Appendix 10: Further memorandum from the
Campaign Against Arms Trade and TAPOL
We are writing to you as Chairperson of the
Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports to express our grave
concerns over recent developments in the UK's arms sales relationship
with Indonesia. We urge your Committee to inquire into the issues
raised in this letter.
In particular, we are concerned that in August
2002, the UK Government quietly agreed to a significant relaxation
in the "assurances" provided by the Indonesian government
as to the end use of UK-supplied military equipment. This was
not announced in Parliament (or elsewhere) at the time and no
explanation has been given as to why the UK Government accepted
the change.
The consequence has been that Indonesia has
been able to use its UK weaponry in the current war against the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh and the UK Government has been
able to argue that Indonesia is not in breach of its assurances
(although we would strongly dispute that argument—see below).
Before September 2002 the Indonesian Government would not have
been able to deploy UK equipment at all to Aceh, at least without
prior notification.
Before we detail our specific concerns we would
like to set out the background (we attach some correspondence
between CAAT volunteer Richard Andrew and the FCO for information).
According to the FCO "before August 2002,
the Indonesian Government had provided assurances that British-built
military equipment would not be deployed to Aceh, and that they
would provide advanced warning of any possible deployment
[italics added]". In August 2002 the British Government received
advance notification from the Indonesian government that they
intended to deploy British-built armoured personnel carriers to
Aceh for casualty removal and logistics.
The Foreign Secretary then wrote to you on 3
October 2003, pointing this out (we enclose a copy of the letter).
He told you "the Indonesian Government has provided assurances
that this equipment will not be used to infringe human rights
in Aceh or elsewhere". However, crucially, he did not tell
you that the Government had just agreed to lift the ban on Indonesia
deploying UK-supplied equipment to Aceh and to remove the requirement
for Indonesia to notify the UK in advance of any UK-supplied equipment
being used in Aceh (see enclosed letter from Mark Polatajko of
the FCO to Richard Andrew dated 20 August 2003).
Subsequently, the Government announced the change
in these assurances, but only by inference. Mike O'Brien MP told
Jeremy Corbyn MP in the House of Commons on 12 June 2003:
"Before August 2002 the Indonesian government
provided assurances that British-supplied military equipment would
not be used in Aceh or be used anywhere in Indonesia against civilians
to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression, assembly
and association of other international human rights standards.
The Indonesian government added that if against expectations,
they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at
a later stage they would inform the British government in advance.
In August 2002 the British Government received
advance notification from the Indonesian government that they
may deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh for casualty
removal and logistics. Hawk jets do not perform these tasks. Ministers
agreed in September 2002 to fresh assurances that British-built
military equipment would not be used to violate human rights anywhere
in Indonesia nor would the equipment be used offensively.
The assurances apply to all British-supplied
military equipment. I emphasised the continuing importance we
attach to the assurances during my recent visit to Indonesia."
Subsequent to this, UK-supplied Hawk jets, Scorpion
tanks and Saracen armoured personnel carriers have all been deployed
to Aceh. After June 2003, Richard Andrew wrote to clarify what
Mike O'Brien meant by his comment in Parliament. We were then
informed that the assurances required of the Indonesians had effectively
been relaxed.
We have three main concerns which we have grouped
under three overall headings.
MISLEADING PARLIAMENT
AND THE
PUBLIC
Your Committee is responsible for the Parliamentary
scrutiny of Strategic Export Control issues. We are extremely
concerned therefore that the Government in its letter to you of
3 October 2003 explaining the events of August 2002 neglected
to make clear that Indonesian assurances on the use of UK-supplied
equipment had been relaxed. It is not possible to infer from the
letter they sent you that subsequent to September 2002 the Indonesians
were permitted to deploy UK-supplied equipment to Aceh and that
they did not need to inform the UK Government in advance. Previously
deployment to Aceh was not permitted without advance notification.
In fact, the only announcement was over eight
months after the event, and only when directly asked, about it
by Jeremy Corbyn MP.
Although Mark Polatajko told Richard Andrew
on 22 October 2003 that the change had been made known to you,
for a change of this importance this can hardly be regarded as
adequate. Leaving aside the misleading nature of the letter, failing
to make a public announcement is scandalous given the importance
of the issue (as we detail below). Putting a letter in the House
of Commons library means some time and energy has to be expended
for parties with a legitimate interest such as ours to discover
the truth (in this case over a year). This cannot be acceptable
conduct. An announcement should have been made in Parliament as
soon as possible after the summer recess in 2002.
JUSTIFICATION FOR
RELAXING THE
ASSURANCES
Leaving aside legitimate questions about what
Indonesian assurances can be worth following the appalling events
in East Timor in 1999 (the Indonesian Army guaranteed security
for the act of self-determination, but actually carried well-documented
crimes against humanity in defiance of UN resolutions and an international
agreement they had solemnly entered into) and Indonesia's record
of using British-supplied equipment against its own citizens,
the human rights situation in Aceh is appalling and cannot justify
such a relaxation.
The level of violence in Aceh in 2002 (mostly
perpetrated by the Indonesian Army). had increased from that seen
in 2000 and 2001. Indeed. looking through the FCO's own Annual
Human Rights Report 2002 (which covers July 2001 to July 2002)
we find the words on page 32 "In Aceh there was a rise in
the level of violence following the expiry of the Humanitarian
Pause in January 2001 . . . the majority of casualties have been
civilians". Reporting from TAPOL corroborates the conclusion.
For example, in April/May 2002 TAPOL reported that the daily death
toll in 2001 was 10 per day, mostly non-combatants, calling 2001
"a very bleak year"[16].
In September 2002 TAPOL reported that in 2002 the death toll,
mostly civilians, was around 15 a day[17].
In December TAPOL cited data from the People's Crisis Centre in
Aceh showing that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
had increased 50% in 2002 from 2001, strongly supporting the conclusion
the level of violence increased in 2002[18].
Subsequent to the assurances being relaxed the
Indonesian Army has deployed lethal UK-supplied combat equipment
to Aceh (Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks, and Saracen armoured personnel
carriers). In our view, the very deployment of this equipment
to Aceh, as part of a major military offensive, is a clear breach
of the current assurance that British equipment will not be used
for offensive purposes (the FCO has also previously stated in
correspondence that equipment will not be used for counter-insurgency
purposes, which is the reason for the current military operation).
Indonesian policies in the province have made
it extremely difficult for international media, humanitarian organisations
and human rights monitors to access Aceh to monitor the situation
and therefore we have very serious concerns about the use to which
UK-supplied equipment is being put. We would also question how
effective FCO end-use monitoring can be in such circumstances.
According to the police in Aceh, 470 civilians
were killed between the start of martial law on 19 May 2003 and
31 December 2003. This is likely to be a very conservative figure.
RECENT ARMS
EXPORT LICENCES
ISSUED
From the Government's Annual Reports, we know
that export licences are being issued for equipment which could
potentially be used in Aceh (we do not know precisely what the
equipment being licensed is from the Annual Reports).
In 2002 export licences were granted for the
following, all which could potentially be for any of Hawk jets,
Scorpion tanks or Saracen armoured personnel carriers:
Components for air to surface missile launching
equipment;
Aircraft cannons;
Components for aircraft cannons;
Components for armoured fighting vehicles;
Components for armoured personnel carriers;
Components for combat aircraft;
Components for military aero-engines;
Components for military aircraft communications
equipment;
Components for military aircraft head-down displays;
Components for military aircraft navigation
equipment;
Components for tanks;
Equipment for the use of aircraft cannons;
Equipment for the use of military aero-engines;
General military aircraft components;
Military aircraft head-down displays;
Military aircraft navigation equipment;
Technology for the use of air to surface missile
launching equipment;
Technology for the use of aircraft cannons;
Technology for the use of bomb handling equipment;
Technology for the use of combat aircraft;
Technology for the use of general military aircraft
components;
Technology for the use of military aero-engines.
Additionally military utility vehicles have
been licensed as well as armoured all wheel drive vehicles (we
understand last year's licence for this description was for a
VIP Range Rover but this may not be the case this year). We are
also very concerned that the financial value of licences granted
from the Military List for Indonesia rose from £2 million
in 2000 to £41 million in 2002, and that the number of export
licences issued rose from 54 in 2001 to 182 in 2002.
CONCLUSION
We would request that you look into this matter
very closely when conducting your review of the 2002 Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report, focusing in particular on:
— Why the assurances were relaxed and
the FCO's justification for this in the light of the human rights
situation in Aceh;
— Why the FCO chose to mislead you
about the relaxation and prevented effective public scrutiny of
the issue;
— Whether the licensing policy towards
Indonesia is being properly implemented given the evident breach
of assurances that British equipment will not be used for offensive
purposes.
January 2004
16 TAPOL Bulletin. 116.7. April May 2002, see
http: tapol.gn.apc.org.166-7visi.htm. Back
17
TAPOL Bulletin. 168. September 2002, see http: tapol.gn.apc.org.168head.htm. Back
18
TAPOL Bulletin. 169.170. January February 2003, see http:
tapol.gn.apc.org.bulletin169-170.htm. Back
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