Coalition operations
107. The White Paper has moved on significantly from
the SDR and the New Chapter in its consideration of coalition
operation. It notes that:
The most demanding expeditionary operations, involving
intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be
conducted if US forces are engaged.[98]
This has prompted some to question why the UK is
limiting itself in this way. CDS acknowledged that the assumption
was that the UK would not engage in inter-state conflict on its
own again.[99] Coalitions
will be essential since the UK will no longer prepare to carry
out any large scale operations alone, according to the Secretary
of State, who told us:
we do not envisage needing to generate large-scale
capabilities across the same spectrum, given that in the most
demanding operations it is inconceivable that the United States
will not be involved…[100]
The language was very forceful and indicated a change
in emphasis—in November 2003 the Secretary of State only
referred to the possibility of the UK engaging in large-scale
combat operations without the US as being "highly unlikely".
[101]
108. But as well as maintaining its connection with
the US, the UK must also consider other allies. In embracing the
new technology MoD says it is attempting to ensure that it leaves
gateways available for allies to connect to later, when they acquire
the capabilities to join the UK network. The Secretary of State
denied that the UK was finding it hard to keep up with the US,[102]
but this was not the picture received from other contributors
to our inquiry. In dealing with the US lead in areas of NEC, the
defence chiefs told us that the UK would never be able to replicate
the US capability, but attempts were being made to ensure that
the UK could plug into the US network as required.[103]
CAS told us that:
We are not actually trying to catch up because if
one chased them then I think…one would never overhaul them.
What we are trying to do is point ahead and get to the same capability
at the same time…That does not mean …we will buying
the same things, but it does mean…that we will be working
out protocols, processes and procedures to ensure that as these
things come into service…we will be inter-operable.[104]
CGS put it as follows: "we must be able to fight
with the Americans. That does not equal we must fight as the Americans".[105]
We remain to be convinced that in an era of effects-based operations
and network-enabled capability this aim (to be able to plug into
the US network as required) will be achievable, and we will watch
this with interest.
109. The biggest problem could be that the UK will
not know in advance which countries will be able to bring which
capability to operations of "coalitions of the willing".
A further complication is that different countries have different
requirements and equipment, often with differing bandwidth capabilities.
The UK is seeking to keep up with the US in order to share their
picture, not copy their network. We conclude that the implications
of effects-based operations, utilising network-enabled capability,
on coalition operations have not been properly addressed in the
Defence White Paper.
110. Difficulties could also arise over rules of
engagement (ROE). Even today NATO ROE is open to different interpretations
by separate national contingents on the same operations. When
visiting British troops on a variety of operations in the past
few years, we have regularly had raised with us the problem of
national red-cards—that is caveats by national governments
on what their troops can and cannot do—which is claimed
to be a significant obstacle to making multinational coalition
operations work effectively. This is especially so where there
are small composite units from a number of countries, rather than
organic independent national contingents capable of decisive action.
CGS told us that such situations had to be carefully handled:
The degree to which you get cohesion in a multi-national
force is to some extent at least a function of the degree of commitment
of the national contingents to the task in hand…the whole
question of a national red card…there is no easy answer…It
goes back to… the level to which it is sensible to have a
multinational force. If you are going to fight a war-fighting
operation you need to be very careful as to how far down these
routes you allow a multinational force…[106]
111. We are concerned that as the pressure grows
towards the UK sending smaller and smaller force packages on coalition
operations as articulated in the White Paper, the danger of the
resultant force's effectiveness being dependent on the caveats
of some of the smallest contributors will increase. We have repeatedly
seen that while British forces often contribute the most effective
capability to coalition operations, the limited size of our contributions
can mean that we are dependent on forces from countries that do
not share our doctrinal, or indeed political approach. The ambition
of successful effects-based operations in a coalition context
is we believe well beyond the current political and military capabilities
of our alliance structures. We have identified some of the
reasons why we believe that effects-based operations are going
to be a huge challenge for the UK Armed Forces. Unless the question
of national red-cards and caveats is urgently reviewed by NATO
and the European Union, the potential for ineffectual coalition
deployments is significant. The UK should beware of planning for
operations in which small UK force packages operating as part
of a coalition are assumed to be capable of achieving "effect".
If they must rely on coalition partners, there must be robust
agreement on the "effects" sought. This problem has
the potential to undermine the UK's approach to composite coalition
operations.
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