Examination of Witnesses (Questions 511-519)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q511 Chairman: Gentlemen,
thank you very much for coming. Major General, the last time we
met, I think, you were in your Lawrence of Arabia kit, in a tent
in the desert, so I did not quite recognise you when you came
in. We are deep into our inquiry into Lessons of Iraq, and really
look forward to what you are both going to say. The first question
looks almost like a question on an examination paper, forgive
me. Can you both explain to the Committee your role in Operation
Telic and the composition of your respective commands? It would
be helpful, subsequent to this meeting, if you could draw us perhaps
an organisation chart, or send us any relevant documentation,
because probably it would be easier to send than to run through
verbally, but if you would not mind having a crack at the question?
Thank you.[1]
Major General Brims:
I commanded 1 (UK) Armoured Division, which was made up of 3 Commando
Brigade, 7 Armoured Brigade, 16 Air Assault Brigade and divisional
troops. Brigadier Cowlam commanded the joint force Logistic Component,
which had some of our Land Component logistic support embedded
in it, so there was quite a close relationship. Nationally, I
was the Land Force Component Commander, and nationally I reported
to the National Contingent Command Headquarters, commanded by
Air Marshal Burridge. Operationally, I was embedded in the 1st
US Marine Expeditionary Force, the equivalent of a corps, and
therefore I was commanding one of the divisions within that US
corps. That US corps was commanded by the Land Component Commander,
General McKiernan, and his Land Coalition Component consisted
of two corps, the MEF, the one I was embedded in, and 5 Corps.
So, although nationally I was a Land Component Commander, in military
speak I was about a two-down tactical commander, which makes me
slightly different from the UK Maritime and the UK Air Components.
Q512 Chairman: Would
that have been a sort of "bog standard" structure, or
was there anything peculiar about it, in the light of the war
and the number of countries that were participating in the activity?
Major General Brims:
No, not really. I can think of one peculiarity, if that is right,
that I would point out. In the US Marine Corps, in 1 MEF, they
had their own Air Wing, a tactical air wing, which supported the
whole Corps, including 1 (UK) Armoured Division, and that was
quite a unique experience. It is a very big organisation, but
because we had that it meant that we did not take as much of our
own artillery as otherwise we might have taken, we did not, for
example, take MLRS, the multi-launch rocket systems.
Q513 Chairman: Upon
mature reflection, was there anything organisationally that might
have been done differently, or was the structure that you were
given the one you think will be useful for any similar activity?
Major General Brims:
It was a very useful structure for what we did in this operation.
I would have absolutely no complaints about the structure or the
people with whom and around whom I worked.
Q514 Chairman: And
I would not have expected you to say anything different.
Major General Brims:
I have said it publicly before, I thought the British troops were
wonderful, magnificent; but also I say that the US troops, from
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force with whom we worked, were great
people.
Q515 Chairman: In
the last Gulf war, it was pretty obvious that we wanted to work
alongside the US Army, because of NATO experience, but, from what
we have heard of the last conflict, it would appear there is more
symmetry now between ourselves and the US Marine Corps?
Major General Brims:
I cannot comment because I was not in the last Gulf war and I
worked with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force only on this operation;
but it was a privilege to work with people. Of all the Commanders
around me, there was nobody with a big ego, everybody co-operated,
we got on really well, everybody gave of their very best and co-operated
in the most magnificent way.
Q516 Chairman: Thank
you. Brigadier; same question?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I was Commander of the Joint Forces Logistic Component, which
was a Joint Component, primarily, the majority was made up of
Army units and a large proportion of that was 102 Logistics Brigade,
which I commanded, in peacetime, in Germany. It was an organisation
of about 7,500 people, 19 major units, predominantly Army but
with some Navy and Air Force elements, a joint staff, with the
Headquarters Signal Squadron, and support, about 200 people, about
65% Army, 25% Air Force and about 10% Navy. And our role was to
receive, stage and onward move all three components as they came
into theatre, then to sustain them and conduct other operations
as required. As the General said, we were very closely allied
to the Land Component, we provided the Land Component 3rd Line
Logistics piece, and for that we used most of 102 Logistics Brigade.
Q517 Chairman: Thank
you. Again, a chart would be very helpful. Having discussed the
structure, perhaps a follow-up to that, General. How did the command
chain function between you and a 3* UK National Contingent Commander
in Qatar, on the one hand, and your tactical commander, as you
mentioned, an American 3*, in theatre?3[2]
Major General Brims:
Nationally, I reported to National Component Headquarters in Qatar,
and the operational orders I got were done through the coalition
chain of command, and the conduct of operations was all done by
that. In the planning phase, I was keeping the National Contingent
Command Headquarters informed all the way through, and if there
had been any difficulties, if I had perceived that something was
contrary to the UK's interests or law, I would have raised it
through the National Contingent Headquarters; actually, I never
had to do that. In the planning phase, not only did we have the
National Contingent Headquarters above us, but it sat alongside
the US Central Command forward in Qatar, which ran the overall
operation, and therefore it was a two-way flow of information,
which I got down the national chain of command, and down the coalition
chain of command; and we had embedded liaison teams in the Corps
Headquarters of MEF, and in the coalition Land Component Headquarters,
General McKiernan's, we had British officers in there. So I was
very well-informed, and views on the planning and views on concepts
were well aired and we were able to do parallel planning, parallel
in the sense of I could be planning at tactical level while others
were planning at the operational level at the same time, concurrently,
which was excellent.
Q518 Chairman: Thank
you. Brigadier, since Air Marshal Burridge was responsible for
the sustainment of all British forces, did you report to him through
1 (UK) Division or direct to Qatar?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No, I reported direct. Unlike the Land, the Air and the Maritime
components, who were embedded within the coalition components,
Logistics was a national responsibility and so I reported directly
to Air Marshal Burridge. Quite clearly, at staff level, I was
speaking to PJHQ, and indeed to Land, Fleet and Strike, almost
daily, but my chain of command was very clear, straight to Qatar
and the Air Marshal and his staff.
Q519 Chairman: But
what if you wanted to borrow things from the Americans; there
must have been an occasion?
Brigadier Cowlam:
At theatre level, we aligned to 377 Theatre Support Command; tactically,
with the Land component, we were aligned to 1 MEF and the Marine
Logistic Command, and therefore I had links. And indeed for the
early part of the campaign I was co-located with 377 Theatre Support
Command, we had embedded staff in their Headquarters although
we were not under their command, and so the level of co-operation
was very close, and we did help each other out, constantly. And
a similar arrangement happened with the Marine Logistics Command,
further forward.
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