Appendix 13: Further memorandum from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
A. INTERNATIONAL
FORA
European Union
1. What further work needs to be done to bring
the arms export policies and administrative procedures of the
associated countries in line with EU requirements? How is the
British Government assisting in this process?
Since April 2003, the 10 associated countries
have attended the Common Foreign and Security body on arms exports,
known as COARM, and they have also been provided with Member States'
Code of Conduct denial notification data for the last two calendar
years. This information and interactions with current Member States
will enable the accession countries to develop an understanding
of how EU members regard specific arms export licence applications,
and so to further converge their policies. As regards the associated
countries' administrative procedures, we consider that they are
now, following regular bilateral and multilateral contacts with
the UK and several other EU Member States, in line with EU standards.
The UK has organised, in partnership with the
Estonian and Slovakian governments, two seminars at which current
and accession EU Member States will have a further opportunity
to share experiences on the application of the licensing criteria
in the EU Code of Conduct. These should take place in late 2003
and early 2004.
2. According to the DTI website, the Government
believes that the European Commission's proposal for a Council
Regulation on trade in equipment related to torture and capital
punishment "as it stands needs refining so as not to unintentionally
catch or ban legitimate goods". The Government proposes to
"enter into discussions with the Commission and other EU
Member States with a view to amending the proposals in a constructive
manner, including agreeing the list of controlled items"
(Regulatory Impact Assessment online at http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control/policy/tortureria.htm).
What changes is the Government seeking to the Commission's proposal?
Which legitimate goods in particular is the Government concerned
would be caught by the proposal as it stands? When does the Government
expect discussions on the Regulation to be concluded?
Although the UK supports the main thrust of
this proposal, there are a number of elements that the UK would
wish to be refined or re-worded during the course of discussions
with the Commission and other EU Member States. These include
the subject referred to in the following question, and the annexes
to the Regulation. Annex I , which for example, contains a list
of goods which would be banned on the basis that the equipment
has no, or virtually no, practical use other than for the purpose
of capital punishment etc. However, there has been no technical
discussion on the rationale for inclusion of products in Annex
I, in particular, the UK has concerns with the proposed inclusion
of certain handcuffs and automatic drug injection systems which
we believe would have legitimate uses. In this instance we will
be seeking agreement to move these items from Annex I, which would
only allow for the granting of an export authorisation where the
goods are for the exclusive purpose of public display in a museum,
to Annex II thereby allowing for a case by case assessment, against
agreed criteria, to be undertaken.
Discussions on the proposed Regulation are still
at a relatively early stage and are unlikely to be concluded before
March 2004
3. Article 14 (2) of the European Commission's
proposal for a Council Regulation on trade in equipment related
to torture and capital punishment states that under certain circumstances,
notably where any Member state objects twice to a licensing decision
by another Member state, the final decision on whether to grant
the licence in question will be taken by the Commission. What
is the Government's view on this proposed extension of the Commission's
competences?
The UK does not believe it would be appropriate
for the Commission to play such a role and will therefore be seeking
changes to this part of the text. The UK is not alone in raising
such concerns about Article 14.
4. The EU's "action plan for the implementation
of the basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction" of June 2003 includes as
a measure for immediate action "considering the involvement
of the Commission" in the export control regimes. Has such
consideration taken place, and with what results?
The EU is still considering this issue in the
light of Commission proposals. The British Government is clear
that such proposals should be considered carefully against the
objective, as stated in the Action Plan of "making the EU
a leading co-operative player" in the export control regimes.
That means we should be looking for actions that produce not only
a stronger EU performance in the regimes but one that contributes
more effectively to the purposes of the regimes. A good example
is to make sure that the EU is playing a full part, through its
Member States, in chairing those regimes where the chair is taken
for a year by a volunteer member.
A greater Commission role might contribute to
this objective, but this has to be balanced against the political
sensitivities of other participating states about what their role
might be. Any negotiation of an expansion would need to be treated
with care, so that the issue did not distract the regimes from
their core tasks.
5. To what extent have the "measures
for immediate action" in the action plan been implemented?
How has the British Government participated in this process of
implementation?
The EU has been vigorous in taking forward implementation
of the "measures for immediate action". For example,
the EU programme on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Russian
Federation is being extended; a plan for diplomatic action has
been agreed; we are discussing a standard WMD clause as an essential
element of all EU mixed agreements with third countries as well
as finalising a Common Position on universalising the main multilateral
agreements; we have agreed an increase in the International Atomic
Energy Agency's safeguards budget. The UK has played an active
part in discussions and offered some thoughts to the Italian Presidency
on how these measures can be taken forward.
6. What progress has been made on the "measures
for the coming months or the longer term" relating to export
controls in the action plan? What progress in these areas does
the Government view as a priority?
7. Have any arrangements yet been made for
"peer review" of Member States' and acceding countries'
export control systems, as outlined in the action plan?
The Government will respond to questions 6 and
7 together.
The implementation of these measures has started
well. For example, we are discussing with partners a standard
non-proliferation clause for inclusion in EU agreements with third
countries. The Commission has also provided an initial proposal
for taking forward the idea of a peer review of export control
systems which is the subject of ongoing discussions between Member
States and the Commission.
The proposals foresee most of the peer reviews
taking place in the first half of 2004.
United Nations
8. What progress was made at the UN Biennial
meeting of states in July 2003 to review the implementation of
the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons? How successful
was the UK in its stated aim of pushing "forward where possible
on areas left unresolved at July 2001—(i) export control,
(ii) brokers, (iii) assistance to developing countries"?
How will the British Government be helping to take this programme
forward over the coming year?
At the meeting, the UK made a national statement
on the need to strengthen and enforce export controls and on the
need to mobilise resources to combat small arms proliferation.
The UK, with the support of 29 other states, initiated two successful
side meetings for interested states to discuss further support
for, and the means to, strengthen international controls on small
arms transfers. The meetings established a considerable degree
of support, particularly for regional processes to agree further
consensus as an interim stage to greater international agreement.
The UK has offered its support where needed to facilitate these
regional processes, and remains committed to working with partners
internationally to achieve stronger export controls on transfers
of small arms. The UK will continue to work on this issue prior
to and during the next UN Biennial Meeting in 2005, and at the
UN review conference in 2006.
The UK believes that stronger export control
legislation is key to reducing the flow of small arms to developing
countries, and thus limiting the impact of arms transfers on development.
Both in terms of development and counter-proliferation work, the
initiative has proved to be successful in what is one of the most
important but contentious parts of the international community's
efforts to tackle the problems of excessive availability of small
arms. Some differences of opinion are apparent, but there is constructive
engagement from many countries. It is now essential to engage
with interested states to maintain the momentum behind this initiative.
We are optimistic about progress being made, while recognising
also the ambitious nature of the initiative.
The UK made a statement at the Biennial Meeting
about development assistance in which we emphasised the need to
integrate SALW policy. It was also stressed that all States need
to co-operate closely to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
trade and that those States in a position to do so should seriously
consider rendering technical and financial support where needed.
The UK also hosted a meeting on donor co-ordination, at which
the UK launched a booklet "Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed
Violence".
The UK places a high priority on efforts to
integrate arms control and reduction measures into development
assistance. In April 2003, the Government brought together government,
multilateral and non-governmental development agencies to explore
ways to integrate small arms reduction into development assistance.
The UK encourages all development agencies to engage more fully
on small arms issues and is ready to work in partnership to drive
this issue forward. Between now and 2006 the UK will, in partnership
with other development agencies and donors; support further research
into the impact of SALW and armed violence on development and
poverty; work to comprehensively integrate armed violence and
small arms reduction and prevention into its own development assistance
and encourage other agencies to do the same; work to increase
donor co-ordination on armed violence issues; and work to secure
buy-in on this issue from the OECD and the World Bank. The UK
is highlighting the urgent need for co-ordinated and comprehensive
financial and technical assistance for affected States.
In recent months the UK has supported a Norwegian-Netherlands
initiative on brokering which supports our wider aims, following
on from the Lancaster House Conference on strengthening export
controls. The intention is that this initiative works in partnership
with the UK initiative, as the issues are mutually supportive.
9. What steps has the Government taken to
mainstream action against small arms proliferation within its
broader export control policy?
Over the last 12 months the UK has worked hard
to raise global awareness of the need to improve controls on small
arms transfers, and this has included work to mainstream SALW
into wider export controls. The UK is leading the global effort
to develop common international standards on arms exports. In
December 2002 the UK was instrumental in securing Best Practice
Guidelines in the Exports of SALW in the Wassenaar Arrangement,
a group of 33 of the world's major arms exporters. In January
2003, the UK brought representatives of 49 arms exporting states
and interested organisations to Lancaster House, London, to build
consensus on the need for tougher international controls on arms
exports. This was only the first step in a long-term process of
dialogue. At the July 2003 UN Biennial Meeting of States we initiated
further discussion and, with partners, hope to carry forward the
process via regional dialogue, working towards eventual consensus
on responsibility in arms transfers.
The Government also fully applies the Consolidated
Criteria to any proposed SALW export from the UK; and will do
so for any applications to broker SALW received under the new
export control legislation.
UK Waiver from US International Traffic in Arms
Regulations
10. What changes have been made or are planned
to the British export control system in order to increase commonality
with the US system for the purposes of an ITAR waiver?
Although there are differences in some respects
in the underlying approaches of the UK and US to export controls,
these approaches are widely considered to be comparably effective.
The Wassenaar Arrangement
11. What improvements to the Wassenaar Arrangement
has the UK been seeking during 2003? With what degree of success?
How has the UK been taking a lead in the 2003 review process?
(Answer—previously classified—updated
February 2004) The UK played a leading role in the WA Assessment
(review). We made a number of proposals for the development of
the Arrangement at the start of the process. Work was carried
forward in a number of "task forces", made up of those
countries with a specific interest in the subject covered. Together
with the US and the Netherlands, the UK led a Working Group in
Specific Information Exchange. Within this, we achieved consensus
and subsequent endorsement by the Plenary for the reporting of
transfers of small arms and light weapons. We also sought agreement
to arrangements for the exchange of denial notifications (DNs)
for selected Munitions list (ML) goods and consultation on such
notifications for both ML and dual-use goods where a limited system
of DNs already existed. We were unable to reach consensus on this
issue at the Plenary. Denial Notification and Consultation has
been deferred to the General Working Group for study and will
be one of our priorities for this year. The UK substantially contributed
to the activities of the Task Force on MANPADS, Terrorism and
Rules of Procedure as well as contributing papers to the Task
Force on Outreach and Participation, with a successful outcome
for the UK in all of these areas.
12. In response to the Committee's second
report of this session, the Government stated that it "supports
the introduction of a denial notification procedure to support
consistency of decision by the Participating States of the Wassenaar
Arrangement within its ambit". What improvements to the denial
notification procedure would the Government like to see achieved?
(Answer updated February 2004) The Government
would like to see the introduction of a denial notification procedure
for the major weapons and weapons platforms listed in Annex 3
to the Initial Elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement. We consider
that such additional information sharing would further enhance
Participating States' standards or responsibility in export control.
Under our proposals a denial notification would be issued when
a Participating State decided to refuse a licence application
for a transfer for reasons which came within the purposes of the
Arrangement, or when it would contravene the provisions of a UN
arms embargo. We also propose a bilateral consultation process
for Annex 3 items, broadly similar to that operated within the
European Union.
We also supported a proposal to introduce a
consultation mechanism for those dual-use goods refusals that
are already subject to a denial notification procedure.
We were unable to reach consensus on these proposals
at the 2003 Plenary, although they have been deferred to the WA's
General Working Group for study during 2004.
13. What were the obstacles to the agreement
of new reporting arrangements on small arms and light weapons
in December 2002? Is it the case (as reported) that these proposals
were blocked by the Russian Federation? Please provide further
information on the role the UK is playing to achieve such an agreement.
(Answer updated February 2004) No single
delegation blocked agreement to the reporting arrangements to
which the Committee refers; indeed, there were a number of different
proposals regarding thresholds for SALW reporting, but it was
not possible to reconcile them. It is important to recognise that
such reporting is sensitive because of the information provided,
and administratively complex.
However, Participating States continued to discuss
this issue during the WA Assessment, which took place during 2003,
and the measure was adopted at the December Plenary. The UK played
a lead role in facilitating agreement on this issue and others
to which SALW reporting had been linked.
14. The Annual Report states that at the 2002
Plenary meeting a "number of additional proposals aimed at
strengthening export controls as part of the fight against terrorism"
were made. What were these additional proposals; which country(ies)
proposed them; what was the UK's opinion of them; and what prevented
their acceptance?
* * *
15. The 2002 plenary statement confirmed that
the Wassenaar was open to "prospective adherents" on
a "non-discriminatory basis". Have any nations indicated
that they aspire to join the group in the near future? Are there
any countries in particular that the Government is encouraging
to join the Arrangement?
(Answer updated February 2004) The Wassenaar
Arrangement has formally received applications for membership
from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, Croatia, Malta and Slovenia.
HMG supports the applications of all EU accession states, and
other countries, providing that they meet the WA selection criteria.
The following criteria are taken into consideration
when deciding on the eligibility of a state for participation:
— Whether it is a producer/exporter
of arms or industrial equipment respectively.
— Whether it has taken the WA Control
lists as a reference in its national export controls.
— Its non-proliferation policies and
appropriate national policies, including: Adherence to non-proliferation
policies, control lists and, where applicable, guidelines of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the Australia Group; and through adherence
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxicological
Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and (where
applicable) START I, including the Lisbon Protocol.
— Its adherence to fully effective
export controls.
16. According to the Wassenaar Arrangement
Munitions List, "France, the Russian Federation and Ukraine
view this list as a reference list drawn up to help in the selection
of dual-use goods which could contribute to the indigenous development,
production or enhancement of conventional munitions capabilities".
How does the United Kingdom view this list? How does this differ
from how France, the Russian Federation and Ukraine view the list?
The United Kingdom includes all items on the
Wassenaar Munitions List in the UK Military List and reflects
all changes to the list as soon as possible after they have been
agreed by the Plenary by way of an amendment to the Export of
Goods (Control) Order. However, the Arrangement is not an export
control regime and thus there is no formal commitment to adopt
the list nationally. France, Russia and Ukraine have chosen to
highlight this fact by the insertion of the footnote but in practice
they also control the items on the Munitions List.
Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee
17. What was the outcome of consultations
within the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2002 on engaging non-member
states and transhipment states on counter-proliferation issues?
Which non-member and transhipment states were involved? What role
did the UK play in these consultations? What progress in this
area has been made since 2002? What progress was made within the
Zangger Committee on outreach to non-members?
* * *
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation
18. What does the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation add to pre-existing fora?
The Code calls for greater restraint in the
development, testing, use and spread of ballistic missiles. It
also introduces a number of confidence building measures, including
advance notice of missile launches, to increase transparency and
reduce mistrust between member states. The Code is not the first
or only initiative in the field of missile non-proliferation.
It is merely a first step toward further efforts that can be taken,
in the UN and elsewhere, to prevent the proliferation of ballistic
missiles.
19. How will the Government be helping other
signatory states to abide by the commitments made in the Code?
The transparency and confidence building commitments
in the Code are being developed through evolution and best practice.
The Government is helping other subscribing states through setting
a good example and scrupulously abiding by its commitments in
the Code. The Government has shared its first Annual Declaration
under the Code with other subscribing states. The Government also
sends technical experts to annual and inter-sessional meetings
of subscribing states that discuss implementation of the commitments
in the Code.
20. The Hague Code of Conduct has not been
signed by a number of countries possessing ballistic missile technology
(including some of proliferation concern), including China, Egypt,
India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam and Yemen.
What steps is the Government taking to encourage these and other
states to subscribe to the Code?
We have received indications through our HCOC
partners that some of the countries mentioned here are now viewing
adherence to the Code more favourably; in particular Kazakhstan
and Yemen. We very much hope that these countries and the others
you mention will choose to sign up to the Code soon. The UK has
been involved in demarches to a number of non-signatory countries
around the world, both singly, in conjunction with HCOC partners,
and where the UK is acting as EU presidency, to encourage adherence
to the Code.
21. What, if anything, is the Government doing
to encourage specifically regional approaches to the missile proliferation
issue, for example on the Indian subcontinent, or in the Middle
East?
We recently undertook a number of joint demarches
with the Australian government in Southeast Asia. Demarches were
undertaken inter alia in Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand. The government supports promoting the HCOC in regional
fora, recognising that adherence to non-proliferation norms helps
build confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states and can
reduce regional tensions.
G8 meetings
22. The Committee would be grateful for details
of the G8 lobbying programme on export controls. What are the
aims of the programme, who are the targets of the lobbying programme,
and how is the lobbying being conducted?
At the 2002 G8 summit in Canada, leaders agreed
the Kananaskis Principles "to prevent terrorists, or those
that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials
of mass destruction." Principle number 5 called on countries
to "develop, review and maintain effective national export
and transhipment controls over items on multilateral export control
lists . . ." The G8 is planning a number of targeted demarches
on export controls to countries of particular concern, as well
as some regional organisations. The list of countries and organisations
has not yet been finalised, but we expect it to be so shortly.
It is envisaged that the lobbying will be carried out in capitals
by the Embassy of whichever country holds the G8 Presidency—currently
France.
23. How has the Government implemented the
measures agreed at Evian to prevent the acquisition of MANPADS
by terrorists? What is the Government doing to address the threat
posed by MANPADS that may already have been acquired by terrorists?
The UK's inter-departmental working group co-ordinates
and implements the G8 Action Plan agreed at Evian. We are committed
to tackling the MANPADS threat, and to that end have active programme
of work with all stakeholders, including industry. We are confident
that the UK already has strict export controls on MANPADS, although
we keep under active review both current and future potential
measures for combating the MANPADS threat. We are also considering
a ban on the export from the UK of MANPADS to non-state actors,
which would formalise our current policy. The Action Plan committed
Partners to review progress in December 2003. We are now discussing
with partners the active exchange of information on implementation
and future planning.
In addition to work within the G8, the UK is
actively engaged within the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) negotiations
to further strengthen already strict guidelines on export controls.
The United Nations, NATO, and OSCE have also taken steps in recent
months in response to the MANPADS threat and we have actively
worked with these organisations.
The potential threat posed by MANPADS already
in the possession of terrorists is amongst those being addressed,
including through joint work with industry and with foreign partners
both bilaterally and in the relevant multilateral forums. Security
considerations make it inappropriate to comment further upon this
work at this time.
Export Control Outreach and Bilateral Talks
24. The Committee would be interested to see
further details of the bilateral talks on export controls held
with China, Hong Kong, Israel, Macau, Poland, Russia, Serbia and
Montenegro, and Ukraine, as well as details of the work carried
out with the US and Canada. What were the reasons for selecting
these particular countries for bilateral talks? At whose instigation
were the talks started?
The government conducts both routine annual
bilateral talks (Russia, China and Israel) and a programme of
ongoing assistance (Hong Kong and Macau). However, talks can also
form part of the Government's response to specific issues, for
example, UK experts visited Serbia and Montenegro, at the request
of our Foreign Secretary, following a breach of UN sanctions by
a company in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia
and Montenegro). The UK held discussions with Poland during their
Chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime and assisted
the Ukraine with their export controls. The Government has co-operated
with the US and Canada in joint work in the Balkans and Eastern
Europe, including joint visits to Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia.
The instigation of talks may result from any
one party, as in the examples of Serbia and Montenegro and the
Ukraine, or as is more often the case, is the result of long standing
mutual agreements.
B. THE EXPORT
LICENSING PROCESS
Involvement of DfID and assessment against Criterion
8 (Sustainable Development)
25. The Secretary of State for International
Development did not "consider it appropriate that she should
co-sign the report" in 1999 when DfID considered around 15%
of all export licence applications (HC (1998-99) 840), and she
remained "of the view that it would not be appropriate for
her to sign the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export
Controls" in 2000 (Cm 4799), by when DfID had chosen to see
fewer than 5% of all export licence applications. Why did the
Secretary of State for International Development decide that it
was appropriate for her to sign the 2002 Annual Report?
The Export Control Act of 2002 changed the legislative
basis for considering export licences and made explicit the need
to consider sustainable development issues when assessing licence
applications. Since this legislation enshrined DfID's role in
the assessment process, the Secretary of State felt it appropriate
to put her name to the 2002 report.
26. (a) How many licence applications (absolute
numbers of both SIELs and OIELs) were considered by DfID in 2002?
(b) How many licence applications did DfID request to see during
2002, in addition to those circulated to the Department as a matter
of course? Please provide details of these applications. (c) How
many licence applications were referred to DfID for assessment
by other Government Departments (other than those circulated as
a matter of course) during 2002? Please provide details of these
applications, and state which Department referred the applications
in question. (d) How many licence applications were assessed by
Government Departments other than DfID against criterion eight
during 2002? Please provide details of these applications, and
state in each case which Department conducted the assessment.
DfID considered 235 SIELs and 175 OIELs in 2002.
The Government only records the total numbers
of applications referred to DfID; it does not keep details of
whether these applications are requested by DfID or referred by
other Departments. However, in practice we would expect the procedures
announced by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on
19 September (Official Report Columns 309W-311W), together with
the fact that DfID can itself ask to see any other applications
as appropriate, to result in the automatic referral of all relevant
applications to DfID. In addition to this, FCO and MoD liaise
with DfID when assessing some licence applications to improve
their evaluation. However, this is on an ad hoc basis.
DfID is the lead department for advising on
sustainable development considerations, although other Departments
may also offer opinions. FCO and MoD assess all export licence
applications against the criteria as a whole. However,
where appropriate, DfID carry out a more detailed assessment against
criterion 8, as was set out by the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry. MoD has particular expertise in assessing "legitimate
defence and security needs" and aspects of "technical
capacity" under the criteria.
27. In 2002 and in 2003 to date, for how many
licence applications that were refused was Criterion 8 a relevant
consideration, recognising that a licence application may be refused
for a combination of reasons? The Committee would be grateful
for details of any such applications.
* * *
28. Criterion 8 requires that "states
should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence
with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources".
How does the Government assess whether states' diversion of resources
for legitimate security and defence needs is "least",
and how do such assessments inform the Government's decision-making
about licence applications?
The Department for International Development
leads on the assessment of export licence applications against
Criterion 8.
"Least diversion" is addressed on
a case-by-case basis according to the procedures for assessing
relevant export licence applications against Criterion 8 announced
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on 19 September
2002 (Official Report Columns 309W-311W). The announcement stated
that DfID would raise any concerns about least diversion by reference
to the other agreed indicators. The specific factors considered
in assessing "least diversion" will include:
(i)
whether a proposed export is consistent with the
recipient country's legitimate defence and security needs;
(ii)
the potential effect of the proposed export on the
recipient economy and sustainable development; and
(iii)
the extent of diversion of human and economic resources
which the proposed export would be likely to bring about.
The MoD will ordinarily make an assessment of
(i) when giving advice against Criterion 4. A separate assessment
of this factor is only made if, for any reason, assessment under
Criterion 4 has not been undertaken. Where a separate assessment
of this factor is required the MoD acts as the lead department.
In either case the MoD will take into account,
as appropriate, capability requirements identified by security
sector reform programmes, pre-planned equipment programmes and
capabilities recognised within UK conflict prevention strategies
or strategic defence reviews.
The DfID will make an assessment of (ii) where
an export licence application is for equipment destined for a
country eligible for International Development Association concessional
loans and the value of the equipment exceeds a pre-determined
country specific threshold (below these levels the DfID has judged,
taking into consideration the relevant economic and other indicators,
that an export will not breach Criterion 8). The DfID will make
its assessment after consideration against the indicators set
out by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in her written
response, dated 19 September 2002 (Official Report Columns 309W-311W),
to question from the honourable Norman Lamb.
The DfID will consider the above assessments,
together with any other information deemed relevant, in coming
to a judgement on (iii).
29. Has the DTI yet received exhausted licences
for the air traffic control system to Tanzania?
The Government has not yet received the exhausted
licences for the Tanzania air traffic control system.
Refusals and revocations
30. In 2000, no SIELs were refused on the
grounds that they presented a "risk of contributing to internal
tensions and conflicts in the recipient country". In 2001,
one licence was refused on this basis. In 2002, 76 licences were
refused on this basis. Why were so many more licences refused
on this basis in 2002 than in previous years?
31. To what does the Government ascribe the overall
rise in the number of SIEL applications refused, by more than
100% since 1999—changes in the Government's assessment process,
the nature of the applications themselves, or other factors?
The Government will respond to questions 30
and 31 together.
There are many possible factors, which could
lead to a change in the number of refusals over time, not all
of which are necessarily relate to the licensing process. Attached
for ease of reference is a table showing refusals statistics in
relation to Criterion 3 and WMD/missile-related concerns from
1999 to 2002. The table also shows the rates of all refusals (not
just under Criterion 3 or for WMD/missile concerns) for Israel,
India and Pakistan (there is overlap between these statistics).
Clearly there was a significant increase in the number of licences
refused under criterion 3 in 2002.There has also been a progressive
increase in the numbers of licences refused because of a risk
of contributing to proliferation of WMD or ballistic missiles.
Clearly global issues and changing situations in particular destinations
are taken into account in reaching export licensing decisions.
The Committee will note that there was a significant increase
in the number of refusals for Israel in the 2002 Annual Report.
In addition, there has been a gradual upward trend in refusals
for India and Pakistan since 1999. There have, however, been no
changes to the Government's assessment process, which would lead
to these increases.
See table below.
|
| Refusals: | 1999
| 2000 | 2001
| 2002 |
|
| Total | 136
| 207 | 245
| 296 |
| Criterion 3 | 4
| 0 | 1
| 76 |
| WMD/missile-related concerns | 73
| 109 | 122
| 121 |
| Israel | 0
| 3 | 31
| 84 |
| India | 56
| 72 | 89
| 83 |
| Pakistan | 9
| 52 | 36
| 21 |
|
32. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of the "licence revoked after it was issued in error and
subsequently issued in 2003". Were the circumstances in which
the licence was issued in error different from the circumstances
in which a licence was similarly issued in error in 2001? Were
lessons learnt from the error in 2001 applied in the case of the
licence issued in error in 2002?
* * *
Appeals
33. Why was there a large increase in the number of appeals
in 2002 over previous years? To what does the Government ascribe
the increased proportion of appeals upheld in 2002?
The number of refusals and revocation decisions in 2002 (296)
did not increase dramatically on the figure for 2001 (245). There
is no obvious reason for the increase in the number of appeals
in 2002. The Committee will be aware that all exporters who are
refused a licence have an automatic right of appeal. Whether or
not to exercise that right is the decision of the exporter concerned.
At this time it appears that the number of appeals will increase
again in 2003.
Military OGEL
34. In the 2001 Annual Report, the Government wrote that
"the new military OGEL, introduced in May 2002 . . . will
significantly reduce the number of SIELs required each year"
(p 365). But the actual number of SIELs issued in 2002 is only
marginally smaller than in 2001. How has the new military OGEL
impacted on industry's requirement for SIELs?
The number of SIELs issued each year reflects a wide range
of factors, not all of which are necessarily related to the export
licensing process. However, in the first half of 2003 there were
800 fewer SIEL applications received than in the same period in
2002. We believe that at least some of this fall in SIEL numbers
is due to companies using the new open general licence. In order
to draw the OGEL to the attention of industry, officers of the
DTI, whilst undertaking visits, have been briefing companies of
its possible application. There is some recent evidence that an
increased number of exporters are planning to make use of the
licence and it is therefore possible that there might be a further
reduction in the number of SIELs issued in the future.
Performance in processing licence applications
35. The Committee would be grateful for details of all
SIEL applications (not including sanctions only applications)
where decisions taken in 2002 took more than 60 days or which
had been awaiting decision for more than 60 days at 31 December
2002; and of OIEL applications where decisions taken in 2002 took
more than 120 days or had been awaiting decision for more than
120 days at 31 December 2002.
* * *
36. Why did the (modest) progress in the proportion of
SIEL applications processed within 20 working days stall in 2002?
Has there been any further progress since?
Performance against Government targets to decide on 70% of
applications in 20 working days was adversely affected by the
India/Pakistan crisis, and by poor performance in some areas of
the licensing process. Steps taken to improve handling of export
licence applications, among other things, have resulted in a significant
leap in performance in 2003. To date, 76.5% of SIEL applications
have been decided on within 20 working days.
37. How has the ECO performed so far in 2003 against its
internal targets that 90% of SIEL applications should be processed
in 60 working days and 100% within 120 working days (assuming
that these targets remained in place)?
The ECO has processed 92.2% of SIEL applications in 60 working
days and 99.4% of applications in 120 days. We confirm that these
targets remain in place.
38. Has any progress been made since 2002 in improving
the speed at which the Government is able to process appeals?
Performance against the Government's target for processing
appeals against refusal or revocation remains disappointing. The
Government is continuing to seek improvements in processing times
for appeals in the context of the wider review of the export licensing
process.
39. The Committee would be grateful for an assessment of
progress made by the JEWEL project. Have performance targets for
processing licence applications, rating requests and appeals been
altered? How are Government Departments now performing in terms
of long-standing SIEL applications, in particular those applications
taking 21 days or more to process?
Officials are finalising the JEWEL review and aim to report
their findings to Ministers in November. We will give the Committee
an update on the project as soon as possible. The review is looking
at not just performance indicators but also IT systems, business
processes, relations with exporters and joint working arrangements.
The present performance indicators have not been changed,
pending the JEWEL review. For the first nine months of this calendar
year Government has, for the first time, exceeded the 70% of SIEL
applications in 20 days target. Government is currently processing
76.5% of SIEL application in 20 days. The corresponding figure
for last year was 57.5%.
The number of SIEL cases that are outstanding for more than
six months is two and over 12 months one. This has reduced from
38 and nine respectively last year.
Enforcement
40. Were any strategic goods intended for export stopped
by HM Customs and Excise in 2002 or since? What was the nature
of these goods, and did HM Customs and Excise take any further
action against the exporters of the goods? How has HM Customs
and Excise acted on the rating advice received from the Export
Control Organisation in 2002 and since?
* * *
41. In how many cases since 2000 has a licence been refused
because of suspicion that an end-use certificate has been forged
or illicitly obtained? In how many cases since 2000 has it come
to light after the issue of a licence that an end-use certificate
may have been forged or illicitly obtained? What action was taken
as a result?
We do not, as a matter of course, record on our databases
whether licences are refused because we believed at the time that
the end-user certificate supplied was forged or illicitly obtained.
Departments involved in the licensing process do, of course, look
very carefully at supporting documentation supplied. In many cases
where licences are refused under criterion 7 of the consolidated
EU and National Code of Conduct (ie as a result of there being
an unacceptable risk of diversion of the goods) we have concerns
that the stated end-use, and therefore the end user documentation
is suspect.
In cases where we have issued licences and it subsequently
emerged that the end user certificates have been forged or illicitly
obtained, then those licences are revoked. For example, six licences
for the export of small arms to Jordan were revoked (in 2001)
when it came to light that the items were likely to go to someone
other than the stated end-user.
Government to Government transfers
42. The Committee would be grateful if the Government could
identify those licences (SIELs and OIELs) appearing in section
2.6 of the Annual Report which are for surplus Ministry of Defence
equipment the ownership of which was transferred to an overseas
Government while the equipment was still in the UK, and which
therefore required an export licence before collection.
We do not collect such information.
43. The Committee would be grateful for details of any
Government to Government transfers of military equipment in 2002
that do not appear in Tables 7 and 8 of the Annual Report.
In addition to the major pieces of equipment listed in Tables
7 and 8 of the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls 2002,
items in the following categories were exported Government-to-Government
in that year.
|
| Country | Type of Equipment
|
|
| Australia | Components for ground based radar systems
|
| Canada | Components for military aircraft
|
| Denmark | Ground based radar equipment and components for ground based radar
|
| Finland | Components for ground base radar
|
| Kuwait | Components for armoured fighting vehicles; components for military aircraft; components for missiles
|
| Saudi Arabia | Components for aircraft and their engines; components for naval vessels and their systems; components for ground based radar systems; components for simulators
|
|
44. The Committee would be grateful for details of any
military equipment gifted by the Government since the letter from
the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to Llew Smith MP of
15 January 2003.
Set out below are details on goods subject to strategic control
that have been gifted, or approved for gifting, by the government
since the letter from the Minister of State for the Armed Forces
to Llew Smith of 15 January 2003.
Approved March 2003—Challenger 2 Ammunition
to Oman
Handed over 1 April 2003—de-mining equipment
to Kenya
45. The Committee would appreciate an explanation of the
circumstances under which two Wessex helicopters (value £80,000)
came to be gifted to Uruguay. Why is it considered desirable to
gift helicopters to Uruguay?
The Uruguayan Air Force had experienced problems with the
maintenance of 11 ex-RAF Wessex helicopters that were purchased
in the later 1990s. The gifting of two surplus Wessex aircraft
in 2002 was seen as a small gesture in recognition of the value
we attach to defence relations with that country.
* * *
Export licence decisions
46. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of all licences (SIELs and OIELs) issued for export in 2002 to
the following countries: Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Syria.
* * *
47. The Committee would be grateful to receive details,
as available, of all licences (SIELs and OIELs) issued for export
to Indonesia between 1 January and 11 July 2003 (and subsequently
if available) (cf HC Deb 8 September 2003 c 73W).
* * *
48. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of what appear to be multiple destination OIELs issued in 2002,
as follows: (a) an OIEL including: Angola—OIEL No 6, Argentina—OIEL
No 17, Brazil—OIEL No 55 etc; (b) a temporary OIEL including:
Bangladesh—OIEL No 12, Brazil—OIEL No 30, Brunei—OIEL
No 14, etc; (c) an OIEL, including: Argentina—OIEL No 16,
Bahrain—OIEL No 22, Bangladesh—OIEL No 15, etc; and
(d) an OIEL, including: Ecuador—OIEL No 10, India—OIEL
No 25, Kenya—OIEL No 12, etc.
* * *
49. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of OIEL No. 29 to New Zealand.
* * *
50. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of all licences granted during 2002 for plutonium and/or enriched
uranium (including products containing plutonium and/or enriched
uranium).
* * *
51. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of all incorporation cases (considered under the additional factors
of 8 July 2002) on which decisions were reached during 2002.
The Government has told the Committee that it intends to
publish in future Annual Reports information on cases where incorporation
is involved. However, the Government said in its response to the
Committee of 28 October 2002 that, whilst every effort would be
made to collect and provide the necessary information quickly,
it would take some time for this data to feed through into the
Reports themselves. Because of the need to set up new arrangements
for collecting and collating the relevant information, this information
is not available for licences issued in 2002. A system is currently
being put into place that will enable such cases to be highlighted
and it is hoped that such information will be made available in
the 2003 Annual Report. However, because of the time it has taken
for the data to feed through, although the Government will make
every effort to provide this, it might not be possible to provide
the necessary information for the entire year.
52. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of the Global Project Licence issued in early 2003, and of any
others issued since.
The Global Project Licence was issued on 24/01/03. The licence
is valid for the export of missiles and missile components to
the French Government. The licence also permits the missile components
to be returned to listed companies (linked by contract to the
exporter) for repair, replacement or upgrade. The licence conditions
are confidential. There have been no discussions on Permitted
Export Destinations at this stage of the project. No other Global
Project Licences have been issued since.
* * *
53. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of all licences (SIELs and OIELs) refused and revoked during 2002,
including OIELs from which particular destinations and/or goods
were excluded.
* * *
54. The Committee would be grateful to receive details
of all appeals considered during 2002, and of those outstanding
at 31 December 2002.
* * *
55. The Committee would be grateful for details of any
licences granted since 2001 for export to India of (a) battlefield
surveillance radar or (b) flexible printed circuit boards for
main battle tanks.
* * *
Government promotion of defence exports
56. The Committee would be grateful for details of promotion
activities for specific defence exports carried out in 2002 by
FCO ministers in Chile, India and Singapore, and in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Tanzania while in the UK, and for details
of FCO ministerial promotional activities in 2003, including in
Singapore, and in India from the UK. (cf HC Deb 14 July 2003,
cc 47-48W and ibid 15 July 2003, cc 255-256W). Which ministers
carried out the promotion activities, on which dates, and which
transactions were discussed? The Committee would also appreciate
similar details of any promotion activities carried out in 2002
and 2003 by Ministers in other Government Departments.
Set out below are details of promotion activities for specific
defence exports carried out by the relevant department's Ministers
in 2002, and 2003 so far. Ministers regularly have meetings during
which they, as a main topic or as a secondary matter, promote
British exports, including defence equipment. The Government does
not keep a central record of these meetings, or the substance
of the discussions.
The Committee should note that, since their question was
tabled, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has amended its previous
response. Therefore the countries listed for the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office will differ to those specified in the question.
Some information is publicly disclosable and some is provided
in confidence. Where the information is confidential, it is because
of commercial sensitivities or to protect international relations.
The confidential information is provided in the separate annex
(not printed).
DfID
No Minister from this department has conducted any such activity
during the specified period.
DTI
The Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) of the Ministry
of Defence takes lead responsibility for promoting British military
equipment and arms sales to foreign customers and as such no DTI
Minister has undertaken any specific defence promotional activity
either on an overseas visit or while in the UK. Discussions on
defence related issues may arise in the margins of a DTI Ministerial
visit, but there have been no discussions of note.
FCO
|
| Country | Date
| Minister | Equipment
|
|
| Chile | 6-8 March 2002
| Baroness Symons | A frigate procurement programme
|
| India | 27 February 2002
| Foreign Secretary | Sea Harrier/Sea King/Hawk
|
| India | 29 May 2002
| Foreign Secretary | Hawk |
| India | 17 October 2002
| Mike O'Brien MP | Hawk |
| India | 20 January 2003
| Foreign Secretary | Hawk |
| India | 20 May 2003
| Foreign Secretary | Hawk |
| India | 17 June 2003
| Foreign Secretary | Hawk |
| Singapore | 21 May 2002
| Ben Bradshaw MP | Typhoon/Eurofighter
|
| Singapore | 8 January 2003
| Foreign Secretary | Typhoon/Eurofighter
|
MoD |
| | |
| Asia & Far East |
| | |
| India | 4 July 2003
| Geoff Hoon | Hawk |
| India | 20 January 2003
| Geoff Hoon | Hawk |
| India | 5 February 2003
| Lord Bach | Hawk |
| India | 1 June 2003
| Geoff Hoon | Hawk |
| Singapore | 26-27 February 2002
| Lord Bach | Typhoon |
| Singapore | 1 June 2002
| Lord Bach | Typhoon and Hawk
|
| Singapore | 11 October 2002
| Lord Bach | Typhoon |
| Singapore | 16 June 2003
| Lord Bach | Typhoon |
| Singapore | 30 June 2003
| Lord Bach | Typhoon |
| Americas | |
| |
| Chile | April 2002 |
Lord Bach | Chilean Frigate programme
|
| Chile | 25-28 June 2002
| Lord Bach | Chilean Frigate programme
|
| USA | 17-18 June 2002
| Lord Bach | JSF, Galileo and Nimrod MRA4
|
| USA | 11-15 November 2002
| Lord Bach | JSF |
| USA | 23-27 February 2003
| Lord Bach | JSF |
| USA | 23-24 July 2003
| Lord Bach | EH101 helicopter
|
| Europe inc | |
| |
| Eastern Europe | |
| |
| Czech Republic | 24 September 2002
| Geoff Hoon | Gripen |
| Czech Republic | 21 November 2002
| Geoff Hoon | Gripen |
| Czech Republic | 30 April 2003
| Geoff Hoon | Gripen and Typhoon
|
| Middle East | |
| |
| Inc Egypt | |
| |
| Bahrain | 2-3 July 2002
| Lewis Moonie | General references to defence exports
|
| Bahrain | 28 October 2002
| Geoff Hoon | General references to defence exports
|
|
* * *
57. Why was it considered appropriate to invite the Syrian
Government to DSEi 2003?
Invitations to official overseas defence delegations are
the subject of careful consideration and consultation between
Government Departments. The invitation of a country delegation
by HMG does not indicate that country will be able to import any
particular item on display, or under discussion, at an exhibition.
Any application from industry for a licence to export would still
be assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU
and National Arms Export Licensing criteria.
A list of proposed invitees is initially selected by the
Ministry of Defence, selection taking account of ongoing marketing
campaigns, longer-term prospects for business, and the cost involved
in hosting the delegations. As wider consultation on the list
takes place, political issues, arm embargoes and current international
relations imperatives are also considered.
Syria was considered to have longer-term prospects for export-related
business and, as a government, we remain keen to improve our relations
with that country. We are committed to a policy of constructive
and, where necessary, critical engagement which allows us to support
reform while maintaining a robust dialogue on issues of concern.
We have never hidden the fact that we have differences on a number
of issues, but the nature of our relationship means we can discuss
these issues candidly and at the very highest level. This is something
we will continue to do.
End-use assurances
58. What information does the Government have that the
Indonesian authorities may have used British built military equipment
in operations in Aceh in 2003 in a way that breached the Indonesian
Government's assurances not to use such equipment offensively
or in violation of human rights? What representations has the
Government made to the Indonesian authorities about how they have
used British built military equipment in Aceh? If the Government
believes that the assurances have or may have been breached, has
it taken any action against Indonesia, or in relation to existing
export licences to Indonesia or pending licence applications?
Does the Government regard the Indonesian Government's assurances
about the use of British built military equipment as standing?
The Government has no confirmed evidence that British-built
military equipment has been used in violation of human rights
or offensively anywhere in Indonesia in 2003. However, following
the resumption of hostilities in Aceh, the British Ambassador
in Jakarta sought and received from the Indonesian Defence Minister
on 20 May confirmation of Indonesian assurances that British-built
military equipment would not be used offensively or in violation
of human rights. Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien also raised
this in meetings with President Megawati and the Indonesian Foreign
Minister on 3 June, and again with the Indonesian Foreign Minister
on 23 July. We continue to raise the matter with Indonesian officials,
for example, Mr O'Brien again raised the issue when the new Indonesian
Ambassador Dr Prof Juwono Sudarsono paid an introductory call
on 6 October.
The Government regards the Indonesian Government's assurances
about the use of British built military equipment as standing.
59. What action does the Government believe would be appropriate
for it to take if an end-user did not abide by assurances given
on the use of military equipment? When an end-user has made such
assurances to the British Government, has the Government set out
what the consequences of a breach of these assurances might be?
Is there any specific action that the Government is required to
take against an end user that breaks end-use assurances?
The Government carries out careful and effective risk assessment
on end-users before making export-licensing decisions, so as to
prevent UK arms falling into the wrong hands. Where substantive
misuse or diversion is established, the Government may, for example,
revoke existing export licences to that country or end-user, and
information on such misuse or diversion will be taken into account
when assessing future export licence applications.
Where the end-user is another government, the United Kingdom
has the full range of diplomatic tools available to it. Where
there is a case of diversion or fraud by a private individual,
we look to co-operate with the authorities of friendly countries
to bring the perpetrators to justice.
There are no set rules for dealing with substantiated cases
of misuse or diversions. Instances are regarded as serious and
dealt with on a case by case basis. We will always try to ensure
that the negative effects of any misuse or diversion are minimised,
where possible, and that any relevant procedures are kept under
review to prevent a similar occurrence in the future.
November 2003
(updated February 2004)
| 
