Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)
20 APRIL 2004
GENERAL SIR
MICHAEL WALKER,
ADMIRAL SIR
ALAN WEST,
GENERAL SIR
MIKE JACKSON
AND AIR
CHIEF MARSHAL
SIR JOCK
STIRRUP
Q200 Chairman: General, obviously spearhead
affects you far more than others.
General Sir Mike Jackson: Indeed,
Chairman. The spearhead battalion is one of a number of elements
within the JRRF. It is one of those at very, very high readiness
and it has been used on several occasions over the last two or
three years; but it is one, if you like, golf club in the whole
piece.
Q201 Chairman: Were there any lessons
learned from the last deployment to the Balkans? Because they
moved pretty swiftly.
General Sir Mike Jackson: No,
I think it went pretty well.
General Sir Michael Walker: Not
on spearhead per se but on NATO readiness times, in fact
NATO readiness times required us to have that reserve in theatre
within five days with its lead elements and within seven days
with the rest of the unit. In fact, we had a request to have it
there "by sunset, please"—a rather Somerset Maugham
request—but anyway we got it there by sunset because for
national reasons we have it at a higher degree of readiness. So
I think the lesson is there, and certainly for the next NATO Chiefs
of Defence it is one of the subjects we will be discussing as
to the NATO readiness states. As you will appreciate, with NATO
having force packages, with Europe now beginning to develop force
packages, there needs to be coherence between the various states
of readiness across the piece. Interestingly, the other nations
who sent their troops there, having said they could not do it
in under 14 days actually achieved it in about three. That, I
think, is the lesson: we need to see what NATO states of readiness
really need to be.
Q202 Chairman: Who else is there in NATO
who can move forces fairly rapidly?
General Sir Michael Walker: Clearly
it depends on how far. The Germans, the Italians and the French
all moved their reinforcing battalions to Kosovo at the same time
as we did but arrived shortly after.
Q203 Chairman: Will the concept of JRRF
be used to support the global small-scale counter-terrorist operations
that the White Paper introduces into the Defence Planning Assumptions?
Let's ask the question in this form: Can it be incorporated?
General Sir Michael Walker: Yes.
Q204 Chairman: Will this be a change
of concept?
General Sir Michael Walker: No,
because—
Q205 Chairman: Or will it need additional
forces assigned to it?
General Sir Michael Walker: The
concept is a very flexible one, which is why we adopted it. It
essentially provides what pictorially I would depict as a spearhead,
with those forces who are for their time being on the roster at
the point of the spear, being at higher degrees of readiness.
Now, of course you can have whatever forces you like in there,
from special forces through to standard infantry to armour or
whatever, but the concept is a sensible concept; there is nothing
magic about it. It is a process actually that we have adopted
for many years; it is merely that we have now described it in
this term, the concept of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. I think
"Rapid Response" might be better because it is a response
rather than reaction—we do not like always being reactive
to respond—nonetheless, I think the reality is that we are
unlikely to see counter-terrorism or any other reason for deploying
British forces requiring a different approach.
Q206 Mr Viggers: Following, first, the
issue of readiness, there was a headline-grabbing story which
I saw yesterday, attributed to the Secretary of Defence Donald
Rumsfeld in the United States, of "10, 30, 30": of troops
available in ten days, to deal with the enemy in 30 days and to
have them regrouped in 30 days. Is that a helpful concept in terms
of British strategic planning?
General Sir Michael Walker: We
tend not to describe them in the same numerical formula but, in
essence, this is the sort of thing the JRRF does anyway. We deploy
within a certain time for a declared period of sustainability
with the potential to sustain it for longer if necessary. That
is the basis of the planning for JRRF.
Q207 Mr Viggers: Turning to air power
and specifically the single-role fast jets, the Defence White
Paper states that there is to be a reduced role for single-role
fast jets and a desire to project air power from both the land
and the sea, and that the MoD is "now considering how and
when it should reduce the numbers of combat aircraft in order
to reflect these developments". The Secretary of State has
told us that no decision has been reached on a reduction plan
for the acquisition of single-role fast jets. What is the assessment
of the training implications and the costs of moving from single-role
to multi-role capabilities?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
If I may answer the second part first, the costs are already included
in the programme, because this is not something that has just
cropped up, it is something we have been moving towards for a
considerable time. Our Forward Equipment Programme has taken account
of that and our experiences in recent operations have merely underlined
the correctness of that particular move. There is no doubt that
in Iraq last year, for example, the first aircraft out of theatre
were the Tornado F3 and the F15C, quite simply because they could
only operate in the air defence role and we could not afford the
footprint on the ground or the logistic support for aircraft that
were no longer necessary in that role. The need for multi-role,
the efficiency that it brings, not just in terms of tactical flexibility
but in terms of logistic support and in footprint on the ground,
is clear. In terms of training, there is no doubt that it brings
an additional bill. If you want to train people in more skills,
then that takes time. The approach we will take, though, is, as
we have done in the past, a phased approach. Again, this is not
something that is necessarily entirely new because if we look
even within a particular broad role in the past, such as offensive
support, we have had squadrons which have specialised in Alarm,
squadrons which have specialised in anti-shipping attacks, but
they have all been able to carry out roles in other areas as well.
This multiplicity of training is something that is not new to
us and we will have to adopt, throughout the training year, a
phased approach.
Q208 Mr Viggers: If you reduce numbers,
of course, you increase the proportional impact of attrition.
Have you been reviewing the need for increased force protection?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
We take account of the need for force protection all the time.
In calculating the numbers we are likely to need in an operation,
we take account of not just the different roles but all the other
aspects of the operation, including the threat. All of that is
built into our calculations. Force protection is a crucial element
in our overall force package and has been for some time, so I
do not think there is anything new in that.
Q209 Mr Crausby: It appears from previous
witnesses before this Committee that one of the lessons from Iraq
was that air-land integration was not as well practiced as it
might have been. Could you tell us what specific steps have been
taken to improve air-land coordination in the future?
General Sir Michael Walker: You
are right. I think we recognise that. I would say this was not
just a feature of our own national operations. It was widely seen
that since the Cold War the working together of the two, the land
and air environment, had become a much less common part of our
training than it was during the Cold War days. At the moment we
are analysing what the training needs are going to be for us to
be able to get that piece right. Clearly the air-land coordination
gets much more complex if you are operating with other people's
air forces as well, so at the moment we are addressing how we
can get our own house in order. It is never always going to be
the case that our own aeroplanes will necessarily be those overhead
our own troops at any particular time and so we are looking closely
at how the Americans do it. They have a number of devices they
use, not least the American marines, who have a thing called the
ANGLICO, the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, which is a
very good system for doing it. We are trying to make sure that
those who are going to be taking part in these sorts of operation
are going to have the right training but I do not think we have
not put the package together finally yet.
General Sir Mike Jackson: I would
just echo CDS. It was clear that not only was the offensive deep-strike
use of air power very central to the outcome, but also close air
support, once to be thought a rather old-fashioned way of using
aircraft and air power, proved not to be the case. The two front
line commands, Land Command and Strike Command, have actually
put a project together, as CDS says, to bring up what is required
and then how best to do it to improve our ability in that area.
Q210 Mr Crausby: Will the RAF participate
in BATUS at a significant level in the future?
General Sir Michael Walker: I
am not sure BATUS is necessarily going to be the answer. The answer
is they could but at BATUS we tend to train up to brigade level.
Very often it is at the divisional level and the corps level where
the coordination of the air effort in support of land forces is
managed. There is no reason why they cannot but we really need
to wait to find out the outcome of the study to make sure that
we put the two environments together with the best possible effect
at the end of it. But there is no reason why they should not and
they have.
General Sir Mike Jackson: It does
happen from time to time.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
This is not something that we do not know how to do because there
were many examples in Iraq itself, in particular parts of the
theatre, where it worked extremely well, but that was because
those involved were practised, understood the procedures, understood
one another and had done it before they actually got to theatre.
We need to look at extending that particular expertise throughout
the force structures on both sides.
Q211 Mr Crausby: Will army Apache forces
train with the RAF?
General Sir Michael Walker: They
will train with all three components, yes. When you ask "Will
they train with the RAF?" what do you envisage, is it the
requirement to train with the Royal Air Force? Remember that the
Apache is essentially a weapon system that operates within the
land commander's battle envelope, if I can use that expression.
I am sorry to use such a strange term but we are talking about
the area around it. The training piece is by and large a question
of de-confliction and the allocation of targets, so of course
that would come into the whole wider management of the battle
structure, including the air-land management. Training with the
Royal Air Force is a matter of training in the procedures and
working together rather than specifically going up and joining
the Royal Air Force and flying off around the skies together,
if you see what I mean. So it has to be a joint, combined training
in that context.
Q212 Mr Crausby: Will the number of forward
air controllers be increased?
General Sir Mike Jackson: Again,
I think we await the outcome of what they are saying. Inevitably
there is an expense which goes with an increased number of forward
air controllers and there is a balance to be struck as to how
that is best arranged most economically. We are not quite there
yet. For what it is worth, if this would put your mind at rest
at all, there is clear understanding that the day of the forward
air controller is most certainly not over—of which there
was some talk a few years back.
Q213 Mr Blunt: I need a little bit of
reassurance. I would like it individually. The White Paper appears
to be based on an assumption that it is the statement by the Secretary
of State for Defence that in the most demanding operations it
is inconceivable that the United States will not be involved.
The Defence White Paper will help shape our armed forces for a
decade and more to come. Do each of you think that it is reasonable
to base the shape of our armed forces on the assumption that it
is inconceivable that the United States will not be involved in
future large-scale operations alongside the United Kingdom?
General Sir Michael Walker: If
you want some reassurance, yes, I do believe that is the case.
They are the only nation that has the range of capabilities required
to prosecute high intensity warfare in the most demanding set
of circumstances. If we are going to go into these, we recognise
that we are unlikely to do it unilaterally and therefore the only
nation alongside whom we are likely to find ourselves in those
circumstances is the United States. In that context, I think that
is a very reasonable assumption.
Q214 Mr Blunt: In paragraph 2.5 of the
White Paper it says, "The most demanding expeditionary operations
involving intervention against the state adversaries can only
plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged . . ." Are
we saying that the United Kingdom on its own will never again
be able to fight a state adversary (as we had to do over the Falklands,
for example) on our own? Therefore the White Paper is based on
an assumption that the United States will always be at our side.
General Sir Michael Walker: I
think the assumption is that we would not see ourselves engaging
in inter-state conflict on our own. I think that is a very fair
assumption.
Q215 Mr Blunt: May I ask you each whether
you think that is an assumption on which we should properly rely
for the future of British defence.
General Sir Mike Jackson: "Never"
is a very conclusive word, is it not? As CDS have said, one needs
to make very careful judgments over the probabilities and it is
difficult to construct the scenario, it would seem to me, where
the United Kingdom would engage in inter-state conflict single-handed.
We had the example in 1982, and I trust there will be no repeat
performance of that, but, perhaps outside of that particular set
of circumstances, it is very hard to see any circumstances in
which this country's national interest would be so threatened
that it would have to set out alone. It would be part of a wider
piece. The assumption, it seems to me, is that it would be part
of a wider piece in which the United States inevitably will be
involved because it is that wider piece.
General Sir Michael Walker: If
I may just add: remember the Falklands was demanding, but I would
not have described it as "the most demanding". This
did not use all the weapons of war and capabilities that we would
use in the most demanding type of operation. There was very little
armour used; there was very limited artillery. It was essentially
a lighter war-fighting operation. We need to remember that war
fighting can happen at any level and with any forces but the most
demanding we are talking about here is the exploitation of every
single capability that is necessary to prosecute the most demanding
form of war. In those circumstances, I do believe it is a fair
assumption.
Q216 Mr Blunt: The kernel of my concern
is that we appear to be stripping out the air defence capability
both of the navy and of the army in the various savings measures
that are currently being taken. Of course both of those capabilities
were critical in 1982. The operation in 1982, although it was
light in the terms you have presented it, we would not now be
able to carry out in the course of the next decade when those
capabilities are not present for the United Kingdom. That means
that the shop therefore appears to be being bet on this assumption,
where Lord King, former Defence Secretary, said to the House of
Lords that in his experience "the inconceivable usually happens".
Maybe by definition we cannot conceive of the circumstances in
which it might happen but experience tells us, in my judgment,
that Lord King's words would appear more often than not to be
correct.
General Sir Michael Walker: I
cannot let you get away with the statement that we appear to be
getting rid of all the air defence within the army and the navy.
I do not know where you have got that from, but that is absolute
nonsense.
Q217 Chairman: Tory Central Office maybe!
General Sir Michael Walker: Alan,
do you want to comment about your own views?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I would
make a couple of points. Within the definitions that you have
given about this large scale and the whole spread of capabilities
being used, I would agree that it is extremely unlikely that we
would ever be involved in an operation without the United States,
that inter-state type operation. "Inconceivable" is
a word I probably would not ever use, because I think it is true
to say that you never know what is going to happen in the future.
We have found that again and again and again. But the basis of
assuming that we will not be involved at the very highest levels
of military capability in an inter-state operation without the
US I think is a very sensible basis on which to go forward. I
think where you are coming from is a similar thing to the Falklands
again.
Q218 Mr Blunt: Not just the Falklands.
We are a member of the Commonwealth.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if
maybe I could talk on an operation of that type.
Q219 Mr Blunt: If a Commonwealth country
is invaded, that brings with it obligations to the United Kingdom
that the United States does not share.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if
I could talk on the specifics, where you talk about air defence
being stripped out and capabilities: looking to the future—and
I will use the Falklands as a scenario, because one needs a scenario—we
will have the capability of doing exactly what we did before.
We will keep it with our CVSs, through until the CVF comes; and
when the CVF comes, we will be even more capable of conducting
that type of operation. The loss of the FA2s—and there has
been considerable debate about that—is a loss of air defence
capability in the short term, but we of course have layered air
defence and we are able still to provide air defence for the carrier
group. Focusing more on deep strike is the way we need to go for
the future—we are certain of that, looking at the operations
that have happened—and would give us an ability to conduct
an operation like the Falklands with more capability than we have
had in the past. So I am not concerned on that specific but I
would not use the word "inconceivable" because I also
agree that the one thing of which you can be absolutely certain
in Defence terms is that it is the thing which you have not predicted
that will happen—which is why we need all of the capabilities
we have in defence, in those multi-role capabilities, to be able
to react to that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
I would echo that. I would just say that, since we are unable
to predict the future and if, as you say, the unexpected usually
happens, then the important thing is to be able to react to an
uncertain future. The way to do that is not to focus on specific
issues but to accept the need for adaptability in our military
structure, in our capability and in our tactics. I think that
is the issue on which we should be focusing rather than on specific
sets of capability that we think might or might not be required
in the future.
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