Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140 - 159)

WEDNESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2004

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JOCK STIRRUP KCB AFC ADC

  Q140  Chairman: May I largely endorse what my colleague has said. With your budget severely constrained we cannot expect you to bear the burden of industrial and economic policy in Scotland or Wales or Northern Ireland or anywhere, but does your appraisal include the consequences of closure for the economy as a whole? We hear a lot about joined-up government, will there be joined-up government with this airfield review where what might be great for the Royal Air Force or Ministry of Defence budget might be pretty damning, indeed catastrophic, for a community which appears to be largely dependent upon the Ministry of Defence? Are you being joined-up in your approach, Air Chief Marshal?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: Our business cases always take account of the wider issues: social, economic, industrial impacts.

  Q141  Mr Roy: Disproportionate impacts?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: That is something which the business case would have to judge.

  Q142  Chairman: Will that business case be published eventually or is it internal to the Ministry of Defence?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I am not sure of the rules on that, Chairman, I will have to get back to you.

  Q143  Mr Roy: Please do not tell me that for ten minutes you have been doing all this equally and everything will be clear and then you fling in a one liner at the very end that you may not publish it because if you say that you have just null and voided the last ten minutes of what you have been saying because no-one will believe you or the MoD unless they see the evidence of how you came to the decision to close.

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: Fortunately that is not what I said. What I said was I do not know what the regulations are.

  Chairman: I think you have made the point. Read the Glasgow Herald tomorrow.

  Q144  Mr Viggers: My questions are about the total aircraft numbers. In the document Future Capabilities, page 18, there is a table of overall force levels and some of them are very specific: for instance, 36 infantry battalions, 25 destroyers and frigates, even 83 transport and tanker aircraft, so those are specific statements of numbers. The figure for offensive aircraft is the number of "deployable force elements" and for air defence aircraft "deployable aircraft and the aircraft held at readiness for the QRA air defence of the UK". We know that the MoD has committed publicly to purchasing 232 Typhoons and 150 Joint Strike Fighters. In evidence to the Committee's 2001-02 report on Major Procurement Projects the MoD went into some detail on Eurofighter and it said an active fleet of Typhoons would be 137 aircraft and then it went into detail about the number of squadrons and so on. Why, uniquely, does Future Capabilities list only the number of deployable fast jets rather than the total fleet?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I cannot answer for how that particular paper was constructed but what I can do is try to explain the difference between listing force elements and listing total fleet size. In considering our operational capability we have to think not just of the aircraft but of the people, the crews, because highly trained, highly skilled crews are just as important at delivering the operational capability as the aircraft and systems themselves are. That means that those crews have to be trained and that requires flying hours. If you look at the number of force elements that you will apply as a maximum on an operation that will tell you what sort of size of air crew force you need to sustain. It will depend upon the crew ratio that you deploy on the operation, typically 2:1 for the Royal Air Force; it will depend upon how many additional combat ready crews you have to leave back in the United Kingdom, for example for QRA, but also to continue the training of the new crews coming through; it will depend upon what percentage of your squadrons at any one time are not combat ready because they are still working up. That will give you your total frontline crew size. That will also tell you the size of the operational conversion units you need to train people to feed that frontline. You will also have to add in things like the operation evaluation units which are developing doctrine and tactics. That will give you your total air crew size for a given aircraft type and that in turn will generate an annual requirement for a certain number of flying hours. Aircraft, in a sense, are commodities, they wear out, you use up their fatigue life over time and, unfortunately, despite our best efforts you occasionally lose some through accidents. Given an annual requirement for flying hours across a 25/30/35 year life of an aircraft type you can work out from that how many platforms you are going to need over that very long period to generate that number of flying hours. That gives you your total fleet size and—I stress—your total fleet size over the entire life of the aircraft which can stretch out, as we know, to a quarter or a third of a century or more. Ideally, of course, we would only buy those aircraft when we needed them, when the ones we had in the frontline were worn out through attrition or fatigue life but, of course, industrial production does not work like that and you have to have a sustainable production line of a particular aircraft type. That is what generates the requirement for your total fleet. There is a distinct difference between the size of force you are going to employ on an operation and the total fleet size you will need over a very long period of years to generate the flying hours to train the crews.

  Q145  Mr Viggers: Yes, because the Secretary of State has told us that we can manage requirements with a smaller number of fast jets. That was his explanation for the disbandment of a Tornado 3 squadron and three Jaguar squadrons. We are interested to know how these decisions affect the numbers of Typhoons in the active fleet.

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: As I said in response to an earlier question, at the moment we are focused very much on developing the capabilities in tranche 1 and tranche 2 for which we hope we will have a contract some time in the near future. The total fleet requirement is something that will need to be addressed when we look at tranche 3 in due course.

  Q146  Mike Gapes: Can I ask you about the Joint Strike Fighter and the reported difficulties there are with the short takeoff vertical landing version of that aircraft and the serious weight problems there are. It has been reported that the solution to this is a significant reduction in the capacity of the weapon bay. What are the implications of that? What impact will that have on the operational capability of the Joint Strike Fighter?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: It has no direct implications for the United Kingdom. The reduction in the size of the weapon bay means that it will not be able to house the 2,000lb class of weapon internally in the weapon bay but it could, of course, still carry it externally.

  Carriage of a 2,000 lb class weapon is not one of our key user requirements for the joint strike fighter. I would also just say that in terms of weapon development for the future, the trend is very much towards a smaller class of weapons, towards a more tailored effect which minimises collateral damage, for example—just one example—the small diameter bomb programme which the United States is pursuing at the moment. So as far as our operational requirements are concerned, that does not have any impact.

  Q147  Mike Gapes: What about if you were carrying a weapon on the exterior of the aircraft, bearing in mind this is supposed to be a stealth aircraft? Is that not a problem? Does that not have an impact?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: Yes, but we have other aircraft which can carry the 2,000 lb class weapon. The 2,000 lb class weapon is of course for a particular type of target and increasingly in the future we are going to be looking at smaller classes of weapons. So I could not sit here today and say, "We will never want to carry a 2,000 lb class of weapon on JSF", but what I can say is that given the trend of weapon development and given the capabilities we have in other parts of our inventory, such as on Tornado GR4, such as on Typhoon in due course to deliver 2,000 lb weapons, this would not be a serious constraint for us with regard to JSF.

  Q148  Mike Gapes: But you would confirm that if you did carry it, it would have to be outside rather than inside and therefore it would reduce the stealth capability?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: Yes, it would.

  Q149  Mike Gapes: The JSF is over budget and late. Figures have been given of 1.4 billion over the UK budget. When can we now expect it to enter service for the RAF?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: We are still working on a date of around 2012 for the first aircraft appearing, but we will have to see what the implications are of the restructuring of the programme which the prime contractor has made over the last few years, not least to address the weight problem. We do not know at the moment what the implications are because there are efforts to recover some of the lost time in other parts of the programme.

  Q150  Mike Gapes: When will the in-service date be set formally? You said "around 2012", I understood it was originally earlier than that, and around 2011 had been mentioned.

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: No, 2012 has been the date up to now. Again without wishing to seem to duck the question, it is not possible to have that degree of precision at this stage of the programme. We have to understand that we are talking about development programmes at the cutting edge of technology which will run into problems. It is unthinkable that they would not run into problems. So whether there will be an impact on the in-service date and, if so, what that impact will be, are things which are impossible to forecast at the moment.

  Q151  Mike Gapes: Can I move on to some questions relating to the number of aircraft, the maximum number of offensive and air defence aircraft available for deployment? The Future Capabilities document states that we will be able to deploy up to 84 fast jets. Within what sort of timescale would such a deployment on that scale be possible?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I think it said up to 80 fast jets, up to 64 offensive fast jets.

  Q152  Mike Gapes: Okay, we can check that.

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I think I am right. How long will it take to deploy 80 fast jets? Again, it depends. If we were deploying just 80 fast jets, it would take a certain period of time, but almost inevitably we will not, we will be trying to deploy a lot of other things as well—land forces, various other elements of our force structure—so the priority we give to each bit of that force structure will depend on the environment and the operational circumstances at the time. All I would say is that in Op Telic last year we deployed roughly the same amount of materiel, the same number of people as we did for the Gulf War in 1991, and did it in half the time. That included 70 fast jets. We are working to improve our deployment capability all the time, so I would expect that figure if anything to come down.

  Q153  Mike Gapes: The table actually has got 20 air defence aircraft and 64 offensive support aircraft, which does add up to 84. I do not know whether within your 64 or your 20 there is a variation. Is this to do with the QRA?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would have to look at the table and the detailed numbers, but what I can say is that in terms of expeditionary deployment the plan is to deploy up to 80 fast jet aircraft.

  Q154  Mike Gapes: Is that for a large scale operation?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: For a large scale operation.

  Q155  Mike Gapes: And in high readiness?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: Yes.

  Q156  Mike Gapes: So it would not necessarily need a significant period in order to prepare those aircraft?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: It depends what you mean by "significant period", they would not all be able to deploy within 48 hours, but then they are not all required to be deployed within 48 hours. They would all be able to meet the readiness states at which they sit. Within that force structure, and I do not want to go into detail in this forum, we would have so many aircraft of one type at a certain readiness state and then so many at a slightly lower readiness, but all within the high readiness bracket, and they would all be able to deploy within those timescales, and usually when we are called upon to do it quicker, we can.

  Q157  Mike Gapes: Perhaps you can send us a note with more information, if you cannot give it verbally?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would be delighted, yes.

  Q158  Mike Gapes: What are the main constraints which have meant that we are talking about 80 or 84?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: The main constraints on the total number?

  Q159  Mike Gapes: Yes.

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: It is a matter of judgment in terms of overall capability. It would be nice to have more aircraft deployed, but to have more aircraft deployed would mean less resource available to spend on other things which we believe are more important for overall effect, overall capability, so inevitably it is a question of balancing numbers against all the other parts of your force structure which go together to create that total effect. What one is seeking to do is maximise the effect created for any given level of resource.


 
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