Volunteer Reserves
138. Gaps in manning are, of course, regularly filled
by reservists. Since 1995, the Reserves have provided between
10-14% of UK forces in the former Yugoslavia (5,400 members of
the Territorial Army and over 2,100 ex-Regular Army Reserves).[146]
Reservists also served in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, East Timor
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in this period, as well
as more recently in Iraq. They also support the work of military
training teams in over 30 countries.
139. The White Paper talks about ever-closer integration
of regular and reserve forces, and as the regulars are restructured,
so the reserves will also have to be integrated with whatever
emerges.[147] Since
the SDR it has become clear that reserves will not only be used
to augment the regulars for occasional large scale operations
(with longer lead times) but for all operations. Furthermore,
we received evidence that in a number of cases the armed services
were forced to fill a number of the "key enabler" gaps
with reservists in Operation Telic—hence the need for very
short notice sometimes. As CAS put it "we could not have
done without them".[148]
One senior officer told us that the future use and structure of
the reserves was the most important strategic question facing
the Armed Forces post-Operation Telic.
140. The most dramatic recent change has been the
use of compulsory call-out orders. These were first used following
the attacks of 11 September 2001 to call-up intelligence specialists
and RAF movements personnel—the first compulsory call-out
since the 1950s.[149]
During Operation Telic 1 (i.e. the major combat phase) some 7,500
reservists were compulsorily mobilised for service in Iraq and
many continue to serve in a variety of deployments today, for
example there were some 1,600 on Operation Telic 3 in March 2004.[150]
Under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 there are specific limits for
mobilised service under different call-out orders: under section
52 (national danger, great emergency or attack on the UK) reservists
may be called on to serve for three years in five; under section
54 (warlike operations) one year in three; and under section 56
(peacekeeping and disaster relief) nine months in 27.[151]
Before Operation Telic, MoD came "perilously close"
to having to use compulsory mobilisation for operations in the
Balkans.[152] Since
Telic, because of operational demands, 140 compulsory call-out
orders have also had to be used for reserves to support operations
in the former Yugoslavia.[153]
141. Although to date the system of compulsory mobilisation
has worked well, there are concerns that due to the high turnover
of personnel in the TA, the trained strength of the volunteer
reserves may not be as large as suggested by the total establishment
figures and therefore the pool available for operations that much
smaller. Furthermore, having come down from 55,000 to a target
of 40,000 under SDR, the TA as of December 2003 was under strength
by over 2,000 at 37,750.[154]
Operation Telic revealed marked differences between the various
services—the Royal Auxiliary Air Force for example mobilised
85% of its actual strength, while for the Royal Navy Reserve the
figure was 10%, with 33% of the Royal Marine Reserve called up.
142. CAS noted that the RAF tended to rely too much
on reserves to provide specialist capabilities and this meant
that they were hit very hard during times of great need. This
is the heart of the problem—should reserves act as an augmentation
element of the regulars, or as the providers of essential specialist
capabilities? Either way in an era of regular operations, what
it means to serve in the reserves is changing and this will need
to be understood by the reservists themselves and their employers.
143. The Secretary of State acknowledged that in
the future MoD needed to give employers more information and needed
to be more responsive to the effect that the removal of individuals
could have on smaller companies. He also acknowledged the importance
of notice periods before call-outs. We reported in our Lessons
of Iraq report that almost all those called-up for Telic 1 were
given 14 days or less notice to report, despite the target figure
of 21 days or more and called upon "MoD to ensure that the
appropriate lessons are learned to avoid the need for such short
notice to report, and to recognise the impact of this on reservists,
their families and their employers".[155]
In its response, the Government noted that for Operation Telic
II & III, 21 days notice to report was generally given and
for Telic IV, MoD generally achieved over 28 days. However, it
warned that operational circumstances meant that a set period
of notice could not be guaranteed.[156]
144. We are surprised that in a whole chapter on
the reserves in the Supporting Essays Volume of the White Paper,
there is not a single reference to the families of reservists.[157]
This despite the main White Paper referring to the need for "a
commitment to improve the relationship between the services, the
reservists themselves, their families and their employers".[158]
CGS accepted that MoD could not be complacent, lest the good will
of reservists and their employers was lost. Given that many
reservists are mobilised for service in units that are not close
to their homes, we are concerned that MoD should be seen to be
prioritising effective methods of welfare support to the families
of mobilised reservists, who in many cases receive extremely short
notice of call-out.
145. It appears that the MoD still has not decided
how best to deploy reservists—as specialists or as formed
units. Efforts are under way to draw up databases of skill-sets
that the MoD can draw on, but the Secretary of State told us that
not all reserves want to use their specialisms, adding, "we
should not in principle mobilise people because of their civilian
skills".[159]
Nevertheless, we understand that the Territorial Army is considering
whether to use reserves as formed units or as back-fillers for
gaps in the future. In the Royal Navy all reservists are used
as individual back fillers, although following a decision taken
in 2002 to restructure the reserves to provide niche capabilities
where gaps existed, some fill specific specialisms such as in
psychological operations and civil-military co-operation.[160]
A longer-term question is whether reserve units should train with
their regular partners so as to integrate better operationally,
a question that we have not had answered as yet.
146. Another factor to be considered is the welfare
of the individuals concerned and their families. Some have argued
that reservists tend to be better supported if they serve in their
own units, which can provide an established structure of pastoral
care. But given the patchy "footprint" of the reserves
around the country, many reservists do not have the extended family
relationship with their regiments enjoyed by regulars. This point
was accepted by the Secretary of State who told us MoD needed
to do more to alleviate such problems:
…individuals…may not actually live anywhere
near a unit or a base. Their particular unit may have its headquarters
a long way from their home. We have to do more to make sure that
family members in particular are informed as to where they are
and what they are doing…the kind of support …a regiment
would provide. Given the nature of reservists and where they live
and how they operate, that is actually quite an important factor.[161]
147. However it is achieved, in an era of reliance
on the reserves to support operational deployments, there will
be an increasing requirement for MoD to look after reservists
and their families. Although there is no detailed information
on this matter in the White Paper, we were pleased to note some
attention to this problem in the Government's response to our
Lessons of Iraq report.[162]
We recommend that MoD considers mobilising Welfare Officers
across all the services where reservists are deployed.
148. In our Lessons of Iraq report we also noted
pressure on reservists to carry out tasks of a civilian rather
than a military nature:
We are concerned about the continuing requirement
on the ground for specialists from the military in areas which
would under other circumstances be provided by civilian organisations.
Many of these specialists will be reservists, and their prolonged
deployment may have adverse consequences for retention in specialisms
which are already suffering from undermanning.[163]
Sir Kevin Tebbit told us that, rather than accept
the increasing use of reservists to fill specialist gaps, notably
for post-conflict reconstruction work, the focus was now on creating
a pool of experts from various departments, companies and non-governmental
organisations ready to contribute to such operations at short
notice.[164] A cross
departmental working group (MoD, DFID and FCO) has been established
to consider ways in improving UK planning, co-ordination and management
of post-conflict reconstruction activities.[165]
We welcome these initiatives as important steps towards the
realisation of true cross-departmental effects-based operations
and look forward to being updated on their progress.
149. We are also concerned that the establishment
of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces in each brigade district
may have implications for future mobilisation policies, especially
if the move is towards the deployment of composite units. We understand
that out of the headline figure of 500 CCRF troops per brigade
district, no more than 350 are actually expected to turn up in
time if called out. This may not matter as much when the odd dozen
have been mobilised as individuals, but could be significant if
whole units are deployed overseas, especially as those who have
volunteered for the CCRFs may, in many cases, be not only fit
for role, but also the keenest members of the volunteer reserves.
150. Sir Kevin Tebbit, denied that this might be
a problem:
Some of the individuals who might be in the CCRFs
might also at certain times be reservists who would be called
up to engage in operations overseas, but my understanding is in
very small numbers, very small proportions…I am not aware
of a significant issue there.[166]
In fact, the numbers concerned were not small—as
of March 2004, some 852 members of the CCRFs were mobilised overseas
or were on active service in the UK.[167]
Furthermore, the total figures can mask significant regional disparities
with consequences of exactly the sort we warned about in our earlier
SDR New Chapter report. In January 2004, 150 members of the London
Regiment CCRF (the district which faces the greatest likelihood
of call out) were deployed on Operation Telic. They were still
there in May 2004 when members of the regiment escorted us during
our visit to Iraq. In addition, 147 members of the 15 North East
Brigade (S) CCRF, 126 members of the 49 East of England Brigade
CCRF and 99 members of the 15 North East Brigade (N) CCRF were
also deployed at the same time.[168]
It is clear from these figures that during a period when the British
consulate in Istanbul was bombed and Madrid suffered its worst
terror attacks ever, the capital's flagship reinforcement unit,
the London district CCRF had deployed a third of its trained strength
to Iraq. Furthermore, these figures do not include reservists
serving on other operations.
151. We conclude that MoD has still not taken
seriously enough the need for a "predictable" element
to be available for civil emergencies at home. We remain to be
convinced that the MoD has adequately thought through the use
of reserve forces at home and away in an era of constant operational
commitments and a significant threat to the UK.
152. The employers of reservists are extremely varied
and include many small companies. Among the largest employers
are the public services which all-together employ 30% of all volunteer
reservists.[169] One
of the main issues that needs to be addressed is whether the mobilisation
requirements enshrined in the Reserve Forces Act 1996, are now,
in an era of mass compulsory call-outs and repeated operational
deployments, too onerous for reservists and employers alike. At
the time of enactment, these requirements were rather more theoretical
than is the case today. CGS told us that this was a problem he
took very seriously:
I think we need to be careful. It would be, I think,
a mistake to assume that we could use the reserves at the tempo
at which we have been using them over the last year. The Reserve
Forces Act [1996] says once in every three years and certainly
that is the law, but I personally think that may be a bit too
often.[170]
153. Solutions being considered include a possible
"new deal" on compulsory mobilisation and a possible
return to voluntary mobilisation if at all possible. A new arrangement
with employers could be that, notwithstanding the Reserve Forces
Act 1996, the normal goal would be for no more than one mobilisation
year in five in the future. Another possibility is for reservists
to be offered, as it were, career breaks from their service, when
they could know they would not be called up. There is also the
question of the reimbursement of employers for the full cost of
having to replace staff when they are mobilised, which, we were
told, is not always covered under the current arrangements. In
our Lessons of Iraq report we criticised the way in which MoD
had decided to require reservists to inform their employers (and
prospective employers) of their membership of the volunteer reserves,
which could have negative implications for the employment prospects
of some reservists.[171]
In its reply, the Government argued that employers were automatically
informed of employees' membership of the reserves upon mobilisation
and did "not expect routine employers notification to have
a significant impact on employer support".[172]
This did not answer our actual point about the interests of the
reservists themselves.
154. We are pleased to note that the MoD is taking
seriously the pressures that have been placed on the reserves
in recent years. We welcome this, but we would urge the MoD to
avoid exploiting the commitment and dedication of the reserves
through overuse. If the reserves are intended to fulfil an ever
increasing role in the Armed Forces, this will require fundamental
structural changes in the relationship between the regulars and
reserves. We await detailed proposals from the MoD on how it intends
to improve the terms and conditions of reserve service, both for
the reservists themselves and their families as well as their
employers.
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