Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-119)
31 MARCH 2004
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP AND SIR
KEVIN TEBBIT
Q100 Mr Jones: Largely through self-indulgence
and ill-discipline Mr Blunt has asked most of my question, but
that is something I will take up after the meeting. I shall curtail
what I can ask as a lot of it has been covered already. In terms
of network enabled capabilities, what costings have actually been
done? It is an evolving concept and what might be the idea today
might not necessarily be the concept which is delivered in 10
years' time.
Mr Hoon: You have already answered
the question in the sense that this is an evolutionary process.
There is no single network that we are going to purchase to make
all of this happen. What we are going to do is to ensure that
the equipment we have is joined up across the services and within
each of the services to ensure that we can deliver those effects
I have described. We could pick a figure out of the air.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Our settlement
from the 2002 spending round had a specific emphasis on network
enabled capability, which is one of the reasons why we are not
so flush with cash for everything else as we might hope. The most
important programmes which are going forward now are the Bowman
digitisation of the army, which is rolling out. The Chiefs of
Staff will have described it to you. That will be the very important
catching up period for the army in relation to the other two services.
The Watchkeeper programme for UAVs is very important in this context
as well and the ASTOR programme, aerial surveillance. The importance
is how these are all linked together, but nevertheless these are
important elements in network enabled capability because it is
about systems, it not just about a network. The majority of our
programmes are focused particularly on this sensor/decision making/command
control communication system/and platforms and I might say that
the Defence Information Infrastructure they are bringing forward,
fielding first in our new Main Building and then progressively
throughout the Department of State and the Armed Forces themselves,
will be the infrastructure from which we hang an awful lot of
different applications, both business applications and battlefield
applications in this networked arena. It goes through the whole
future programme of our equipment.
Q101 Mr Havard: In a sense this is the
area in which RAB might apply. This is where I see the Treasury
as a force multiplier. If what you are actually going to say is
that in terms of making these evolutionary decisions and as the
thing morphs as it goes, then you need some form of flexibility
presumably in how you can actually deploy monies as well as people
during those processes? How these financial disciplines apply
within the Ministry of Defence may have to be tailored slightly
differently in how they might apply elsewhere.
Mr Hoon: Perhaps we could launch
you at the Treasury to persuade them.
Mr Havard: I am not sure whether I am
guided or unguided at the moment.
Chairman: We think the latter at the
moment.
Q102 Mr Roy: A question on the network
enabled capabilities. During the new chapter inquiry we heard
that there is still some scepticism towards NEC. We know, for
example, that the army is behind the Royal Navy and the RAF in
embracing NEC. To what extent is it possible for NEC, smart technologies,
etcetera, to provide the capabilities which effectively replace
the heavy end of the spectrum? How swiftly can this transformation
occur that you hope does occur and how swiftly can that be accomplished?
What obstacles do you expect to have to overcome?
Mr Hoon: May I just resist your
premise. I hope nothing I said implies that the army was in any
way reluctant to embrace these changes. What I was driving at
was that if you look in a warship—and this has been the
case for a very long time—it is packed with sophisticated
electronic equipment; if you look in the cockpit of any modern
fighter aircraft that is the case. There has not been that same
requirement for the army to develop that kind of sophistication,
although it has some very sophisticated equipment where necessary.
What we are looking at is a significant change which probably
would most affect the army in terms of equipping individual soldiers
with technology which would give them both the ability to pass
back information to the decision makers in a way which has never
been possible before, as well as perhaps once that information
has been processed then to take decisions as to how to deal with
the threat. I would not want you to think from anything I have
said, or anything suggested in the White Paper, that the army
is in any way reluctant to embrace this; it has simply been a
fact that the technology has largely gone into platforms like
warships and fighter aircraft.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The best way
of answering your question is to give you the concrete examples
of the two most important projects. The first is the fielding
of Bowman. We already had the personal role radio fielded for
Telic; we are now fielding all the data links which will go into
a whole range of current fighting equipment and therefore enable
them to link up more effectively on the battlefield and therefore
have bigger gaps between them, so they can cover a wider distance
whilst still remaining a coherent force. That is being fielded
progressively between now and 2008 brigade by brigade. The other
key piece of equipment is the future rapid effects system (FRES),
which is the new medium-weight concept for land forces. We are
at the moment in the project definition stage of FRES for a system
which would be fielded. This is always difficult because when
you say things are going to be fielded, if you have not yet completely
fixed the designs, it is very unwise to say exactly when the thing
is going to be completed in its production run. The year of 2010
has been mooted around in public, so as the Permanent Secretary
I shall not retreat from that, but we are usually beaten for not
meeting dates which we sometimes put too quickly in the public
arena. FRES is the key to that future medium-weight, network-enabled
fighting system for the army.
Mr Hoon: As far as Bowman is concerned
we actually met a very ambitious target date.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Bowman is fully
on track and being fielded exactly as it should be.
Mr Hoon: Something I am sure Crispin
would like to reflect upon.
Q103 Mr Roy: Not during my questioning.
Secretary of State, may I just clarify a point? Obviously I am
not trying to put words into your mouth with regard to the scepticism,
but that is what is coming across and I am quite sure you would
agree that there are still many sceptics about NEC, in fact the
former Chief of Defence Staff, Lord Boyce, said in the House of
Lords on 24 March that "much of the future hi-tech that is
given so much hype is not suited for . . . low intensity peacekeeping
tasks". Would you agree or disagree on that?
Mr Hoon: I perhaps did not put
it with quite his eloquence, but I said something very similar
in my introduction. I am not saying this technology will replace
soldiers on the ground, particularly soldiers on the ground doing
difficult and demanding peacekeeping operations, as they are doing
in Iraq as we speak. However, the war fighting part of it can
only be enhanced by the kind of technology we are describing and
we would be derelict in our duty if we did not provide that modern
technologically sophisticated equipment to our Armed Forces.
Q104 Mr Roy: Leave aside the war fighting
part. Look at the immediate post-conflict phase for example. Is
there not a danger there that men on the ground are still obviously
paramount and it is not simply high technology which is needed?
Does the White Paper take this into account sufficiently? I am
talking directly about the post-war phase.
Mr Hoon: I perhaps tended to suggest
in my last answer that there was a distinction between the two,
but if you put men on the ground you want them to be properly
able to communicate, whether they are in war fighting situations
or peacekeeping situations. When I came last to this Committee
you were complaining about the fact that the communications equipment
was not as good as it should have been and it was not and has
not been for a very considerable number of years. The success
of Bowman demonstrates that we are tackling that problem. It has
taken longer I am sure than any previous occupant of my position
would have liked, but we are, as a result of some very difficult
decisions to abandon previous projects and to go ahead in the
way we have done in the last couple of years, making a difference.
We are now beginning to deliver precisely the kind of communications
equipment that I am sure the Committee wanted to see in place
some years ago, as I did. That will help a peacekeeper, just as
much as it helps a war fighter.
Q105 Mr Roy: I recognise that Bowman
is obviously an improvement, but is there anything else outside
that which is actually of assistance to the peacekeeping element?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The other project
is called FIST, the future infantry soldier technology, where
we are going through assessments and design phases. QinetiQ, which
used to be called DERA, the hi-tech science and technology end
of our activity, are working on these concepts. This will give
the individual soldier much greater technological support for
the future, but as the Secretary of State says, this comes back
to the point that for peacekeeping and peace support roles, you
have to have boots on the ground. There will still be the boots,
we hope, and in many ways . . . Far be it for me as a humble official
to anticipate a political intervention, but I did realise that
I was getting myself into difficult territory there. The fact
is, however, that there is a trade-off between a technologically
encased soldier and making the contact which is necessary with
the civilian people on the ground to do good peacekeeping and
peace enforcement and we will maintain that balance. I know the
Chiefs of Staff attach a great deal of importance to ensuring
that human dimension of how they do peacekeeping and peace support
so effectively throughout the world is retained, while at the
same time we use the best technology to make sure our people communicate
well and are safe and effective.
Q106 Mr Roy: A more general point. You
were talking there about the trade-off. Is there not a danger
of reducing the numbers of our Armed Forces to such an extent
that they are incapable of the range of tasks which we now expect
of them?
Mr Hoon: We are not seeking to
reduce the numbers. What we are trying to do is to enable those
Armed Forces to conduct a greater range of tasks because that
is the kind of world in which we and they have to operate. It
does require some adjustment in thinking about how we organise
and deploy those forces, given the strategic environment in which
we operate. I started this job shortly after British troops went
in to Kosovo. Since then they have been committed to operations
in Sierra Leone, in Afghanistan, in Iraq on a major scale; they
have also conducted other operations in places like East Timor.
It has been a hugely demanding period of time for the Ministry
of Defence and we have to have the kinds of forces which are needed
to be able to support those sorts of operations. I accept that
those are ultimately political judgments, but the Committee shares
in those political judgments as to which of those operations we
should not have conducted. Whenever I ask that question, nobody
is able to give me an answer, at least nobody sensible in the
political spectrum. In those circumstances, we have to go on supporting
our Armed Forces and equipping them to be able to do that range
of very demanding responsibilities.
Q107 Mr Jones: May I ask a follow-up
question about FRES? The last time I asked a Parliamentary Question
about it, the response was that the in-service date was still
2009. Are we to take from what Sir Kevin has said today, that
that is going to slip? What problems does that face us with, for
example, with some of the very aged vehicles such as Saxons which
are in need of replacement? My second question is about FIST.
Clearly that is going to demand a high degree of knowledge of
technology for the individual to be able to master it. Do you
have any comments on an article, I think in last week's Sunday
Telegraph, around the educational achievement levels of recruits
into the Armed Forces? Are you confident, if we are going to introduce
something like FIST, which is going to need that degree of technical
expertise, that the people recruited and level of educational
attainment are actually there?
Mr Hoon: Certainly as far as any
slippage in FRES is concerned, it is a concept for the moment.
We are elaborating that concept, thinking through what we might
need. I actually defended the previous Conservative Government
over its inability to get an effective communication system in
place simply because I recognised that the technology was changing
so rapidly. By the time they actually got to the point of taking
decisions, the technology had moved on and that was one of the
difficulties they faced. At some point you have to make a judgment
to go ahead with the technology as it is. FRES will be an example
of where, although the platform should remain relatively consistent,
how we actually incorporate communications and other kinds of
technology into it will be something we still need some time to
think about so that we can get the right combination of platform
and technology to deliver an effect, as Sir Kevin indicates, from
2010 and onwards. That is a huge challenge.
Q108 Mr Jones: Why was the decision taken
to change tack in terms of going out to a systems house to do
the work?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is the
point. This is not evasion; this really is not evasion. You are
damned if you do and you are damned if you do not in this business.
Here is an area where a lot of technology has been emerging. A
lot of technology is emerging, but it is not entirely mature:
electric drive, electric armour, technologies which are just about
within the grasp, but are just coming on. We could say "Let's
go right now" and get something fielded very quickly which
will be in the second division in terms of ground forces by 2015.
Or, we can take time to give proper attention to the assessment
phase. The McKinsey studies we have had say we should spend as
much as 15% of the total project cost in getting the design right
before we go into production. By using a systems house, we are
seeking to do that. There is a lot of emerging technology there.
We need to capture the best of it and then proceed with the programme,
otherwise there is a risk that we will buy something in haste
and it will be obsolete before it has got into half of its life.
Mr Hoon: As far as the second
question is concerned, my experience of talking to people in the
army is that quite a fair number of them say things to me like
"I didn't like school. I didn't get on with exams. I wasn't
interested, but the army has made an enormous difference to my
expectations in life". The combination of the kind of learning
and training that the army in particular, but it is true of the
other two services, provides means that people who, for whatever
reason, simply did not get on at school and did not appreciate
the environment of education at school, actually find service
in the Armed Forces enormously rewarding. I am not particularly
concerned about that survey, even if it is accurate, because the
level of training and education provided in modern Armed Forces
is second to none and actually transforms the life chances and
expectations of the people who serve.
Q109 Mr Blunt: I am sure that last answer
must be a cue for me. In your opening comments—and you have
said it before—you said " . . . we do not envisage
needing to generate large-scale capabilities across the same spectrum,
given that in the most demanding operations it is inconceivable
that the United States will not be involved". How do you
react to Lord King's comments in the debate on defence in the
House of Lords last week, when he said that in his experience
the inconceivable usually happens?
Mr Hoon: He had considerable experience
of doing the job which I am currently doing. His practical experience
was of course that it was inconceivable.
Q110 Mr Blunt: Do you acknowledge that
there is a very widespread concern that that assumption that we
are going to have to rely on the United States for every conceivable
kind of large-scale operation is one which is in a sense a risk,
a gamble, because I would suggest it is actually conceivable that
the political climate may significantly change in the United States.
It could change quite rapidly and we might be at the high water
mark of the United States being prepared to exert force around
the world in the way it is now. We may see a wholesale change
in the political climate of the United States. How do you react
to that?
Mr Hoon: I would simply rely on
a study of post-World War Two history. There is no evidence under
any administration during that period of time that the United
States has not wanted to be engaged in the world.
Q111 Mr Blunt: The United States was
not engaged in the Falklands re-conquest. Under your vision for
the future, will the United Kingdom be able to undertake large-scale
operations outside Europe, the Mediterranean and the Gulf?
Mr Hoon: Under what I am describing,
especially given the strategic changes which have taken place
as far as the defence of the Falklands is concerned, I have no
doubt that we will be able to mount an operation if necessary,
to ensure that the Falklands remain as part of Britain's overseas
territories.
Q112 Mr Blunt: Do you recognise that
there is considerable concern about the lack of transparency over
the work strands which are taking place, the very significant
amount of work you are doing there? Although you did not give
an answer on the amount you were seeking to invest in networking
capability or the amount you have to find to keep the Department
within its expenditure limits, I understand that there are 14
work strands and the Departmental target is about £1.5 billion
a year. That involves very substantial change and I understand
that one of them is around ground-based air defence. For example,
we may see very significant reductions in that capability in the
Armed Forces, which, when combined with the significant capability
gap there will be in sea-based air defence, means there is then
a significant period of risk, where we would simply not be able
to launch a large-scale operation of the type we were able to
do in 1982?
Mr Hoon: Your question shows the
difficulty almost of anecdote in a sense, of picking on one or
two particular capabilities and saying these are extremely important.
I have no doubt, as I indicated earlier, that cases can be made
for a whole range of particular capabilities which ideally it
would be advantageous to have and to continue to have. What I
am saying, and I do not think this is any different from the judgments
previous Defence Secretaries have had to make, is that we need
to optimise both our spending and our capabilities to deal with
the kinds of threats we face. I am grateful for this opportunity
to discuss these issues with the Committee. If the Committee judges
that our assumptions—and they are set out in some considerable
detail in this White Paper—about the kinds of threats we
have to deal with are wrong, then this is an opportunity for us
to have that discussion. I shall certainly take very seriously
the Committee's assessment of the strategic landscape. What I
have to do if there is a common view of that strategic landscape
is then to judge what the best ways militarily are of equipping
our Armed Forces to deal with those threats. Again I indicated
that at a certain stage I shall make announcements about those
judgments. Again, I am sure the Committee will want to have a
further discussion. This is an opportunity for the Committee,
if it so wishes, to say these assumptions are in some way wrong.
I accept that you have made an observation about the Falklands.
I am absolutely confident that we could deal with the threat to
the Falklands, not least because of the changes we have made to
the way in which the Falklands are defended since 1982. Therefore
the exact operation which was conducted then is unlikely to be
repeated again in the future because it is unlikely to be necessary.
Q113 Mr Blunt: The White Paper discusses
the possibility of small-scale operations in Asia and counter-terrorist
operations worldwide. These are rather general terms for what
can prove to be very demanding and extremely political missions.
What spectrum of operations do you envisage under these categories?
Mr Hoon: The one reason for incorporating
that kind of commitment is because of what we saw in Afghanistan.
The Chairman taxed me at the outset about adjustments in our thinking
since the strategic defence review. I recognise that one of the
elaborations which I described in opening about the SDR was the
fact that we can no longer safely assume that the main theatre
of operations for the United Kingdom would be Europe and the Middle
East, which is essentially what we set out in the SDR. Afghanistan
demonstrates that a failed state, providing a harbour for terrorist
organisations, means that that threat can strike at us or our
close allies from huge distances. Therefore we need to recognise
that global environment in which we accept in almost every other
respect that we have to face up to dealing with threats from as
far afield as they can come.
Q114 Mr Blunt: In recognising the difficult
decisions you have to make over the next few months, do you believe
it would actually help the Ministry of Defence to an extent in
its eternal battle with the Treasury over resources to have much
more transparency on the work strands you are doing on these capability
choices you are having to make, the things you would like to have,
the things you then cannot have because of budget constraints?
There is a significant defence community, and I am very conscious
that defence is somewhat of a subject for experts, who at the
moment are operating on rumour and semi-informed comment from
connections they have inside the Ministry of Defence However,
for the nation, and Parliament, in facing up to the choices you
are going to have to take, what we are likely to be presented
with is the conclusions of your work, rather than actually being
able to take part in the debate about policy, which is obviously
then being driven in this balance between capabilities and resources.
Would it not be better to publicise in more detail what is going
on in the work strands, so that more people could be more informed
about the decisions you are having to take and the financial environment
in which you are having to take them?
Mr Hoon: I can always see the
argument for the kind of transparency which you describe. I should
be delighted if we could have a sensible, practical discussion
about defence policy in public. We could all properly consider
the options and reach reasonable conclusions. If you will forgive
me for being a little unkind, what then happens is that people
like yourself issue blood-curdling press releases talking about
the threat to the Falklands or to various pieces of equipment,
in order to make rather cheap political points. You may say that
is your job and that you do that in the interests of your political
party, but it hardly helps the kind of informed debate which you
are advocating.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: From the point
of view of an official, I am organising the work done within the
department within the context of the policy which ministers have
endorsed publicly, that is to say the Strategic Defence Review,
the New Chapter and the White Paper. That provides us with the
policy base. That has not changed. What we are looking at now
are the various work streams to consider priorities, risks, managing
risks where they can best be taken—one hates to talk about
risks, but that is what our business is—and then coming
up with recommendations to ministers as to where these balances
should lie, but within the context of the existing policy, not
a different policy and that would be brought forward to ministers
later this late spring/summer.
Mr Blunt: Sometimes there is an element
of chicken and egg about this.
Q115 Mr Hancock: The Prime Minister during
Question Time today re-emphasised the point that resources would
not be an issue when it came to defending the homeland. I should
be interested to know from you, Secretary of State, and you, Sir
Kevin, what you consider to be the constraints you are under in
developing the role of the Armed Forces into that matrix of homeland
defence.
Mr Hoon: As I indicated, and as
the Committee will be well aware, as far as the land territory
of the United Kingdom is concerned, by and large those are matters
which are the day-to-day responsibility of the Home Office. What
we have sought to do, particularly in the New Chapter work, is
to continue to reconfigure our Armed Forces to provide appropriate
support to the civil authorities. I believe, particularly with
the way in which we have identified the need to be able to communicate
with the police, establish regional liaison officers, as well
as rapid reaction forces on a regional basis, that is a significant
contribution. If we need to go further, then again that would
be a judgment we would have to make in the light of the particular
circumstances. I have been very struck, in my time doing this,
not actually so much, fortunately, by the terrorist threat to
the United Kingdom, but by the way in which, for example, Armed
Forces were able to assist in dealing with the problems of flooding,
or for that matter foot-and-mouth disease. One of the things which
struck me very forcibly about the reaction to flooding which affected
a number of communities up and down the country a couple of years
ago was that where there were Armed Forces stationed, for example
I visited army forces in York, because of their part in the local
community they immediately responded by helping that community
when it was in difficulty. Down the road in Leeds, where there
were no bases for soldiers, there was no such assistance to the
local authority. It seems to me that following the idea of having
a regional group we need to look at the footprint of our Armed
Forces in the United Kingdom and we need to recognise that over
the years for the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy that footprint
has inevitably been consolidated in certain parts of the country.
I passionately believe that as far as the army is concerned, we
can do more to spread that footprint more evenly across the United
Kingdom.
Q116 Mr Hancock: I was very interested
in your opening statement, which I listened to with some interest
and, re-reading it now, that you made the point again on the home
defence issue about the joint regional liaison officers. I should
be grateful if you could tell me whether they are all now in place
and what are the benefits they bring to the table in this issue.
On the question of the 14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, they
do not take account of your very valid point about where there
are armed forces the reaction is there, where they are not there
is none, but the 14 Civil Contingencies have been based on existing
military locations.
Mr Hoon: Of course.
Q117 Mr Hancock: Where is the priority
then to spread that further, to give the sort of cover which you
have suggested you would like to see and which obviously would
be welcome? The one thing we found when doing the paper on civil
contingencies was the heavy dependency on the armed forces by
local authorities wherever they were. Their first call was always
to look at what military assistance was available.
Mr Hoon: That is a very important
area for debate and I am grateful to you for identifying it. In
a sense we had to work with what we had at the time of the New
Chapter and what we have in terms of consistent national footprint
are obviously reservists and that is why these forces on the regional
basis are made up of reservists. They are spread fairly evenly
across the country. There are some areas where we should like
that more, but essentially there is a reasonably consistent footprint.
What the challenge is for the future, not something which could
be done overnight because of basing requirements, because of investment
which we made in certain parts of the country and not others,
is to look at how our regular Armed Forces fit into that. I concede
that in the context of what happened on 11 September in New York—and
we have had this discussion before—there is a direct threat
to the homeland of the United Kingdom which we might have to deal
with and we might have to use our Armed Forces to deal with. I
recognise that there is an assumption amongst people who perhaps
started in local government in the course of the Cold War, that
there will always be Armed Forces to call upon in every part of
the country, but the Committee knows as well as I do that that
is simply not the case. I gave the illustration of the discrepancy
between Leeds and York to illustrate my point. What I fed into
the system in the Ministry of Defence, which we are seeking to
work through in quality terms, is how we look as well at the contribution
which the Armed Forces could make across the country in a more
consistent way. That will take time because of the decisions in
the past as to where units are located, where the investment has
been made and the kinds of ways in which we can look at that.
It is something I believe very strongly, because not only is it
about reacting in emergencies, it is about recruitment, it is
about ensuring that the Armed Forces are in the public eye, it
is about all sorts of civic connections which are very important
and very strong in this country. It will take time for that evolution
to show a change.
Q118 Mr Hancock: If it is done properly,
surely there is a substantial cost implication there. If you listen
to what the Prime Minister is saying, then it is unfair that cost
should fall on the existing budget of the MoD. It should be part
of this "no resource will be spared" point of view which
the Prime Minister expounded in some detail in the House today,
which would lead people to believe that if the Ministry of Defence
needed it to put this capability into place, it would be found.
I am interested in whether the regional liaison officers can communicate
safely and securely with the police, the fire and medical services.
It is obvious they cannot currently because they do not have a
compatible system. We found evidence that this was one of the
big pitfalls; that these people did not have the ability to communicate
easily. One of the people who spoke to us actually expressed that
very real concern. There is a resource implication, is there not?
Last week the First Sea Lord said that we were still failing on
our maritime commitment to homeland defence. He said that he did
not feel that these capabilities had been properly exercised as
yet. I do not see anything in this paper which is going to lead
me to believe that the resources needed to bring the maritime
capability up to a level, which somebody who represents a maritime
constituency would say would be something the population would
feel confident about, is clearly established.
Mr Hoon: What I can say is that
the paper does make clear our determination to ensure that those
issues of communication are resolved and resources will be made
available for that purpose. We have reorganised up to 500 reservists
in each of 14 regional areas to carry out the rapid reaction responsibility.
As far as maritime protection is concerned, whenever it has been
needed and has been required, we have had no difficulty in responding
to the requests we have received and similarly when perceived
threats have come from the air, appropriate decisions have been
taken. The judgment has to be made not on theoretical and rather
abstract construct but on what has actually happened; when those
threats have arisen we have been able to deal with them.
Q119 Mr Hancock: I think the First Sea
Lord was actually talking about the real thing. He was not talking
in an abstract sense. He gave examples in his evidence of the
freighter which was tracked down and finally stopped, of the threat
of mines being dispersed in our major shipping lanes. These are
real threats, they are not abstract ones. The capability to defend
this island from those sorts of things is a very real one. I am
with you. I think your initial point and the example you gave
of Leeds and York is a very interesting one which needs to be
expanded upon greatly. Are you sure that the Armed Forces we do
have can continue to support the operations we would expect them
to do and still fill the role in high tempo operations which you
alluded to? You cannot do both with the existing manpower.
Mr Hoon: Of course and in effect
that is part of the point I am making that our regular Armed Forces
are not configured and organised for that kind of territorial
home defence. That is a concept which has long since passed, because
of the assumptions we have made—and I invited the Committee,
if they have any great reservations about this to say so—that
there is no large-scale threat to the territory of the United
Kingdom and if there were we would have to reconfigure our Armed
Forces in order to deal with it. Our judgment is that should a
threat emerge, we would have time to make that change and that
adjustment. As far as a terrorist threat is concerned, which I
think is what you are largely talking about, then we have the
capabilities to deal with that threat should it manifest itself
in the United Kingdom from the air. We have quick reaction aircraft
who are there and available to deal with that threat and there
have been occasions on which we have perceived such a threat and
have sought to deal with it. The First Sea Lord gave an example
of a threat at sea. Again, we had the forces available to deal
with that. I think they worked for the Metropolitan Police strictly,
but I shall not go into any more detail than that. Similarly,
were there to be a threat on land, we have the forces available
to support the civil authorities. We are not talking about war
fighting on the territory of the United Kingdom. Our judgment
has always been that if we are to deal effectively with a terrorist
threat which might manifest itself in the United Kingdom, the
best way of dealing with that threat, so long as we know where
it is, is to go to deal with it at source, which is what we did
in Afghanistan. That continues to be our assumption. We are not
in a world where we have highly trained, extremely expert armed
forces waiting for the threat to arrive in the United Kingdom.
I do not judge that would be sensible. If the Committee thinks
otherwise, I should be delighted to hear it; actually I should
be disappointed to hear it.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It might just
be worth adding that there is at the moment activity to pull together
bids for civil resilience being co-ordinated by Sir David Omand
in the central contingencies area, working very closely with the
Home Office to help to fill some of the requirements which exist
in this area of communications and infrastructure resilience as
well as other things which will be fed into the spending round
proposals. It would be wrong to imply that everything is being
put on the shoulders of the Ministry of Defence; that is not the
case. Clearly it does affect a number of other government departments
and this is being looked at in three separate Cabinet committees;
I forget all the various names of them. The idea that it is not
being worked on, would be misleading. The other point I would
make is that during Operation Fresco we did keep 19,000 Armed
Forces available for that while at the same time generating the
forces for Operation Telic. Although it was difficult, it was
possible to do both. The only thing which had to give was that
some units had to be used for Telic with more extended readiness
and they had to move faster—and they achieved it—than
they should have actually been expected to do. Really it was a
tremendous achievement, so I would not want to underestimate the
capacity of the Armed Forces to be valuable at home as well as
meeting international obligations. The 14 units which the Secretary
of State spoke about in reserves are of course augmentations of
the land army which is available as well as the reserves and in
addition to our international commitments.
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