Appendix 17: Further memorandum from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
EXPORT LICENSING:
POST EXPORT
MONITORING
We have, as agreed during the Foreign Secretary's
appearance before the Committee last year and mentioned in subsequent
PQs, been conducting research into the US Government's system
of end-use monitoring, Blue Lantern. I am now writing to let you
know of our findings and conclusions.
We have investigated Blue Lantern through study
of material and discussions, involving both the British Embassy
in Washington and an official visiting from London. Ministers
have agreed the conclusions.
Blue Lantern is run by the Office of Defence
Trade Controls in the Department of State. They carry out end-use
checks on about 10-12% of the 40,000 or so licences the US processes
annually. Most of them are the sort of the pre-licensing checks
that we carry out here. A little less than half are post-export.
Of those the vast majority are carried out through documentary
checks or simple checks of arrival. Only around 0.5% of licences
issued—those judged to be at highest risk—are subject
to physical monitoring through an on-site inspection.
We conclude that we already carry out the vast
majority of the work in the Blue Lantern programme as part of
our current licensing procedures, although we have not "badged"
it as a separate programme.
We have carefully considered whether to carry
out such checks on a similar sample basis would add a further
level of certainty to our own system of controls. We are not convinced
that it would do so to any significant extent. We believe that
our careful system of post-export checks reduces the risk of misuse
to a minimum. Once an item has been exported, the options for
putting right misuse or diversion are limited. A formalised system
of post export checks would only divert resources and focus away
from the most important decision: whether to export or not. We
are, however, very conscious of the need to ensure that UK exports
of military goods are not diverted to those who would use them
to commit human rights abuses or acts of terrorism.
We will therefore encourage relevant officials
to consider greater use of the facility already available to them
to request end use monitoring on a case by case basis, reminding
them of the indicators that would suggest such action. We will
also look to see if export licensing procedures should be adjusted
to make such checks, which as noted will normally fall short of
requiring a visit, easier.
February 2004
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