heavy equipment. They do not make up
big figures but they might explain some of the arithmetic you
are talking about.
General Sir Michael Walker: Again,
to put in context, the normalisation process in Northern Ireland
eventually will have a different lay down, it will not just be
the infantry of course, there are three sets of brigade, and one
of them is closing now. The infrastructure which has supported
our deployment over there will fall, also, and they will add to
our ability to move manpower to where we want it or get rid of
it in that case where we do not need it, get rid of the posts.
The numbers are indicative at this stage but if you are talking
about purely four battalions' worth, you are talking about 2,500
and the other 500 come from various other drawdown posts.
Q10 Mr Havard: My concern is if there
is an assumption of a larger number being released, and planning
based on those assumptions, and then it is a substantially less
number of people who are released, then quite clearly the assumptions
are all wrong in the planning.
General Sir Michael Walker: Absolutely.
I understand that.
Q11 Mr Crausby: Future Capabilities
tells us that the future Army will have ". . . significantly
more capacity to meet the challenges of concurrent operations
overseas than it has today". Since overall numbers are being
cut, no matter how much, can I ask whether this will be at the
expense of availability for emergencies or other tasks that might
arise in the UK?
Mr Hoon: Obviously I would hope
not. I think it is important to concentrate on the capabilities
that we are looking at. Part of the limitation on deploying a
battalion, as I tried to explain earlier, is whether you have
enough support to go with that battalion. One of the problems
we have faced in recent times—and I am sure we have discussed
this before—in relation to two chains of logistic supply
we had at one stage in the Balkans—one servicing Bosnia
and the other Kosovo—it is an enormous strain on manpower
of maintaining those kinds of simultaneous chains. What this reorganisation
will do, it will give us more capacity and support and, despite
your question, will give us greater ability to deploy soldiers
than we have currently.
Q12 Mr Crausby: General Sir Mike
Jackson said: "What I am doing now will make the Army better
able to fight wars in ten to 20 years". Ten to 20 years is
a long time to plan for with unexpected circumstances, God forbid
that we should have to face what the Russians have recently had
to face in Beslan for instance. How much will these longer term
benefits affect us in shorter term capabilities?
Mr Hoon: I think we do have to
look ahead, and I am sure the Committee does when it is preparing
its reports, not least because adjustments in training, organisation,
the acquisition of equipment, are long term projects. We have
to make assessments, they are not easy, I am not pretending they
are always right but we have to make assessments of the future
strategic landscape and attempt to organise our armed forces to
be able to deal with those threats in a rapidly changing strategic
environment. This is not an exact science, I am not pretending
that we expect to get everything absolutely right. It is one of
the reasons, for example, why we have placed so much emphasis
in equipment on flexibility, on having the kind of equipment that
allows us to use our capabilities to maximum effect given the
change in the circumstances we might face. Instead of organising
specifically as we did in the Cold War to face a particular enemy
in a battle plan that was well worked and well understood, we
have to be able now to move troops to the far side of the world
at quite short notice, sustain them in a potentially hostile environment
and, therefore, flexibility is absolutely crucial to that ambition.
Q13 Mr Havard: You say that you are
not absolutely confident about getting everything absolutely right,
and I think that is absolutely fair. The question lots of people
ask is, is this the end, are these the numbers that we really
envisage will be the case in ten or 20 years or is this just a
first step in what might bring some more pain later?
Mr Hoon: As I implied earlier,
the one area of the Army that is relatively easy to adjust in
terms of numbers is in fact the infantry. It is something we could
increase quite quickly if we needed to. We judge that this is
the right range of capabilities. I well understand why people
concentrate on the infantry, I am not diminishing in any way their
role or importance but that is not the Army. The Army consists
of a huge number of specialists and a huge number of very well
trained, sophisticated people that we have to have regard to,
also, when we are discussing future deployments.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think it is
just worth adding, the concept of readiness states. When we looked
at the political horizon and tried to work out what sort of scenario
contingencies we should need to size our forces for, we looked
at near and medium term and said: "One medium scale and up
to two small scale activities concurrently" as being what
we had been doing in the recent past and what, looking at the
political international horizon, we thought we might be doing
in the medium term. That does not exclude in any way the ability
to generate up to large scale operations should the circumstances
arise but we would expect then to have more warning time. In other
words, we do not expect the world situation to deteriorate so
rapidly into needing to put out large scale forces that we could
not—using the core capabilities flexibly that the Secretary
of State has mentioned—regenerate up to meeting a large
scale contingency. I just add this concept of readiness states
and how much time it would need to prepare to the issue.
General Sir Michael Walker: Could
I just add, the focus on numbers, of course, about the Army fails
to note that a future Army structure is much more than just about
the numbers of people in it, it is about modernisation, it is
about introducing digitisation network and open capability, it
is about introducing the future rapid effect system in the form
of a medium capability for the Army, it is about introducing a
watch keeper, UAVs, all these sorts of things. When General Mike
talks about making the Army better able, he is not talking there
about the fact that the number of tanks has come down, he is talking
about the package that is represented in the White Paper. Of course,
it is unlikely to be like that in 20 years' time, since when have
the forces stood still? This is the most remarkable thing. For
the first time in my life we are taking some positive things,
for which otherwise in the normal course of events the armed forces
would be being criticised, but what we have is people saying "No,
you should be staying the same". We have to modernise, to
move on, to face the modern threats around the world and it seems
to me that this is the right sort of direction to go in but certainly
it will not look exactly like this in 20 years' time.
Q14 Chairman: When we went through
the Options for Change—which I recall—the MoD were
very reluctant to tell us the criteria that were going to be deployed
in deciding which regiments were going to be merged and which
regiments were not going to be merged. When it comes to deciding
who the unlucky four are—one Scottish, three English—will
you tell us the criteria please by which that decision is likely
to be made?
Mr Hoon: I think certainly we
can set out the general principles of that. I think I mentioned
some of them in answer to questions when I made my statement.
Clearly one factor in that will be the level of recruitment of
the particular single battalion regiment, inevitably those that
are less good at recruiting are more vulnerable, it necessarily
follows. Equally, part of the structure is to try and establish
a clear and consistent footprint for the Army across the country—organised
already in divisions so it is not particularly novel—but
obviously there will be some changes based on that distribution.
Rightly, in my view, recruitment is going to be a significant
factor.
Q15 Chairman: Perhaps it might be
helpful in a parliamentary answer or letter to me, Secretary of
State, if you give a little more thought to the criteria because
people have a right to know why their regiment is being eliminated.
Geography is one factor, recruiting is another. Does that recruiting
include the Commonwealth and other troops that have been recruited?
Will it be with or without the additional overseas forces that
are being deployed because you find it difficult?
Mr Hoon: I have recruiting figures
for both so I insisted when I was looking at the figures for recruitment
that I was given the figures both including Commonwealth citizens
and not including so that will be considered carefully, certainly.
Q16 Chairman: When Lord Astor of
Hever asked in the House of Lords what Army regiments are under
establishment strength, in each case what is the full establishment
and what is the extent of any shortfall, Lord Bach said that he
provided information on all but the infantry. Frankly, the infantry
statistics could only be obtained at disproportionate cost. Now
it occurs to me infantry statistics of recruitment can be found,
the Headquarters Infantry Glasgow, Army personnel, the Director
of Infantry, the Ministry of Defence, any colonel/lieutenant colonel
of a regiment so why in a parliamentary answer did the MoD not
include the strength in 2004 of each of the infantry regiments
and the June 2004 shortfall? What is the cost? What is the excessive
cost?
Mr Hoon: It may well have been
that in order to supply the kind of precision that is required
in a parliamentary answer that the day to day snapshot would have
been difficult other than by physically ringing each and every
regiment to get that day's figures. Certainly we have available
to us the general picture and I am perfectly willing to share
that with the Committee.
Q17 Chairman: You are very welcome
to send Sharon along to use our telephone if you are so short
of cash that a telephone or fax is a disproportionate cost. What
I say, Secretary of State, is we will write a letter, after collusion
with your Department, which will provide us with the information
on how many each regiment is short of, what the targets are, how
well they are doing, so that at least we have some idea of the
criteria that you might be taking into account when you are making
a final decision. That is okay, we will work on that fairly quickly.
If I might digress ever so briefly and say the criteria for Options
for Change appeared to be which regiment had a heavy hitter in
key decision making positions? The Director of Infantry, his regiment
was untouched by any mergers. I would not want to embarrass anybody
in high positions now but that was the correlation, which seemed
to be the principal criteria. Will you give us assurances that
the decision will be made—if it is to be made to bust four
regiments—on perfectly rational grounds that will be explained
to give assurance to people that it is not cabal like decision
making which I have seen in the past?
Mr Hoon: Can I make it clear that
it will be based on objective consideration. Can I make it clear,
equally, that decision will be taken by me once the Army Board
have made their recommendation.
General Sir Michael Walker: This
business about the disbandment of four battalions puts it in a
rather stark context. The Army Board are going to make this plan
and they are working up to the autumn to do it, and they will
give their recommendation to the Secretary of State. As I see
it, the intention is not to get rid of all the bits and pieces
that represent what you now refer to as particular battalions,
the plan is to form into large regiments, half the infantry are
already in large regiments, the other half are in small regiments.
I would encourage you to get up and talk to people in the Army.
The vast majority of people in the Army say it is about time we
got on with this because it has been an impediment to the way
we manage our business, particularly when you are a busy set of
armed forces and you need to use your infantry battalions for
operational overseas tours. The first thing is we are not talking
about everything disappearing. The second thing is that people
are consulting and I think you will find if you go around to your
constituencies or to the constituencies of those who are most
anxious, they will find that the colonel/commandant of the Scottish
division is indeed consulting with the Scottish regiments to find
out how they want to do it. They have been given the flexibility
to do it in a number of different ways and they will choose. That
seems to me to be a very sensible way to do it. The actual criteria,
if you like, by which the numbers have come down in certain areas
are exactly as the Secretary of State says, and I am sure there
is no difficulty in providing the rest of the considerations that
the Army Board took at the time. Do go and talk to people. It
is those outside the system and those who are least familiar with
what is going on who have the strongest views about whether these
things should stand or fall. It is not the manpower that is going,
it is the structure of the Army that is going to allow us to fight
things better as Mike Jackson says.
Q18 Chairman: Perhaps we have been
talking to different people. A few more questions, if I may. Are
you going in for a homogenous structure in which all divisions
are going to be identical? Are they going to be three battalions,
four battalions?
Mr Hoon: No, they are not. I think
there will still be enormous diversity across the structure and
"homogenous" is not quite the word that I might use.
It will be consistent in the sense that there will be structures
right across the United Kingdom that will be consistent one with
another. There will no longer be single battalion regiments, as
General Walker has indicated. There will be structures that we
have already in large parts of the Army duplicated elsewhere.
That is a necessary consequence, incidentally, of ending the arms
plot. It is important to stress that those who in principle support
the idea of ending the arms plot have also got to be willing to
advocate a means of delivering that, and what we are proposing
is for that reason.
General Sir Michael Walker: That
is absolutely right.
Q19 Chairman: During the SDR there
were certain things that were excluded—nuclear weapons and
Eurofighter. Which infantry regiments were out of the frame? The
Ghurkhas, the Guards, the Parachute Regiment? Who else?
General Sir Michael Walker: None
of them were out of the frame, they were all considered.
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