Appendix 22: Further memorandum from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Question numbers refer to the oral evidence
taken before the Committees.)
At Questions 9 and 10, the Foreign Secretary
offers to provide an explanation regarding end-use assurances
given by the Indonesian Government. As we understand it, until
August 2002, the Indonesian Government was bound by an undertaking
not to deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh, and to
provide advance warning of any possible deployment. In August
2002, the British Government received advanced notification of
the Indonesian Government's intent to deploy British-built armoured
personnel carriers to Aceh for "casualty evacuation and logistical
support". The Indonesian Government provided assurances that
this equipment would "not be used to infringe human rights
in Aceh or elsewhere". On 3 October 2002, the Foreign Secretary
wrote to the Chairman informing him of this. However, in September
2002, the British Government also agreed that the Indonesian Government
would no longer need to provide advance warning of any deployment
of military equipment to Aceh. The Indonesian Government gave
fresh assurances that "British-built nillitary equipment
would not be used offensively or in violation of human rights"
anywhere in Indonesia. However, neither the Chairman nor (to our
knowledge) anyone else in Parliament was made aware of this broader
change in policy, until a written answer was given on 12 June
2003 to a parliamentary question from Jeremy Corbyn MP. When the
Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committee on 3 October 2002 to
inform us of the Indonesian Government's advance warning of its
intent to deploy British-built armoured personnel carriers to
Aceh, why did he not also tell us that the Government had agreed
to do without such advance warnings in the future?
At Questions 12 and 15, the Foreign Secretary
promises to write to explain why the Government decided to do
without these advance warnings.
The Government will answer these questions together.
In August 2002, the Indonesian government approached
the UK government saying that they wished to deploy British-built
military equipment to Aceh, which would have represented a breach
of existing assurances. The Indonesian government subsequently
gave a new assurance that British-built military equipment would
not be used for offensive purposes, nor to infringe human rights
either in Aceh or elsewhere in Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia
also told us that if, against expectations, they had to contemplate
the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage they would
inform the British Government in advance.
When writing to the Committee in October 2002,
our overriding concern was to bring to Parliament's attention
the Indonesian government's proposal to use British-built military
equipment in Aceh, which would have been in breach of the assurances
then in place.
On reflection, the Government accepts that the
letter should have made explicit that we no longer required advance
notification of the deployment of British-built military equipment
to Aceh. There was no intention to withhold information from the
Committee, and all this was subsequently made clear in the response
to Jeremy Corbyn's PQ 118138 of 12 June 2003. The October 2002
letter to the Committee did make clear that all export licence
applications for Indonesia would continue to be rigorously assessed
on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National
Arms Export Licensing Criteria. There was therefore no change
in the policy in which export licences are assessed, and no practical
change in the way in which UK controls of exports to Indonesia
are implemented.
The Indonesian Government had been open in announcing
their intention to deploy equipment to Aceh. We were satisfied
with the substance of the new assurances, since they explicitly
rule out the use of British-built military equipment offensively
and for internal repression in Aceh and throughout Indonesia.
Advance warnings of deployment to Aceh alone was sub sumed as
soon as the assurances became applicable to the whole of Indonesia.
The Consolidated Criteria do not specifically
regulate where in the importing country the equipment is to be
located. Where the equipment is likely to be used will, however,
be one factor in assessing an export licence application against
the Consolidated Criteria.
At question 17, the Foreign Secretary offers
to provide details of recent visits by Government officials to
Aceh.
Current: The EU Troika (currently Italy,
Ireland and the Netherlands) are planning a visit to Aceh.
February 2004: Two British Embassy officials
visited the capital of Aceh, Banda Aceh. They met two local human
rights NGOs, STRA and Koalisi HAM.
January 2003: Following up on the donors
meeting in Tokyo, the US, Japanese and Italian (representing the
EU) Ambassadors, together with the head of the World Bank office
in Jakarta, visited Aceh. They met the Joint Security Committee
and observed the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, which subsequently broke down in May 2003.
September 2002: An Embassy official visited
Aceh to observe mock elections.
July 2001: HMA Jakarta met Aceh Governor Abdullah
Puteh.
At Question 44, Mr Oakden states that "all
of the accession states either are already or will be members"
of "each of the supplier regimes, including Wassenaar".
Is the Government certain that Acceding Countries which are not
members of export control regimes will become members of all of
those regimes this year?
The Government fully supports the EU Presidency's
efforts to promote EU Acceding Countries' membership within these
fora. However given that decisions within the regimes require
consensus, the Government cannot at present be certain of the
outcome in each case.
We expect a silence procedure to be launched
shortly within the Australia Group (covering chemical and biological
weapons) on the applications of the five EU Acceding Countries,
which are not already members with a view to their attendance
as members at the next Plenary in June. At present we anticipate
no difficulties.
A silence procedure is already underway in the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on the applications of
the seven relevant EU Acceding Countries. A final decision will
be taken at the MTCR's intersessional meeting, the "Reinforced
Points of Contact" meeting, in April. No objections were
raised on any application during the three-month consultation
period that preceded the launch of the silence procedure on 1
March.
The three EU Acceding Countries not currently
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have lodged applications.
These will be discussed at the annual Plenary in May.
Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement
are currently discussing the prospective membership of EU accession
states that are not currently participating in the Arrangement.
Based on the outcome of these consultations, a silence procedure
will be initiated in the course of 2004.
At Question 49, the Foreign Secretary offers
to provide more information in confidence on the Hemant Lakhani
case.
While the Foreign Secretary is committed to
providing the Committee with as much relevant information as possible,
he has concluded that it would not be appropriate to comment On
this specific case, which is currently being pursued by US law
enforcement agencies. We would however reiterate that the Government
already has tight controls on the export and transfer of MANPADS;
we are considering whether any additional measures are appropriate.
At Question 56, the Foreign Secretary promises
to look at Mr Battle's suggestion to extend the productive expenditure
criteria under the ECGD to proposed exports to all of the International
Development Association countries.
In order to ensure that the poorest countries
do not develop new unsustainable debt burdens, the Export Credit
Guarantee Department only supports exports to countries that meet
"productive expenditure" criteria.
ECGD, in conjunction with DFID, already apply
the "productive expenditure" criteria to 67 of the 81
countries able to receive assistance from the International Development
Association. The other 14 countries have larger economies where
debt sustainability is less of a concern.
ECGD has, or is just about to, publish guidelines
for exporters on the UK's application of the productive expenditure
criteria. These guidelines clarify our policy for all stakeholders
rather than introduce any new requirements. They can be found
at http://www.ecgd.gov.uk
At Questions 61-64, the Foreign Secretary
suggests the subject needs to be followed up "in some more
detail". The proliferation of small arms in the developing
world fuels insecurity and conflict, which in turn hampers countries'
sustainable development. In assessing export licence applications—especially
for the transfer of small arms and light weapons—against
criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria, how are possible human
security impacts factored into the assessment?
All licence applications are assessed against
the Criteria as a whole. The Criteria require the Government to
take into account a wide range of issues which impact on human
security, including internal repression, the existence of tensions
and armed conflicts, and regional peace, security and stability.
When assessing licences against Criterion 8,
which focuses on the economic impact, human security implications
are captured by consideration of whether the import meets that
country's legitimate needs of security and defence.
April 2004
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