7 Conclusion
155. The Defence White Paper flows directly from
initiatives articulated in the original Strategic Defence Review
of 1998. Since then much has changed in the strategic environment.
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the world has entered
a new era of terrorism with the potential for strategic effect.
When the SDR was produced there was believed to be no direct conventional
threat to the UK. This belief has been repeated by CDS in discussing
the implications of the White Paper.[173]
We continue to be concerned that MoD has not significantly altered
its approach to dealing with such a terrorist threat beyond the
articulation of an expeditionary policy for fighting terrorists
at distance. This approach has informed all the MoD's work on
policy since the attacks on the United States. It relies on the
terrorists agreeing to fight us on our terms rather than theirs.
156. Given the strategic agility demonstrated by
global-reach terrorism in the past four years, we remain to be
convinced that the MoD has sufficiently addressed the question
of the military's role in defending against strategic effect terrorism
at home as well as abroad.
157. The Defence White Paper emphasises more clearly
than ever before in policy statements the centrality of effects-based
thinking in force planning and we welcome this. While conceptually
not new, effects-based operations do provide a way of thinking
which should allow for a clear focus on ends sought rather than
the means available. One crucial enabler of this will be the development
of network-enabled capability, which offers the prospect of the
better allocation of resources and holds out the potential for
precise delivery of effect at greater speed. However, we believe
it is essential that the important differences between effects-based
operations and network-enabled capability are emphasised rather
than obscured. An example of the latter is the way in which discussion
of effects-based operations and the relevance of "redundant"
platforms has been blurred with the implications of network-enabled
capability. While such capability can be a useful tool in the
realisation of effects-based operations, it is not a pre-requisite
for them and may in some cases play only a supporting role in
the delivery of the desired effect.
158. The White Paper remains disappointingly vague
about numerous areas of relevance to these questions, including
future force structures, manning levels, equipment choices and
the costs of embracing new technologies. It refers to the possibility
of making reductions in "redundant" capabilities, but
goes into no detail about what these might be. We were unable
to elicit any further information from the Secretary of State,
the Permanent Under Secretary, or the Chiefs of Staff about the
likely direction of these changes.
159. This raises important questions about the usefulness
of policy statements such as the Defence White Paper. The intention
appears to be increasingly to focus on the provision of medium
weight forces which are more deployable and therefore appropriate
to those tasks identified in the White Paper as likely to be required
of the Armed Forces. We remain concerned that the decision to
give up heavy-weight forces in favour of lighter capabilities
is being implemented long in advance of their medium-weight replacements
becoming available. The FRES family of vehicles for example remains
a distant prospect, not a specific programme with predictable
delivery dates. Overall, we remain alarmed at the slow pace of
embracing network-enabled capability—in contrast to the
apparently swift capacity for the renunciation of existing capability
deemed "redundant".
160. We do not believe that effects-based operations
and network-enabled capability justify a reduction in the current
scale of the UK's Armed Forces. The policy of reducing existing
numbers of platforms in advance of acquiring new capabilities
is potentially dangerous. At a scale of forces significantly below
that which we currently possess, the Armed Forces would be vulnerable
to attrition (losses) during operations. This could undermine
our capacity to meet enduring obligations and still be capable
of mounting medium and large-scale operations in the future. The
White Paper tends to emphasise the projection of force, often
at the expense of the presence of force. True effect is a product
of quality and scale.
161. We were told by one senior officer that the
future of the reserves was one of the most important strategic
questions facing the Armed Services following Operation Telic.
From what we have seen during this inquiry this question has not
as yet been sufficiently thought through by MoD. The White Paper
offered little in the way of clarification. Over the past six
years the reserves have been used to plug gaps in the regulars.
Consistently around 10 per cent of deployed forces have been reservists.
This has had significant implications for how the reserves are
structured and their relationship with the regulars, but also
placed at centre stage the whole question of how the MoD supports
reservists and their families and the relationship with employers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the demands of Operation Telic 1 and subsequent
post-conflict operations (Operation Telic 2, 3 and 4) have now
led to problems of over-stretch amongst the reserves themselves.
162. The White Paper has not properly considered
possible innovations in the way the reserves might contribute
to effects-based operations in the future. MoD's primary focus
appears to have been on the implications of network-enabling technologies
on the structure of the Armed Forces and their equipment programmes,
not on the manpower and training implications of effects-based
operations. Given the demanding and increasingly cross-government
nature of effects-based thinking, it may be that the volunteer
reserves could play a crucial part in expanding the capacity of
the Armed Forces to deal with future challenges. The wider strategic
implications of effects-based operations, which place increasing
demands on the individuals involved to understand the impact of
their actions, may require specialised forces, able to operate
with, but not necessarily as, regular high-intensity war-fighting
troops. Whether reservists could offer this specialised capability
remains to be seen, but we believe that a truly innovative approach
to the use and nature of the volunteer reserves will need to be
at the centre of future work on realising effects-based operational
capability.
163. The reserves could not only offer specialised
skills that would be uneconomic to keep permanently employed in
regular forces, but they could also widen the pool of personnel
available for the UK. This could point the way forward for a military
contribution not only to effects-based operations at a distance
from the UK, but also, in time, to an enhanced contribution to
its defence. Innovative and specialised contributions by volunteer
reserves could allow for the engagement of a wider pool of citizens
in fighting the threat of terrorism. In this way what have been
termed "unlikely counter terrorists" (in essence non-traditional
elements of British society contributing to homeland security)
could be better integrated with pan-Whitehall counter-terrorist
policies, within the context of existing military structures.
We were concerned to hear that the Home Secretary was unwilling
to consider any significantly enhanced role for the Armed Forces
in home defence. He emphasised the need for clear divisions in
evidence to us and the Home Affairs Committee:
I think we need to retain…the very clear separation
between military and civilian forces, the primacy domestically
of the civilian authorities seeking the help of and calling on
the military but not seeing those as taking over their role and
for the public to have confidence in that so that we are very
clear where the boundary lies in a democracy. It has worked very
well for us and I think we would be wise to retain that distinction.[174]
A novel approach to the nature and potential capacity
of the reserves to support effects-based operations at home (and
abroad) could be part of a solution to the Whitehall departmentalism
that we believe has undermined the British response to the implications
of 11 September 2001.
164. Since the SDR of 1998, it has been apparent
that the Armed Forces have been over-stretched and not simply
in a few specialisms as claimed by MoD. The White Paper is depressingly
short on detail about how the challenges of excess stretch and
the tempo of operational commitments will be addressed and we
believe that this crucial failing in the implementation of the
original SDR continues to be the area of greatest weakness in
MoD policy. We have seen little evidence during our inquiry that
the demanding operational tempo of the past six years and consequent
stretch on service personnel will not be repeated. MoD must place
this issue at the top of its priorities.
165. While on the surface the Defence White Paper
represents only another small incremental step from the original
Strategic Defence Review and its successor publications, taken
together the steps of the past six years signal the prospect of
profound changes in the Armed Forces. We are not clear why the
MoD has not made these significant implications more explicit,
but believe that the time for obfuscation is now past. CDS told
an audience at RUSI that "one of the reasons for the excellent
reputation of the UK's Armed Forces is the professionalism of
the troops that serve in them and we intend to maintain and maximise
this advantage".[175]
To ensure this advantage we believe the Armed Forces should be
openly and honestly appraised of the implications of MoD thinking
and the likely changes that will effect their professional lives,
not only so that they feel true engagement with the process, but
also so that they can contribute to the process.
166. Finally, we believe that the implications of
effects-based operations, utilising network enabled capability,
on the relationship between political and military leaders has
been inadequately considered by MoD. The fact that the British
political-military interface worked effectively during Operation
Telic, as we were told during our inquiry into the Lessons of
Iraq, should not promote a sense of complacency in MoD and in
Whitehall more generally. Technological advances, the growth of
a culture of 24-hour news and the increasingly non-linear nature
of conflict suggest to us profoundly different and potentially
more intense strains on the political-military interface than
previously experienced. The existing structures may not be capable
of supporting the rapid and politicised pressures of effects-based
operations in such a context. They should be reviewed in advance
of the next major challenge, not during it.
173 'Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture, December
2003', RUSI Journal, p 37. Back
174
HC 417-I (2003-04), 2 March 2004, Q 84. Back
175
'Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture, December 2003', RUSI
Journal, p 39. Back
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