Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
25 FEBRUARY 2004
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR EDWARD
OAKDEN CMG AND
MR DAVID
LANDSMAN
Q40 Chairman: There is a logic problem
here.
Mr Straw: —and a logical
difference between the final equipment and the components that
go to make it up. There just is. Obviously, for some things the
issues are very similar where you are dealing with equipment which
is plainly aggressive or can upgrade the aircraft. Where you are
dealing with an awful lot of components then you have to judge
it, as the criteria say, on a case-by-case basis, and a lot of
the issues where I am asked for my decision on components come
into this area, for example, where although the equipment into
which they are going to be installed, for sure, has a purpose
as a weapon or part of a weapons system, the equipment itself—an
ejector seat or fire control system—does not have that purpose
at all. Now, there is the other issue you raise, which is about
incorporation. I know Ms Squire was concerned about this last
year but I am happy to go into further detail about that. There
is just a reality that the international defence industry has
become more and more internationalised; the production lines are
international now and they are not just national or local. That
is one of the reasons why there has been an increase in the total
number of licences for components, because increasingly British
companies are supplying components to other companies. I think
there is now only one completely UK-made military aircraft, which
is the Hawk; all the others are now made in different parts of
Europe or between Europe and the United States. So we are in this
production line situation. The judgment I then had to make when
I came to consider what became called the Incorporation Policy
is whether we were making a strategic decision, effectively, to
cease to play our part in those production lines where otherwise
the production was consistent with the consolidated criteria.
This may be an uncomfortable position for some people but the
country has made a strategic decision on an all-party basis that
we have a defence industry, that it needs to be controlled properly—as
it is—but within that it has to prosper. If that is the
case, then colleagues have got to accept that as circumstances
change, and the increasing globalisation of production is one
of the major changes in circumstances, then the way in which we
have to deal with licences also has to change, although the criteria
have not changed, nor the rigour with which we put them into force.
Q41 Rachel Squire: I think the Foreign
Secretary may have advanced the issue because I was going to ask
about the Government allowing the temporary export to China of
a variety of training and combat aircraft demonstration models
and mock-ups, saying this was for exhibition purposes. Am I right
to conclude that that does indeed suggest that we are ensuring
British companies will be well-placed to sell to the Chinese,
perhaps, when, rather than if, the current embargo is lifted or
relaxed?
Mr Straw: I have a feeling, Ms
Squire, that these particular approvals predated the decision
of the European Council to review the embargo. So I do not think
there is any direct cause and effect there, but I can check on
that. What, however, is the case is that there is plainly a difference
between a licence for use in the particular country and a licence
for exhibition where it is not for use in a country, and again
we look at it on the basis of the consolidated criteria. I remember
reading a note about this and I have been trying to find it in
my extensive brief.
Q42 Chairman: Perhaps you could drop
us a line on that one.
Mr Straw: I may even turn it up,
but I have definitely seen it on the page.
Q43 Mr George: Secretary of State, on
4 May 10 new nations join the European Union. My questions, which
are related, relate to how well these 10 new countries are going
to fit into European practices and the European Code of Conduct.
The impression I have from what the Government have said is that
they are reasonably happy with the 10 countries' administrative
procedures but I do not know if the Government—and we will
find out in a moment—is satisfied with their implementation
of the European Code of conduct or their ability or willingness
to implement properly. The question then is, of these 10 new countries,
none of them appear to have a very strong tradition of export
control. What have we been doing to ensure that these 10 new members
of the European Union do not become the weakest link in the export
control system, in terms of both the standards and enforcement?
Mr Straw: Mr George, it is an
issue which we, as a Government, and I as Foreign Secretary, take
very seriously. What we have been doing specifically is we have
organised two seminars for accession states about the code's criteria
and how they should operate, because it is not just what is on
the paper it is about what approach individual officials should
take when they are looking at arms applications. One took place
in Estonia and the other in Slovakia. The seminars focused upon
how concretely you need to take licensing decisions. Although
the accession countries have been applying the criteria for a
number of years as part of their accession arrangements, we thought
it important to provide them with strategic information. There
was also a session in the seminars on transparency, focusing on
the information provided by almost all Member States in their
annual reports, albeit that some of their annual reports are limited.
There is also the issue of ensuring that all the EU accession
states become members of the non-conventional weapons group regimes,
like the Australia Group, the MTCR, the NSG, the Wassenaar and
the Zangger groups. I was checking through this in preparation
for this Committee hearing. The EU WMD action plan provides for
the setting up of a task force to assist accession states on export
controls and discussion with the EU regulation. 10 cluster groups
of three countries per group have been set up. The UK is in two
such groups; the first with Ireland and Malta, the second with
Greece and Cyprus. Within each group a visit will be made to each
country to discuss customs issues, transhipment, identification
of goods in the regulation and technical control issues. Customs
and Excise are working closely with these countries. There is
then the Australia Group, which is a group—as you know,
Mr George—of like-minded countries which aim to limit and
frustrate the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons
through the implementation of export controls. Five of the EU
accession states are expected to join the Australia Group this
year—they are: Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—and
we are supporting the applications. The other five are already
members of the regime. In respect of the Missile Technology Control
Regime, again, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia
and Slovenia are applying to join the MTCR and the other accession
states are already members. These are going to be considered at
a meeting in May. Then again, for the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
Malta, Estonia and Lithuania have applied to join the regime,
the other accession states are already members. The other two
groups are not directly relevant, the Wassenaar and the Zangger.
Just to give you an indication that we are concerned about the
point you raise, ticking the box that you agree the criteria is
only the first stage; you have got to make sure you apply it.
So we are very concerned it is applied, both in respect of conventional
and non-conventional weapons. We have a good relationship with
the accession states, for all sorts of reasons of which you are
aware, and we intend to continue to stay alongside them on this.
Their arms industries, as with their size, varies a great deal.
Q44 Mr George: You are getting close
to a related point on the peer review process. Are you satisfied
it is working? It seems a bit like the whipping system in the
House of Commons, where these wonderful people are able to coax,
cajole, persuade and arm-twist. We are amongst the best of the
countries in relation to the implementation of arms-control regimes.
Are you really satisfied that this peer review control, peer review
system is really working? It will take more than a few seminars.
Again, the impression I have is that the Americans are rather
better at it than we are. At the end of the day, on 5 May will
you be able to say "Well, look, I think now we have made
very significant and successful steps to getting these guys into
the regime that we regard very highly"?
Mr Straw: I am going to ask Mr
Oakden to answer your specific point, but let me make this clear
point, that I am satisfied that as from 1 May the regime which
these countries will operate under, and its enforcement, will
be better than it has been in previous years in these countries.
The very fact that they are joining the European Union is a way
of raising their standards of law enforcement generally. Whether
it is at the level which we would regard as wholly satisfactory
is another question, but it is moving in the right direction,
and you only have to look at some of the other former Soviet Union
nations which are not joining the EU, so we do not have the same
control over them, to see what the problems are.
Mr Oakden: It is a serious issue
and I think it is recognised across all the accession states as
being a serious issue. Clearly, for the larger states with bigger
bureaucracies, implementing these detailed obligations is maybe
less of a challenge than for some of the smaller ones. However,
as the Foreign Secretary has just gone through, for each of the
supplier regimes, including Wassenaar, all of the EU Member States
are in the control regimes and all the accession states either
are already or will be members. That has entailed a substantial
effort, not just bureaucratically but in terms of the commitment
of their officials to follow through what that actually means
in practice. Clearly, it will be an on-going challenge but it
is one that has quite a high priority.
Q45 Tony Baldry: Foreign Secretary, sometimes
sitting here it seems a planet away from the impact of the irresponsible
use of weapons on individuals elsewhere in the world. I was in
Sierra Leone last week and amongst the things I was looking at
were camps for amputees. The indictment for the UN Special Court
for Sierra Leone makes chilling reading. We saw last weekend a
massacre in Northern Uganda by the resistance army and the continuing
abuses in the DRC. These are all innocent people out there who
get killed, maimed and injured by the irresponsible use of weapons.
Last October Oxfam and Amnesty International launched a campaign
for an international arms trade treaty "to prevent arms being
exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit
grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law." One does not have to look far for instances of that
and, of course, there is still a UN War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda.
I understand the Government's line on arms is that HMG "supports
the goal of an international instrument on arms transfers, but
argues that for it to be effective such a treaty would have to
enjoy the support of all major arms exporting countries."
So, on that, I would just like to ask two very simple questions:
what do you consider to be the prospects of all major arms-exporting
countries supporting an international arms trade treaty, and can
you tell us which countries are reluctant to establish such a
treaty? What are we doing to gain their support? Is this something
we are passively sitting in Whitehall saying, "If the others
do it we will do it"? Or is this something where you and
colleagues are pro-actively suggesting to other major arms-exporting
countries that we need to have a new international instrument
to try and prevent future substantial violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law?
Mr Straw: We are at an early stage
but let me say I do welcome the proposals which have been made
by Oxfam and others in respect of this, and their concern. The
issue, however, and where you always have to make a judgment with
these international draft instruments, is how effective they would
be and whether it is going to be possible to gain support for
them; in a sense, what diplomatic and other price would you have
to pay? You asked me what countries have supported it up to now.
I am aware of reports that Finland has offered support but it
has offered support for the treaty's principles but not the text.
The Netherlands have, I think, given support in rather similar
terms, saying that (according to my information) they support
agreements which strengthen the control on arms trade but they
are not convinced an arms treaty is feasible yet. So we are having
consultations on this. It goes without saying that if I felt an
arms control treaty would deal with many of the problems which
you have raised and we could get it through, I would be in favour
of it. After all, we have signed up to all sorts of instruments
in terms of arms control and there is no argument there, in principle,
between us, it is just whether this is going to work. The examples
that you use, I think, are quite interesting because you talk
about Sierra Leone and Uganda, where there have been the most
terrible massacres. Most of the loss of life and the damage in
both of those conflicts has been caused through small arms. It
happens, as you know, that we have a large defence industry and
small arms plays a tiny part in that in the UK. We have made a
lot of efforts better to control the trade in small arms. In respect
of that, we are well ahead of the proposals for the arms trade
treaty, but it has been very, very hard going. A lot of people
make a lot of money out of small arms and they are also relatively
easy to produce in unlicensed, uncontrolled premises. It is difficult.
We have already got international treaties and instruments in
respect of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and I have
issued proposals this morning better to enforce those regimes.
We have got the Missile Technology Control Regime, of which we
are members. There is no issue at all about what we want to do,
it is just whether this is the right way of doing it. I remain
open on it.
Mr Oakden: Can I just add one
point? We have talked about this somewhat in the European Union.
There is, I think, a general agreement that the real countries
that we need to be getting at are not the other countries of the
European Union, they are not a problem, it is the countries which
are the major exporters of small arms. Our experience hitherto,
including on all the work we are doing on small arms, is that
if western countries, EU countries, get out in front and say "We
want to do this" that actually makes it harder, very often,
to bring either some of the developing countries on board because
they feel that they are being made to sign up to somebody else's
agenda, or, indeed, some of the big exporters of small arms. So
what we are trying to do is, at this stage, talk through—and
ministers have been involved already—with the NGOs exactly
how best to go about this. Clearly, we will do what we can, both
nationally and within the European Union, to try to create a movement
from this that goes wider than the western consensus. When we
have discussed this within the European Union that seems to be
where the centre of gravity is about where we should be going
forward on this treaty.
Q46 Tony Baldry: I think we would all
welcome the restrictions on small arms exports to Africa. Indeed,
the Prime Minister on 9 December of last year said in the House
of Commons: "In respect of small arms we already prevent
their sale into Africa, which is the single most important thing
that we can do." However, when I look through the annual
report on strategic export controls I note that the number of
African countries receiving UK open export licences for small
arms has increased from four in 1999 to 11 in 2002. This includes
machine guns to Senegal, components for mortars to Cameroon, Angola
and the Ivory Coast and Namibia, and grenade launchers to Tunisia.
I can see that grenade launchers go a bit beyond small arms, or
AK47s, but there seems to be a kind of disparity between what
the Government is saying about small arms and Africa and what
is actually happening.
Mr Straw: I have not got the details
directly in front of me of those applications. By definition,
I am happy to go into detail there. I do not think there is a
disparity, Mr Baldry. I am happy to provide you with more detail.
We are very, very careful about our arms exports anywhere, particularly
to Africa, for reasons which are well understood.
Mr Landsman: If I can just add
to that. On some of those we can obviously provide some more details,
but some of those will be for the use of humanitarian agencies
in certain circumstances or for UN peace-keeping forces.
Q47 Tony Baldry: I cannot imagine humanitarian
agencies using heavy machine guns in Senegal, but I will be very
interested to hear the details of that.
Mr Straw: There was some concern,
not in respect of Africa but another country, about armoured vehicles
which looked as though they were military vehicles but, in fact,
they were for a well-known broadcasting organisation. We were
about to be pilloried for providing armoured vehicles to a country
which had a record which some questioned. We cannot give full
details of these exports because they are confidential, but the
armoured vehicles were for a well-known broadcasting company.
So sometimes there is an explanation which may even satisfy this
Committee.
Q48 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
I want to turn to the very key recommendation which was made unanimously
by this Committee last year in our report HC620. We said this:
"We recommend that the Government should seek to extend extraterritorial
control to all trafficking and brokering which if conducted in
the UK would not be granted a licence." Sadly, this unanimous,
all-party recommendation from these four Select Committees of
the House has not been accepted by the Government. Indeed, in
practical terms it has been rejected to the tune of 90% plus,
because as you are well aware the only weapons to which the extraterritoriality
provisions as far as trafficking and brokering is concerned that
are currently being applied are to missiles in excess of 300 kilometres
range and limited amounts of items which have a torture connotation,
such as handcuffs. Everything in between is excluded. This, as
you will be aware, was the major issue of policy which was the
subject of the Committee's debate in Westminster Hall on 6 November.
I must put it to you that in the contributions that were made
by all those who took part from all parties the argumentation
put forward by the Members of the Committee and other Members
of the House who took part for the policy position of the Quadripartite
Committee, I believe, the argument was won absolutely conclusively
in relation to the—I thought—wholly unpersuasive and
thoroughly inadequate defence of the Government's line that Mr
Nigel Griffiths put forward. I know it is incredibly difficult
for you, as Secretary of State, in front of a Committee to indicate
that the Quadripartite Committee may have got the policy right
whereas the Government has got it wrong, but that is what I invite
you to respond to the Committee by saying. If you do not think
this is a serious issue I am going to come to some very serious
questions to you, Foreign Secretary. I put it to you, this is
a serious life and death issue, to which I am going to come in
a moment. I put it to you that the Government's policy is jeopardising
life.
Mr Straw: Of course it is a serious
issue, but I was smiling at what I thought was a witticism of
your own but, there we are, maybe I made a mistake there. Of course
these are issues of life and death by definition, but it is perfectly
possible for colleagues to disagree about how you deal with these
issues in an honourable way without it being implied that because
we have come to one view about this discrete issue of extra-territoriality
therefore we are less assiduous in terms of trying to protect
people's lives than those who have come to the opposite view.
On balance these are always judgments but I have to say that I
have always been sceptical about this issue of extra-territorial
control and extra-territorial offences except in very specific
circumstances. We are members of various international instruments
which make genocide, torture and so on, crimes which are try-able
internationally, slightly different from extra-territorial jurisdiction
but they are try-able internationally. Also we have very strongly
resisted efforts by the United States to impose an extra-territorial
jurisdiction on otherwise perfectly lawful activities, for example
of United Kingdom businessmen, both operating here and in third
countries. There are businessmen in this country, and your Party
complains about this as much as mine, who are absolutely sound,
who are not involved in any improper conduct, and yet are subject
to all kinds of restrictions because on the basis of our law,
not that of the United States, they happen to make decisions to
trade with other countries to which the United States takes exception
and there are various extra-territorial offences as well. This
also arises in taxation. This is a subject of some difficulty
for us and other European countries and the US. The US does have
a system of extra-territorial controls, however we have not been
made aware of one single successful prosecution which has been
made under US extra-territorial brokering controls, for example.
I am open to further information on this. It is not an ideological
position I am taking, I am simply taking a position on the balance
of the arguments; if the arguments change I am happy to change.
In contrast, I am told that for over 25 years Germany has operated
a system of brokering controls applying to activities done on
German territory similar to the United Kingdom controls with regular
prosecutions resulting in custodial sentences. That is our approach
so far. I am very happy to look again at the debate that took
place in Westminster Hall and the report. This is not an idle
view we have come to. I appreciate the position of the Committee.
It is much in my interests to agree with the Committee wherever
I can, and I do, because why should I not, you have great expertise
and you look at these things. I do not open your reports with
the view that I am going to disagree with what you say, I open
the reports with the view that I should agree with them whenever
I can take the recommendations on board. It has not been possible
here so far, as I say, but we are always open to argument.
Q49 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
at no point have I suggested idleness or any lack of assiduousness
on your part. I am sure this is an honest difference of view and
I, and I am sure other Members of the Committee, wish to persuade
you that the Government has got the policy wrong. This is not
an issue about British businessmen conducting themselves legally.
The Quadripartite's position is quite clear: the extension of
extra-territoriality that we are seeking is in relation to trafficking
and brokering which if conducted in the UK would not be granted
a licence. I suggest you have to defend the position why should
it be legitimate for a UK broker outside the territorial area
of the UK to make a sale of a particular item to a particular
country which if conducted inside the United Kingdom would require
an export licence. It would seem to me, and to the rest of the
Committee, that as far as people who are British citizens are
concerned, and therefore liable to British law, the same boundaries
of the business should apply whether they are operating inside
the UK or not. Can I come to a specific weapon? Here we have an
individual case where I must put it to you the Government has
been put on to very, very clear notice of the risks that it is
running. I put it to you also, Foreign Secretary, it is not an
issue as to how many successful prosecutions there have been or
not, the issue is whether the law in place is a law which will,
as far as possible, do all that can be done in legal terms to
protect the lives of British and, indeed, other people from the
activities of British citizens. The case that I am referring to,
which has been widely reported in the press, is the case of Mr
Hemant Lakhani who, following clearly a very successful intelligence
operation, as has been widely reported, and British Intelligence
Services should be congratulated, was arrested in the United States—I
stress Mr Hemant Lakhani is a British citizen—whilst he
was allegedly trying to sell up to 50 Russian surface-to-air missiles.
The question which I believe you and your colleagues in Government
need to ask yourselves with the utmost seriousness is given the
absolutely known risks from the proliferation of surface-to-air
missiles today, and the media have been full of reports on British
and other aircraft from such attacks, and we have already suffered
the loss of several lives in Iraq from surface-to-air missiles,
how can you defend the situation when you are clearly on notice
of a British subject already having been subject to arrest on
allegations of trying to procure Russian surface-to-air missiles
of not including surface-to-air missiles in the extra-territoriality
provisions that the Government has now passed into law?
Mr Straw: On the detailed point
that you raise, Sir John, Mr Oakden can go into this in more detail
in the closed session. I think you are asking about MANPADs and
we already have tight controls on the export of these. It does
not matter if they were a UK National or not, if they were engaged
in the same activity in the UK they would prima facie be
committing a criminal offence in the UK, so I am not entirely
clear what point it is you are making. Of course we take these
things seriously.
Q50 Sir John Stanley: Can I just put
it very clearly. If this particular gentleman, as a British citizen,
was engaged in the brokering of surface-to-air missiles outside
the UK's territorial jurisdiction, that particular individual
would not be the subject of the offences which you have laid down
in the Secondary Legislation which the House has now passed. That
is the legal position.
Mr Straw: Hang on. There are other
provisions, for example the Terrorism Act, which do necessarily
have extra-territorial effect. We can go into detail about the
specific case in the closed session. Sir John, I am very happy
to look again at this issue and your recommendation. The only
question is, is it going to work? It is not an issue of principle
here whatsoever, we are all in favour of the toughest enforcement
in this area. There may be arguments about the judgments, and
sometimes they can lead to sharp arguments, but there is no issue
of principle. Let me say I have got form as long as your arm for
introducing all sorts of further criminal offences on to the criminal
calendar, principally as Home Secretary but also as Foreign Secretary,
so that does not worry me at all, it only worries me is it going
to work. I will promise you I will look at it again.
Chairman: I am very conscious of the
time. Can we have quick questions and quick answers, please?
Q51 Sir John Stanley: You suggested,
as did Mr Griffiths in replying to the debate, that this issue,
this huge lacuna of everything between handcuffs and missiles
with ranges in excess of 300 kilometres, was in some way going
to be covered by the terrorism legislation. Mr Griffiths said:
"The trafficking in shorter range missiles by terrorists,
or for the purposes of terrorism, is covered in many circumstances
by the anti-terrorism legislation which has extra-territorial
effect". That is one of these ministerial statements which
probably we have all been guilty of from time to time which is
factually correct but inadvertently is actually profoundly misleading
in the impression it conveys.
Mr Straw: You may be guilty of
that, Sir John, but—
Q52 Sir John Stanley: I just want to
finish my point. Why it is profoundly misleading is that this
trade is not conducted by people who are clearly terrorists, absolutely
not, it is conducted by middle men, people who are disguising
very, very carefully their activities and doing their utmost to
shield themselves from any association with terrorism. For that
reason, and you as a lawyer will understand this, if you are going
to make a prosecution you have got to do it on the basis of proving
a connection with terrorism and I believe under those circumstances
you will virtually never achieve it. If you are going to mount
a prosecution on the fact of brokering, which is what the extra-territorial
provision should extend to, you have got a much greater chance
of succeeding with a prosecution and I ask you to consider that
issue.
Mr Straw: I will look at it again.
Q53 Mr Blunt: Secretary of State, just
to come back to the international arena. To quote from an American
academic study, it says: "Having four regimes that appear
to policymakers to be doing the same thing, regulating weapons-related
technologies and items, has resulted in a lack of sustained high
level political attention in almost all Member States, including
the United States", I think with the honourable exception
of this Committee. "In this context one can understand the
complaints from firms and their clients about confusing and overlapping
regulations and the consequent introduction of piecemeal solutions
by individual legislators. In most countries that we have studied,
the issues appear so esoteric to national policymakers that few
high level political resources are invested to rationalise the
national export control system as a whole". Do you agree
with that?
Mr Straw: I think it is a fair
criticism, Mr Blunt. It is complicated. These systems have grown
up on a bespoke basis. Personally, as I have already made clear,
one of my great concerns—this is a personal concern—is
about the lack of enforcement mechanisms for biological and toxic
weapons. I published a Command Paper about this two years ago
and have been arguing for it internationally. However, those who
are opposed to a more substantial enforcement regime argue that
if you go down this route you have then got a problem of interference
with the pharmaceutical industry, for example, which is at the
heart of the argument over biological weapons control. Then the
issue is it is better to ring-fence biological weapons in order
that at least you can have a reasonable regime in respect of chemical
weapons and nuclear weapons. That is why these things have grown
up. I do not defend these arrangements. It would be good if they
could be rationalised and it would also be good if senior people
at all levels in other governments paid the same kind of attention
that I believe we do in the UK Government.
Q54 Mr Blunt: Does it not mean, as Mr
Oakden said, talking with NGOs about how we might approach this
at this stage is really not good enough? If we are going to get
a single international control regime, now is the time to strike
because now is the time that the full attention of the United
States is engaged following 9/11.
Mr Straw: The US are engaged in
a number of initiatives, including the ones which I talked about
yesterday, and that was part of the purpose of President Bush's
speech that he made on 11 February as I recall. They have taken
a lead over things like the global partnership to clean up WMD,
particularly in Russia and former Soviet countries, and much else
besides, but if you take the issue of biological weapons, the
control and enforcement regime, one of the countries which take
a different view from us is the United States. It is on the record.
There was an international conference about this towards the end
of 2001. We sought to achieve at least a consensus that could
continue the process of discussion but although the United States'
Government is very committed indeed to counter-proliferation and
generally to arms control, there are some of these issues, and
BW is a good example, where their view of what is required is
different from ours. Their view, in a nutshell, is that it is
so difficult fully to enforce a BW regime that it may not be appropriate
to try and we have a different view. You have to deal with these
things on a case-by-case basis, I think.
Q55 Mr Blunt: I am conscious that we
are pressed for time. Does the need for the Proliferation Security
Initiative demonstrate the limitations of current arrangements
and does that initiative not really demonstrate that we are now
in effect carrying out other countries' export controls on WMD
and missiles by proxy?
Mr Straw: We need the Proliferation
Security Initiative because although there are many countries
which observe the high standards to which every other country
in the world, bar a tiny handful, are committed, there are other
countries which sign up to international instruments but do not
enforce or, even if they wish to enforce, lack the capacity to
do so. Of course it is right, and in a sense this is a good example
of us using extra-territorial arrangements in a practical way,
that we should seek to take action to enforce rules which the
originating countries should have enforced themselves. The best
example, and I hope this is of some reassurance to Sir John, is
the proposal in respect of the transport of WMD, their delivery
systems and related materials, on commercial vessels on the high
seas where we want agreement with the flag countries to be able
to interdict and not just for drug purposes.
Q56 Mr Battle: Foreign Secretary, could
I focus on arms exports to developing countries and perhaps try
to make a modest but constructive proposal because, as we all
know, the Export Credit Guarantee Department offers subsidised
insurance cover for arms sales to actually encourage arms companies
and recipient countries to take up arms sales that might not be
otherwise economically viable and which might have a massive negative
impact on their economies. I think we should welcome the Government's
introduction of what is called the productive expenditure criteria
for arms sales to all the HIPC countries, the highly indebted
poor countries. Would an extension of that productive expenditure
criteria to all the international development association countries,
all the poor countries listed under the UN, not dissuade them
from taking up arms and taking on more unsustainable debt and
also release money for the alleviation of poverty? I would just
suggest that as a practical suggestion, it would get widespread
common support. What arguments could there possibly be against
that modest extension?
Mr Straw: I am very happy to look
at it is the answer, Mr Battle. I do not think you were suggesting
that countries in that category should not have any kind of defence
arrangements at all, because plainly they need them, but it has
got to be proportionate. We are applying this criterion of proportionality
pretty rigorously, as we have done in the refusal to which your
attention has been drawn, and we can no doubt discuss that in
closed session if you wish. I will certainly follow it up.
Q57 Mr Colman: Foreign Secretary, some
very brief questions around what I understand to be the Government's
intention to give two short take-off and landing aircraft to Nepal.
First of all, you said that you wished to keep us as a Committee
informed, but in this case the decision to give these two aircraft
emerged via the press in Nepal rather than through a statement
to Parliament or even a letter to this Committee. Plainly by the
look on your face you are concerned that this is so. The second
point, while I still have your attention, is as we said last year
in terms of the supply of helicopters, again this Committee did
not oppose that, we were surprised that the money for these two
aircraft should come from the global conflict prevention pool,
and again we were surprised that these aircraft were supposedly
there to prevent conflict. We were a bit surprised that this pool
was used to fund it. First of all, could you perhaps assure us
that this was a one-off and should such gifts occur in the future,
and we support Nepal, you would inform us before the event rather
than us hearing about it through the press? Secondly, would you
again like to reconsider using the conflict prevention pool money?
Mr Straw: Mr Colman, we do not
at the moment have a system of prior scrutiny. There is an argument
in favour of that, but we have retrospective scrutiny, so it is
appropriate that the committee is told once a licence has been
issued, but not in advance. There is nothing particularly secret
about this at all, but the reason I was looking puzzled was that
I have written quite a number of letters about this and I thought
perhaps one of them was to the committee but I have certainly
written letters to colleagues who have followed this up on behalf
of constituents. I think you said we need to support Nepal. We
have had to take a strategic decision that the government of Nepal
needs support, subject to some clear conditions, because of the
very severe threat it faces from the Maoists. I do not say for
a second that I regard the human rights record of the government
of Nepal as satisfactory; in a number of respects it is not, but
I also say that the human rights records of the Maoists is infinitely
worse and the strategic consequences of us either supporting them
or washing our hands of the issue would be very serious, so we
have to make a difficult choice in an imperfect world and that
is the choice that we have made. It is not an oxymoron for us
to use the global Conflict Prevention Fund to support, for example,
the operation of short take-off and landing aircraft because sometimes
you have to prevent conflict and its scale by making use of military
action; there is no other way. Again, it is an unpleasant world
we live in but it is a world that we do live in. It may be helpful
to provide the committee, Chairman, with information about these
aircraft. They are twin-engined Islander aircraft with a normal
carrying load of around seven persons, including the crew. They
will be capable of conducting non-lethal activity such as search
and rescue but are not combat aircraft and do not have a substantial
military lift capability. The aircraft are used by some UK police
forces for similar roles to that anticipated for these aircraft
in Nepal, and we would arrange for an agreement between ourselves
and the RNA that the aircraft would be strictly limited to a logistical,
medical and humanitarian role, so I hope that is helpful. With
respect to the two helicopters, they were gifted during 2002 for
transportation and were not designed for offensive purposes. Their
supply to the Royal Nepalese Army was on the condition that they
were used solely for troop and equipment carrying, medical evacuation
and humanitarian purposes. We stipulated that combat or attack
roles were excluded to the lifetime of the aircraft, including
the fitting of weapons, allowing soldiers to fire from doorways
whilst airborne or the dropping or ordnance. It may, however,
sadly be known that one of the two aircraft crashed on 3 April
whilst on a re-supply task with one fatal casualty and a number
of serious injuries, but that was not to do with the nature of
the aircraft, I understand.
Q58 Chairman: Could not almost any arms
sale be justified on the grounds that it is conflict prevention?
Mr Straw: No. You have got to
make judgments here, Dr Berry. The Conflict Prevention Fund is
not a pacifist programme. What we have done in Sierra Leone, which
was raised earlier, has been very significant in preventing conflict
not only in Sierra Leone but also elsewhere in West Africa. It
does involve the use of arms.
Q59 Chairman: It was a good question
though.
Mr Straw: But a better answer,
if I may say so!
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