Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence
THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
READINESS ASSUMPTIONS
1. Holding force elements at readiness is
expensive in terms of manpower, equipment maintenance and infrastructure.
It is, therefore, important to ensure that the readiness profile
reflects accurately our planning assumptions. The UK response
to recent operational demands and our view of how operational
contingent and standing commitments (previously PCFs) may develop
in the future endorses the SDR principle of graduated readiness.
Judgements made on the nature of a UK military contribution to
resolving crises continue to be based on the concept of Warning
Time, depicted at Figure 1. Readiness forms a key part of the
Warning Time equation and is the currency used to determine the
operational posture of force elements. The aim of this planning
assumption is to set out the guidance on the readiness levels
of forces required to participate in contingent tasks. While the
detail of policy may change the readiness of individual force
elements, the concept of a JRRF profile remains consistent with
the future posture of the Armed Forces.
2. Warning Time. The lead up to operations
can be defined as Warning Time. This is the time between first
indication of a crisis from diplomatic or intelligence sources
and the time of the first engagement in theatre. The components
are:
(a) Decision Time. The period from
first indication of the problem until the moment of decision to
commit forces.
(b) Readiness. The time required
for force to be ready to deploy for operations.
(c) Deployment Time. The period to
deploy forces into theatre.
(d) In Theatre Preparation. The time
including acclimatisation training, integration with coalition
forces and tactical deployment in order to be ready to start operations.
| WARNING TIME |
| | | |
| | | |
| Decision Time | Readiness |
Deployment | In Theatre Preparation
| | | |
| |
| | |
| | | |
| |
| First Indication | Committed
| Ready in Theatre |
| | |
Time Line
R
Figure 1
3. The period required for each of the four elements
of Warning Time will vary depending on many factors, including
the nature and complexity of the operation, scale of commitment,
range, environmental conditions and the scale of coalition involvement.
Working backward from required "Ready in Theatre" time
scale, in-theatre preparation will be determined by force size,
nature and complexity of the operation. Deployment time prior
to this will be a function of range and available lift. Unit readiness
will be determined by pre-deployment training and required sequence
of deployment. The time required to complete these three components
will then inform the time available for the political and military
decision making process to be completed.
4. Whilst Figure 1 represents a linear progression which
might be applied to each of the military components, the phasing
will be different. The logistics component in particular will,
in many cases, be the critical path in terms of acquiring and
building up sustainment stocks for the operation, a time scale
for which will span the entire period from the moment of commitment
until ready in theatre.
5. Significant judgements are as follows:
(a) As Large Scale operations will be deliberate
in nature with a minimum warning time of 6 months, heavier forces
previously held at very high readiness for these operations can
be held at medium readiness.
(b) There will be an increasing demand on high and very
high readiness light forces to rapidly deploy to a wide range
of Small and Medium Scale peace support, power projection and
focused intervention operations.
(c) Whilst many operational contingencies require rapid
response of lead elements, possibly only at Small Scale, the balance
of forces to achieve overall weight of effort may be held at lower
readiness. A system of graduated readiness, therefore, will more
efficiently achieve the desired force balance.
(d) Similarly, by breaking out force elements into one
of six capability elements, it becomes clear that the overall
scale of effort for the operation does not demand identical scales
from each. We must focus closely on identifying the capability
elements required for each type of operation, sequence their arrival
in theatre and therefore ensure the most efficient build up of
logistics resources.
(e) Whilst each operation might be different, the following
general rules will apply:
(1) Deliberate Intervention. It is anticipated
that the planned air campaign will precede ground operations,
although maritime support may be needed at an early stage for
strategic lift, force protection, theatre entry and establishment
of the lodgement.
(2) Peace Enforcement. These operations are likely
to have land as the prime contributor and as the supported component.
However, in some circumstances, the build up of land forces will
precede power projection operations.
(3) Power Projection. Probably air and/or maritime
heavy. The air or maritime component is likely, therefore, to
be the supported component command. The focus in such operations
will be for rapid effect.
(4) Focused Intervention. These operations are
likely to require light or medium weight land forces, supported
by air and maritime components in a joint context. The nature
of the operation demands extremely rapid response capability from
all committed force elements at very high readiness, building
to Medium Scale at high readiness following Small Scale CT deployment.
(5) Peacekeeping. These operations are likely
to have land as the prime contributor and as the supported component.
(f) Forces will not be held at readiness for humanitarian
and NEOs. These contingencies, whilst they may not be discretionary,
will be met by force elements held at the appropriate readiness
for other operations.
(g) Analysis indicates that forces required for standing
commitments are invariably held at immediate or very high readiness.
Numbers of such forces should kept to a minimum, commensurate
with the delivery of the task. The posture of some force elements
attributed to standing home commitments can also now be held contingent
against additional Home Defence tasks.
(h) Readiness requirements for Reserve Forces are the
subject of further ongoing work. SDR New Chapter recommendations
have highlighted an expanded role for the Reserves, the reinforcement
of the regional C2 structure and the formation of Reaction Forces
within each Bde area.
APPENDIX
READINESS STATES
| Immediate | R0 | Ready for task.(Includes PCFs, force elements on a current task, or at the point of departure).
|
| Very High Readiness | R1 |
at two days' notice |
| R2 | at five days' notice
|
| R3 | at 10 days' notice
|
| High Readiness | R4 | at 20 days' notice
|
| R5 | at 30 days' notice
|
| Medium Readiness | R6 | at 60 days' notice
|
| R7 | at 90 days' notice
|
| Low Readiness | R8 | at 180 days' notice
|
| R9 | at 12 months' notice
|
| Very Low Readiness | R10 |
at 18 months' notice |
| R11 | at 24 months' notice
|
| R12 | at beyond 24 months' notice
|
CONCURRENCY AND
ENDURANCE ASSUMPTIONS
1. The number of operations we are able to conduct concurrently
and their duration are key defining factors in the overall size
and shape of our deployable force structure. In order to ensure
that there is sufficient breadth, depth and balance in the force
structure (particularly between front line elements and enablers)
to cope with the number and variety of contingencies that might
arise in the future it is important to ensure that our concurrency
and endurance assumptions focus on each of the six capability
elements[4] In addition,
account must be taken of the need to meet standing commitments
with both permanently committed and contingent forces.
2. Multiple concurrent contingent operations at medium
and small-scale have been and will continue to be the norm, and
must be undertaken on a routine basis as far as possible within
harmony guidelines. The first set of concurrency assumptions that
meet these criteria revolve around the requirement to meet a Medium
and a Small Scale commitment on an enduring basis plus a one-off
more discrete Small Scale commitment as follows:
| Component | Medium PK (Enduring)
| Small PK/PP (Enduring) | Small PP/FI/NEO
|
| C4ISR | Medium | Small
| Small |
| Maritime | Small | Small
| Small |
| Land | Medium | Small
| Small |
| Air | Small | Small
| Small |
| Log | Medium | Small
| Small |
| | |
|
Table 1
3. These assumptions provide a "snap-shot"
basis for defining the number of force elements required to meet
multiple commitments without breaking harmony, but do not accurately
portray the more likely complex sequence of operations that will
be undertaken over time. We need therefore to be able to meet
a relatively high frequency of varying crises and conflicts, that
can only be met through sequential rather than concurrent commitments
at medium-scale, if harmony guidelines are not to be broken on
a routine basis. Thus, on enduring operations, we should plan
to reduce the UK's commitment to small-scale as soon as possible,
so resulting in a routine pattern of operational commitments along
the following lines:
Figure 1
4. There will be occasions when it will not be possible
to draw down an ongoing Medium Scale commitment prior to committing
to a second Medium Scale operation. This will place greater stress
on our force structure and will, for many force elements, demand
the breaking of harmony guidelines. We should therefore plan to
meet this level of commitment on a relatively infrequent basis.
The resulting double Medium concurrency assumptions are as follows:
| Component | Medium PK (Enduring)
| Small PK/PP (Enduring) | Small PP/FI/NEO
|
| C4ISR | Medium | Small
| Medium |
| Maritime | Small | Small
| Medium |
| Land | Medium | Small
| Medium |
| Air | Small | Small
| Medium |
| Log | Medium | Small
| Medium |
| | |
|
Table 2
5. A second situation in which greater stress can be
placed on our force structure is the relatively infrequent requirement
to conduct more deliberate Large Scale commitments. Again, this
could occur whilst we are already committed to an enduring peacekeeping
operation from which complete extraction would be difficult. We
should therefore assume that our commitment to the ongoing operation
would draw down completely for maritime and air elements, and
reduce to Small Scale for the other three elements whilst committing
to the one-off Large Scale operation, giving the following assumptions:
| Component | Large-DI/PE
| Small PK-(Enduring) |
| C4ISR | Large | Small
|
| Maritime | Large |
|
| Land | Large | Small
|
| Air | Large |
|
| Log | Large | Small
|
| | |
Table 3
6. We should assume that the starting dates for any two
concurrent operations would be staggered, and that:
(a) For concurrent Small Scales and a Medium Scale there
should be no gap.
(b) For concurrent Medium Scale operations we would
not begin to move the second deployment until 30 days after the
first deployment had completed its arrival in theatre.
7. Similarly, we should not plan to concurrently recover
from one operation whilst deploying to another, and that those
forces recovering from a theatre would wait until either additional
charter lift can be made available or until after the deployment
to the new operation is complete.
8. In addition to contingent commitments overseas there
are a number of standing military tasks that have forces permanently
committed to them.[5] We
should plan to undertake these concurrently within harmony guidelines,
but when conducting operations at Large Scale or concurrent Medium
Scales we should plan to reduce or suspend them, with the exception
of:
— MT1.1 Strategic Intelligence.
— MT1.2 Nuclear Deterrence.
— MT2.1 Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.
— MT2.2 Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern
Ireland.
— MT2.3 Integrity of UK Waters.
— MT2.4 Integrity of UK Airspace.
April 2004
4
The sixth capability element is Special Forces, not discussed
here. Back
5
Note that additional reinforcements to the forces permanently
committed to these tasks are assumed to be provided as a contingent
commitment. Back
|
