Examination of Witnesses (Questions 980
- 999)
WEDNESDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 2003
AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
MALCOLM PLEDGER
KCB OBE AFC, BRIGADIER DEREK
JEFFREY, COLONEL
DAVID MARTIN,
BRIGADIER SEUMAS
KERR CBE AND
BRIGADIER SHAUN
COWLAM CBE
Q980 Chairman: Gentlemen, welcome.
In furtherance of our inquiry into the Lessons of Iraq this is
a very relevant section of our inquiry. We have had briefings
touching on this subject and when we visited Iraq we talked to
people out there too and we realise how very important this area
of responsibility is. Would you like to introduce your team please,
Air Chief Marshal.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Thank you very much, Chairman. On my far left is Brigadier Shaun
Cowlam whom I think you have seen before. He was the Joint Forces
Logistic Component Commander in Telic. Seumas Kerr is next to
me; he is Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics in PJHQ. On my right
is Brigadier Derek Jeffrey who is the Director of Operations within
the Defence Logistics Organisation and was therefore involved
day-to-day in the Ministry of Defence planning. On my far right
is Colonel David Martin who is Assistant Director Supply Chain,
Operations, anticipating that we may get into some detail on things
like asset tracking.
Q981 Chairman: Spot on. Thank you
very much. The first question is when did DLO begin planning for
the campaign? When were they asked to plan for the campaign and
when did they begin planning for the campaign in Iraq?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
It is virtually impossible to say there was a particular date
when we stopped planning broadly for operations and specifically
concentrated the planning process on Operation Telic. I would
simply say that our endeavours matched the broad political direction.
For example, I think it was 24 September when the statement was
made that we needed to match, in terms of resilience, our operational
and logistic planning for Iraq, consistent with the diplomatic
effort that was going on. From then on, what I will call the balance
of activity obviously started to focus more and more on what that
might mean. Therefore there was change in emphasis from what I
would call being ready generically for conflict to focussing particularly
on what we might have to do in that environment.
Q982 Chairman: Obviously it is a
rather delicate question because if the military started planning—and
were seen or known to be planning—prior to any decision
having been made, then this could have been misconstrued. Perhaps
you could give us more than an indication as to how you think
about things before being formally instructed. That would be quite
helpful. One can imagine a situation but you would not have known
when a decision was going to be made. It could have been made
very quickly, but it was not. If you had waited and you were told
"It's two weeks to go before we're off, do your planning"
you would have been made to look rather unprepared and rather
foolish. Perhaps you could give us an indication.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
It is an incremental process. I think already other witnesses
have already talked about the operational estimates that go on,
the fact that the PJHQ then makes those assessments about trying
to set in place the force elements that we might use in different
circumstances and it is a series of options then that you develop
depending on the environment, the length of the strategic operating
and communicating distances and a series of those went on through
that period. As you know, there was a northern option that we
looked at before eventually we did other contingency planning
for the southern option. It is a series of incremental endeavour.
Q983 Chairman: Perhaps you could
give further thought to it and drop us a detailed note. This is
a rather important question and you would have more time to think
about your answer if you would write to us in due course.[1]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
We can quite easily tell you what physically went on at certain
times under the lead of these different organisations, but I am
reluctant to give specific dates to say that is what we did because
it was consistent with that diplomatic effort.
Q984 Chairman: That is why I suggested
you give some further thought to it. We would be very grateful.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Certainly.
Q985 Mr Howarth: I put it to Sir
John Reith when he came here that given what we have been told—particularly
by 2nd Royal Tank Regiment—about the fact that their tanks
were desertised at the very last minute and literally at midnight
before they crossed the line they were working on the tanks that
we had come perilously close to being unprepared for the conflict.
He accepted the expression "perilously close" although
he qualified it and said, "I would not have put our men into
peril". We are here to learn the lessons of Iraq. What we
would like to know from you as military men—all senior military
men—upon whom the lives of the men under your command depend,
is are you satisfied that in future the military commanders will
give the politicians due warning that you cannot put troops and
equipment at risk by failing to give sufficient notice? We recognise
that there are political pressures on any government, but unless
you people, in your positions, are prepared to say "You have
to give us sufficient warning; this time we came perilously close,
next time we could be too late".
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Can I turn that round, Mr Howarth, and say that actually the date
on which we crossed the line was set and agreed by the operational
commanders. All the endeavours that went on, of course, then informed
that decision. That decision was taken at a particular time because
the system was ready. I think rather than looking at this as a
close run thing, actually the arrangements were put in place such
that the operational commanders were ready.
Q986 Mr Howarth: You are giving the
impression that this was fine tuning to the ultimate degree. Sir
John Reith told this Committee when he came here on 9 July, "It
was very close but we did not know until we went exactly when
we were going to commit to the conflict".
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
But we would not, of course, necessarily have committed to the
conflict if we had been in the position you describe. We were
ready. If I may I will ask the Brigadier to comment because he
was in the PJHQ who were doing the estimates, challenging the
logistic chain then to provide the requirements which in due course
either the operational commander could declare to be sufficient
to cross the line or not.
Q987 Mr Howarth: Can I just say that
everywhere we went we heard from the units we spoke to that it
was all pretty close run stuff. We are putting to you that if
we are going to learn any lessons from this conflict perhaps we
should not be so risky.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
And I am trying to turn it round and say that the risk was judged
and that risk was judged to be acceptable in operational terms
on the date we crossed.
Brigadier Kerr: We did come perilously
close. There was a debate all along when we were going to actually
desertise the armour. I can remember a discussion going back a
couple of months before that as to whether or not 7th Armoured
Brigade—which those tanks came from—was going to have
the opportunity to desertise before we sailed the tanks out to
the Middle East. The decision was to allow some training to take
place. We knew when it came down to it that it would be all about
that set date; we thought it was going to be the end of March
but we never knew quite when it was going to be. The decision
that had to be made had to be cleared through the House, but also
were we ready? General Robin Brims (who has been here) and General
John discussed it with the Americans and the view at that time
was that we came perilously close but we were ready to cross the
line of departure.
Q988 Mr Jones: In terms of Challenger—November
2001—(clearly one of the issues there was about desertisation
although we have been told that the sand is different in Iraq
than it is in Oman) did you not come perilously close so that
you had to fly engineers out from Alvis Vickers into theatre to
desertise, and they did a great job I understood. Surely if there
had been problems getting them out there then those Challengers
would not have been operational, would they?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
But Mr Jones, as I said, this is the way we did it in order to
fulfil the operational remit. Having done the estimate and the
planning we then put in place the logistic arrangements to fulfil
it. I do not see a reason why we would have been more comfortable
if we then decided we wanted to desertise at the operational request
in theatre and we had shipped by sea. What is the point? This
was the way we actually achieved the lines of requirement, within
the commander's decision cycle, to be ready.
Brigadier Kerr: You are right,
we did fly out engineers, but had they not been ready the commanders
would have said "No, we are not going to go on that date"
and we would have delayed it. General John had always made that
very clear. As his logistician I was to advise him linking in
with the DLO—Shaun Cowlam, Derek—we were all speaking
together all the time to be able to advise commanders. Commanders
take the risk; not us as logisticians. We advise and give them
the facts. General John was aware, as Mr Howarth said, that we
did come perilously close.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
But it was the optimum way to use the whole of the strategic base
in order to achieve the operational commander's decision cycle;
and it worked.
Q989 Mr Jones: The point being, that
surely if we knew about the desertised Challenger in November
2001, I cannot understand why decisions were not taken earlier
to actually start doing that. We knew that if we were not going
to go to Iraq they would be used in some type of desert situation.
Brigadier Kerr: In November we
did not know.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I would suggest that the definitive statement you have just made
is not entirely correct. You just said that we knew we would be
going into a conflict in a desert environment. That is what transpired,
but in—
Q990 Mr Jones: That is absolute rubbish.
I am getting a bit tired of this. We had rubbish from Webb when
he came before us, who said that the option of Saif Sareea was
to take the tanks to see if we could get them there, the idea
was not to use them and that is why they were not used in terms
of the sand. Surely, if you have a situation in November 2001
when there is clearly a problem with Challenger in terms of desertisation,
why should it then develop into a last minute situation? Credit
to Alvis Vickers and credit to you for actually doing it. Like
a lot of things in the British Armed Forces, they are very good;
if they are asked to do things they do it. All I am asking is
why it took so long to recognise that Challenger needed some desertisation
if we knew the problems that came out of Saif Sareea. I thought
the entire idea of Saif Sareea was to learn lessons.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I suggest we did learn the lessons. We learned what we needed
to do and we put in the means of achieving it with a set timescale
and we achieved that.
Q991 Mr Jones: And came close.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
We came close to the day that we crossed the line; that is absolutely
true. Nonetheless the plan worked.
Q992 Chairman: Can you describe more
broadly how you and the DLO were involved in the planning process?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
The DLO as representatives in the Ministry of Defence, is engaged
from day one on any of these strategic planning options. That
worked particularly well because we were able to keep track and
change effectively and in a timely manner against the different
pressures from the diplomatic process that was going on. In turn—as
I think you have heard from Air Marshal Burridge—the system
goes out to the CJO who does the overall estimating and our people
at a lower level were given that estimate. The Brigadier can tell
you more about the successes. Then, of course, it is not just
the DLO, it is of course the front line who have significant logistics
responsibilities. The engagement is an integrated one that goes
on in operational and technical planning and what I would call
the letting of the contracts for sea-lift, for air-lift, creating
the sustainability requirements for the whole of the force element
planning tables, and they are translated into effect by that integration.
Brigadier Cowlam, in being nominated as the Joint Forces Logistic
Component Commander, goes forward and the DLO having primed the
outload arrangements for what I would call initially a push arrangement
into theatre, then starts to follow the priorities set in theatre
that are very definitely made by the operational commander who
in turn is not only training his people and getting ready to cross
that line but ensuring he has the necessary sustainment arrangements
in place. The interaction is at all levels. It goes on both at
the Ministry of Defence very early in the process; it goes on
with the PJHQ and it goes on with the front line commands. It
also goes on, I have to say, with the industrial base. Again,
if I could reflect on what Mr Jones said, I have to acknowledge
the responsiveness and degree of integration, cooperation and
partnership that that planning regime produced. The system is
really seamless and I think the proof of the pudding then is,
as I have said, the statistics: in volume terms, about the same
amount of equipment as we did in 1991 in half the time. That does
tell me we have learned an enormous lesson and the planning system
actually does work.
Q993 Chairman: There were one or
two near-run things in 1982 as well so far as I recall. One wonders
whether you like living dangerously and one suspects that that
liking of living dangerously is part of the ethos and you got
away with it.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think this is the real world and I think we have to be ready,
prepared, sufficiently responsive and flexible in order to respond
in these kinds of timescales and I just do not think there is
going to be a situation where the Military will always get these
kinds of options to say that we need six months or we need nine
months or we need 27 months. What we have to do is to be able
to respond, to adjust and, through the enormous capabilities of
these people, actually succeed.
Q994 Chairman: We will come on later
to the just-in-time philosophy and I think some of the arguments
will be similar to the ones we are seeing now. To what extent
was the size and shape of the force decided upon influenced by
your advice on logistical capabilities?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Having brought these experts, perhaps I could defer to Brigadier
Kerr because of his role then in setting that operational estimate.
Brigadier Kerr: If I could just
say a little on how we do the estimate and then how it has an
impact on the size and structure of the force that you are talking
about. The estimate is very simple and common sense. We talk about
the four "D's" which is Duration, Distance, Destination
and Demand. You do that for any particular operation. Having conducted
the estimate we then put together a sustainability statement which
we work out very carefully with the DLO and with the front line
commands looking at the art of the possible. The size and the
structure of the force is actually driven by the operational imperative.
As you have already heard, a decision was taken to send a divisional
structure. There was then a debate about time and clearly the
logistic sustainability was in issue there. It was actually driven
by the operational imperative but clearly there were logistic
constraints. You could not have sent the whole of the British
Army, for example, and therefore it was decided that we would
send the division that we did.
Q995 Chairman: What would be the
maximum size of force? If the British and the Americans had said
that they needed 65,000 or 75,000 people out there, is there an
upper limit where you would say that you could not do it?
Brigadier Kerr: The limit would
not so much have been on people, the limit would have been sustainability
of the equipment and how much had been invested over the years.
It is mainly armour that is the driver for that. They could have
looked at square brigades in four battle groups or triangular
brigades (a term we use with three battle groups which I am sure
you are well aware from your visits). The structure could have
been different, but it was decided on the structure that we had,
partially driven by timelines and political decisions as well.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think it is an iterative process. Given the distance and the
numbers of ships that were actually available to us, then that
again impacts on the size of the force in terms of that iterative
arrangement or, alternatively, on when we might have been ready.
Those things are taken into account in the way that this is moved
forward in response to the operational estimate.
Q996 Mr Roy: Can I just talk about
possible misgivings of any front line commanders during the planning
process in relation to not being supplied in time. Can you tell
us specifically how they would raise their concerns with you and
did you actually receive any concerns?
Brigadier Kerr: To say how we
are joined up together as a community to support commanders and
operations, from the Permanent Joint Headquarters prior to and
also during—and still—I chair a twice weekly video-tele
conference which has on it the Deputy Chief of Staff from the
division. Shaun was on it in theatre and Derek was on it, David
was on it and the front line commanders were on it as well. The
opportunity was from Andy Cowling who was the Deputy Chief Staff
of the Division in theatre during the operation to feed back any
constraints. There was a daily debate, operating 24-hours a day
for the opportunity for commanders to say that they did not have
something. No-one is going to say that commanders had everything
they needed, but they had enough to cross the line of departure
otherwise we would not have been recommending to CJO that we were
ready.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think that Brigadier Cowlam, in his JFLogC hat here was very
definitely what I would call the mirror on that as the interaction
with the operational commanders in theatre.
Brigadier Cowlam: What a unit
commander does, through his own staff, is identify what equipment
sustainability items he has. If he feels he has a shortage he
will report them to the brigade command level, and then at the
brigade level there are staff who will cross-reference that. If
they believe there is a shortage they will report it to the divisional
command level. As Seamus mentioned that is when we would see it
on the VTC My staff on the echelon behind divisional level are
monitoring what is going on day by day by day; all the specialist
staff are talking to each other almost 24 hours a day and we build
up a picture. However, it is quite important to recognise that
a particular problem that a unit sees has to be put into the context
of what the force holds and it may well be that a particular unit
feels that it is short of certain supplies which is either held
back for other purposes or for different priorities. There is
an echelon of levels of staff and commanders involved to make
sure that, as Seamus said, when 7th Brigade, for example, were
required to cross the line of departure, they had sufficient to
meet their needs.
Q997 Mr Roy: I understand what you
are saying, but we heard, for example, that centrally there was
not enough body armour for everybody. The reality is that there
were people speaking who were in theatre and had to take the body
armour off to give to someone else. Certain people were telling
us that there was not enough body armour but centrally they were
being told there was enough for everybody.
Brigadier Cowlam: That is one
example where the different levels of command make decisions.
I was there as part of the programme that said that there was
a shortage of body armour which had a higher priority than other
areas. What you have to remember of course is that a certain number
are procured but it does take time to deliver into theatre and
then within theatre—as I think I mentioned when I was here
before—there is a mass of activity that is going on and
we prioritise activities that we are taking. I am not suggesting
that body armour is not a priority at all but in the volume and
complexity of what we were doing perhaps, with the benefit of
hindsight, we did not move it as far forward as quickly as we
would have wished.
Q998 Mr Roy: Were you happy with
that type of communication? Was it all one way from the bottom
all the way up? Was it also going back?
Brigadier Cowlam: It was. I am
sure you will have picked up from your visits that there are different
perspectives depending on where you sit. At unit level—I
have been a unit commander myself—there is a lack of visibility
about what is going backwards because quite frankly they are focussed
in on their own activities. There is also a lack of visibility
about what is going on on the flanks. That does create a certain
lack of confidence which leads—as I think you have already
discovered—to over-demands and that puts pressure on the
supply chain. Of course, the reality overall is that there are
a lot of rumours. There are sometimes perceptions which build
up. As I am sure you know, there is prioritisation by the chain
of command which may decide that a particular unit will not be
given a particular resource because there are higher priorities.
Communications are always stretched. I think the perspective at
unit level—and it changes as we go through the chain of
command—does tend to be quite subjective and quite rightly
focussed in on the operational imperative because they carry the
operational risk. There is a tendency sometimes to exaggerate
the difficulties but they run the risk and therefore we must listen
to them.
Q999 Mr Roy: I understand what you
are saying in relation to a tendency to overestimate the risk
or whatever, but we were told by a quartermaster—who was
literally hitting his head against a brick wall—that he
eventually got hold of a lorry from somewhere and drove the lorry
back himself to receive goods and then brought it back during
the night again. Does that not tell you something?
Brigadier Cowlam: Absolutely.
I would say that those sort of things do happen because people
try to short-circuit the system, but I agree with you that that
is not what the system should do. I am not saying that everything
is perfect all of the time either. From my perspective I monitored
very closely what was going on at brigade and divisional level.
I was confident that the systems were working within the constraints
that we had. Certainly I was speaking several times a day back
to the United Kingdom both to PJHQ and direct to the DLO asking
where things were and adjusting priorities.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Could I just add one thing. There is a difficulty here that our
challenge is to provide the assurance in the users' eyes that
what he needs at the time is there for him, and provide that confidence.
Currently we all accept, because of the feedback we got from some
of the sources you have described, that that is not the current
situation. I think we also have to understand that in many instances
the reason why they have not is deliberately by management and
by the balance of priorities from an operational perspective.
Firstly we have to get that assurance in the users' eyes which
currently we do not have. To do that we have to gain greater visibility
and management function end-to-end here. We accept that absolutely
and it feeds into one of the higher priority lessons I think you
have already seen from the emerging conclusions. There is a whole
series of interactions in that; it is not simply that they did
not have it and they should have had it.
1 Ev 411 Back
| 
