Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
2 MARCH 2004
RT HON
DAVID BLUNKETT
MP, MR ROBERT
WHALLEY, SIR
DAVID OMAND
KCB AND MS
CHERYL PLUMRIDGE
Q1 Chairman: Secretary of State and colleagues,
most of whom are well known certainly to the Defence Committee,
and I suspect to the Home Affairs Select Committee too, welcome
to today's joint meeting of Defence and Home Affairs. This session
has taken a little longer to organise than we would have liked,
we are delighted that you have agreed to it and you have brought
such a very strong team with you. It may not be unique for two
committees to hold a joint session but it is pretty unusual. We
are taking evidence with the wide issues that we wish to discuss
with you today. These are your responsibilities, however, your
Department is joined in this process of decision-making by the
Cabinet Office, MoD, et cetera et cetera. As you know Home
Secretary the Defence Committee published a substantial report
on defence and security in the United Kingdom in July 2002 and
we continue to be actively interested in the subject, as Sir David
knows very well. I must pass John Denham's apologies to you for
his unavoidable absence today. We have a lot of questions to ask
and two hours to ask them in, my mathematics has worked out that
it will be five minutes per Member of Parliament and the hatchet
will fall plus or minus five minutes. Home Secretary perhaps you
would like to introduce your team and then we can begin questioning.
Mr Blunkett: As you know David
is in overall charge now in relation to the structures from the
Cabinet Office, overseeing the Cabinet Committees that deal with
these issues. Bob Whalley is Head of Terrorism Directorate and
Cheryl Plumridge from the Cabinet Office for civil contingencies.
Chairman: Thank you very much. The first
couple of questions are from Marsha Singh.
Q2 Mr Singh: Home Secretary, how will
you assess the general threat to security in the United Kingdom
from international terrorism? In your assessment are we safer
now post Afghanistan and Iraq or more at risk?
Mr Blunkett: I set out last Wednesday,
including quoting from the Director General of the Security Service
the continuing on-going threat to the United Kingdom and I demonstrated
from the terrible tragedy in Bali all of the way through to Istanbul
when over 50 people were killed, including our Consular General
and many of his staff, that we faced a continuing threat. That
threat has not diminished. The nature of the threat was different
to anything we had experienced before and that required a different
response. I set out in the discussion paper that we published
along with our reply to the Newton Inquiry and to Lord Carlisle's
review our challenge is really for all of us is to take a look
at the nature of what we face and the way in which we can react,
our own views being that security and intelligence is our best
protector. Of course as part of the contest interventions programme
we have linked prevention with pursuit of the terrorists, with
the protection of the public at home and with the preparedness
for any consequences. We are trying to ensure those four key pillars
are moulded together.
Q3 Mr Singh: I think the threat to United
Kingdom interests abroad is all too clear but in terms of the
United Kingdom what is your thinking about the terrorist capacity
to introduce weapons of mass destruction on United Kingdom soil?
Mr Blunkett: I think we need to
be very careful about the nature of the definition we make. There
is an on-going international debate as to what constitutes a weapon
of mass destruction. Over the last two and a half years we have
had discussions ranging from what constitutes a dirty bomb through
to what in terms of chemical or biological attack would constitute
something more than we have been threatened with in the past.
I would not use the term "weapons of mass destruction"
solely in terms of the internal capacity but part of our programme
and part of the investment we have been putting in is precisely
to prevent the accumulation of or the ability to be able to trigger
the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear capacity to
create that kind of reaction. We could get into esoteric definitions,
Chairman, we are dealing primarily here with the issue of preventing
people being able to develop the capacity here in Britain whilst
dealing with the nature of international terrorism which is that
it is by its very nature global and it is inter-linked networks
rather than a traditional, formal military attack.
Q4 Mr Singh: Home Secretary you have
said in the past we have damaged some of al-Qaeda's capability,
to what extent have we damaged it and are there any other terrorist
groups we need to know about because al-Qaeda seems to be the
one that everybody focuses on, have they spawned other groups
or cells?
Mr Blunkett: The Anti-Terrorism
Crime and Security Act, particularly Part IV, was predicated on
the issue of the development of al-Qaeda and its loose associates
and networks, including those who are prepared to raise funds
for or facilitate those who are more directly engaged with threatening
our life and liberty. The disruption of the Taliban by the removal
of the Taliban from Afghanistan clearly made an enormous difference
given that the Taliban were using Afghan soil not merely for training
but for preparing and facilitating. I included in the documents
last Wednesday continuing threats issued by Osama bin Laden in
terms of tapes of videos that have been issued. There is obviously
a difference between being able to use a country and the regime
in the country as the foundations and as the cover for your activities
as opposed to having to be, which is a presumption that is being
made, in the mountainous areas on the border of Pakistan. That
has obviously disrupted the capacity but not the capability.
Q5 Mr Singh: Is there any evidence of
fund-raising for terror in the United Kingdom and if there is
have we had any success in putting a stop to it?
Mr Blunkett: As you know there
are two different strands, one through the United Nations and
one through our domestic legislation and we have been involved
not merely in terms of disruption of those who were directly involved
with terror groups but those who were using the bureaus and the
sophisticated transfer arrangements to get money out of the country.
It is difficult in open session to talk about the related nature
between those who are picked up and tried for criminal activity
and their perceived involvement with the terrorist network. I
would be circumspect in terms of dealing with that if you will
forgive me.
Chairman: Thank you. We have a couple
of questions on Central Government co-ordination, the first in
this section is Crispin Blunt.
Q6 Mr Blunt: Home Secretary, if I can
take you back to Marsha's first question briefly and I apologise
if I am asking you to repeat something you have already said in
a different forum, are we safer in the United Kingdom after military
operations in Afghanistan? Are we safer in the United Kingdom
after military operations in Iraq? Is the answer to those two
questions different and if so will you explain why?
Mr Blunkett: I think the answer
is different. I do not intend this afternoon as a deliberate act
of policy to start a debate round the situation and the decisions
we took over Iraq except to say that the primary concern related
to the non-implementation of 1441 not the related but central
issue of the use of a rogue state and the ability of those working
for and alongside al-Qaeda to be able to draw on the disruption
and the disfunctionality that is caused by the continuance of
someone like Saddam Hussein in power. The Afghan situation is
much more directly related for the reason I gave a moment ago,
namely they were providing cover, succour and support from the
Taliban regime and for the development and training and preparations.
I do not believe in terms of the threat to us in the United Kingdom—and
I draw on the Director General of the Security Services advice
for this—that the threat has diminished. I believe that
in terms of the ability of the international community to be able
to hunt down and to be able to disrupt the operation of the network
we are in a better position post the removal of the Taliban for
the reasons I gave a moment ago.
Q7 Mr Blunt: Thank you. In addressing
that undiminished threat how do you ensure that you are able to
exert clear political authority and command over the wide range
of public organisations which report to several different government
departments?
Mr Blunkett: The operation of
the new structure under the Committee DOP(IT) and the two sub-committees
that I chair under that are designed primarily to co-ordinate
to ensure co-operation and to have a clear direction and prioritisation
so that we develop a matrix that allows us to weigh the threat,
weigh the allocation of resources and ensure that where there
are overlaps they are complimentary rather than contradictory
and as we have done with the four pillars that I spelt out and
with the programmes that we have laid out, the resilience programmes,
that we can actually ensure that we are genuinely prepared and
we are working together. We have demonstrated that in terms of
exercises such as the one that we undertook at Bank tube station
on 7 September last year.
Q8 Mr Blunt: Would you describe homeland
security as a discrete area of work or does it come closer to
being an attitude of mind or an approach that runs through everything
that Government does?
Mr Blunkett: I do not believe
it is discrete operation but I would put it as more than an attitude
of mind. I think it is a strand running through the activities
that are directly related, whether it is in terms of what we are
dealing with directly or the threat from CPRN or the preparedness
we have to undertake in relation to ambulance, fire, the co-ordination
of local and regional activity which, of course, is now being
underpinned by the new Bill and in the way which the Ministry
of Defence have established their new regional reactive capacity.
Q9 Mr Blunt: How much of your time do
you spend on homeland security issues?
Mr Blunkett: On combined homeland
security and counter-terrorism it obviously varies depending on
the nature of the perceived threats and the reports from the security
intelligence services. When there are major concerns I am spending
a very substantial part of the week on it. I would normally spend
about 20% of my time on a regular basis on resilience and counter-terrorism
because the two go hand in hand depending on the nature of the
threat. We are obviously responding in terms of planning ahead.
Q10 Mr Cameron: I just want to pursue
this accountability point, Sir David Omand is the only Permanent
Secretary really who does not work to one secretary of state or
to any single junior minister, every Government department works
on the principle that there is a permanent secretary, a minister
of state and a secretary of state accountable to Parliament: why
is it not necessary in this area?
Mr Blunkett: Sir David Omand works
for the Prime Minister. Prior to June 2001 those functions of
the Cabinet Secretary were split and enhanced firstly to take
account of the events of 2000 in terms of the fuel dispute and
secondly in terms of the lessons to be learned and the importance
of co-ordination arising out of the events of foot and mouth disease
outbreak. Subsequent to June 2001 the very substantial lessons
of enhancement that were necessary post September 11, and obviously
none of us would have been able to foresee the necessities arising
from that. We have clearly enhanced both our co-ordination and
capability. As the Prime Minister has overall direction in relation
to the security and intelligence services and as this activity
relates directly to that, namely the resilience that backs it
up, the elements of the four pillars that back that up, it has
been sensible to do it in this way. We would have done it another
way if we thought it was more sensible.
Q11 Mr Cameron: In order to co-ordinate
clearly Sir David has to look at things that the Home Office does
and the Department of Health does and other departments do and
I remember asking you about the Drugs Tsar and why he was not
appropriate and things should be repatriated to the Home Office,
what is the difference between this and the Drugs Tsar situation?
Mr Blunkett: The Drugs Tsar was
dealing with drugs. Here we are dealing with the whole range of
counter-terrorism, including the preventive elements of security
intelligence plus the international elements. David Omand was
in the States last week—he makes more regular visits than
even select committees do—and he was engaged not simply
with Tom Ridge and the homeland security people but with General
John Gordon working directly to the President and of course the
overlap with Condoleezza Rice. There is an absolute read-over
here, which is not the same as one person dealing with the domestic
agenda and simply co-ordinating the activities of mainly three
departments.
Sir David Omand: It may be helpful
if I just add it is a traditional role of the Cabinet Office to
assist in the co-ordination of government. I see the Cabinet Office
as having two main roles, supporting the Prime Minister in leading
the government and supporting the government collectively in the
effective discharge of their business particularly through the
committees that the Home Secretary has referred to. I see no difficulty
at all being in the centre of government supporting the Cabinet
Committee structure and the work and ensuring that the Prime Minister
is in a position to lead on this issue.
Q12 Mr Cameron: How does the accountability
work? Heaven forbid Sir David were to make a mistake who is responsible,
is it the Prime Minister who is responsible to Parliament or because
some of what he does does cover Home Office territory is it your
responsibility?
Mr Blunkett: We deliberated this
in the sub committees I chair and we had made a decision that
I would be held to account by Parliament for the decisions of
those committees. As you will appreciate I sleep less well at
night than I did three years ago. The seriousness of the issues
cannot be underestimated. It is necessary for a Cabinet minister
to hold those responsibilities where individuals have taken decisions
outside the remit of the Cabinet Committees and they relate specifically
to their area of work they would carry the responsibility themselves,
which seems to us not only to be sensible in terms of people holding
and having to account for themselves in terms of their responsibility
but being clear in the decisions they take that is not to be passed
over to somebody else. The worst situation would be if a senior
Cabinet colleague made a decision in their area which related
to resilience or to the issues we are discussing here this afternoon
and they knew they were not to be held to account for them that
would change the nature of their relationship to the constitution
but also to myself as chair of the appropriate Cabinet committee.
We are trying to be sensible about this, whether it is to do with
health, whether it is to do with transport, whether it is to do
with policing each of us carry a responsibility on a day to day
basis. Where that responsibility has being brought together and
decisions have been taken through the Cabinet structure then I
would have to carry that responsibility.
Q13 Mr Cameron: From the outside the
list of committees looks quite complex, you say that you have
ministerial responsibility and Sir David is really responsible
through the Prime Minister. Do you keep it under review? The Americans
have gone for a homeland security department and the Defence Committee
seem to suggest that having one minister responsible for this
area was worth looking at, do you keep this under review?
Mr Blunkett: We do. The Defence
Committee took a particular view, the Science and Technology Committee
view took another view, and the Home Affairs are joining with
you today and have not expressed a view. The Government as a whole
felt that it was important to react in our circumstances where
we have a different security and policing structure to the United
States and where we felt that creating a whole new superstructure
and department from scratch and funnelling resources and responsibility
through that would be disruptive to the long tried work that we
have undertaken, not least in the 30 years prior to the Good Friday
Agreement where we were threatened on a monthly basis by terror
generated from Ireland on the mainland of Britain. Resilience
as well as counter-terrorism measures were part and parcel of
securing our well-being.
Sir David Omand: Can I just add
that this would not be the first area of national life where our
way of doing things is better appreciated abroad perhaps than
it is at home. I have a continual stream of visitors from overseas
coming to see how we do it. I have to say without being complacent
about it, because we are always looking for ways to improve, our
ability to co-ordinate across Government is second to none.
Q14 Chairman: There was no criticism
of you, Home Secretary, whatsoever in this, just the belief that
you were over-burdened with other issues and that somebody who
was primarily exclusively focusing on these issues might be an
alternative model. It is quite clear that is not going to happen.
Mr Blunkett: I assure you I did
not take it personally. There are days when even those who are
less burdened feel over-burdened and today I feel fine.
Q15 Chairman: It is bit early to say
that!
Mr Blunkett: I thought I would
get it in early. No politician worth their salt actually confesses
to feeling over-burdened. Can I just say that I think the nature
of responsibilities for internal security and the nature of the
services for the counter-terrorism branch SO13 and of general
policing and of organised crime led to a logical understanding
that whoever the Home Secretary was it was sensible for them to
take the lead on those issues. That was reinforced by our experience
in the fuel crisis where it was important to establish that there
was somebody who could pull the security and policing elements
together without engaging in prolonged discussion with those who
did not have responsibility for those areas.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q16 Mr Viggers: I would like to ask about
the geographical aspects of control and co-ordination. Does the
threat to central London dominate planning?
Mr Blunkett: It forms an enormous
amount of time and energy in that I have ministers working under
me as part of the structure that I described. Nick Raynsford as
the Minister for London has played a key role in being able to
pull people together, including the 44,000 businesses in London
with which we communicate; in providing advice in terms of the
role, advice and support of the Metropolitan Police; and in relation
to preparedness were there to be an attack. In addition there
is the work that was developed and is now being carried forward
by the Minister of State in the Home Office Bev Hughes on CBRN
and it gives us the capacity to be able to respond to that very
quickly and effectively.
Q17 Mr Viggers: Thank you.
Mr Blunkett: We have had good
co-operation from the Mayor's Office and from other institutions
in London which has been very helpful.
Q18 Mr Viggers: The areas in the country,
the regions, the counties, the police force areas, health authority
boundaries and emergency service areas are not always consistent;
how do you ensure organisational consistency and clarity across
the country for the purposes of civil contingencies?
Mr Blunkett: The development of
the structures at a regional level have been substantially enhanced,
as you will be aware, not least in terms of the Reaction Force
that has now been put in place and is available and was completed
by the end of December. We now have in place the practicalities,
that is the issue of training, the necessary equipment, including
appropriate protection suits and decontamination units, the necessary
organisation under traditional civil defence and of course the
new bill will enhance that and provide greater clarity and update
the 1920 Act and the 1948 Act.
Q19 Mr Viggers: Does this consistency
apply across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well?
Mr Blunkett: We have drawn the
devolved administrations into the Cabinet structure and into the
practical, administrative co-ordination. I am pleased that there
has been for very good reason very, very good co-operation from
them in planning and responding to their elements of the overall
plan.
Sir David Omand: Can I just add
to that. As a result of hard work over the last few years we now
have a set of boundaries for the various services, including the
Armed Forces, which are coterminous so that police areas do now
nest within government regions and the military structure now
fits alongside that. Compared to the situation that existed a
few years ago it is now very much simpler.
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