Conclusions and recommendations
Background to the Defence White Paper 2003
1. As
the post-conflict stage in Iraq has shown, a great deal more is
required to achieve the objectives of an effects-based operation,
than advanced military technologies in the hands of numerically
small forces. (Paragraph 21)
2. We
recommend that the MoD should explain more fully how UK forces
have supported the United Nations (UN); how the UK expects to
continue to do so; and how defence planners see the UK's military
role within the UN system in relation to its roles within NATO
and the European Union. (Paragraph 25)
3. While
we note the co-operation between MoD and FCO at the policy level
(such as on Conflict Prevention Pools) we believe that the future
operational demands of effects-based thinking will require even
greater collaboration. (Paragraph 31)
Strategic Environment
4. We
are disappointed that a policy document that could have far reaching
implications has been presented with little or no detail on the
relevant procurement decisions, funding questions or likely changes
in force structures and consequent effect on personnel. (Paragraph
35)
5. What
has emerged in the past six years is the extent to which the Armed
Forces have been operating at the limits of what they can achieve.
The Strategic Defence Review's (SDR) planning assumptions provided
relatively little resilience to enable the services to re-orientate
when called upon to do so. (Paragraph 37)
6. It
may be rash of the White Paper to state that "we expect to
see a similar pattern of operations in the future", just
after its predecessor document—the Strategic Defence Review—has
had to be substantially amended, not least because unforeseen
developments in the security environment have led to changes in
operational demands. We are not convinced that expecting things
to follow a similar pattern to the recent past is the best way
to shape UK defence policy in an era of rapid change. (Paragraph
42)
7. We
are left wondering whether the Defence White Paper is properly
set in the strategic context of Britain's security circumstances,
or whether it is more a reflection of what the UK has actually
been doing for the last three years, and the existence of a number
of legacy systems of whose continuing importance the MoD is uncertain.
In other words it is far from clear whether the review process
has actually been effects-led, or rather resource driven. (Paragraph
46)
8. We
are not convinced that an essentially reactive approach to defence
of the UK homeland is satisfactory given the nature of the threat
to the UK today. (Paragraph 48)
9. The
approach of fighting terrorism at distance has informed all of
the MoD's work since 11 September 2001, but ultimately assumes
that terrorists will agree to fight on our terms and in places
of our choosing. As UK Ministers and officials regularly warn,
they may choose to bring the campaign closer to our region, or
indeed to the UK itself. In the context of repeated attacks on
the UK we do not think that MoD's assumption would be sustainable.
(Paragraph 49)
Effects-based operations
10. We
note that MoD has only "begun to develop" capabilities
to provide a range of options other than having to resort to traditional
attritional warfare methods. We are disappointed at the apparent
lack of progress in developing capabilities to provide non-kinetic
options. (Paragraph 52)
11. We
believe that focussing on network-enabled capability risks emphasising
technology at the expense of a thorough consideration of the utility
and application of military force and its judicious and appropriate
use in effects-based operations. In our view the three critical
elements identified by Chief of the Defence Staff (sensors, a
network and shooters), which were previously set out in the SDR
New Chapter, will require a vital fourth element of effective
decision-making, which is not a consequence of NEC but a requirement
for the realisation of effects-based operations. (Paragraph 62)
12. We
believe that MoD's discussion of the evolution of warfare has
not always distinguished sufficiently clearly between the concepts
of network-enabled capability (NEC) and effects-based operations
(EBO). NEC may contribute to the delivery of military effect in
support of EBO, but it is not a prerequisite for it, or indeed,
necessarily the main contributor towards an effects-based operational
outcome. (Paragraph 64)
13. While
the improvements in precision, accuracy and firepower are obvious,
we have found less evidence that adequate resources have been
devoted to the provision of the intelligence capabilities, including
human intelligence, and cultural understanding which are essential
to underpin these technological advances. (Paragraph 68)
14. We
agree that effects-based operations should embrace the whole gamut
of military and cross government capability and support the Government's
goal of better fusing all elements of national capability to strategic
ends. However, we believe that the limits of what the military
can achieve in effects-based operations on their own needs to
be understood by all parts of the MoD and across Government departments.
(Paragraph 69)
15. We
are not convinced that mass "effect" alone will be enough
in meeting the challenges faced by UK, since in many situations
we will still require the capacity for mass "presence"
as well. (Paragraph 72)
16. It
is impossible to assess whether the application of network-enabled
capability to fewer platforms will really produce greater (or
even equal) effect, without any discussion of the costs of embracing
these technologies and the structural implications for the armed
services of such developments. (Paragraph 73)
17. We
believe that a policy of reducing the existing number of platforms
in advance of acquiring the new capabilities (and of demonstrating
their effectiveness) is potentially dangerous. (Paragraph 74)
18. We
accept that there is every justification in seeking to benefit
from advances in technology to deliver decisive effect when it
is required. However, we believe the UK's future security challenges,
on the scale of effort envisaged, require the retention of the
existing scale of forces, plus the benefits of network-enabling
capabilities. Otherwise, the Armed Forces will be unable to operate
without again placing unsustainable demands on service personnel.
(Paragraph 79)
19. We
believe that if the number of platforms in certain key areas (such
as large surface ships) was significantly reduced, the UK Armed
Forces would be vulnerable to any significant combat attrition
in future operations. We have not seen evidence that this factor
has been taken seriously enough into account by MoD in its approach
to platform numbers. (Paragraph 81)
20. We
believe MoD has not addressed the issue at the heart of effects-based
operations—the difference between the "projection"
of force and the "presence" of force. We fully support
the idea of devoting further resources to enabling assets and
achieving more deployable forces. We do not however believe this
should be at the expense of reasonable scale. In high-tempo high-intensity
operations (and in engaging targets of opportunity), projection
forces may be sufficient. But as extensive peace support operational
experience has demonstrated, the UK may also be called upon to
provide presence and for that there is still no substitute for
numbers. We believe that true effect is a product of quality and
scale. We believe that any reduction in the establishment of the
Army would be premature. (Paragraph 84)
21. We
understand the necessity of placing high intensity war-fighting
at the heart of military training, but question whether the continued
emphasis on war-fighting skills is the correct way of approaching
the challenges of effects-based operations. We recognise that
while effects-based operations may alter the balance between capabilities,
the concept does not do away with the need to have armed forces
that can fight wars of the most demanding type. However, in the
wider strategic context, effects-based operations place new demands
on individuals at all levels to understand the impact of their
actions. We question whether the current emphasis on training
for war, supplemented by limited pre-deployment training which
hone skills for peace support operations, are adequately equipping
our service personnel for these much wider demands. The current
preoccupation with speed, agility, parallel operations, decisiveness
and tempo misses a vital human aspect of effects-based thinking,
which has significant ramifications for the way we train our Armed
Forces. We are not convinced that these have been adequately addressed
by the White Paper. (Paragraph 88)
22. Much
of the talk about effects-based operations and network-enabled
capability is still stuck in the world of kinetic effect and physical
destruction, with the higher order psychological effects remaining
elusive. The skills we are asking of our Armed Forces in support
of these operations are of a significantly different and additional
nature to what has previously been asked of them, even for
war-fighting and to ignore this risks sending them unprepared
into complex and dangerous situations. (Paragraph 89)
23. We
believe that the advent of true effects-based operations may have
very significant implications for the nature of military training
and indeed on the structure of the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 91)
Command Issues
24. We
question whether it is reasonable to expect people at the operational/tactical
end of the spectrum to consider constantly the full implications
of their actions on the effects sought, but we believe that this
is a major implication of embracing effects-based operations.
We are not convinced that these challenges have been properly
grasped or addressed by the Defence White Paper. (Paragraph 97)
25. The
command chain needs to address the implications of the actions
of the few (in human rights abuse cases) more comprehensively
than it has done to date—to show that every possible step
has been taken to ensure that similar incidents do not occur in
future and such "effects" are not repeated. The fact
that similar incidents occurred amongst coalition forces in Afghanistan
before Iraq and in Somalia before that, should have warned senior
military and civilian leaders as to the dangers. In effects-based
operations, the Armed Forces need to place the enforcement of
acceptable standards behaviour towards civilians, detainees and
prisoners at the centre of their efforts. (Paragraph 102)
26. The
shift to high levels of expeditionary activity around the world
in support of "effects" can be seen as evidence of the
re-politicisation of defence policy. No longer can defence been
seen as supporting ends somewhat detached from other aspects of
foreign and domestic policy. Rather it will now have to operate
as an integral part of that political process, with consequent
changes in the position of the Armed Forces within the political
process. (Paragraph 104)
27. We
remain concerned that the demands of effects-based operations
on the higher command have not been fully appreciated by the MoD.
We recommend that in their reply to this report the Government
set out its understanding of these developments and their doctrinal
implications. (Paragraph 106)
28. We
remain to be convinced that in an era of effects-based operations
and network-enabled capability this aim (to be able to plug into
the US network as required) will be achievable, and we will watch
this with interest. (Paragraph 108)
29. We
conclude that the implications of effects-based operations, utilising
network enabled capability on coalition operations have not been
properly addressed in the Defence White Paper. (Paragraph 109)
30. We
have identified some of the reasons why we believe that effects-based
operations are going to be a huge challenge for the UK Armed Forces.
Unless the question of national red-cards and caveats is urgently
reviewed by NATO and the European Union, the potential for ineffectual
coalition deployments is significant. The UK should beware of
planning for operations in which small UK force packages operating
as part of a coalition are assumed to be capable of achieving
"effect". If they must rely on coalition partners, there
must be robust agreement on the "effects" sought. This
problem has the potential to undermine the UK's approach to composite
coalition operations. (Paragraph 111)
Force Structures and Personnel
31. We
continue to be surprised at the slow pace with which unmanned
aerial vehicle technology is being embraced by the UK Armed Forces.
It does not seem that many of the effects-based operational capabilities
that the MoD indicated it was exploring in the New Chapter have
been significantly advanced since, although we welcome the introduction
of Bowman radio ahead of its (albeit revised) in-service date.
A number of the key programmes identified in the SDR New Chapter
have either slipped further or remain unchanged. We are concerned
that the UK still does not have sufficient secure data links to
allow it to integrate with United States forces, especially in
the land environment. (Paragraph 113)
32. In
evidence, the Secretary of State and the Chief of Defence Staff
refused to discuss the current MoD work streams in which a range
of issues including future force structures are being considered.
We have been disappointed at the lack of openness by MoD witnesses
during this inquiry in responding to what we believe have been
reasonable and appropriate questions. (Paragraph 115)
33. We
are surprised that the Army is prepared to do away with, as yet
unspecified, quantities of heavy armoured forces when their replacement
(FRES) remains a concept which has not even left the assessment
phase. (Paragraph 116)
34. The
future challenge of close air support, demonstrated by Afghanistan
and repeated in Iraq, is how to supply timely and precise air
support to small numbers of friendly forces in non-linear engagements,
not how to destroy large enemy divisions such as Saddam's Republican
Guards. It is a problem that does not appear to have been resolved
by MoD. Given the repeated references to "jointery"
in official policy documents we are surprised that the operational
practice of air-land integration has been so slow to change. We
recommend that MoD addresses this question with much greater urgency
than has been displayed to date. (Paragraph 123)
35. We
believe work on dealing with excess stretch is urgently required
and represents one of the greatest weaknesses of the Strategic
Defence Review implementation to date. (Paragraph 127)
36. We
were disappointed that the Chief of the Defence Staff prevented
the Chief of the General Staff from answering a question on future
Army Step 2. We regret the level of secrecy that has met our repeated
requests for detail on the implications of the White Paper for
force structures, and personnel and urge Ministers to review their
approach to parliamentary oversight of these matters. (Paragraph
130)
37. Since
the Strategic Defence Review, the MoD's own harmony guidelines
have too often not been achieved in terms of the work life-balance
of Armed Forces personnel. We have seen no evidence in the White
Paper that the demanding operational tempo of the past six years
and consequent stretch on too many of our service personnel will
not be repeated. We urge MoD to place the achievement of harmony
guidelines at the top of its list of priorities. (Paragraph 132)
38. We
believe that manpower shortages and the resultant practice of
"gapping" (not filling posts deemed non-essential) must
be tackled seriously and urgently by the MoD. Achieving full manning
levels must be a priority for the Armed Forces in an era of regular
deployments. (Paragraph 137)
39. Given
that many reservists are mobilised for service in units that are
not close to their homes, we are concerned that MoD should be
seen to be prioritising effective methods of welfare support to
the families of mobilised reservists, who in many cases receive
extremely short notice of call-out. (Paragraph 144)
40. In
an era of reliance on the reserves to support operational deployments,
there will be an increasing requirement for MoD to look after
reservists and their families. Although there is no detailed information
on this matter in the White Paper, we were pleased to note some
attention to this problem in the Government's response to our
Lessons of Iraq report. We recommend that MoD considers mobilising
Welfare Officers across all the services where reservists are
deployed. (Paragraph 147)
41. We
welcome initiatives such as creating pools of specialists ready
to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction work as important
steps towards the realisation of true cross-departmental effects-based
operations and look forward to being updated on their progress.
(Paragraph 148)
42. We
conclude that MoD has still not taken seriously enough the need
for a "predictable" element to be available for civil
emergencies at home. We remain to be convinced that the MoD has
adequately thought through the use of reserve forces at home and
away in an era of constant operational commitments and a significant
threat to the UK. (Paragraph 151)
43. We
are pleased to note that the MoD is taking seriously the pressures
that have been placed on the reserves in recent years. We welcome
this, but we would urge the MoD to avoid exploiting the commitment
and dedication of the reserves through overuse. If the reserves
are intended to fulfil an ever increasing role in the Armed Forces,
this will require fundamental structural changes in the relationship
between the regulars and reserves. We await detailed proposals
from the MoD on how it intends to improve the terms and conditions
of reserve service, both for the reservists themselves and their
families as well as their employers. (Paragraph 154)
| 
