IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
SCRUTINY
36. The Government has not ruled out the possibility
of publishing limited end-use information, broken down between
Government and non-Government.[39]
This would be a start, but it would not clarify many of the more
recent examples in which information in an Annual Report has lent
itself to misleading or worrying interpretations. For example,
the Government's suggestion would lead, in the case of a licence
for the US Armed Forces operating in Uzbekistan, to the country
of destination being identified as Uzbekistan, but to the end
user being shown merely as 'Government', which would continue
to give the misleading impression that the end user was the Government
of Uzbekistan.
37. When we have previously recommended that the
Government should "consider publishing information on end
users of licences by broad category", the Government has
replied that it "remains concerned that there are still significant
confidentiality issues arising from the publication of end user
information by broad category, and that the examples highlighted
by the Committee (i.e. Police and Armed Forces) do not negate
these concerns".[40]
We suspect, however, that the Government's concerns about "significant
confidentiality issues" arising from publishing such information
may be overstated, and the evidence that we have received supports
this suspicion.
38. It is unsurprising that in their evidence to
us, NGOs have consistently called for greater transparency, identifying
it as a "key issue".[41]
As things currently stand, NGOs are often in the position of not
being able to substantiate their concerns about exports. As we
were told, "things might be happening, they might not be,
but the evidence is not made available".[42]
39. The DMA is a less expected source of support
for our argument, but in fact, evidence that we have received
from the DMA calls strongly for greater openness in this area:
The DMA has expressed some strong reservations
and frustrations, both publicly and privately, about the limited
nature of the end-use related information which is provided in
the FCO's Annual Report, and has raised the issue of whether further,
additional, detailed information could and should be usefully
provided by the Government on end-use matters, without encroaching
upon commercial or diplomatic/security sensitivities, which would
have the positive effects of achieving greater openness and transparency,
and also protecting the British Government and Industry against
erroneous claims of irresponsible licensing decisions and commercial
activities, respectively … Even taking into account concerns
of commercial confidentiality and security, we are sure that in
many cases (especially with regard to permanent exports, rather
than for temporary licences) more end-use information should be
able to be usefully provided than is currently the case. [43]
40. The DMA provides examples of cases in which greater
openness would be useful. These are very similar to some of the
examples that we have encountered, and discussed above:
under the UK system, an export of spare parts
to a Royal Australian Navy vessel, whilst on a courtesy visit
to Indonesia, would appear under the UK system to be an export
to Indonesia (the geographical location of the vessel, at the
time), rather than Australia (the nationality of the customer)—clearly
different levels of contentiousness!
in the 2000 Annual Report the section on Morocco
includes mention of a raft of licences being issued for small
arms and light weapons, which could result in the unsighted having
extremely dubious opinions of HMG for approving these "exports".
In fact, we understand that many, if not all, of these are apparently
to be accounted for by the supply of props for the filming of
"Black Hawk Down" in Morocco.[44]
41. There are limits to how much end-use information
it is appropriate to publish. There are some areas in which the
provision of information might threaten commercial confidentiality:
for example, when equipment is being exported on a trial basis
before a contract has been signed.[45]
There is also some end-use information which it would clearly
not be appropriate to publish for security reasons, such as precisely
where it is intended to use non-conventional weapon detection
equipment.[46] Equally,
most countries would not be prepared to have the detail
of their procurement programmes published by the British Government.
But this is not to say that it is impossible to go any further
than the Government currently does in what it publishes. Indeed
it seems to us (and also apparently to the DMA) that there is
room for the publication of substantially more end-use information
than is currently the case.
42. The following are a number of ways in which the
Government might wish to consider publishing further information
on end use:
- Multiple-destination OIELs
could be cross-referenced, to make it clear under each country
entry that only one licence is involved. Where such an OIEL is
for only one end user, this too could be stated. There may also
be circumstances in which the end user is willing to be identified.
- Where an OIEL is for a limited quantity of equipment,
stating that this is the case or even revealing the quantity concerned
could help to diffuse potential concern about proliferation.
- Publishing information by broad category of end
user (Local Armed Forces, Local Police, Foreign Government, International
Organisation, Private Security Company, Industry, NGO, Media,
Private Individual) could help in many cases to allay concern
about the appropriateness of particular export decisions.
43. We conclude that it would be in the Government's
interest to publish more information on end use, because it would
enable public debate on export controls to focus on those licensing
decisions which are genuinely debatable, rather than to criticise
the Government for decisions which appear highly contentious but
which are in fact entirely sound. Given the strong support for
greater transparency in this area shown not only by us, and not
only by NGOs, but also by representatives of the British defence
manufacturing industry, we recommend that that the Government
should reassess its position that it cannot "go any further
in publishing end-user information".[47]
44. The supplementary information provided to us
on licence applications is also often inadequate. It is sometimes
impossible to interpret the descriptions we receive of goods licensed
for export without some supplementary information on end use.
With components in particular, it is often impossible to understand
from the licence description alone what the component is, and
to know for what main equipment it is intended. This description
is often little more than a catalogue number, for which we lack
the catalogue. "LINE 18 3120998187239" is a particularly
egregious example. Debate based only on the fact that the Government
has licensed an unspecified component for export to a country
is bound to be misinformed.
45. End-use information, on the other hand, tells
us not only that the equipment in question is for spare parts
on a vehicle transmission system, but also the type of vehicle
involved and further information about the user of the equipment.
Similarly, the numerous descriptions of items we have seen such
as "PART NUMBER AC66886, SERIAL NO'S TS031 & UF038"
tell us next to nothing, whereas the knowledge that the equipment
is to support a particular aircraft within a named national airforce
is much more useful in reaching a judgement as to whether the
export should or should not have been allowed.
46. Where we requested information on OIELs for 2002
we asked to be given the identity of end users, where these were
specified; and details of any other conditions affecting the use
of the licence. However, we did not receive this information,
except in a small number of cases on which we asked the Government
for further clarification. Information on end use should not be
particularly difficult to supply. We have received end-use information
on SIELs issued in 2003 which appears to be drawn directly from
applicants' documentation. We recommend that future supplementary
information provided to us on licence decisions should include
information on end use where this is requested, as without this
information we cannot properly assess the Government's licensing
decisions.
Actual exports
47. We have previously recommended the provision
of more information on actual exports. The very basic information
provided on the value of exports is not directly comparable with
the categories of goods which the Government controls. We regret
the fact that it has not been possible to reach agreement within
the EU on changing Tariff Codes to enable a greater level of transparency
in the information provided on the value of strategic exports,
and we hope that the Government will take any opportunities that
arise to press for such changes in the future. We welcome the
Government's commitment to exploring how it can improve the data
available on the value of defence exports.[48]
48. The Action Plan for the Implementation of
the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction[49]
proposes a joint effort by member states and the Commission to
establish equivalence between EC customs classification and the
lists of controlled dual-use items. We recommend that the Government
should take a leading role in promoting this initiative.
Improving parliamentary scrutiny
49. It is now a number of years since a system of
prior parliamentary scrutiny of export licence applications was
first proposed. We continue to support a system of prior scrutiny
of the most sensitive export licence applications, because it
would allow us to feed into the licensing process at a point which
would be most effective. We believe that the arguments
which the Government has raised against such a system have been
shown in previous Reports to be misplaced.
50. When we took evidence from the Foreign Secretary
in February, he did not hold out any hopes that the Government
had changed its position on prior scrutiny, but he did suggest
that the Government was considering "ways of enhancing retrospective
scrutiny".[50]
51. We do not believe that retrospective scrutiny
is an adequate substitute for prior scrutiny—but it is what
we have, and it is not without its benefits, as the last five
years of our joint inquiries have shown. We believe that there
are a number of ways in which its effectiveness could be usefully
enhanced:
- Information on licence applications
is currently only made available long after the decisions on those
applications have been taken. Information on decisions taken in
January 2002 appeared in an Annual Report published in July 2003,
some 19 months later. Providing information on licensing decisions
more swiftly after they have been made would mean that the public
and the Committee would have a chance to consider more topical
decisions and policies than is currently the case.
- More detailed supplementary information on licence
applications could be provided to the Committee in confidence
as a matter of routine. This would save the Government from much
of the effort of having to carry out a separate exercise to compile
this information once a year. It would also enable the Committee
to distinguish genuinely debatable licensing decisions from decisions
which might appear of concern from published information alone.
52. We recommend that the Government should help
us to improve our retrospective scrutiny of export licence applications
by publishing more timely licensing information than is currently
the case, and by making it a systematic part of the administration
of export controls to provide us in confidence with further information
on these licensing decisions, including information on end use.
We do not regard this as a substitute for a system of prior scrutiny,
but it would be an improvement on the current situation.
21 2002 Annual Report, p 10 Back
22
2002 Annual Report, p 11 Back
23
Appendix 12 (DTI) Back
24
Government response to the Second Joint Report from the Committees,
Session 2002-03,Cm 5943, p 10 Back
25
Appendix 13, q 51 Back
26
Appendix 13, q 52 Back
27
Appendix 11, Section N Back
28
2002 Annual Report, p 3 Back
29
See paras 29-35. Back
30
HC (2002-03) 474, paras 41-42 Back
31
2002 Annual Report, pp 26-27, 233, 323 Back
32
Appendix 16; see also Q 75 (Mr Isbister) Back
33
See HC (2002-03) 474, paras 130-154 Back
34
Appendix 23 (DMA) Back
35
See para 22. Back
36
Appendix 7 Back
37
HC Deb 8 September 2003, c 73W Back
38
Q 48 Back
39
Appendix 11, Section P; Cm 5943, pp 19-20 Back
40
Cm 5943, p 20 Back
41
Q 87 (Mr Isbister) Back
42
Q 96 (Mr Isbister) Back
43
Appendix 23 (DMA) Back
44
Appendix 23 (DMA) Back
45
Q 165 (Mr Otter) Back
46
Q 157 (Mr Otter) Back
47
Appendix 11, Section P Back
48
Appendix 11, Section Q Back
49
Henceforth WMD Action Plan Back
50
Q 66 Back
