The FCO's Strategy Paper
26. The original SDR was trumpeted as having been
foreign policy led, but was criticised by some observers when
the foreign policy conclusions upon which it was based were not
published. Commentators have long argued that in the evolving
security environment of the post-cold war world, the UK was in
need not of another statement of defence policy, or foreign policy,
but rather a broadly defined national security policy.
27. MoD emphasised to us that the Defence White Paper
had been drawn up in close co-operation and consultation with
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and pointed to the fact
that shortly before the Defence White Paper was published, FCO
published its own strategy document, UK International Priorities:
A Strategy for the FCO. In that document, the FCO identifies
8 strategic priorities for the UK:
i. a world safer from global terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction;
ii. protection of the UK from illegal immigration,
drug trafficking and other international crime;
iii. an international system based on the rule
of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts;
iv. an effective EU in a secure neighbourhood;
v. promotion of UK economic interests in an open
and expanding global economy;
vi. sustainable development, underpinned by democracy,
good governance and human rights;
vii. security of UK and global energy supplies;
and,
viii. security and good governance of the UK's
Overseas Territories.[21]
28. The MoD is identified as one of the principal
partners across government in all but the fifth of these priorities.
According to the FCO the focus of the UK's security and defence
policy will be on countering the "new threats, often from
non-state actors empowered by new technologies, and originating
outside Europe".[22]
The FCO says that these threats need to be tackled "assertively".
Insecurity in Africa and elsewhere is to lead to efforts to "reach
a clearer consensus on principles justifying the use of force
for humanitarian purposes, conflict stabilisation and timely action
against terrorism or threatening WMD capabilities". Other
issues challenging the UK and its partners will be ideology and
religion, global economic inequalities, population movements,
environmental change, demand for energy and the proliferation
of technology which may have negative as well as positive effects.
The role of UK Armed Forces will "continue to shift towards
deployments in crisis areas around the world. Our ability to project
force will be a key instrument of our foreign policy".[23]
The Defence White Paper for its part focuses its analysis on international
terrorism, WMD proliferation, failing states, social and environmental
factors and regional instability.[24]
29. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP) initiative
is one example of attempts to develop joined up policy for a broader
conception of external security relations by MoD and other government
departments. Both Conflict Prevention Pools—a 'Global Pool'
and an 'Africa Pool'—were established in the Spending Review
of 2000. The overarching intention was that since peace, stability
and poverty reduction "are global concerns and key objectives
for the British government…eliminating violent conflict is
an essential precursor to achieving any of these objectives".[25]
Based upon this vision, ministers agreed that the FCO, the MoD
and the Department for International Development (DFID), in association
with the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, would work closely to
improve the UK's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention
and conflict management. The three main departments would pool
funds that they were spending on various conflict prevention activities,
and the subsequent pools were to receive additional central funds
to serve as an incentive to promote new substantive initiatives.
This form of "joined up" government was not predominantly
about financial management, but instead designed:
to improve the effectiveness of the UK contribution
to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction
in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict
and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where
the UK can make a significant contribution.[26]
30. This was not the first initiative by the Government
to promote "joined-up" policies and programmes, but
it was the first to be applied to a concept—conflict
prevention—that sought to promote policy and programme
coherence and coordination in its activities overseas. There is
no equivalent that we are aware of by other governments. After
three years in operation the Conflict Prevention Pools have demonstrated
some benefits from pursuing an imaginative and joined up initiative.
However, each of the three main departments also have relevant
spending programmes of their own that do not necessarily conform
to a common definition of conflict prevention and are not susceptible
to common forms of evaluation and monitoring.
31. Despite collaborating in the Conflict Prevention
Pools, we have not seen substantial evidence of cross departmental
co-ordination or effects-based thinking emerge from the two policy
documents from the FCO and MoD. We discuss how true effects-based
operations will increase the requirement for a pan-Whitehall approach
in Chapter Six below. In the case of the FCO, this may require
diplomats to engage more directly with concepts such as information
operations in missions involving British forces, rather than seeing
their role in narrow diplomatic terms. While the CPP initiative
is a good model of inter-departmental cooperation and the harmonisation
of priorities around one particular UK security theme, the limits
of its impact on the ground—and in Whitehall—since
2000 demonstrate how far the UK still is from the broadly defined
national security policy for which our predecessor Committee,
and many commentators, have repeatedly called. While we note
the co-operation between MoD and FCO at the policy level we believe
that the future operational demands of effects-based thinking
will require even greater collaboration.
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