Government response
1. This memorandum constitutes the Government's response
to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee's report, Defence
White Paper 2003 (Fifth Report of Session 2003-04, HC 465-1,
published on 1 July 2004). The Government welcomes the Committee's
Report.
2. The Ministry of Defence published its once-a-Parliament
White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World on
11 December 2003 (Cm 6041). It provided an updated assessment
of the security environment, and serves as a policy baseline against
which the Department evaluated the structures and capabilities
required by the Armed Forces to carry out the operations they
can expect to undertake. The conclusions of this work were set
out in a further Command Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing
World: Future Capabilities that was published on 21 July 2004
(Cm 6269). This covers many of the issues revisited by the Committee's
report. These two Command Papers represent an evolution of the
expeditionary strategy articulated in the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review (SDR), and built on the conclusions of the SDR New Chapter
of 2002 (Cm 5566) and recent operational experience.
3. It identified the three key challenges to our
peace and security that now confront us: international terrorism,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and weak and
failing states.
4. In responding to these challenges, the White Paper
sets out the need for a rebalancing of the UK's Armed Forces to
reflect the most likely military operations. In addition to our
standing Military Tasks and overseas commitments, our Armed Forces
must be optimised to conduct three concurrent Small and Medium
Scale operations, at least one of which is an enduring peace support
operation. This reflects our experience of the pattern of operations
since the SDR, and is what the Department and military leadership
judge the trend to be for the foreseeable future. These forces
must be capable of rapidly projecting military effect further
afield than the core regions set out in the SDR (Europe, the Near
East, North Africa and the Gulf) to encompass sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia, and to meet the wider threat from international
terrorism on a global basis. Key to this will be our ability to
exploit successfully the benefits to be derived from advances
in technology; in particular those associated with Network Enabled
Capability (NEC).
5. In building this into our plans, the Armed Forces
must retain the flexibility to adapt at longer notice for the
less frequent, but more demanding Large Scale operations. The
policy set out in the White Paper seeks to strike this balance.
We will plan to maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities to ensure
that we are able to conduct limited national operations, or be
the lead or framework nation for coalition operations at Small
and Medium Scale where the US is not involved. But we do not need
to replicate the same spectrum of capabilities at Large Scale,
given that it is inconceivable that the most demanding of operations
could be conducted without the involvement of the United States
(either leading a coalition or as part of NATO), where we have
choices as to what we contribute.
6. In planning for the future the Department will
concentrate on enhancing our ability to deliver military effects,
and continue to move away from simply assessing military capability
by the numbers of platforms and personnel in the inventory. Future
capability will be measured against the characteristics of speed,
precision, agility, deployability, reach and sustainability, and
its ability to integrate rapidly with other capabilities to deliver
a specific military effect and swiftly combine with others to
achieve a different effect. In doing so, the Armed Forces will
continue to provide support to the Home Office and other civil
authorities responsible for the security of the UK, including
at times of crisis.
7. The MoD will also ensure that the organisation
of the Armed Forces will reflect the reasonable aspirations of
its people in terms of, for example, greater geographic stability
in their home lives.
8. Changes to the force structure and future equipment
programme to support the policy set out in the White Paper were
announced on 21 July 2004. These ensure that we have the right
capabilities we need for the challenges ahead, and that we are
spending our resources in the best possible way.
Background to the Defence White Paper 2003
As the post-conflict stage in Iraq has shown,
a great deal more is required to achieve the objectives of an
effects-based operation, than advanced military technologies in
the hands of numerically small forces. (Paragraph 21)
9. We agree that national and international objectives
for such complex operations, particularly during the transition
from a conflict to a post-conflict situation, cannot be achieved
solely by military forces. Contributions from other Government
Departments, multinational organisations and the private sector
are essential elements, particularly for the process of rebuilding
security, social and economic infrastructures.
10. The 2003 Iraq conflict provides, however, a good
example of how we envisage the effects-based capabilities of the
Armed Forces contributing to overall goals. The Armed Forces achieved
rapid and precise military effects during major combat operations
in Iraq, before adapting to undertake post-conflict, stabilisation
and reconstruction tasks, in partnership with other Government
Departments, allies and partners and the Iraqi people, in support
of the broader UK and international effort.
We recommend that the MoD should explain more
fully how UK forces have supported the United Nations (UN); how
the UK expects to continue to do so; and how defence planners
see the UK's military role within the UN system in relation to
its roles within NATO and the European Union. (Paragraph 25)
11. Supporting Essay 1 to the Defence White Paper
provided an assessment of the roles of the UN, NATO and the EU
in responding to the strategic environment, and their inter-relationships.
As a permanent member of the Security Council the UK has particular
and continuing responsibility to ensure that the UN can deliver.
12. The MoD supports the UN in a number of ways,
for example:
a) providing sophisticated forces for coalition
operations implementing UN Mandates;
b) providing officers to key posts in UN missions
where we can make a valuable and influential contribution (e.g.
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan);
c) working with EU partners on a "battlegroup"
concept to offer rapid response capability for temporary and focused
support of UN operations;
d) training peacekeeping troops from third party
countries, particularly in Africa. This will enable the UN to
call upon a larger pool of quality manpower and African states
to do more of their own peacekeeping. In this, we are striving
to coordinate our efforts with key partners, especially France
and the US;
e) participating fully in cross-Whitehall efforts
to support the further reform and development of the UN Department
for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); and
f) engaging in the work of the High Level Panel
on the UN response to key challenges to international security.
13. We contribute some 7.4% of the costs of UN peacekeeping
(assessed costs). We currently have 22 military observers and
434 troops in UN operations. While this represents 1.07% of UN
military manpower, there is a qualitative dimension. Moreover,
this is slightly above our overall share of the world population
(0.92%).
14. Examples of the UK contribution to UN operations
include: a One Star Chief of Staff in Sierra Leone; a Colonel
Chief of Staff to the Force Commander in the Democratic Republic
of Congo; and a Lieutenant Colonel Military Assistant to the Force
Commander in Sudan.
15. The UK contribution to the UN is likely to remain
limited in terms of personnel on blue helmet missions. However,
considerable help, in the form of key members of UK staff, is
being provided to meet short notice requests for planning assistance
in UN DPKO during the current surge in peacekeeping operations.
16. EU/UN co-operation is developing well with contact
groups regularly exchanging ideas and seeking to develop more
effective working practices. These include the proposal for a
"clearing house" concept, which allows greater co-ordination
of individual EU Member States' contributions to UN missions—here,
the UK is pressing for better co-operation and synergy between
the three organisations—UN/NATO/EU—in order to avoid
duplication of effort.
While we note the co-operation between MoD and
FCO at the policy level (such as on Conflict Prevention Pools)
we believe that the future operational demands of effects-based
thinking will require even greater collaboration. (Paragraph 31)
17. We agree with the Committee's conclusion that
effects-based planning and operations have implications across
government. The MoD will continue to work closely with other government
departments—particularly the FCO and DFID—to ensure
that military effects-based planning complements wider strategic
planning and the cross-government effort on crisis prevention
and management, and close, integrated working on the planning
and execution of operations and their aftermath.
Strategic Environment
We are disappointed that a policy document that
could have far reaching implications has been presented with little
or no detail on the relevant procurement decisions, funding questions
or likely changes in force structures and consequent effect on
personnel. (Paragraph 35)
18. The White Paper provided a comprehensive statement
of Defence policy and the strategic context in which our Armed
Forces operate. The Secretary of State for Defence made clear
when publishing the White Paper last December, and indeed to the
Committee, that further work was underway to develop the appropriate
force structures and forward equipment programme. This work has
now completed, and its conclusions were set out in a further Command
Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities
that was published on 21 July 2004.
What has emerged in the past six years is the
extent to which the Armed Forces have been operating at the limits
of what they can achieve. The Strategic Defence Review's (SDR)
planning assumptions provided relatively little resilience to
enable the services to re-orientate when called upon to do so.
(Paragraph 37)
It may be rash of the White Paper to state that
"we expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the
future", just after its predecessor document—the Strategic
Defence Review—has had to be substantially amended, not
least because unforeseen developments in the security environment
have led to changes in operational demands. We are not convinced
that expecting things to follow a similar pattern to the recent
past is the best way to shape UK defence policy in an era of rapid
change. (Paragraph 42)
19. The force structure changes that the 2003 White
Paper heralded will better enable our Armed Forces to carry out
the operations they are most likely to undertake, and specifically
address resilience in those areas of the force structure that
have been under most pressure since the SDR. Much of the SDR remains
valid today; in particular, the expeditionary strategy and modernisation
programme it initiated. It provided a fundamental rethink of how
the UK's Armed Forces, including their supporting infrastructure,
should be structured to meet the increasingly complex security
environment that followed the Cold War and the emergence of instability
in many areas of the world.
20. The SDR New Chapter and the 2003 White Paper
represented a refinement of the assumptions we made at the time
of the SDR, reflecting enduring strategic threats. In particular
operational experience since 1998 demonstrated that our Armed
Forces are more likely to be engaged on a series of concurrent,
Small and Medium Scale operations, rather than the simple pattern
of Large or Medium Scale operations that had formed the focus
of our planning assumptions at the time. Our analysis of future
trends is that this pattern of operations is likely to continue,
but we must retain the flexibility for Large Scale operations
as we did for Operation TELIC.
We are left wondering whether the Defence White
Paper is properly set in the strategic context of Britain's security
circumstances, or whether it is more a reflection of what the
UK has actually been doing for the last three years, and the existence
of a number of legacy systems of whose continuing importance the
MoD is uncertain. In other words it is far from clear whether
the review process has actually been effects-led, or rather resource
driven. (Paragraph 46)
21. Modernisation on the scale the White Paper envisages
is clearly a major challenge requiring significant investment
and prioritisation. But the 2004 Spending Review increased the
defence budget by £3.7Bn in the Spending Review period (an
average real terms increase of 1.4% per year). The resource challenge
is one that the Government is determined to meet.
We are not convinced that an essentially reactive
approach to defence of the UK homeland is satisfactory given the
nature of the threat to the UK today. (Paragraph 48)
The approach of fighting terrorism at distance
has informed all of the MoD's work since 11 September 2001, but
ultimately assumes that terrorists will agree to fight on our
terms and in places of our choosing. As UK Ministers and officials
regularly warn, they may choose to bring the campaign closer to
our region, or indeed to the UK itself. In the context of repeated
attacks on the UK we do not think that MoD's assumption would
be sustainable. (Paragraph 49)
22. The Government agrees that a pro-active approach
to defending against terrorism is preferable and makes no assumption
that terrorists will "fight on our terms and in places of
our choosing". It has put in place a comprehensive counter-terrorism
strategy which will ultimately address all aspects of the challenge
of terrorism both at home and abroad, using all of the means available
in the best way possible.
23. In the UK, the Home Office is responsible for
counter-terrorism policy and the lead for domestic security lies
with the civil agencies. The Government has made very substantial
investments in domestic counter-terrorist capabilities across
the board, from intelligence to consequence management.
24. The SDR New Chapter (Cm 5566) spelt out the areas
where Defence capabilities contributed to domestic security and
where improvements were required.
25. The Government has therefore maintained (and
made a number of enhancements to) those specialised military capabilities
whose use is essential within the UK including hostage recovery,
explosive ordnance disposal, and air and maritime integrity.
26. More generally, the Government does not believe
it is an efficient use of resources to establish a permanent dedicated
cadre within the Armed Forces for consequence-management tasks
in the UK. However there are long-standing and effective arrangements
by which military resources can be made available in emergencies
under the principles of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
(Military Aid to the Civil Power, Military Aid to Other Government
Departments, and Military Aid to the Civil Community) to undertake
those tasks for which they are suited.
27. These arrangements are being maintained and enhanced.
The New Chapter improved the capacity of the Armed Forces to respond
to requests for assistance, and their ability to engage in contingency
planning with the civil authorities, both by establishing a new
capability in the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force and strengthening
the regional chain of command.
28. In any particular situation, Ministers will have
to make a decision on the best use of the available military resources,
depending on the severity of the civil emergency, the relative
importance of deployed operations and the impact of the commitment
on the recuperation, training and exercising of units not operationally
deployed, and on the morale and well-being of Service personnel.
A civil emergency is no different in this regard to any other
short-notice task.
Effects-based operations
We note that MoD has only "begun to develop"
capabilities to provide a range of options other than having to
resort to traditional attritional warfare methods. We are disappointed
at the apparent lack of progress in developing capabilities to
provide non-kinetic options. (Paragraph 52)
29. As the Committee has identified, "effects-based
operations" embrace both kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
Kinetic effects have been the basis of military operations for
many years, and, as such, are well understood. Non-kinetic means
were also used with some success during Operation TELIC and UK
Armed Forces already have some capability in the information operations
and electronic warfare areas among others. Only recently, however,
have the doctrine, technology and understanding of the intelligence
required to exploit the potential of non-kinetic effects started
to mature. As technology, doctrine and other work develop the
MoD will continue to consider and develop capabilities, including
non-kinetic, which enhance the operational effectiveness of UK
Armed Forces. During 2005 we expect to improve our limited information
operations capability, including radio broadcast, leaflet and
television production.
We believe that focussing on network enabled capability
risks emphasising technology at the expense of a thorough consideration
of the utility and application of military force and its judicious
and appropriate use in effects-based operations. In our view the
three critical elements identified by the Chief of the Defence
Staff (sensors, a network and shooters), which were previously
set out in the SDR New Chapter, will require a vital fourth element
of effective decision-making, which is not a consequence of NEC
but a requirement for the realisation of effects-based operations.
(Paragraph 62)
30. NEC is intended to improve understanding of events
in the battlespace and to improve the delivery of military effect.
As well as affecting existing and planned equipment, it will require
progressive changes to doctrine, training and command and control
arrangements to take advantage of the new capabilities. We agree
that the decision-making processes will need to adapt to the new
opportunities presented by NEC and it is recognised that NEC should
be considered in the context of effects-based operations using
military and non-military resources and employing a range of instruments
(diplomatic, military and economic).
We believe that MoD's discussion of the evolution
of warfare has not always distinguished sufficiently clearly between
the concepts of network enabled capability (NEC) and effects-based
operations (EBO). NEC may contribute to the delivery of military
effect in support of EBO, but it is not a prerequisite for it,
or indeed, necessarily the main contributor towards an effects-based
operational outcome. (Paragraph 64)
31. Chapter 4 of the White Paper describes how effects-based
operations focus on desired outcomes and contribute to a wider
cross-government strategy. Network Enabled Capability, on the
other hand, concerns the coherent integration of sensors, decision-makers
and weapons systems along with support capabilities. NEC will
deliver the knowledge superiority and ability to apply rapid and
precise military effect that will enable us to exploit the full
potential of EBO.
While the improvements in precision, accuracy
and fire power are obvious, we have found less evidence that adequate
resources have been devoted to the provision of the intelligence
capabilities, including human intelligence, and cultural understanding
which are essential to underpin these technological advances.
(Paragraph 68)
32. The Future Capabilities Paper recognises that
technological advances (and stand-off sensors, in particular)
will not remove the requirement for timely and accurate human
intelligence, particularly in the field at operational and tactical
levels. The rebalancing of the Army that the Paper outlines will
include a reinvestment of resources into additional intelligence
staff to enhance our deployable human intelligence capability.
We agree that effects-based operations should
embrace the whole gamut of military and cross government capability
and support the Government's goal of better fusing all elements
of national capability to strategic ends. However, we believe
that the limits of what the military can achieve in effects-based
operations on their own needs to be understood by all parts of
the MoD and across Government departments. (Paragraph 69)
33. The Effects-Based Operations Concept is currently
being drafted and will be shared with other Departments to secure
a common understanding of effects methods and terminology. An
effects-based approach focuses on what is to be achieved (outcome
focused) rather than how to achieve it (activity focused). Such
an approach is optimised by collaborative cross-government working
but will also improve individual Departments' outputs and will
provide an effective approach to the complex operations of the
future.
We are not convinced that mass "effect"
alone will be enough in meeting the challenges faced by UK, since
in many situations we will still require the capacity for mass
"presence" as well. (Paragraph 72)
34. We agree that sometimes the presence of substantial
forces is necessary to achieve the desired effect, for example,
deterrence or stabilisation, though we expect that in such scenarios
the UK will be acting in a coalition and thus only have to provide
part of the force. In other situations the effect can be achieved
with less 'mass'. A clear understanding of the required effect
and the choice of actions available should allow us to achieve
our objectives more efficiently than has been the case in the
past.
It is impossible to assess whether the application
of network enabled capability to fewer platforms will really produce
greater (or even equal) effect, without any discussion of the
costs of embracing these technologies and the structural implications
for the armed services of such developments. (Paragraph 73)
35. The force structure changes that are being introduced
(as outlined in the Future Capabilities Paper) will deliver flexible
and adaptable Armed Forces that are properly equipped and structured
to carry out the most likely pattern of concurrent Small and Medium
scale operations. The relative costs of different ways of conducting
operations were part of the analytical process. The changes we
are making are about shaping the Armed Forces to conduct the type
of operations we expect them to face in the future.
36. Key to this will be taking advantage of developments
in technology and network enabled capability which will enable
our Armed Forces to act ever more quickly, precisely and effectively,
and increase the military effect they can deliver. This will allow
them to deliver the desired military outcome with fewer but more
capable, linked assets.
We believe that a policy of reducing the existing
number of platforms in advance of acquiring the new capabilities
(and of demonstrating their effectiveness) is potentially dangerous.
(Paragraph 74)
37. As highlighted in the Future Capabilities Paper,
there are certain areas where we judge our current capability
is disproportionately high now for the actual level of threat
(anti-submarine warfare and air defence, in particular). This
judgement was not dependent on new capabilities. We also identify
the capabilities in which we need to invest. It is therefore prudent
to reduce some capabilities now, whilst restructuring and investing
in our priority areas.
We accept that there is every justification in
seeking the benefit from advances in technology to deliver decisive
effect when it is required. However, we believe the UK's future
security challenges, on the scale of the effort envisaged, require
the retention of the existing scale of forces, plus the benefits
of network-enabling capabilities. Otherwise, the Armed Forces
will be unable to operate without again placing unsustainable
demands on service personnel. (Paragraph 79)
We believe MoD has not addressed the issue at
the heart of effects-based operations—the difference between
the "projection" of force and the "presence"
of force. We fully support the idea of devoting further resources
to enabling assets and achieving more deployable forces. We do
not however believe that this should be at the expense of reasonable
scale. In high-tempo, high intensity operations (and in engaging
targets of opportunity), projection forces may be sufficient.
But as extensive peace support operational experience has demonstrated,
the UK may also be called upon to provide presence and for that
there is still no substitute for numbers. We believe that true
effect is a product of quality and scale. Effects-based operations
may in some circumstances reduce the required numbers of people
and platforms, but they cannot be regarded as an all-purpose substitute.
We believe that any reduction in the establishment of the Army
would be premature. (Paragraph 84)
38. At their heart, military operations will remain
a human activity. Technology will be used to support the decision-maker.
Equally, technology will not replace the value of deployed personnel
across the spectrum of conflict; rather it will make our Armed
Forces more effective. For instance, in enduring peacekeeping
operations for which the UK already—and rightly—has
an unparalleled reputation, deployed personnel will be assisted
by sophisticated technology.
39. The White Paper identifies a mix of enduring
and non-enduring operations and the range of strategic effects
we need to plan to achieve whilst conducting them—usually
as part of a coalition. Achieving some effects will be more manpower
intensive than others; effects-based operations should improve
the planning and conduct of operations, and new technologies will
assist in achieving military effect more rapidly and decisively.
40. However, we recognise that in some operations
numbers will be key, and are restructuring the Army to significantly
increase the manpower available for expeditionary operations.
In this respect, the restructuring of the infantry, made possible
by the progress made towards a lasting peace in Northern Ireland,
will be key. We have been able to reduce the number of infantry
battalions to the Province by four; a move which, owing to the
need to rotate battalions through this task, has actually freed
up 16 battalions for use on other tasks. The manpower freed-up
by this move will be re-distributed across the Army, not only
to develop more robust and resilient unit establishments within
the infantry, but also to bolster the most heavily committed specialists
such as logisticians, engineers, signallers and intelligence.
Additionally, the phasing out of the traditional practice of arms
plotting will further increase the efficiency and availability
of Army resources.
We believe that if the number of platforms in
certain key areas (such as large surface ships) was significantly
reduced, the UK Armed Forces would be vulnerable to any significant
combat attrition in future operations. We have not seen evidence
that this factor has been taken seriously enough into account
by MoD in its approach to platform numbers. (Paragraph 81)
41. The paper Delivering Security in a Changing
World: Future Capabilities, published in July 2004, explained
in detail the methodology used to determine the force structure.
Our force structure is designed to be sufficiently robust to allow
for attrition, though any need to replace assets lost through
attrition would clearly slow down the speed of recuperation of
the Armed Forces for future operations
We understand the necessity of placing high intensity
war-fighting at the heart of military training, but question whether
the continued emphasis on war-fighting skills is the correct way
of approaching the challenges of effects-based operations. We
recognise that while effects-based operations may alter the balance
between capabilities, the concept does not do away with the need
to have armed forces that can fight wars of the most demanding
type. However, in the wider strategic context, effects-based operations
place new demands on individuals at all levels to understand the
impact of their actions. We question whether the current emphasis
on training for war, supplemented by limited pre-deployment training
which hone skills for peace support operations, are adequately
equipping our service personnel for these much wider demands.
The current preoccupation with speed, agility, parallel operations,
decisiveness and tempo misses a vital human aspect of effects-based
thinking, which has significant ramifications for the way we train
our Armed Forces. We are not convinced that these have been adequately
addressed by the White Paper. (Paragraph 88)
42. The White Paper set out the extensive work already
underway to ensure that our troops are fully prepared for effects-based
operations. Our Servicemen and women remain the crucial component
to any military operation we undertake. The MoD fully recognises
this, and the White Paper has acknowledged the need to invest
in the development of capable and motivated Servicemen and women,
who possess both the necessary confidence and comprehensive skill
sets to adapt to unexpected challenges. The Defence Training Review
2001 set out clear objectives to advance individual education
and training, through high quality and robust means that stress
the need to be responsive to rapidly changing requirements and
opportunities.
Much of the talk about effects-based operations
and network enabled capability is still stuck in the world of
kinetic effect and physical destruction, with the higher order
psychological effects remaining elusive. The skills we are asking
of our Armed Forces in support of these operations are of a significantly
different and additional nature to what has previously been asked
of them, even for war-fighting and to ignore this risks sending
them unprepared into complex and dangerous situations. (Paragraph
89)
43. In any operation, now or in the future, the UK
will of course seek to achieve the full spectrum of effects, ranging
from the physical to the psychological. Steps to incorporate and
act upon the lessons learnt from our operations in Northern Ireland,
the Balkans and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq are already
underway—including the integration, initially at the strategic
level, of kinetic/physical targeting and information/psychological
operations. The benefits arising from this increased synergy have
already begun to emerge and we are exploring options to embed
an Effects-based Operations Cell in the Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ), the UK's operational headquarters. At the individual level,
the MoD recognises the need to continue to evaluate its effects-based
training and to adapt it accordingly. This is reflected in the
Defence Individual Training and Education Strategic Plan 2004
(that looks out to and beyond 2015), which has instigated a change
delivery programme to optimise training and education for expeditionary
operations, firmly placed within the Information Age. The plan
includes undertaking the necessary Joint training to deliver flexible,
multi-disciplined forces and innovative commanders with greater
situational awareness.
We believe that the advent of true effects-based
operations may have very significant implications for the nature
of military training and indeed on the structure of the Armed
Forces. (Paragraph 91)
44. The Committee is right to highlight the significant
implications that the advent of true effects-based operations
may have for the Armed Forces' training and structures. The MoD
is alert to the need to adapt to the changing environment and
develop more agile forces that are fully capable across the spectrum
of operations, ranging from high-intensity warfighting through
peace support to humanitarian activity, all of which may occur
simultaneously in the same operation. The White Paper provided
a comprehensive assessment of the principal changes affecting
the Armed Forces to achieve this, and initiated further work to
develop structures that offer broader utility across the range
of operations. Certainly, providing the right training for our
Servicemen and women is central to the delivery of the core competencies
that support effects-based operations. This is why the MoD, through
the Defence Training Review 2001 and its initiatives, has done
much already and continues to develop the right training regime
and the right training facilities. The importance of Service ethos
within the UK's Armed Forces, including the strong emphasis on
teamwork and values, will not change. It is this which continues
to drive and motivate our Servicemen and women, providing them
with the moral framework to overcome the challenges they may face.
Command Issues
We question whether it is reasonable to expect
people at the operational/tactical end of the spectrum to consider
constantly the full implications of their actions on the effects
sought, but we believe that this is a major implication of embracing
effects-based operations. We are not convinced that these challenges
have been properly grasped or addressed by the Defence White Paper.
(Paragraph 97)
45. This observation reflects a misunderstanding
of the nature of effects-based operations, which complement the
UK's manoeuvrist approach. By focusing on the effects that they
wish to achieve in a campaign or operation, Commanders are better
able to synchronise the actions of individual elements of their
force to achieve success. Their planning is translated into directives
and orders that express what has to be achieved without
constraining the freedom of action of their subordinates by telling
them how to achieve it. When the orders are executed, the
actions of units and individuals are governed by Rules of Engagement,
which set out the permissions and restrictions on the use of force.
The command chain needs to address the implications
of the actions of the few (in human rights abuse cases) more comprehensively
that it has done to date—to show that every possible step
has been taken to ensure that similar incidents do not occur in
future and such "effects" are not repeated. The fact
that similar incidents occurred among coalition forces in Afghanistan
before Iraq and in Somalia before that, should have warned senior
officers and civilian leaders as to the dangers. In effects-based
operations, the Armed Forces need to rigorously enforce observance
of acceptable standards of behaviour towards civilians, detainees
and prisoners by their personnel. (Paragraph 102)
46. The UK does not tolerate the abuse of people
under its duty of care. Commanders will continue to ensure that
all members of the Armed Forces are aware of their moral and legal
obligations.
The shift to high levels of expeditionary activity
around the world in support of "effects" can be seen
as evidence of the re-politicisation of defence policy. No longer
can defence be seen as supporting ends somewhat detached from
other aspects of foreign and domestic policy. Rather it will now
have to operate as an integral part of that political process,
with consequent changes in the position of the Armed Forces within
the political process. (Paragraph 104)
47. Defence has been, and will remain, an essential
means of achieving the UK's wider Foreign and Security Policy
objectives. This was as true during the Cold War as it is today.
We remain concerned that the demands of effects-based
operations on the higher command have not been fully appreciated
by the MoD. We recommend that in their reply to this report the
Government sets out its understanding of these developments and
their doctrinal implications. (Paragraph 106)
48. Effects-based operations and planning, by clearly
focusing on the effect required to achieve objectives, will provide
commanders at all levels with improved processes for determining
the best actions to be taken. As the EBO concept develops it will
undergo rigorous validation through an Integrated Analysis and
Experimentation plan to identify the impact on all Lines of Development,
including personnel. It is likely that there will be significant
impact on the high-level analysis, planning, execution and assessment
processes within the military, requiring senior commanders to
evolve and adapt their current practices to ensure that the military
contribution to EBO remains cogent.
We remain to be convinced that in an era of effects-based
operations and network enabled capability this aim (to be able
to plug into the US network as required) will be achievable, and
we will watch this with interest. (Paragraph 108)
49. We are already able to plug into some US networks
as necessary, for example the Blue Force Tracking system using
leased US equipment during Operation TELIC and the Link 16 data
link system for air and maritime platforms. Maintaining this ability
to fight alongside the US on the most demanding operations is
a continuing task and we are pursuing a range of initiatives and
developing concepts with the US to ensure that we can operate
together as and when appropriate. For example, radars of our frigates
and destroyers will be networked with those of US naval forces
when they are fitted with the UK version of the US developed Co-operative
Engagement Capability (CEC), we are conducting trials to demonstrate
interoperability between the BOWMAN radio system and the US equivalent
and we are active in NATO in taking forward NEC and interoperability
initiatives with the US and European Allies.
We conclude that the implications of effects-based
operations, utilising network enabled capability on coalition
operations have not been properly addressed in the Defence White
Paper. (Paragraph 109)
50. The White Paper emphasises the importance of
ensuring that our Armed Forces are prepared and equipped to lead
or act as framework nation for European (and other coalition)
operations at Small and Medium Scale where the US is not engaged.
This clearly places a premium on the ability of our Armed Forces
to operate seamlessly alongside other nations, particularly those
of our NATO and EU allies and partners.
51. However, as technology develops, it becomes even
more important that not just we, but all NATO partners invest
in capabilities that enable us to operate at the same tempo as
the US. We are actively encouraging this approach through the
Allied Command for Transformation and the development of the NATO
Response Force, with its emphasis on creating flexible, deployable
and technologically advanced and interoperable forces.
52. Similarly, the UK has strongly supported the
establishment of a capabilities focused European Defence Agency
to energise the development of capabilities and co-ordinate associated
acquisition policies.
53. Whilst we must ensure that our capability plans
are consistent with the direction in which the US is heading,
we must ensure that we avoid developing capabilities in isolation
from our other allies.
We have identified some of the reasons why we
believe that effects-based operations are going to be a huge challenge
for the UK Armed Forces. Unless the question of national red-cards
and caveats is urgently reviewed by NATO and the European Union,
the potential for ineffectual coalition deployments is significant.
The UK should beware of planning for operations in which small
UK force packages operating as part of a coalition are assumed
to be capable of achieving "effect". If they must rely
on coalition partners, there must be robust agreement on the "effects"
sought. This problem has the potential to undermine the UK's approach
to composite coalition operations. (Paragraph 111)
54. The full benefits from the adoption of an effects-based
approach (EBA) will be realised by taking the idea beyond national
boundaries and convincing our allies and coalition partners of
the efficacy of such an approach, enhancing international collaboration.
Encouragingly, many nations are giving consideration to the adoption
of an EBA.
55. Through proper operational force planning (which
is already an integral part of NATO and ESDP procedures), effective
force packages can be built to deliver the desired effect. Whilst
we seek to minimise coalition nations' Rules of Engagements (ROE)
caveats, so called 'Red Cards', we acknowledge that there will
always be certain national caveats on which nations will not be
able to compromise. Through proper planning it is usually possible
to work around these, so that although they might affect the way
an operation is conducted, they would not affect the achievement
of the desired outcome.
56. The capability or effectiveness of a force is
not necessarily related to its size. In our planning for operations
we consider that capable, albeit sometimes "small",
UK force packages operating within a coalition are fully able
to deliver "effect".
Force Structures and Personnel
We continue to be surprised at the slow pace with
which unmanned aerial vehicle technology is being embraced by
the UK Armed Forces. It does not seem that many of the effects-based
operational capabilities that the MoD indicated it was exploring
in the New Chapter have been significantly enhanced since, although
we welcome the introduction of Bowman radio ahead of its (albeit
revised) in-service date. A number of the key programmes identified
in the SDR New Chapter have either slipped further or remain unchanged.
We are concerned that the UK still does not have sufficient secure
data links to allow it to integrate with United States forces,
especially in the land environment. (Paragraph 113)
57. The Department is actively embracing new technologies
such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The early announcement
on 20 July 2004 of Thales as the preferred bidder for the WATCHKEEPER
UAV capability ahead of the main investment decision planned for
later this year confirmed that this important Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programme remains
on course. WATCHKEEPER will build on the capability represented
by the in-service PHOENIX UAV capability and the Joint UAV Experimental
Programme began work last year to examine the utility of UAVs
in roles beyond the WATCHKEEPER capability. As the Committee notes,
the BOWMAN communications system achieved its In Service Date
ahead of the target in March 2004. The ASTOR programme remains
on track and the assessment phase of the Future Rapid Effect System
(FRES) was approved in April 2004.
58. We are working to improve the capability to exchange
information securely with US forces in the land environment through
plans to enable the BOWMAN and FALCON communications systems to
interoperate with their US counterparts.
In evidence, the Secretary of State and the Chief
of the Defence Staff refused to discuss the current MoD work streams
in which a range of issues including future force structures are
being considered. We have been disappointed at the lack of openness
by MoD witnesses during this inquiry in responding to what we
believe have been reasonable and appropriate questions. (Paragraph
115)
We were disappointed that the Chief of the Defence
Staff prevented the Chief of the General Staff from answering
a question on future Army Step 2. We regret the level of secrecy
that has met our repeated requests for detail on the implications
of the White Paper for force structures, and personnel and urge
Ministers to review their approach to parliamentary oversight
of these matters. (Paragraph 130)
59. In announcing the publication of the White Paper
last December, and again in his opening remarks to the Committee
on 31 March, the Secretary of Defence made it quite clear that
the results of work to establish the precise force structures
and forward equipment programme to support the policy set out
in the White Paper would be published by the summer of 2004. That
work was detailed in the Future Capabilities Paper published on
21 July. Internal advice to Ministers in preparing such a paper
is customarily confidential.
We are surprised that the Army is prepared to
do away with, as yet unspecified, quantities of heavy armoured
forces when their replacement (FRES) remains a concept which has
not even left the assessment phase. (Paragraph 116)
60. Our priority is to rebalance our Land forces
so that they are better structured and equipped to conduct the
full range of military tasks on concurrent Small and Medium Scale
operations, whilst still being able to reconfigure at longer notice
to undertake Large Scale operations. The balanced Land force of
the future will comprise two heavy armoured brigades, three medium
weight brigades and a light brigade (in addition to the air assault
and Royal Marine Commando brigades). A full explanation of this
rebalancing is contained in the Future Capabilities Paper.
61. As the White Paper made clear, the first stage
in this process is the establishment of the new light brigade,
and the reroling of one heavy armoured brigade. There is no operational
reason why this move should be held up pending the introduction
of enhanced medium-weight capabilities, such as FRES.
The future challenge of close air support, demonstrated
by Afghanistan and repeated in Iraq, is how to supply timely and
precise air support to small numbers of friendly forces in non-linear
engagements, not how to destroy large enemy divisions such as
Saddam's Republican Guards. It is a problem that does not appear
to have been resolved by the MoD. Given the repeated references
to "jointery" in official policy documents we are surprised
that the operational practice of air-land integration has been
so slow to change. We recommend that MoD addresses this question
with much greater urgency than has been displayed to date. (Paragraph
123)
62. Failings in the Air/Land interface were recognised
in the Op TELIC Lessons and Project Coningham-Keyes (PC-K), a
joint initiative between FLEET, LAND and STRIKE Commands, initiated
to identify and address current capability shortfalls, with an
emphasis upon tactical level execution. High-level doctrine has
been improved by the publication, in October 2003, of IJWP 3-30
Joint Air Operations while AJP-3.3.2 Close Air Support (CAS),
currently under development by NATO, will provide more procedural
detail and, importantly, ensure compatibility for coalition operations.
PC-K identified lower, tactical level deficiencies, prompting
recommendations to enhance the current Joint Forward Air Control
Training and Standards Unit (JFACTSU) and establish additional
Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) in each Division and manoeuvre
Brigade. Command and Control improvements are sought by the proposal
to create, at 1 Star level, a new military post of Commander Joint
Air Land Organisation within HQ STRIKE Command; following initial
support from the 2 Star Policy Group and VCDS, the proposed organisation
is the subject of ongoing studies.
63. The requirement for greater interaction at tactical
level is also acknowledged, evidenced by Ex IRON STORM, which
integrated Tornado GR4, Jaguar GR3 and Harrier GR7 CAS into a
live fire Land exercise, and the STRIKE Command decision to reinforce
the 1 (UK) Armd Div TACP exercise in September 2004 in the Czech
Republic with 8 x GR 7 where the original exercise required just
2 x Hawks.
The Royal Navy target of no more than 660 separated
days in three years, or 220 in any single year, was broken during
Operation Telic for almost 100 personnel. (Paragraph 126)
64. No more than 660 separated days service in three
years is not a target, but rather a Personnel Functional Standard
(PFS) endorsed by the Navy Board. There is no PFS of 220 days
separated service in one year.
We believe work on dealing with excess stretch
is urgently required and represents one of the greatest weaknesses
of the Strategic Defence Review implementation to date. (Paragraph
127)
65. The White Paper makes it clear that the changes
we propose to introduce are specifically to optimise the Armed
Forces for the pattern of operations they are most likely to face:
multiple, concurrent Small and Medium Scale operations, that assume
an enduring commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement as
well as warfighting. The changes are designed to ensure that
we maintain high quality, flexible and adaptable Armed Forces
that are best equipped to meet the full range of the threats and
challenges we face.
66. At their heart is the restructuring of the infantry,
made possible by the significant progress made towards a lasting
peace settlement in Northern Ireland. Here, we have been able
to reduce by four the number of infantry battalions committed
to the Province—in practice, a commitment of 16 battalions
because of the need to maintain 24-month tour intervals. The manpower
this move frees up will be re-distributed across the Army, not
only to develop more robust and resilient unit establishments
across the infantry, but also to reinforce the most heavily committed
specialists such as logisticians, engineers, signallers and intelligence.
This, together with a greater availability of Army resources resulting
from the phasing out of the traditional practice of arms plotting,
will enhance our ability to meet the likely pattern of expeditionary
operations, whilst at the same time reducing the burden on our
personnel and the interval between operational tours.
Since the Strategic Defence Review, the MoD's
own harmony guidelines have too often not been achieved in terms
of the work-life balance of Armed Forces personnel. We have seen
no evidence in the White Paper that the demanding operational
tempo of the past six years and consequent stretch on too many
of our service personnel will not be repeated. We urge MoD to
place the achievement of harmony guidelines at the top of its
list of priorities. (Paragraph 132)
We believe that manpower shortages and the resultant
practice of "gapping" (not filling posts deemed non-essential)
must be tackled seriously and urgently by the MoD. Achieving full
manning levels must be a priority for the Armed Forces in an era
of regular deployments. (Paragraph 137)
67. Service personnel have been heavily committed
to expeditionary operations over the last few years. This pressure
has not been uniform across the three Services, or even within
them. The Department is keenly aware of the need to maintain a
balance between commitments and the available manpower. It follows
that we will continue to seek to ensure that our people are not,
routinely, required to exceed guidelines on individual separation.
68. Key to this for the future will be the force
structure changes that were announced on 21 July. These will ensure
that the Armed Forces are sufficiently balanced and flexible to
meet the security challenges outlined in the White Paper. Once
the new force structures are in place, the Services will be better
configured and balanced to meet and sustain operational commitments,
helping the Services to meet their harmony guidelines, and giving
our people a better work/life balance.
Should reserves act as an augmentation element
of the regulars, or as the providers of essential specialist capabilities?
Either way, in an era of regular operations, what it means to
serve in the reserves is changing and this will need to be understood
by the reservists themselves and their employers. (Paragraph 142)
69. The use of reservists to support such operations
is fully in line with the SDR, namely having more capable, usable,
integrated and relevant reserve forces, which support their regular
counterparts on operations overseas. Every individual joining
the Volunteer Reserve is made aware of his or her call-out liability
under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. During the Cold War, mobilisation
may have been considered unlikely, but this has changed. Since
NATO operations commenced in the former Yugoslavia, the Reserve
Forces have consistently provided between 10-15% of the total
UK manpower deployed in theatre and the call-out of reservists
to support Op TELIC has brought mobilisation even more to the
fore. Thus the Reserve Forces are no longer called on solely in
times of national emergency; as a part of the Total Force Concept,
they are used as and when their skills are needed for operations.
70. As a result of the lessons we have learned from
Op TELIC, mobilisation awareness training is being introduced
as part of routine annual training. This will inform reservists
about the process and likelihood of mobilisation. In addition,
building on the 2004 Defence White Paper, we are drafting a "Defence
Intent for Reserves" which will inform all interested parties,
including reservists and their employers, on the use of the Reserve
Forces in the future.
71. In addition, the MoD's SaBRE (Supporting Britain's
Reservists and Employers) campaign continues to provide information
and advice to employers on the role that reservists are expected
to play in today's environment.
Given that many reservists are mobilised for service
in units that are not close to their homes, we are concerned that
the MoD should be seen to be prioritising effective methods of
welfare support to the families of mobilised reservists, who in
many cases receive extremely short notice of call-out. (Paragraph
144)
In an era of reliance on the reserves to support
operational deployments, there will be an increasing requirement
for the MoD to look after reservists and their families. Although
there is no detailed information on this mater in the White Paper,
we were pleased to note some attention to this problem in the
Government's response to our Lessons of Iraq report. We recommend
that MoD considers mobilising Welfare Officers across all the
services where reservists are deployed. (Paragraph 147)
72. Much progress has been made since TELIC 1 and
improvements continue to be made in the welfare provision for
Reservists and their families. The single Services have all developed
welfare plans and in the case of the Army, where groups of soldiers
from a single unit continue to be mobilised, Commanding Officers
have authority to mobilise both the unit Welfare Officer and the
Unit Employment Support Officer (sometimes the same individual)
for the period of the unit's mobilised service. RAF and RN reservists
are nominated a dedicated Welfare Officer when they are mobilised.
Further studies on welfare provision for reservists are underway,
the results of which will assist us in improving welfare support
further.
It appears that the MoD still has not decided
how best to deploy reservists—as specialists or as formed
units. Efforts are under way to draw up databases of skill-sets
that the MoD can draw on, but the Secretary of State told us that
not all reserves want to use their specialisms, adding, "we
should not in principle mobilise people because of their civilian
skills". Nevertheless, we understand that the Territorial
Army is considering whether to use reserves as formed units or
as back-fillers for gaps in the future. In the Royal Navy all
reservists are used as individual back fillers, although following
a decision taken in 2002 to restructure the reserves to provide
niche capabilities where gaps existed, some fill specific specialisms
such as in psychological operations and civil-military co-operation.
A longer-term question is whether reserve units should train with
their regular partners so as to integrate better operationally,
a question that we have not had answered as yet. (Paragraph 145)
73. In the main reservists have not been called-out
specifically to fill specialist civilian administration roles.
Only two reservists from the Civil Affairs Group who volunteered
to be mobilised for Op TELIC have been called-out specifically
for their civilian skills. For the rest, the fact that they possessed
skills associated with their civilian employment which could be
utilised during the reconstruction of Iraq was fortunate, but
not planned. As part of the Op TELIC Lessons Identified work,
we are looking at the use made of civilian skills in theatre and,
as stated in the Committee's report, efforts are underway to draw
up databases of civilian skills. However, there are no plans to
compulsorily mobilise reservists for their civilian skills; any
such mobilisation would be on a voluntary basis.
74. It is not the case that the MoD has not yet decided
how best to deploy reservists. Reservists are deployed both individually
and as formed units as directed by operational need.
We welcome initiatives such as creating pools
of specialists ready to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction
work as important steps towards the realisation of true cross-departmental
effects-based operations and look forward to being updated on
their progress. (Paragraph 148)
75. Good progress is being made on the establishment
of permanent, improved structures and mechanisms across Whitehall
to address the challenges posed by military-civilian transitions
and post conflict reconstruction activity. An update to the House
on the detail, once finalised across government departments, is
expected this session.
We conclude that MoD has still not taken seriously
enough the need for a "predictable" element to be available
for civil emergencies at home. We remain to be convinced that
the MoD has adequately thought through the use of reserve forces
at home and away in an era of constant operational commitments
and a significant threat to the UK. (Paragraph 151)
76. The Government does not wish contingency plans
for civil emergencies to depend critically on support from the
Armed Forces. That would divert resources away from the overseas
component of its counter-terrorism strategy without improving
the capabilities of the civil agencies and emergency services
best able to respond to contingencies in the UK. Nonetheless support
from the Armed Forces will continue to be made available when
the need arises and the MoD is therefore fully engaged in the
development of contingency planning, both nationally and regionally.
The Government does not believe that the double-hatting of individual
reservists between their primary military roles and CCRFs undermines
the effectiveness of either the broader principles of MACA or
the overall utility of the CCRFs as a national resource alongside
the regular elements of the Armed Forces.
In our Lessons of Iraq report we criticised the
way in which the MoD had decided to require reservists to inform
their employers (and prospective employers) of their membership
of the volunteer reserves, which could have negative implications
for the employment prospects of some reservists. In its reply,
the Government argues that employers were automatically informed
of employee's membership of the reserves upon mobilisation and
did "not expect routine employers notification to have a
significant impact on employer support". This did not answer
our actual point about the interests of the reservists themselves.
(Paragraph 153)
77. As the Committee is aware, this subject has been
the topic of much debate both within MoD and with reservists and
employers. The results of our research prior to introducing Employer
Notification suggested that the more an employer understood about
the implications and the benefits of their employee being in the
Reserve Forces, the more supportive they tended to be. A reservist
who is confident of his employer's support will be more effective
and motivated than one who believes his employer is hostile to
his commitment.
We are pleased to note that the MoD is taking
seriously the pressures that have been placed on the reserves
in recent years. We welcome this, but would urge the MoD to avoid
exploiting the commitment and dedication of the reserves through
overuse. If the reserves are intended to fulfil an ever increasing
role in the Armed Forces, this will require fundamental structural
changes in the relationship between the regulars and reserves.
We await detailed proposals from the MoD on how it intends to
improve the terms and conditions of reserve service, both for
the reservists themselves and their families as well as their
employers. (Paragraph 154)
78. The Reserve Forces will continue to play a key
role in current and future operations. RFA 96 places statutory
limitations on the length of time reservists can be mobilised,
but as the Committee has noted in its report (paragraph 153) the
MoD is considering ways of further ensuring that reservists are
not overused and that a suitable balance between full-time service
and civilian career is sustained. In addition, we are taking forward
work to improve the financial package available to employers and
reservists once mobilised. As noted above, we have also improved
the welfare package available to reservists and their families
and work is in hand to identify where further improvements should
be made. The Future Capabilities Paper announced that we intend
to carry out a re-balancing of our forces to meet future challenges.
A major part of this rebalancing includes, wherever possible,
integration of Regular and TA infantry battalions in the new large
Regimental structure.
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