Examination of Witnesses (Questions 660-679)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q660 Chairman: What
were the assumptions? If you cannot tell us in open session, perhaps
you will write to us. What were the assumptions on the number
of sets of body armour, not the training protection, there was
a lot took it with them, but what were the assumptions, would
every soldier require some form of body armour, and, if so, were
there enough sets available to them?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I cannot answer that question.
Q661 Chairman: You
cannot, or you have not that choice?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No, I cannot. That is a slightly different assumption, that goes
back to the sustainability statement, of the scaling of the force;
we will have to look at what he said.
Q662 Chairman: But
the difference, these days, between the front line and rear area
is not as clear as it may have been in the past. I am just trying
to find out whether, for instance, if you are guarding prisoners
there, it might be desirable to fit your soldiers with the kind
of body armour that might have been required much farther into
the battle-field. So, you say this is not your job, your job is
just to distribute it, it was not your job to—
Brigadier Cowlam:
To specify what would be held, by whom.
Q663 Chairman: But,
in your job, did you know how many sets were available?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No; because there are sets held with each of the components and
in the logistics component, and there will be Task Issues going
in. But there was not a pool of body armour, albeit, as a result
of the shortages which became apparent, we did cross-service and
try to move around, to those under greatest threat, elements of
body protection.
Chairman: I will
not ask you who is the person we should contact, otherwise he
will not like you very much, but certainly it is something, I
think, that we ought to pursue further.
Q664 Mr Jones: Can
I ask that question. In terms of logistics, obviously, I accept
that not everything in the heat of war goes according to plan,
in terms of logistics, in terms of what can be thrown aside, but
we have had a lot of evidence from different people who were in
theatre, including some of the press comments about, obviously,
body armour, but shortages of boots, kit, and all these things.
Was that the fact, that it was in theatre and it was not being
distributed correctly, or was it a fact that it was not there
anyway, or the right decisions had not been taken around what
was actually needed?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The latter.
Q665 Mr Jones: And
who was responsible for that?
Brigadier Cowlam:
It comes back to the assumptions that we were working on, and
the fact that we deployed 45,000 people to the Gulf within 11
weeks, but our planning assumptions, which led to the holdings
of desert combats, for examples, had been insufficient for what
we were actually demanding. The idea that there were pools of
surplus boots and desert combats lying in the desert, waiting
to be distributed, is wrong; by definition, all urgent operational
requirements are very much that, and we had separate systems to
make sure that all UORs were extracted from the normal supply
system and pushed forward as quickly as possible.
Q666 Mr Roy: Still
on the same point. Would it surprise you to know that, on armed
personnel vehicles, some soldiers were without armour, where other
people still in the vehicle did have armour and actually had to
take it off to give it to the first guy out of the door; would
that surprise you?
Major General Brims:
I can answer that question, because I was aware that we did not
have the body armour, we did not think we had the body armour,
where we wanted it, in all cases, so we did a major redistribution;
and it is very hard to do a redistribution of body armour by size,
by the different configurations, where the plates go in, whilst
actually conducting an operation.
Q667 Mr Roy: But is
it acceptable to you, if you have got five or six men in a vehicle,
that two of those men, who are driving, for example, or whatever,
in the front, who are not going out, they first have got to take
them off, have got to give them to their colleagues, because those
colleagues are the first people to open the door to go out; because
that was what was happening?
Major General Brims:
It is not acceptable, and I am not aware of that particular story,
but I knew of certain things and I was taking action on stories,
not as acute as the one you describe but I was aware of some.
Q668 Mr Jones: Air
Marshal Burridge admitted that there were problems with the supply
of ammunition in the field. Were you aware of any problems, for
example, with helicopters that were going into the front line
with very limited amounts of ammunition?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No.
Major General Brims:
No.
Q669 Mr Jones: If
I told you that there were helicopters, and they were restricted
to 400 rounds of ammunition, would that surprise you?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I would be very surprised.
Q670 Mr Jones: So
you were not aware that that actually happened?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No.
Q671 Rachel Squire:
Can I apologise for missing some of the earlier evidence, but
I was on a Standing Committee dealing with the Army, Air Force
and Naval Discipline Acts Continuation Order, and the Armed Forces
Review of Search and Seizure Orders; so not entirely unconnected
with the day-to-day business of the Armed Forces. A lot of it
has been covered, and some of it you may well have answered when
I was not here, but can I focus my questions particularly to yourself,
Brigadier Cowlam, as the Commander of the Logistics Brigade. My
colleagues have just touched on the speculation on supplies not
arriving in time and shortages of certain items. Can I just be
clear whether you yourself would say there were very clearly shortages
that you encountered, and, if so, what those were?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think the most significant shortage that I was aware of at the
time was desert combats, which was a very emotive subject, quite
reasonably. I was aware of the body armour shortage when we started
the redistribution programme, and very much trying to find out
where the body armours were, if they existed, and transferring
them between components. There were a number of other, relatively
minor shortages, but, in terms of key battle-winning equipment
and spare parts, commodities, ammunition, for example, I am very
surprised to hear what was said earlier. There was nothing significant
which was causing a lot of friction within the system. I think
there are plenty of anecdotal reports of this missing there and
that missing here, but, in terms of significant shortages, General,
you may be able to offer your perspective on that.
Major General Brims:
I concur.
Q672 Rachel Squire:
Can I then pick up on the comment you made, you compared holdings
with the Americans'; can you specify whether you did rely on the
American forces for any particular items?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Not materiel, because our equipment is very different; for fuel,
totally, all our fuel came through the Americans, our oils and
lubricants we supplied ourselves. In the early stages, during
the deployment, we relied on the Americans for feeding, and we
used some of their contracts to support ourselves, in terms of
accommodation, feeding. We asked them to provide some assistance
in the very early stages over transportation, but then later in
the campaign we returned the kind by moving fuel for them, moving
some of their armour, 4th Infantry Division, when it arrived,
accepting a lot of their prisoners of war, when they did not have
a prisoner of war holding facility, accepting coalition casualties
into our field hospitals. In the early stages, we were heavily
dependent on the Americans, but mainly for domestic and administrative
issues, but otherwise not for any, again, key battle-winning equipment,
apart from fuel.
Q673 Rachel Squire:
Can I ask you then, when the shortages you mentioned and any problems,
which initially you immediately took action to try to overcome,
were those regularly communicated further up the command structure,
for instance, to General Brims or to the military personnel remaining
in the UK?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Yes. We had virtually daily meetings with the divisional staff,
where divisional issues and concerns were exposed to us, and we
had video television conferences, both to Qatar and also direct
to PJHQ, and on those VTCs the front-line commands were on line,
as were the DLO, and the central staffs in London, and the passage
of information was very rapid, because it was through video, and
it did not rely on a strict hierarchical passage of information
flow. And so issues which were raised, and there was a multitude
of issues, the priorities changed day by day, and certainly in
the early stages, when we were first arriving, there was almost
a different crisis every day; but, through assistance from our
American colleagues and also assistance from the Permanent Joint
Headquarters and their staff and the front-line commands, all
the issues were resolved. I cannot think of a single ongoing problem,
apart from the dreaded desert combat issue, and desert boots,
which was something which we were not able to resolve, albeit
some more quickly than others.
Q674 Rachel Squire:
Then can I then pick up on, you mentioned information flow, and
we heard from Air Marshal Burridge about problems there had been
with the logistics tracking system, and he considered that was
a weakness that needed to be addressed. Can you explain to the
Committee how that manifested itself and how you dealt with it?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Yes. I would endorse his comments totally. Questions which have
already come up, how many suits were in theatre, and where were
they, we do not have total asset visibility, and this is a limitation,
because, of course, I cannot say with any confidence, at any one
time, where things were. Equally, if we knew where everything
in theatre was, at any particular time, and the condition it was
in and what availability it had, it would make us much more efficient;
and, compared with our American colleagues, we were the poor relation.
That being said, we do have some limited systems, such as Vital,
and towards the latter end of the deployment a radio frequency
tagging system was introduced, but it was not to the level of
detail and capability which perhaps we need. And I think this
is going to be one of the biggest lessons, it is perhaps a lesson
that we knew already, and I know already that the earlier lessons
in the Department are reflecting the urgent need for this, not
least because it will give us greater reliability, operational
confidence, as well as efficiency downstream.
Q675 Mr Jones: Is
it the case that the three Services use different systems?
Brigadier Cowlam:
We are looking at a joint solution, absolutely.
Q676 Mr Jones: At
the moment, do they use different systems?
Brigadier Cowlam:
There are legacy systems. The formation of the Joint Logistics
Component, the single purpose was to make sure that we take a
joint approach, particularly to the line of communication, and
what is now called the "coupling bridge", to make sure
that the three Services are not in competition with each other.
And that was very much my role, to make sure that each of the
three components, in accordance with the Joint Force Commander's
priorities, was getting the supplies and the access through the
supply chain. But the need for asset visibility is fundamental,
and I think this will be one of the most significant lessons that
we should learn.
Q677 Chairman: The
technology is there, it is just that we have not got round to.
. ..
Brigadier Cowlam:
We believe the technology is there. We introduced an urgent operational
requirement to introduce radio frequency technology, it is a system
very similar to the Americans'. Of course, we were trying to deliver
it at the early stages of the campaign, just at the time that
the Americans themselves were expanding their own capabilities.
Q678 Rachel Squire:
So, again, leading on from that, you said clearly that you considered
that one of the lessons learned is that need for improvement in
the asset visibility, with logistics tracking systems, and so
on; also you commented earlier about making assumptions more accurate,
or trying to do that. Can you say any other key lessons that you
have drawn so far from the operation, in terms of logistics support?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think the fundamentals of what we need and how we go about our
business are sound, it is those systems that we need to put in
place to solve the problems and solve the issues, because, as
I said earlier, every day brings new problems. Total asset visibility,
absolutely right, the assumptions, absolutely right, and probably
the third is more reliable and greater capable capacity in our
communications. We are heavily reliant on communications. We have
some very good communications systems, but in this day and age
we need more and we want more, and I think that, add total asset
visibility with greater capacity communications, they will be
a winning combination.
Q679 Rachel Squire:
Thank you. One final, very specific question. Did you have adequate
supplies of hand grenades?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I cannot answer that question.
Major General Brims:
Yes. I was never given any indication that we did not have.
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