Memorandum by Quaker Peace & Social
Witness
THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
Quaker Peace & Social Witness represents
the Religious Society of Friends in Britain, which has a membership
of 16,000, on issues of peace and justice.
A review of the work of the Ministry of Defence
and the Armed Forces is welcome and we thank the Select Committee
for opening the Inquiry.
1. "DELIVERING
SECURITY"
We welcome this title as an more appropriate
description of the challenge than the narrower notion of "defence".
We believe that delivering security consists
primarily in generating conditions of security and preventing
violent conflict, rather than in military capacities and action.
In particular, it requires a strong financial and political commitment
to diplomacy, international development, protection of the natural
environment and progressive disarmament.
An assumption that the Ministry of Defence has
primary responsibility in delivering security would be out of
date. Its work must be set in context alongside the work of other
Government departments, international institutions and non-governmental
organisations. The White Paper makes little mention of non-military
security goals or the capacities required to achieve them. Even
other branches of Government are barely mentioned.
— We wish to see the UK's strategy
for delivering security set within a more wide-ranging understanding
of what is involved than that currently reflected in the White
Paper.
— Measures are needed to reduce UK
and global military expenditure and increase the financial commitment
to non-military security-related goals.
2. UK-US RELATIONS
The White Paper suggests further alignment of
the UK with the strategic and military policies of the United
States in several areas. Examples of US policy now dominating
UK thinking include: the move from platform-centred to network-enabled
military capabilities; an increased interest in military "coalitions
of the willing" to intervene in disputes; strategic missile
defences; and a renewal of the commitment to nuclear weapons.
The White Paper does not make the rationale for this harmonisation
explicit, however it appears primarily intended to serve the UK-US
political relationship.
The Paper appears to assume (a) the inseparability
of US and UK national interests in security affairs; and (b) a
strong US interest in leading the world into a safer future. In
our view, neither assumption would bear criticism.
— The rationale behind the White Paper's
general alignment of UK policy with that of the US in key areas
should be made explicit and scrutinised thoroughly if it is to
form the basis of reform of the UK security strategy.
— We ask the Committee to consider
opening an inquiry on the UK-US strategic relationship.
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Nuclear weapons present one of the most urgent
challenges facing the UK and the world. The logical conclusion
of nuclear deterrence is that every nation eventually possesses
the weapons, resulting almost inevitably in nuclear conflict.
In autumn last year, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, wrote:
"The very existence of nuclear weapons gives
rise to the pursuit of them. They are seen as a source of global
influence, and are valued for their perceived deterrent effect.
And as long as some countries possess them (or are protected by
them in alliances) and others do not, this asymmetry breeds chronic
global insecurity."
(M ElBaradei, "Towards a Safer World",
The Economist, 16 October 2003)
The replacement of Trident or the advent of
new nuclear weapons would risk leading the world to nuclear tragedy.
Quakers would unequivocally oppose this and passionately support
moves by the UK to renew negotiations towards disarmament and
abandon the nuclear doctrine. This would entail a courageous act
of political leadership consisting in a break with US policy on
this issue.
The White Paper reaffirms " . . . the continuing
role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the UK's
national security." (3.11, p 9). A guarantor of security
is a false idol and an illusory goal. The Paper also states: "We
do not believe the world community should accept the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by further states." (2.7, p 4) These
two statements are obviously inconsistent.
The continued nuclear commitment is incompatible
with the legal obligation upon the UK, contained in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to negotiate nuclear disarmament.
This obligation was clarified and strengthened by the International
Court of Justice in 1996 and by the NPT Review Conference in 2000,
yet is omitted in the White Paper. The reaffirmation of a UK nuclear
policy would also be at odds with the Labour Party's 1997 manifesto
commitment to the global abolition of nuclear weapons.
— The decision on whether to replace
Trident and the process leading up to it should be fully accountable
to public and parliament from an early stage. We would invite
Government to set out now how it will ensure that this is the
case. The historic practice of secret ministerial decisions on
UK nuclear weapons developments outside Parliamentary scrutiny
must not continue.
— The question of whether to replace
Trident provides an opportunity for Britain to broker international
negotiations on the global abolition of nuclear weapons, in the
first instance between other nuclear weapons states.
4. US BASES IN
THE UK
We remain extremely concerned about the lack
of local, parliamentary and legal accountability of US bases in
the UK. These bases were provided to US forces during the Cold
War in return for political favours and nuclear secrets without
proper parliamentary scrutiny. The historical record shows that
the bases have been instruments of US power projection in pursuit
of its national interests.
The secrecy of the agreements allowing US the
use of these sites is incompatible with the accountability required
in democratic government. The exemption of US personnel from English
law in some cases is unacceptable. Commanders in some US bases,
for example Menwith Hill, must be more open to dialogue with members
of the local community who are critical of the bases.
— The White Paper should not be silent
on the role of US bases.
— We ask for an explanation of the
value of the bases in terms of their contribution to delivering
national and international security.
— The activities at the bases should
be accountable before the public, Parliament, the law and local
communities.
— The arrangements under which the
US is allowed to use these bases should be reviewed and, we hope,
abolished.
5. RESPONDING
TO TERRORISM
We recognise that the need to prevent and respond
to international terrorism presents specific challenges to the
international community. The risk that terrorists will acquire
nuclear weapons is particularly grave, arising partly from the
legacy of technological know-how developed by nuclear weapons
states such as our own.
We see no military defence effective against
the phenomenon of international terrorism. Military action appears
likely to exacerbate the conditions of malaise in which international
terrorism thrives. A strategy against international terrorism
might better consist entirely in non-military measures: the development
and even application of international law; international efforts
to reverse economic and political marginalisation on which terrorist
networks feed; support for institutions of regional and global
governance; efforts to engender inter-religious understanding;
proactive diplomacy; and appropriate support for failing states.
In this light, responding to terrorism is better seen as an economic,
developmental, environmental and foreign policy objective than
a military one. Yet these broad non-military measures do not attract
the same degree of political and financial commitment as those
currently conceived in narrower, military terms.
— Non-military counter-terrorism measures
need to be at the heart of a Government-wide policy and funded
in better proportion to the importance of their long-term contribution.
This could be achieved through a diversion of part of the military
budget to appropriate overseas aid and foreign policy initiatives.
6. UK-UN RELATIONSHIP
The White Paper states that the United Nations
"will remain the forum through which the international community
will debate the handling of major security crises" (2.17,
p 6). Its Charter makes clear that the UN is not reducible to
a debating forum but is the legal authority empowered with "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security" (UN Charter, Art 24.1).
The suggestion made in the Paper, that "we
also need the flexibility to build coalitions of the willing to
deal with specific threats when necessary" (2.16, p 5) on
account of "limitations of the UN" (2.17, p 6), is worrying
if it suggests by-passing UN authority in the future.
— UK security policy should explicitly
recognise the centrality of the UN in the task of maintaining
international peace and security and affirm that its legal authority
is not to be circumvented.
7. REGIONS OF
STRATEGIC CONCERN
AND UK MILITARY
EXPORTS
We welcome the White Paper's statement that
points of active engagement for the UK will include "areas
of instability in and around Europe, the Near East, North Africa
and the Gulf" (3.1, p 7) and the extension of strategic concern
to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
The UK currently exports military equipment
to countries in every one of these regions. Substantial UK military
exports in 2002 to India, Israel and Saudi Arabia are among the
examples.
Greater transparency on UK arms exports and
international initiatives to develop stronger regulatory frameworks
are welcome. However, the UK's strategic and economic interest
as a major arms exporter to the developing world compromises human
rights and development and contributes to insecurity and war.
This issue invites more effective parliamentary scrutiny.
— The policy on granting licenses and
Government support for military exports to areas of strategic
concern should be reviewed.
— An assessment should be made of the
impact of UK military exports on international security goals.
— We welcome the forthcoming review
of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and hope
that the Code will be strengthened as a restrictive instrument
and we encourage UK support in general for stronger regional and
global mechanisms to limit and reduce the arms trade.
8. STRATEGIC
MISSILE DEFENCES
We welcome the pledge to "continue to examine,
with our NATO allies, the complex web of strategic issues to inform
future political and policy decisions" about UK involvement
in a strategic missile defence system (3.12, p 9).
We believe that a strategy for security based
on the indefinite development of military might is a dangerously
misguided response to the strategic security challenges we face.
A significant body of evidence suggests that
a US missile defence system would lead to deployment of weapons
in space and that its purpose includes the ability to project
power over other countries for political ends. The threat of an
attack against the UK by ballistic missile appears to be remote,
given that missiles are difficult to construct and the launch
site of an attack could not be hidden from a possible retaliation.
The resources required for a missile defence system could be used
more effectively for reducing the threat through cooperation,
improving nuclear safeguards, controlling missile technology and
reducing missile stockpiles, and improving verification of the
conventions on chemical and biological weapons. The UK has played
a leading role in some of these areas. Strategic missile defences
would also be operationally unreliable, since they would be unlikely
to win the innovations race against evolving missile technology.
Recently announced Russian plans for a new generation of strategic
weapons appear to be a response to the missile defence concept
and risk sparking a new arms race.
We support the Committee's finding in its report
on missile defence of 29 January 2003, that the process leading
up to the decision to allow the use of the Fylingdales radar in
a US missile defence system did not allow for adequate public
and parliamentary debate. We are unconvinced that a political
decision was not made well in advance of the public announcement.
— We hope the Committee will reaffirm
its recommendation that sufficient time and opportunities for
public and parliamentary debate should be allowed before any ministerial
decision is made as to whether to include the UK within a strategic
missile defence system.
9. ARMED FORCES
RECRUITMENT AND
CARE OF
PERSONNEL
While welcoming the UK's ratification of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on involvement of children in armed conflicts, we regret that
the UK has made a "Declaration" setting out situations
in which they envision deploying under-18s in hostilities. We
object strongly to this, believing that it is contrary to the
object of the Protocol and sets an inappropriate example to other
states.
We believe that the UK should cease recruitment
of under-18s into the Armed Forces. In our view, it is wrong that
a young person who is not considered competent to sign a legal
contract in England and Wales can nevertheless be bound beyond
their age of majority into a minimum six year career with the
Armed Forces. We regret the priority the White Paper gives to
"innovative ways to discuss the benefits of a Service career
with young people" (p 12). There is a risk that glamorous
recruitment initiatives will obscure the onerous contractual obligations
and gloss over the risks and horrors of warfare.
We welcome and encourage programmes, in which
ex-Services personnel contribute to civilian life through outreach
programmes not connected with recruitment.
— We call for the withdrawal of the
UK Declaration limiting the application of the Optional Protocol
on the involvement of children in the Armed Forces.
— Reform of the contractual obligations
incumbent on those joining the Armed Forces is long overdue. We
urge the Committee to call for a thorough review.
— The extra strain on the Armed Forces
resulting from the White Paper's anticipated increase of military
engagements should be reflected in further provision of pastoral
care and other personal support for those involved, particularly
on demobilisation.
March 2004
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