Examination of Witnesses (Questions 640-659)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q640 Chairman: You
touched on earlier the things that went really well. We met you
in Oman, where Challenger 2 was experiencing some considerable
difficulties because of the sand, I understand the sand was a
bit different from Oman. Can you just give us your advice on the
way in which the lessons of Oman were learned, when it came to
adapting Challenger 2, very effectively, for deployment in the
Gulf? And when we had Simon Webb et al to give evidence
to us, he said that it was not the purpose of Saif Sareea to test
equipment, just to show how effectively you could deploy. Was
there any testing of equipment? It seems to me, there must have
been, in Saif Sareea?
Major General Brims:
To take Challenger 2, yes, because we desertised it, we up-armoured
it, and I have spoken of the confidence; by up-armouring, effectively,
you form a skirt down the sides, and actually that has a considerable
dust mitigation side-effect. So some desertisation, up-armouring,
not running out, because there is nothing wrong with Challenger,
it is only if you run out of components, which, I think, is what
you referred to when we were in Oman, and we did not run out of
components, and we had a remarkably high availability rate, which
is a tribute to everybody in the whole system. And I think there
were many good lessons from Saif Sareea, because quite a number
of people in the Headquarters, certainly the Divisional Headquarters,
Signal Regiment, the fact that they lived there, they were comfortable,
they understood the desert, I think it made a huge difference.
Q641 Mr Jones: Can
I ask though, in terms of it working, there is no doubt about
that, but why is it then that you were flying out engineers from
Alvis Vickers, I think some actually went out there to desertise
them in theatre; why were the problems that were identified at
Saif Sareea not done earlier? For example, why was the desertisation
not done earlier, and why did it take Alvis Vickers to have to
fly engineers out there?
Major General Brims:
That is the timing; we requested the desertisation, the timing
of it was a matter for people above my level.
Q642 Mr Jones: Well,
no; when were we in Saif Sareea, 2001?
Major General Brims:
Saif Sareea was 2001; but a decision was taken not to desertise
for that exercise.
Q643 Mr Jones: Yes;
so, therefore, once we had actually committed to this operation,
why was it necessary then at the last minute to send engineers
out to desertise them in theatre?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The reason was because there was not time to desertise them before
they were embarked on shipping, and it made a lot of sense to
use that time through concurrent activity. I think, as a result
of Saif Sareea, the integrated project teams were well educated
about what would be required to desertise and improve Challenger's
reliability of performance in desert conditions. And so, on the
one hand, we trained the battle groups and loaded the tanks and
got them to the Middle East; concurrent with that, the Defence
Procurement Agency were procuring the necessary pieces, and then
we arranged a site in Kuwait to bring together the equipment and
the contractors, to allow them to bring up the desertisation standard
on Challenger 2.
Q644 Mr Jones: But
when did Saif Sareea finish?
Brigadier Cowlam:
November 2001.
Q645 Mr Jones: And
when actually did you start sending out tanks for this operation?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Late January 2003.
Q646 Mr Jones: So
why were not steps taken in that year, because certainly it was
a big issue that was in the press, and we raised it in our report
on desertisation; why were not steps taken actually to do that
desertisation beforehand?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I cannot answer the question why they were not desertised; but
all I would ask is, that presupposes that we knew that in 2003
we were going to fight a war in the desert, in 2001.
Mr Jones: Well,
no, but we knew we would be using them somewhere in the desert,
and it was quite a clear problem in Saif Sareea, was it not; apart
from if you accept Mr Webb's, the Policy Director, argument that
they were never meant actually to move anywhere in Oman?
Q647 Mr Roy: Just
on the same point, could I ask you, I understand the tanks have
arrived and then the desertisation begins, that window of opportunity
must really have been only a few days; was it a couple of weeks
or was it a couple of days, and was it long enough to do it?
Brigadier Cowlam:
It was days, and it was long enough. We discussed before the D-day
and G-day decision. We did not have a deadline by which time to
be ready, it was the GOC's assessment that taking into account
the arrival of manpower, equipment, the necessary up-armouring
and adjustments, at what level various elements of the force would
be declared operationally ready; and, by coincidence, the final
two battle groups were declared operationally ready before they
were required to be employed. But it was a fine line.
Q648 Mr Roy: Because
we understood that one of the tankers going across there, for
example, was late by a few days; so, therefore, you are saying
that there was no knock-on effect, that anything arrived late?
Brigadier Cowlam:
One of the final ships, MV Tyche, which was the final ship, was
delayed by about two days, and that meant that, whereas we thought
we would have about, well, depending on how successful the up-armouring
was going and when the final two battle groups were going to be
declared ready, we thought we would have about five days, it turned
out we had about three days. And on that final ship there were
quite a few sustainment items, flat racks for drops.
Q649 Mr Roy: I just
want to be clear on this window of opportunity. The tank crews,
for example, presumably, were doing an awful lot of that work
on the particular tanks during that window of opportunity, on
the desertisation, just before they went into theatre. To the
layman, was that a very good idea to have people working these
long hours, that they must have been, doing that type of work,
immediately before they went into theatre, are they ideal conditions?
Brigadier Cowlam:
This is in Germany, are you talking about?
Q650 Mr Roy: No.
Brigadier Cowlam:
In theatre, before their employment?
Q651 Mr Roy: Yes.
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think it was a case of making sure that we were ready as quickly
as possible.
Q652 Mr Roy: That
was not the question, with respect, the question was is that the
norm, is that ideal, that you could have crews working 12 hours
on the desertisation? I know you had got the Vickers people at
the front, and such, I understand all that, but was that window
of opportunity a long enough time, because I would have thought,
to the layman, that doing all of this long work that they would
not have been ideal preparations for the crew just before they
went into theatre?
Major General Brims:
The sequence of events meant that the tanks had to be shipped
when they were, some of the urgent operational requirements had
to be shipped when they were; not my decision. We saw, when they
came in, in co-operation with Brigadier Cowlam, what he could
outlet, we made the plan, the sequencing, of how we would do the
training, in the way you described, you have to fit things to
the tanks, you have got to fire them to harmonise the computers,
and a range of other things to do with things to make sure the
soldiers are climatised and ready. And we worked out the best
sequence that we could, adjusting it as appropriate, and, in fact,
actually we delivered readiness ahead of our anticipated one,
in the final analysis.
Q653 Chairman: It
appears to me, the British Army and British industry have such
a genius for improvisation, and doing things at the last possible
moment, that sometimes that is exactly what they want to do. But
if you are fighting a war, or going to fight a war, for which
we had quite a lot of notice, a number of things seem to have
been done really at the last possible moment; if the war had started
a week earlier we might have been in considerable difficulty.
So the timing of the war was quite helpful, the ability to improvise
was as magnificent on this occasion as it was previously, certainly
in the Falklands, but it does cause those of us who observe from
a distance some sleepless nights, wondering whether it will be
alright on the night. On this occasion, probably it was; but it
does not need the Duke of Wellington, with his comments on Waterloo,
to be replicated for some of the things that happened with us.
It was a damn near-run thing, in terms of supplies, ships not
arriving, kit arriving late, no left shoes, or whatever, complaints
people have; we were quite fortunate, even though there were skilled
people operating it, and the more I hear the more fortunate I
think we were. Now if you think I am wrong, please, this is an
opportunity to say it. So many things were done really at the
last moment. Am I being fair?
Major General Brims:
All I would say is that I do not make the decisions on when things
are done and desertisation; my job is, I am dealt a hand of cards
and I have got to play them to the best of my ability. And I am
sure that we will learn some lessons where the best of my ability
was not good enough, and we will make sure that we understand
those.
Q654 Chairman: I am
sure your abilities are very high.
Major General Brims:
I cannot comment. I do not deal the pack of cards to myself. I
get the hand I am dealt.
Q655 Chairman: Yes,
but you would like a better hand?
Major General Brims:
I would; and I think sometimes, even sometimes when you have got
your hand, actually, you do not realise you have got the ace of
spades. So I think we need to reflect. But, as far as I was concerned,
I was consulted when we would be ready, and I described earlier
we had agreed to define, within the battle plans and the concept,
that when two battle groups of 7 Brigade were in and had done
all the various processes we would be ready, and, in fact, come
the moment, we actually had all four battle groups of 7 Brigade.
Q656 Mr Jones: Can
I ask the question in this way then. If you had the ideal deck
of cards, what could have been done better, in your opinion, than
was done, in terms of logistical supply and also things like,
as has been described, desertisation, and other things?
Major General Brims:
If you had the wonderful thing, you would have one set of desertised
tanks and one set of non-desertised tanks, but that seems to be
unrealistic.
Q657 Chairman: It
is a very good idea though?
Major General Brims:
I need to answer without being completely frivolous, because it
answers the question.
Mr Jones: It does
not, actually.
Q658 Chairman: We
just wish we could go down the Armani route and actually had a
number of tanks that, in fact, were desertised, because the chances
of some of them being used in the north German plain are fairly
remote, the chances of being used in a desert environment are
infinitely higher. I wonder whether there has been some thought
given to having a stock that might be upgraded, to avoid the British
improvisation, that we say, well, it is much cheaper, it may be
far better having dedicated tanks?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Of course, we do now. I think, to be fair, addressing the logistics
issues, of course, we based our organisation stockholders and
systems on a certain number of assumptions; on this occasion,
we reacted well within those assumptions, in much tighter time-lines
than we had assumed, and therefore I do not think any of us were
too surprised that a lot of hard work had to go in, to make sure
that the necessary equipment, supplies and capabilities were in
the right place at the right time. I think the lesson that we
are learning is we have got to make sure our assumptions are correct
in the first place.
Q659 Chairman: But
if the assumption, let us say, in the supply of ammunition, was
it would be a three-week war then the supplies of ammunition you
would require, obviously, would be very different than if the
war had gone on for one month, two months, or three months. Can
you say to us that, from your perspective, we had sufficient stocks
of ammunition for more than a three-week war?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Yes, I can. The levels and quantities of ammunition were subject
to significant operational analysis, based on the specific missions
and tasks that the UK forces were given. We compared our holdings
with the Americans', and in many cases, to make sure we had sufficient
reserves and echelons of capability, we took more than perhaps
the OA had required.
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