Examination of Witnesses (Questions 880-899)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
JOHN REITH
CB CBE, MR IAN
LEE AND
REAR ADMIRAL
CHARLES STYLE
CBE
9 JULY 2003
Q880 Mr Cran: You would not change
anything?
Lieutenant General Reith: I would
not change anything in the way we set it up. We learned things
as we went along and adjusted, but I would do it in exactly the
same way as we did it.
Q881 Mr Cran: It would be fascinating
to know the things you readjusted as you went along. Can that
be answered quickly?
Lieutenant General Reith: When
you go into an operation like this, when you set off, you know
nothing of what really is going to happen when you have crossed
the line of departure. Remember that the person with whom you
are in conflict is going to try to defeat you by some underhand
means, or whatever, and therefore you have to have a fairly broadbrush
plan when you go. In this particular case, the actual combat phase
was broken into sub-phases, where Phase One was to secure the
oilfields at Umm Qasr, because they were absolutely essential
to the follow-on phases, the humanitarian side, and so forth,
in the reconstruction of the country, and to push up to the Euphrates
crossing at An Nasiriyah. The phase thereafter obviously was to
push on up to Baghdad, and the centre of gravity, as seen for
the combat phase, was the fall of Baghdad, and thereafter to exploit
beyond that. Of course, things did not work out exactly as we
expected. Originally, we were only going to screen Basra; as it
transpired, we were able to enter the city and take Basra. Equally,
the Americans were expecting to have to fight on the Euphrates
and build bridges; as it turned out, they managed to seize them,
the resistance there was much less than expected. So the picture
we had in our minds when we went in did not exactly fit what happened,
so we had to adjust to the new picture.
Mr Lee: I just wanted to add a
couple of words on this subject of planning and when things started.
As General Reith has said, this dates back to having embedded
staff with the Americans, and back to May/June and the first consideration
of this in small groups. I think it might be helpful just to think
of this as a continuum, where, at the beginning of the continuum,
one is talking about staff discussions, people in a very exploratory
way just discussing a subject and then gradually it becoming slightly
more defined. One is talking about contingency plans on paper,
and that was going on during the summer last year in these very
small groups, but, as General Reith said, entirely on a `no commitment'
basis, just an exploratory activity. It was not until September
last year, after President Bush had been to the United Nations
and made the speech, and so on, that we got into a phase which
might be more recognisable as planning, in the sense actually
of developing options and beginning to think about taking action
in respect of training, or whatever, which would have an effect
of some sort on the ground, as opposed to entirely paper contingencies.
Q882 Mr Hancock: When was that?
Mr Lee: That would have been September
last year. So there is a continuum, which starts just with paper
and thoughts on the subject and then moves into more concrete
planning, and obviously right the way through to the conflict
itself.
Q883 Mr Howarth: Did you get a sense,
at that time, that there was beginning to appear in the United
States an inevitability about going to war? Bearing in mind that
the British Government's position was, quite firmly, that no decisions
had been made and the United Nations route was going to be pursued
vigorously, how did it seem to you that the Americans were approaching
it, had they made up their minds?
Mr Lee: No, I do not think there
was an inevitability at that stage. There was a balanced position
where, particularly, as I say, after President Bush went to the
UN, there was a diplomatic track being followed, with 1441 and
weapons inspections, but balanced against that there was the planning
and preparation of a credible military force. Certainly there
was not, at that stage, an inevitability. There was a possibility,
that the diplomatic track, backed up by the threat of force, might
have been successful, and that was a possibility which I think
the Americans would have welcomed every bit as much as ourselves.
It was only later, obviously, that possibility fell by the wayside.
Q884 Mr Hancock: To what extent,
General, despite the embedded nature of some of your staff, was
the plan a fait accompli ? It was a United States plan;
did you just have to fit in around it?
Lieutenant General Reith: It is
much more complex than that, and I am not in any way trying to
make light of what you say. The plan was dynamic throughout, even
on the last day the plan adjusted, and much of it was done by
discussion between myself and General Franks. I had conversations
with the Land Component Commander, I had conversations with the
Commander of the Marines who ended up commanding the First Division,
making sure, from our perspective, that the tasks which they envisaged,
the tasks which were suitable for our troops, that we had the
right balance in our force and our equipment to do those tasks
at an acceptable risk. We went through a series of Commanders
Conferences with the Americans, where I went with Brian Burridge
and our Component Commanders, and we were involved fully in their
thinking and planning as they adjusted the plans.
Q885 Mr Hancock: What were you able
to influence then, from the emerging plan, that was actually a
UK initiative, or a variation?
Lieutenant General Reith: It is
hard to say exactly a specific now, looking back. In the very
early planning, the Americans had decided to attack only from
the south, and militarily it made more sense to be able to attack
on two axes, because there was going to be congestion logistically
coming in through the south. That was suggested to the Americans,
who seized it with both hands, and that is why there was thought
then of putting an axis through Turkey. Of course, as it transpired,
the Turkish authorities were unhappy with that, and we did not
go through Turkey. So then we had to readjust the plan again to
look at another way of doing the plan in the south, and so we
participated in that and looked at what we, the UK, could best
do in the south, and we assisted the Americans on that basis.
Q886 Mr Hancock: The Americans were
talking to the Turks before the Turkish elections, and that is
a lot earlier than October; so the early plan was a very early
plan. Certainly, in September, the Americans were talking to the
Turks before they had their elections and the Government changed,
because they were more, I think, of the feeling they would get
permission to go through Turkey from the original, socialist regime
in Turkey than the new Government. I am interested in this point
about the British involvement and your own background, having
been in other parts of the world where it was important to ensure
that the civilian population knew what was happening and why it
was happening and why you would secure some of the very important
structures which they needed for their protection. I was in Washington
yesterday, where a senior member of the administration told us,
with a great deal of regret, that, despite the fact they had 500
staff working for six months on the post-war situation, the post-fighting
situation, they had got it hopelessly wrong. I was rather surprised
that someone like you, from your background, did not try to suggest
to them, maybe you did, and maybe they did not heed any warnings
to them, that you should be protecting the water supply, the electrical
supply. Maybe the oil wells were important but there was the other
infrastructure which was vitally important, if you were going
to win the hearts and minds of the people within the first couple
of days of a war breaking out in their country?
Lieutenant General Reith: We did
that.
Q887 Mr Hancock: Why did they not
listen?
Lieutenant General Reith: When
we attacked in the south, the first priority, whenever we took
anywhere, was to ensure that we got the pumping stations, the
electricity, distribution system, controls, and everything else,
to secure those without damage. Clearly, there was some damage,
there is bound to be some damage when you are fighting, but it
was minimal. What we found though was a crippled infrastructure,
an infrastructure which had not been invested in for about 20
years. My engineers, and with UK money as well, as part of the
Quick Impact Projects, did a lot of work, using the local population
experts, to get their systems up and running more effectively.
Within Basra before the conflict, most of the time there was no
power, certainly there was no power into the Shia areas. He used
the delivery of power as a weapon to punish people if he was unhappy
with them, and so the Shias were very much sort of third-class
citizens in that area. The power supply really was designed to
go only into the more elite areas, and it was much more difficult
for us to get an even distribution of power. The engineers did
a terrific amount of work, and within three weeks to a month of
our taking over in that area we had the system up to better than
it had been before the conflict and as good as it could get without
the long-term investment.
Q888 Mr Hancock: Then were you disappointed
that the Americans did not follow the advice which the British
were giving them?
Lieutenant General Reith: No.
The Americans worked on exactly the same principle, and, again,
they were shocked at the level of degradation of the system which
had occurred over the years. The problem that we had with the
American system was that they had relied on producing very big
contracts through big companies to do most of this work, and,
of course, it is more difficult, the people who plan from these
companies are finding that the conditions of what they had taken
on are much worse than they had expected. So they are having to
revise contracts, revise the way they do things, as they go along.
It is happening, and Bremer, in the CPA in Baghdad, is working
really hard at it, and Andy Bearpark, who is a Briton over there,
is leading on this now and progressing things very quickly.
Q889 Mr Hancock: I am sure that is
something everybody is glad to hear about. Referring to the First
Reflections on Iraq, and page nine, which is the Planning—First
Reflections, there are three issues here. One is, the important
point which is raised is about developing a range of planning
options to cater for the possible uncertainties ahead of operations,
for example, difficulties associated with access, overflight and
basing. A lot of the evidence we have heard already from your
colleagues who were there were those problems, and it was a lack
of understanding, of the Americans promising to deliver but then
being unable to, and at the last minute our servicemen and women
arriving without the facilities which had been promised being
delivered. What is your reaction to that?
Lieutenant General Reith: We were
planning in a dynamic situation.
Q890 Mr Hancock: But this was in
Kuwait?
Lieutenant General Reith: Yes.
There was a political process running parallel with the military
process here. We were producing a capability which was being used
at that stage for a coercive effect to try to make a success of
UN Security Council Resolution 1441. At the same time, there was
a diplomatic process, trying to get us to be allowed to use various
bases within the region, and there was a public face to many of
the people we dealt with and a private face, and, clearly, in
the end, we managed to get the basing we required.
Q891 Mr Hancock: If I could ask just
two points. One is the planning focusing on military options in
support of the diplomatic process. I can understand, before the
war starts, that that is a key issue. I do not know what part
you played in the writing of these First Reflections on the planning,
but I would be interested to know how that proceeded, once the
fight started, what sort of diplomatic process you were being
made aware of, and what you were being told you could or could
not do? The final point, going back to the humanitarian aid again,
and the question in this final point that we should have planned
better for it, were any of your staff, or any of the UK military
staff, involved in that team of 500 who planned for six months
on the post-war scenario, were any of the Brits involved in that?
Lieutenant General Reith: The
answer is, no, we were not involved in that, that was done in
Washington, it was not done at Centcom, where the military planning
was going on. However, we did a lot of planning in my own Headquarters,
working with London, and what came out of that planning was the
formation of an Iraq Policy Unit within the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, which then worked out the UK strategy linked into this
and tied together the other government departments with us, to
ensure that we could deliver the humanitarian needs and assist
with the initial reconstruction, and that went on. I was delegated
authority to spend up to £20 million initially, and it could
be topped up as necessary for Quick Impact Projects, to get the
utilities back up and running, and also I was allocated the authority
to spend up to £2 million per week on humanitarian assistance.
As it transpired, I did not have to spend the latter, because
there was no humanitarian crisis.
Q892 Patrick Mercer: Gentlemen, what
were the main criteria that went into designing the force package
which Britain gave to the operation?
Lieutenant General Reith: The
criteria were looking at the task and doing an assessment and
working out the package best suited to carry out those tasks.
We extracted those, obviously, from the American planning and
so we came up with a balanced force package to suit the area we
were going through, which was in large part urban and also in
the Euphrates Valley, which is irrigated and obviously wooded,
and so forth, with palm trees, and so we had to get a balance
between armour and light forces.
Q893 Patrick Mercer: The size of
the contribution then was shaped by the task which Britain was
allocated, rather than the task being decided by the size of the
force?
Lieutenant General Reith: Correct.
We did not form the package until quite late, to fit the tasks
which had come out of the planning.
Q894 Patrick Mercer: That is clear,
thank you. Using the quotes again in this document here, who decided
to commit a force whose size exceeded the parameters set by the
SDR?
Lieutenant General Reith: The
process went through a paper from me into the Chiefs of Staff
Committee on the options, looking at various force packages and
whether we could take on all the tasks the Americans wanted us
to, or not. The Chiefs then considered that and the Chief of the
Defence Staff made a recommendation to the Secretary of State,
who approved it, who then put it through to Number 10.
Mr Lee: Perhaps I could just add
to that. The purpose of the defence planning assumptions that
we have is for, it sounds obvious, defence planning, they are
assumptions which are made in order to produce the overall force
structure that we have across the Armed Forces. They are not,
and never were, intended to be limits which we imposed on a particular
operation, in respect of a particular operation, and it is always
possible, given the circumstances, as in this one, that one can
exceed those assumptions and put together whatever force is necessary
for that particular task. Of course, it does mean that you have
got then a recuperation period to go through, and you have to
revise the way in which you restore your force structure to its
original balanced position, but the planning assumptions themselves
are not intended to limit or guide particular operational deployments
in that way.
Q895 Patrick Mercer: General, you
have touched on this already, but at what point was the final
force package decided upon, please?
Lieutenant General Reith: We decided
on it finally, I think, in the middle of January, about the 16th
or 17th.
Q896 Patrick Mercer: So seven or
eight weeks before the start of hostilities?
Lieutenant General Reith: Correct.
Q897 Patrick Mercer: And it did not
change significantly after that?
Lieutenant General Reith: The
package; we included one extra battalion minus, to cover prisoners
of war.
Q898 Patrick Mercer: The Duke of
Wellingtons, yes. Mr Lee, can I come back to you for just a moment,
please. What is your part in the planning and decision-making?
Mr Lee: I work in the Policy and
Commitments area in the Ministry of Defence, which is the Ministry
of Defence part of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation,
to which General Reith referred earlier. Whereas the PJHQ puts
together the operational package and the operational plan, our
role in the Ministry is to apply a more strategic view to that
and balance that proposal across other commitments which we have.
For example, in this case, the commitment to the fire-fighters
dispute, Operation Fresco, as we called it, and other commitments
there are across the world. We provide the link with the other
government departments, which also, in some sense, are part of
the Crisis Management Organisation, the Foreign Office and the
Cabinet Office, and so on, and advise ministers on the basis of
all of these different factors, built upon the operational plan
from PJHQ.
Q899 Patrick Mercer: Thank you. Hindsight
is a wonderful thing, clearly. A couple of weeks ago, we had an
absolutely absorbing visit to 2RTR and the Royal Scots Dragoon
Guards. They both gave the impression, and I understand that any
soldier wants to feel needed on the battlefield, I got the impression
that both of the regiments were very stretched, providing armour
to other brigades which did not have intrinsic or organic armour
with them. With the benefit of hindsight, was the force package
correct?
Lieutenant General Reith: I am
confident that it was. You will know, from your own past military
experience, that we task organise, the commanders on the ground
task organise as to the requirement of that particular battle
group going into that particular task. Which is why, for instance,
a CVRT squadron went with the Royal Marines, and the armour was
broken up between the other groupings.
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