Quadripartite Select Committee Written Evidence


Appendix 10: Further memorandum from the Campaign Against Arms Trade and TAPOL

  We are writing to you as Chairperson of the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports to express our grave concerns over recent developments in the UK's arms sales relationship with Indonesia. We urge your Committee to inquire into the issues raised in this letter.

  In particular, we are concerned that in August 2002, the UK Government quietly agreed to a significant relaxation in the "assurances" provided by the Indonesian government as to the end use of UK-supplied military equipment. This was not announced in Parliament (or elsewhere) at the time and no explanation has been given as to why the UK Government accepted the change.

  The consequence has been that Indonesia has been able to use its UK weaponry in the current war against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh and the UK Government has been able to argue that Indonesia is not in breach of its assurances (although we would strongly dispute that argument—see below). Before September 2002 the Indonesian Government would not have been able to deploy UK equipment at all to Aceh, at least without prior notification.

  Before we detail our specific concerns we would like to set out the background (we attach some correspondence between CAAT volunteer Richard Andrew and the FCO for information).

  According to the FCO "before August 2002, the Indonesian Government had provided assurances that British-built military equipment would not be deployed to Aceh, and that they would provide advanced warning of any possible deployment [italics added]". In August 2002 the British Government received advance notification from the Indonesian government that they intended to deploy British-built armoured personnel carriers to Aceh for casualty removal and logistics.

  The Foreign Secretary then wrote to you on 3 October 2003, pointing this out (we enclose a copy of the letter). He told you "the Indonesian Government has provided assurances that this equipment will not be used to infringe human rights in Aceh or elsewhere". However, crucially, he did not tell you that the Government had just agreed to lift the ban on Indonesia deploying UK-supplied equipment to Aceh and to remove the requirement for Indonesia to notify the UK in advance of any UK-supplied equipment being used in Aceh (see enclosed letter from Mark Polatajko of the FCO to Richard Andrew dated 20 August 2003).

  Subsequently, the Government announced the change in these assurances, but only by inference. Mike O'Brien MP told Jeremy Corbyn MP in the House of Commons on 12 June 2003:

    "Before August 2002 the Indonesian government provided assurances that British-supplied military equipment would not be used in Aceh or be used anywhere in Indonesia against civilians to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression, assembly and association of other international human rights standards. The Indonesian government added that if against expectations, they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage they would inform the British government in advance.

    In August 2002 the British Government received advance notification from the Indonesian government that they may deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh for casualty removal and logistics. Hawk jets do not perform these tasks. Ministers agreed in September 2002 to fresh assurances that British-built military equipment would not be used to violate human rights anywhere in Indonesia nor would the equipment be used offensively.

    The assurances apply to all British-supplied military equipment. I emphasised the continuing importance we attach to the assurances during my recent visit to Indonesia."

  Subsequent to this, UK-supplied Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks and Saracen armoured personnel carriers have all been deployed to Aceh. After June 2003, Richard Andrew wrote to clarify what Mike O'Brien meant by his comment in Parliament. We were then informed that the assurances required of the Indonesians had effectively been relaxed.

  We have three main concerns which we have grouped under three overall headings.

MISLEADING PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC

  Your Committee is responsible for the Parliamentary scrutiny of Strategic Export Control issues. We are extremely concerned therefore that the Government in its letter to you of 3 October 2003 explaining the events of August 2002 neglected to make clear that Indonesian assurances on the use of UK-supplied equipment had been relaxed. It is not possible to infer from the letter they sent you that subsequent to September 2002 the Indonesians were permitted to deploy UK-supplied equipment to Aceh and that they did not need to inform the UK Government in advance. Previously deployment to Aceh was not permitted without advance notification.

  In fact, the only announcement was over eight months after the event, and only when directly asked, about it by Jeremy Corbyn MP.

  Although Mark Polatajko told Richard Andrew on 22 October 2003 that the change had been made known to you, for a change of this importance this can hardly be regarded as adequate. Leaving aside the misleading nature of the letter, failing to make a public announcement is scandalous given the importance of the issue (as we detail below). Putting a letter in the House of Commons library means some time and energy has to be expended for parties with a legitimate interest such as ours to discover the truth (in this case over a year). This cannot be acceptable conduct. An announcement should have been made in Parliament as soon as possible after the summer recess in 2002.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RELAXING THE ASSURANCES

  Leaving aside legitimate questions about what Indonesian assurances can be worth following the appalling events in East Timor in 1999 (the Indonesian Army guaranteed security for the act of self-determination, but actually carried well-documented crimes against humanity in defiance of UN resolutions and an international agreement they had solemnly entered into) and Indonesia's record of using British-supplied equipment against its own citizens, the human rights situation in Aceh is appalling and cannot justify such a relaxation.

  The level of violence in Aceh in 2002 (mostly perpetrated by the Indonesian Army). had increased from that seen in 2000 and 2001. Indeed. looking through the FCO's own Annual Human Rights Report 2002 (which covers July 2001 to July 2002) we find the words on page 32 "In Aceh there was a rise in the level of violence following the expiry of the Humanitarian Pause in January 2001 . . . the majority of casualties have been civilians". Reporting from TAPOL corroborates the conclusion. For example, in April/May 2002 TAPOL reported that the daily death toll in 2001 was 10 per day, mostly non-combatants, calling 2001 "a very bleak year"[16]. In September 2002 TAPOL reported that in 2002 the death toll, mostly civilians, was around 15 a day[17]. In December TAPOL cited data from the People's Crisis Centre in Aceh showing that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had increased 50% in 2002 from 2001, strongly supporting the conclusion the level of violence increased in 2002[18].

  Subsequent to the assurances being relaxed the Indonesian Army has deployed lethal UK-supplied combat equipment to Aceh (Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks, and Saracen armoured personnel carriers). In our view, the very deployment of this equipment to Aceh, as part of a major military offensive, is a clear breach of the current assurance that British equipment will not be used for offensive purposes (the FCO has also previously stated in correspondence that equipment will not be used for counter-insurgency purposes, which is the reason for the current military operation).

  Indonesian policies in the province have made it extremely difficult for international media, humanitarian organisations and human rights monitors to access Aceh to monitor the situation and therefore we have very serious concerns about the use to which UK-supplied equipment is being put. We would also question how effective FCO end-use monitoring can be in such circumstances.

  According to the police in Aceh, 470 civilians were killed between the start of martial law on 19 May 2003 and 31 December 2003. This is likely to be a very conservative figure.

RECENT ARMS EXPORT LICENCES ISSUED

  From the Government's Annual Reports, we know that export licences are being issued for equipment which could potentially be used in Aceh (we do not know precisely what the equipment being licensed is from the Annual Reports).

  In 2002 export licences were granted for the following, all which could potentially be for any of Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks or Saracen armoured personnel carriers:

  Components for air to surface missile launching equipment;

  Aircraft cannons;

  Components for aircraft cannons;

  Components for armoured fighting vehicles;

  Components for armoured personnel carriers;

  Components for combat aircraft;

  Components for military aero-engines;

  Components for military aircraft communications equipment;

  Components for military aircraft head-down displays;

  Components for military aircraft navigation equipment;

  Components for tanks;

  Equipment for the use of aircraft cannons;

  Equipment for the use of military aero-engines;

  General military aircraft components;

  Military aircraft head-down displays;

  Military aircraft navigation equipment;

  Technology for the use of air to surface missile launching equipment;

  Technology for the use of aircraft cannons;

  Technology for the use of bomb handling equipment;

  Technology for the use of combat aircraft;

  Technology for the use of general military aircraft components;

  Technology for the use of military aero-engines.

  Additionally military utility vehicles have been licensed as well as armoured all wheel drive vehicles (we understand last year's licence for this description was for a VIP Range Rover but this may not be the case this year). We are also very concerned that the financial value of licences granted from the Military List for Indonesia rose from £2 million in 2000 to £41 million in 2002, and that the number of export licences issued rose from 54 in 2001 to 182 in 2002.

CONCLUSION

  We would request that you look into this matter very closely when conducting your review of the 2002 Strategic Export Controls Annual Report, focusing in particular on:

    —  Why the assurances were relaxed and the FCO's justification for this in the light of the human rights situation in Aceh;

    —  Why the FCO chose to mislead you about the relaxation and prevented effective public scrutiny of the issue;

    —  Whether the licensing policy towards Indonesia is being properly implemented given the evident breach of assurances that British equipment will not be used for offensive purposes.

January 2004



16   TAPOL Bulletin. 116.7. April May 2002, see http: tapol.gn.apc.org.166-7visi.htm. Back

17   TAPOL Bulletin. 168. September 2002, see http: tapol.gn.apc.org.168head.htm. Back

18   TAPOL Bulletin. 169.170. January February 2003, see http: tapol.gn.apc.org.bulletin169-170.htm. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 18 May 2004