Examination of Witness (Questions 500-510)
MR BALTHASAR
STAEHELIN
18 JUNE 2003
Q500 Mr Roy: Could
you give us some examples of where you have been able to co-operate?
Mr Staehelin: There
are many examples. For instance, we have recently provided support
to the central state pharmacy of Iraq because we feel that it
is important that hospitals are not dependent just on ad hoc donations,
which may or may not respond to their needs, but that we can again
have a system of provision of essential drugs to all the hospitals
in an organised and orderly manner. In this sense, we have argued
very much for the re-establishment of a functioning central pharmacy
for all the hospitals in the country. We have filled the gap ,
providing certain drugs mainly for the treatment of chronic diseases.
For instance, we have an intense dialogue on this matter with
the CPA, with a view to ensuring that this system can resume functioning.
That would be a typical case. It is also important for us that
the ICRC leads the efforts of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent
movement and, in this sense, many of these national societies
have an interest in deploying their activities in Iraq. What is
important for us is that, for instance, if parts of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent movement become active in the rehabilitation
of health structures or water structures, we have interlocutors
who remain stable, who are there for a sufficient time period,
and who have the power to conclude agreements on such work and
to establish policy. For the time being, we have seen a situation
in which the system is emerging and in which it is not always
easy to have a clear-cut policy on each and every issue. That
has sometimes made it difficult to engage on issues, because we
have also seen quite a change of officials on the Iraqi side—persons
who were appointed who then perhaps had to leave. It was not always
easy to find the right interlocutors for the humanitarian organisations.
Q501 Mr Roy: Have
the coalition forces granted you the space to carry out independent
humanitarian actions?
Mr Staehelin: Absolutely.
We have not, to the best of my knowledge, had any attempt to instrumentalise
the ICRC or to use it in a political way. I felt that our independence
was well understood. Operationally speaking, all parties to the
conflict during the combat period realised that only by respecting
the independence of the ICRC would it be possible for the ICRC
to act. Contrary to some other conflicts where it is more difficult
to explain why we operate as we operate in Iraq, to a certain
extent people, having observed us either on the ground or perhaps
indirectly, have been able to see how it makes sense operationally
speaking and, hence, have a great readiness to respect that independence
of the ICRC.
Q502 Chairman: Military
personnel are increasingly doing what you would be doing and what
the other NGOs have been doing by way of provision of humanitarian
assistance. Does this trend have any effect on the way in which
you are carrying out your activities? Is there any competition?
Can you do things better than they do? Can they do things better
than you can do them?
Mr Staehelin: What
is important for us is that, in our reading of the situation and
of the legal framework, there is a primary responsibility of the
occupying powers for the well-being of the country. In this sense,
I would not at all see operations to improve the situation on
the ground by the coalition forces as something which is competition
to us or to NGOs. On the contrary, I think that it should be welcomed.
What is important—and we have seen it in various contexts—is
that it is perfectly clear that there is no blurring of lines;
that it is clear for Iraq that you have, on the one hand, a caretaker
authority in this period of occupation which carries out certain
tasks on its behalf—as it should, and it is welcome—and,
on the other hand, the humanitarian organisations which operate
independently. They can well coexist. However, what we resent
is a blurring of lines which would entail perception problems,
in that suddenly Iraqis would feel that the humanitarian organisations
are in fact part of the coalition and, if they were opposed to
the presence of the coalition, they would be opposed to the presence
of these humanitarian organisations; that indeed the humanitarian
organisations would perhaps at one stage even become targets of
military action. In this sense, it is true that we are against
the blurring of lines. In our recent experience, however, our
head of the Basra sub-delegation has confirmed to me that he felt
that, in the contacts with the British troops, there was no danger
at all of a blurring of lines. He felt that they were clearly
aware that ICRC did not wish to and could not have any blurring
of lines. That is certainly something which is important to us.
Q503 Chairman: Quite
understandably, your NGOs are unarmed and it might be dangerous,
in the event of a war or the unclear termination of that war,
for your people to be operating. Can you tell us what has happened?
We were watching on television that the war had come to an end.
We were expecting the NGOs who were waiting in Kuwait to charge
in and deliver their expertise and their resources. Yet nothing
happened for a while. We heard that you were all waiting for a
signal from the military to say that the environment was now benign
and you could move in. Can you give us a little background to
that and how you felt? Did you or the other NGOs have to wait
for an order to enter? Why was there this delay?
Mr Staehelin: I
would not describe the ICRC as an NGO, because we have this status
in international law. We are somehow not an international organisation,
not an NGO, but something in between. The fact that we have this
status in international law makes a difference and distinguishes
us from the NGO community, also in terms of mandate, role and
the possibilities of access. That said, it is true that, at a
time when southern Iraq was considered not permissive by the coalition
forces, ICRC deployed and worked in southern Iraq. For us it was
very positive that, in the planned operation protocols which we
concluded with CenCom, the Central Command, it was explicitly
recognised that the ICRC has a task to operate in such an environment,
and indeed should not be stopped from doing so. This was important.
It allowed us, for instance, to cross from Kuwait into a combat
zone in delicate circumstances. To a certain extent it is not
easy for NGOs to operate in an environment in which insecurity
is still a challenge to be managed. It is not easy to bring answers
which perhaps do not correspond to the expectations of the Iraqi
population. To a certain extent, if we perhaps have not seen a
rush of NGOs into southern Iraq, it is partly due to security
problems and it is partly due to the fact that the humanitarian
organisations do not necessarily have the most appropriate answers;
or that their answers would perhaps be consequent on other issues
being solved. I think that underlines the point I made earlier,
that I do not feel that we are in a post-conflict situation. Prisoners
of war are not released; combats are still going on; the situation
is volatile. We are not in a post-conflict situation in which
the whole military dimension is over and we now, as NGOs, can
go in and pick up the pieces. We are still in a different stage
of this conflict.
Q504 Jim Knight: I
have a final set of questions on prisoners of war, which were
touched on earlier in questions from Mike Hancock, during which
I understood that, on the whole, your organisation had had reasonable
access from coalition forces to prisoners of war and that there
were some problems with Saddam's regime giving you access to prisoners
of war. Are there prisoners, beyond those you have talked about
and in respect of those held by the Ba'athist regime, whom the
ICRC were not able to visit—held by the coalition?
Mr Staehelin: For
years we have been able to visit detainees held by the Kurdish
parties, linked to the inter-Kurdish conflict of the time. We
were visiting persons held mainly in the camp near Umm Qasr, which
was first run by the UK forces and later by the American forces.
We conducted four visits. The first one lasted from 31 March to
6 April. That was a visit to 4,500 prisoners of war and civilian
internees—because it was a mix—and the registration
and interviews take time. We also visited, for instance, UK Field
Hospital 34 in Az-Zubayr. We also visited UK field hospitals in
north Kuwait and we visited a UK hospital ship. So it is true
that our detention activities went beyond Iraqi territory and
also encompassed two UK field hospitals and one UK hospital ship.
We are now enlarging our operation. We have recently started,
on 24 May, visits in the Baghdad region to new detention facilities.
As we go along, this part of our work will become increasingly
important.
Q505 Jim Knight: There
is a report in a newspaper in this country that an ICRC spokesperson,
who perhaps did not have the same views on the confidentiality
of bilaterals on breaches of the Geneva Convention, said that
there was a breach of the Third Geneva Convention in relation
to a failure of the coalition authorities to grant the ICRC access
to prisoners in the Baghdad area. Do you have any comment on that?
Mr Staehelin: My
only comment is that the article was published a day after we
started these visits. As far as I understand it, the interview
took place a week beforehand. I do not regard it as a breach of
confidentiality if a journalist asks us, "Do you have today
access to all the persons protected by the Geneva Convention?"
and we answer, "We have not yet access to all the persons".
I would not regard that as a breach of confidentiality.
Q506 Jim Knight: Then
if the journalist says, "If you are not given access immediately,
is that a breach of the Third Geneva Convention?", you give
a response?
Mr Staehelin: I
do not think that the ICRC position, nor indeed the spokeswoman's
position, was that the fact that we had not yet had access was
a breach. I think that if we were to be refused access to a category
of persons for a protracted period of time, that would amount
to a breach. However, I do not think that the ICRC has ever qualified
the delay of access as a breach.
Q507 Jim Knight: That
was not the impression that we got from the article, but never
mind. The number of prisoners of war held by coalition authorities
in the south of Iraq has decreased dramatically, but increasingly
these authorities are responsible for other prisoners—many
doubtless having committed criminal acts. Does the ICRC seek access
to people other than prisoners of war who are held in custody
by the coalition authorities? If you do, have you had any problems
in gaining access to those people?
Mr Staehelin: We
seek access to all persons protected either by the Third Geneva
Convention or the Fourth Geneva Convention, which means prisoners
of war but also civilian internees, administrative detainees—persons
who are interned and whose status must be reviewed at least every
six months. Persons accused of common-law offences are also protected
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and we have a right to visit
them. We have started visiting them in the Baghdad area.
Q508 Jim Knight: And
access has been fine?
Mr Staehelin: We
have now started to have access to these categories. There are
new detention places emerging as we speak. We are committed to
visit all of these detention places. All persons protected by
the Geneva Conventions—they are either protected by the
Third or the Fourth and cannot fall between the two Conventions—have
the right to be visited by the ICRC. Of course that does not encompass
if you had, for instance, American or British citizens being detained
in Iraq. They would not be protected by the Convention, because
they will be protected by the authorities governing the country.
Q509 Jim Knight: Are
there any other circumstances, apart from that very last one you
identified, where prisoners captured during the conflict might
not be entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention?
Mr Staehelin: The
fact that a person is protected by either the Third or the Fourth
Geneva Convention does not make subsequent criminal procedures
impossible—for instance, if a person committed a war crime.
The Geneva Convention does not shield a person from possible later
criminal investigation. In this sense, for instance, every Iraqi
person detained today in Iraq is either protected by the Third
or the Fourth Geneva Convention and entitled to have ICRC visits.
Q510 Chairman: Thank
you very much. That was very interesting. If there is any documentation
that you have over the next few months—because we will be
continuing our inquiry into the autumn—we would be very
grateful to receive it. We appreciate your coming and talking
to us.
Mr Staehelin: Thank
you very much. I would also, if I may, refer to our website, www.icrc.org.
I would also like to express my appreciation to all members of
this Committee, not only for their interest but for their respect
for the fact that I cannot pronounce on certain issues and for
not having pressed me on issues on which I would not have been
able to answer.
Chairman: If you
had attended meetings of the Ministry of Defence, you would find
that they had far more sections of policy that they are, for one
reason or another, unable to talk about. We are well used to these
restrictions. You are far from being the worst.
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