Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)
31 MARCH 2004
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP AND SIR
KEVIN TEBBIT
Q160 Chairman: I was linking you with
Aneurin Bevan actually.
Mr Hoon: I was making a far more
subtle point than you have given me credit for. What I actually
said was that we should not in principle mobilise people because
of their civilian skills. It may well be that your illustration
of someone who works for BT also has a military skill as a communicator
and uses his civilian abilities in the reservists. Examples I
was giving were of people who by coincidence, when we found in
southern Iraq that we needed somebody to start building a basic
economy and we had a reservist who happened to be in the City,
were able to put those skills to bear; the teacher illustration
I gave. What would be wrong in principle is that if those skills
were not skills which had been utilised as part of their military
training and experience in the reserves and we called them up
knowing that they had civilian skills which were not otherwise
utilised by the reservists; that is wrong in principle. Many people
will have skills from the civilian world that they bring to bear
in their service in the reserves. The best illustration I can
think of is that quite a number of the people who initially operated
the quarry we required in Kosovo to provide all of the hard standing
which was so important in the early period, so that our trucks
and equipment did not sink into the very considerable amount of
mud which was there, were all people who had actually had that
skill in civilian life but had used that skill as part of the
reserves. We were then able to take advantage of them and their
skills to provide an actual military contribution to the operation.
I was not saying anything which was inconsistent, just subtle.
Chairman: I am sorry if I misunderstood
the subtlety. I would have thought our parliamentary colleague
who was there in Iraq would have been better deployed in dealing
with unruly people as I think he was a Conservative whip, was
he not? I have no idea what he was doing where he was.
Q161 Mr Crausby: In the Defence White
Paper capabilities section, paragraph 4.9, it tells us "We
will not be able to hold onto platforms or force elements that
do not have the flexibility to meet the demands of future operations".
Which platforms and force elements have you identified which lack
the flexibility and adaptability for future operations.
Mr Hoon: I am sorry to disappoint
you, but as I indicated at the outset, those are decisions we
have still yet to take and we are looking at the range of equipment.
It may not necessarily be older equipment. The flexibility issue
is important. If you look at some of the carriers which were built
in the 1960s, presumably designed in the 1950s I assume, they
have provided remarkable flexibility in the way in which they
operate. They have not necessarily been used in quite the way
originally anticipated; as helicopter platforms delivering force
into southern Iraq they were remarkably successful. Flexibility
does not necessarily mean old, it just means that we look carefully
at whether they are capable of doing the kind of job we require
them to do in the future.
Q162 Mr Crausby: There must be some quite
difficult choices to make over the next few years. Will those
difficult choices be made and affected by whether we co-operate
with the Americans or the Europeans?
Mr Hoon: I made clear in my introduction
and it is also in the White Paper, that the United Kingdom should
not be simply filling other gaps in say American capabilities
or for that matter in European capabilities. It does seem to me
that as we need to duplicate capabilities, because we are conducting
a number of different operations simultaneously, that is an opportunity,
particularly to try to identify those areas with shortfalls. Part
of the process we have entered into, the Helsinki headline goal
process, is a process which NATO has in a way emulated by trying
to look at what capabilities are available amongst allies and
then trying to ensure that in the delivery of new equipment we
are concentrating on those areas where we are short. Otherwise
the risk is that we all simply duplicate lots of capabilities
which we do not actually need and that would be a mistake at a
time when we all know the scarcity of equipment and resources.
Q163 Mr Crausby: In paragraph 4.10 you
say something very similar about all the vessels which contribute
less well. A fairly obvious statement. I was going to ask which
vessels you were thinking of and what you intend to retain and
procure in the medium term. I suppose I shall get a similar sort
of answer to that question. Instead of that, can you finally put
to rest these rumours on the carrier? Can you tell us whether
you are considering co-operation with the French Navy for the
UK carrier programme in the future?
Mr Hoon: We are certainly prepared
to co-operate with France or indeed any other country which might
have a similar requirement to our own. We certainly are having
discussions about whether that might assist in producing at a
better price and more sophisticated capability the two carriers
which we know the United Kingdom requires. We know that France
has a requirement for a second carrier of a large scale, but those
discussions are still at a very early stage.
Q164 Mike Gapes: May I come in on this
point? The French Government have just announced a change of policy
with regard to whether this was going to be conventionally or
nuclear powered. Do you welcome that and do you think this will
facilitate future co-operation?
Mr Hoon: The fact is that this
is a matter for France. However, they have decided not to build
a second nuclear powered carrier which means that the possibilities
for co-operation are clearly greater and that means that we could
have that conversation. If they had chosen to build a second nuclear
powered carrier, there would not have been any point in having
that conversation because we are not building nuclear powered
carriers ourselves. It certainly means that there is a purpose
in having the conversation that there would not otherwise be.
Q165 Mike Gapes: This is the anniversary
of the entente cordiale. I hope the conversations are cordial.
Mr Hoon: I am sure they will be
cordial.
Q166 Mr Viggers: You seem to be even
further ahead with your thinking than when you were interviewed
on the Today programme about two years ago, when you were
asked whether there might be mixed crewing and whether you envisaged
a Royal Navy carrier being commanded by a French captain and you
replied "Not in the near future". Have there been any
discussions along this kind of line at all?
Mr Hoon: No, there have not and
my anticipation is the same and that is why I answered Mike's
question so carefully, because I am very concerned about the way
these things can be misrepresented. The French have a requirement
for a new large carrier. We have a requirement for two new large
carriers. If there is some financial and capability benefit in
discussing the way in which we together build three large carriers,
I can see some advantage in that. Those conversations are at a
very early stage and I would not want anyone then to get carried
away with the idea that this somehow means that a French captain
will be in command of a British carrier.
Q167 Rachel Squire: Am I right to think
that you have just made it clear that we are talking of the two
proposed new aircraft carriers being built in this country, that
early discussions are taking place on a third or another carrier
which will possibly be French/British co-operation. What I want
to be clear about is whether we are moving away here from a commitment
that two new aircraft carriers will be built within the UK, as
has always been the policy when it came to British naval ships
being built in the past?
Mr Hoon: No, we are not moving
away from that because we have not got into those kinds of conversations
at all with France. There must be some benefits in at least talking
to France about the fact that they require a conventional large
carrier. It might well look something like the two carriers we
are contemplating building. What we are seeing, because between
us we shall be building three, is whether there are any synergies
or benefits or cost efficiencies which flow from building three
large carriers in roughly the same time frame as against building
only two.
Q168 Rachel Squire: You are effectively
saying that these three could be built in both the UK and France.
Mr Hoon: I anticipate that the
same kinds of political pressures which might lead a UK Government
to commit itself to building two carriers in the United Kingdom,
would also apply to a French Government wanting to build its carrier
in France. That is why it is necessary to explore some of these
issues about where the benefits might arise.
Rachel Squire: I am sure we shall return
to that one.
Q169 Mr Crausby: Moving on to paragraph
4.11, the Defence White Paper calls for a re-balancing of land
forces with an emphasis on mediumweight as opposed to heavyweight
forces. At a time when we have just deployed one of the most heavily
armoured war-fighting brigades in the modern era, is it wise to
make this decision now? Does that make sense? Would you like to
comment on that?
Mr Hoon: Part of the reason for
making a judgment about medium weight is speed of deployability,
so that we can deliver that mediumweight force at longer distance,
probably by aircraft if necessary, and give us that extra flexibility.
That is not in any way to suggest that our heavier forces were
not of enormous value, indeed, back to the point about flexibility—I
have made this point to the Committee before—the use of
very large tanks in an urban environment like Basra was not something
which was classically expected of those who were trained in the
use of Challengers, but they did a tremendous job. One of the
questions is whether they could not have done an equally good
job with a lighter weight vehicle. Those are the kinds of issues,
which Sir Kevin touched on earlier, when we are thinking about
the shape and nature of the future vehicles we require.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Of course paragraph
4.12 says that it does not mean getting rid entirely of heavyweight
forces, it just means altering the mix.
Q170 Chairman: I should have thought
Challenger 2 provided more "shock and awe" than a Land
Rover.
Mr Hoon: I do not think anybody
describes a Land Rover as medium weight.
Q171 Mr Crausby: The White Paper also
says that it is considering how and when the number of single-role
combat aircraft will be reduced. Have any decisions been reached
on this? What are the decisions? In recent conflicts there has
been an assumption that we had air superiority; it has almost
been axiomatic that nobody could compete with us. What is the
thinking on that? Is it to be that we would automatically assume
that no-one would compete in future conflicts on air security?
Mr Hoon: It is clear that we have
to maintain an effective air defence capability and that obviously
was the original plan for Typhoon. What we are looking at, at
least with Typhoon, is to provide more flexibility, a swing role,
an air to ground capability, because our judgment would be that
that is the kind of requirement we need in the future. Back to
the point about effects that we started with, we can deliver far
greater effects in the air with a far smaller number of aircraft
than was historically the case and that is the best illustration
I can possibly give of the mistake of relying on the numbers of
platforms rather than the effect they deliver. If you deliver
smart weapons accurately virtually 100% of the time, it is not
necessary to fly as many sorties, it is not necessary to have
as many aircraft, because you are delivering exactly the same
effect far more efficiently.
Q172 Mr Crausby: Have any decisions been
made on future tranches of Typhoon?
Mr Hoon: No.
Q173 Mr Crausby: When will those decisions
be made?
Mr Hoon: We are in discussion
both with our partners and indeed with the company concerned.
Q174 Mr Cran: On to the question of operating
in coalitions. It is perfectly clear that we are probably going
to be operating in coalitions in future; the Defence White Paper
makes that clear. The problem, however, is that if we think about
co-operating with the Europeans, in principle that is exactly
what we will do if the circumstances suggest we should. Where
I find it difficult to understand it, is because we are finding
it hard to keep up with the Americans, in terms of all their techniques
of command and control and all the rest of it, which I think were
shown up in Op Telic, I am just wondering how that suggests we
are going to be able, although we are willing, to co-operate with
our European partners. We are behind the Americans, but running
quite hard to keep up with them. Our European partners are not.
Mr Hoon: We have not found it
hard to keep up with the Americans. We have had to take certain
decisions on communications equipment for aircraft for example,
but that all worked seamlessly. As I said to the Committee before,
as far as air operations were concerned, they were commanded jointly,
they operated jointly and indeed very often aircraft were in the
sky not knowing what targets they were going to address and not
knowing which nationality would address them. It was an entirely
integrated operation.
Q175 Mr Cran: I did not mean to imply
it was not; of course it is. The Brits are really keeping up with
the latest American thinking; no doubt about that. My problem
is the feeling I have, talking to those who know better than I,
that the Europeans are by and large way behind. The Committee
visited Norfolk Virginia, Transformation Command, and that showed
quite clearly the problem of our being able in those circumstances
to work with our European partners despite the willingness being
there to do so.
Mr Hoon: That is why the UK has
placed so much emphasis on that command and on the transformation
NATO needs to go through. It needs to go through both as an organisation
in terms of the way NATO itself is organised, but it also, as
we have been doing, needs to continue to pressurise Member States
to maintain investment in the kinds of capabilities we are discussing
today. It is a message which I give consistently to my European
colleagues.
Q176 Mr Cran: I am "gloomyish".
You are not going to say that. Are you confident that if it came
to the sort of coalition between ourselves, the Americans and
some European states, the European states would be anywhere near
providing other than fairly basic?
Mr Hoon: Yes, I am. One of the
European states which would be nearest—and I am sure you
would welcome this—would be France, because of the investment
they make in their military capabilities. We simply need to ensure
that that process—and I am sure you will welcome it through
the European Union—is part of the way we are delivering
those improvements. We have agreed in principle on the idea of
an agency in the European Union, whose job it will be to identify
precisely capabilities, to work out where the gaps are and to
make recommendations as to how Member States should fill those
gaps. There is a huge amount going on—and I know you will
welcome it—through the processes of the European Union,
involving our European partners.
Q177 Mr Cran: Whether I do or not is
another matter. I really was not thinking about the French, probably
not thinking about the Germans, probably not thinking about the
Dutch. I am probably thinking about everybody else. All that is
going to happen is that there is just going to be a concentration
of real effort in those states which have the political willingness
to do it and everybody else just follows along.
Mr Hoon: I would not be as gloomy
as you are. I think that, particularly in terms, for smaller Member
States, of identifying niche capabilities, of identifying military
capabilities which certain states might decide to concentrate
upon, which may well be in short supply in the context of a multinational
operation, gives the smaller states an opportunity which historically
they might not have had. In the past, all they have been doing
is duplicating capabilities which the larger countries already
had. As we move into this much more technologically sophisticated
world, it may well be that investing in niche capabilities will
be a very sound investment as far as a smaller country is concerned.
Q178 Mr Cran: My own view is that the
American thinking on all of this is just so far ahead of everybody
else. We are keeping up to it; I think you underestimate the ability
of all but a very few other countries who can even vaguely keep
up with it.
Mr Hoon: We shall meet again in
10 years' time.
Mr Cran: We may.
Chairman: Mr Cran gave a list of possible
no-shows. I do not want him to damage the electoral prospects
of my friend Peter Viggers, who is running for the presidency
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, so I shall give him a right
to reply to say that some of those are highly likely to be committed
to the UK and NATO.
Q179 Mr Viggers: Is there not a security
and intelligence point here? We co-operate with the Americans,
who trust us with more intelligence and security than other European
nations. Some intelligence is specifically "For US/UK"
or other "eyes only". Would we not prejudice that very
advantageous position of practising our defence capabilities with
the United States, if we were known also to be co-operating and
sharing intelligence and security information with continental
allies?
Mr Hoon: No, because the experience
bears out, when forces are deployed on operations, in the Balkans
for example, that where there are US, UK and continental European
forces there is an exchange of intelligence. No-one is going to
hold intelligence which might risk the lives of those who are
in coalition with us and not make that available. There is no
difficulty about that. You are not comparing like with like, if
you will forgive me for saying so. There is a huge difference
between the routine exchanges of intelligence which take place
between the UK and the US, as against the provision of intelligence
for deployed forces on real operations.
Chairman: We just have 12 minutes to
go, subject to there being no votes. The questions get easier
from now on.
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