Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1020
- 1039)
WEDNESDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 2003
AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
MALCOLM PLEDGER
KCB OBE AFC, BRIGADIER DEREK
JEFFREY, COLONEL
DAVID MARTIN,
BRIGADIER SEUMAS
KERR CBE AND
BRIGADIER SHAUN
COWLAM CBE
Q1020 Mr Howarth: Can you tell us
what UOR's were delivered in time for operations but without time
for familiarisation and training in advance?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think I would have to defer again to Brigadier Cowlam, but one
that perhaps would qualify for that statement would be the desert
mitigation on Challenger.
Brigadier Cowlam: I am not sure
I am qualified to answer that question, but I am guilty of my
own perspective. There was nothing that I was made aware of where
there was not significant time to deliver training and drills
in the new equipment. The Challenger 2 was more of an enhancement
to the equipment which did not necessarily require any further
training at all apart from maybe driver skills. I cannot think
of anything from my experience where we were concerned that there
was not sufficient time to bring the UOR into service.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
It is a very difficult question to try to translate because, as
the Brigadier has said, most of this is equipment and the tactics
of employment were not sufficiently different to require a significant
amount of training.[3]
Q1021 Mr Howarth: Stormshadow might
be a suitable bit of kit and was extremely successful when it
came.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
It certainly was and if you would ask me for examples in each
of the areas where this had proved successful I would have to
answer—certainly from the air side—Stormshadow. However,
that did not mean to say that the tactics of employment required
further training. It is the integration of the system on to the
aircraft that takes up most of the challenge.
Q1022 Chairman: Many people in recent
years might have argued that the one certain theatre in which
the UK would be operating has been in the Middle East, and many
would expect that area to be an important area of insecurity for
some time to come. Has the time come to provision properly for
desert operations, rather than turning to UORs when the next operation
arises?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think the broad answer to that is that as we revisit the planning
assumptions which we do every year then we have to factor in whether
or not that is the right way in future to balance the equipment
programme. I am sure that judgment will then come out as part
of the white paper later on this year.
Q1023 Chairman: What about doing,
as the Americans do, a greater pre-positioning of equipment so
that you will not have the hassle of getting stuff out there in
such a rush?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Again, that has to be a consideration in the better balance of
our forces. Whether or not it is the right one then depends on
the risk that we would have to take elsewhere and there are other
uncertainties in the world that we face today.
Q1024 Chairman: We visited Oman and
the Omanis clearly had the far-sightedness to do a proper job
of desertising their Challenger 2 whereas we chose not to. If
one could assume that it is likely—or highly possible—that
our armed forces will be deployed in the Middle East again, has
any consideration been given to doing a proper job on, say 40,
50, 100. I have no idea how many could be done properly and not
rather hurriedly and not, I presume, as good as they are done
by Vickers by the Omanis.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I think Mr Jones alluded to this earlier. I probably did not give
him the full answer. We had learned from Saif Sareea and made
provision in the equipment programme for the lessons and the desertisation
of Challenger. That was already in the programme. Of course the
UOR has now ensured we not only have the fittings but the fitments
and one of the considerations now is whether to retain that at
the end of this particular year. Again, that judgment will be
taken in concert with all the other UOR's that we have fitted.
Q1025 Chairman: When Mr Webb—who
has been referred to earlier—gave evidence to us, I was
quite surprised when he said that the purpose of Saif Sareea was
not to test the equipment and equipment performance. I found that—not
to use Mr Jones' word—slightly difficult to comprehend.
Spending £98 million on sending half of our armed forces
out to Oman would, I would have thought, been rather prudent if
we had actually tested the equipment. One of the purposes, I would
have thought, was not to prove you can get out there quickly but
what you are actually taking out works effectively.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I rather hope we did learn some of the lessons that you described
in testing that equipment. We did test the equipment in theatre;
it may not have been the prime purpose of the exercise.
Q1026 Chairman: Was it a formal process
of testing the equipment?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
As a consequence we put into the programme the means of desertising
those armoured fighting vehicles. I think we did learn something
from that.
Q1027 Mr Jones: If they were put
into the programme, what was the timescale in terms of getting
them desertised? What was going to be agreed?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
I am told two years.
Q1028 Mr Jones: When were they actually
put in the programme? Which year?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
After Saif Sareea, so at the end of April 2002.
Q1029 Mr Hancock: When we started
to take evidence for this inquiry that we were getting feedback
from the men and women who were on the front line out there about
the shortage of equipment, the state of the equipment, the problems
they associated with it. Your colleagues—and indeed ministers—were
in denial of that. You had people on the ground saying that we
had lots of problems and we had senior staff officers and ministers
saying that that was not true, they are just journalist stories
and worried parents. That was not borne out when we actually spoke
to those men and women. What is your view on that, Air Marshal?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
We have had a first go at that and said that there is a difference
in perspective between what I would call a top-down planning and
the arrangements that were in place and then the individuals on
the front line. The reason for that, I think, is many-fold, but
we have already agreed that what we have to do is communicate
the need and whether or not we are fulfilling that need better
to those who prosecute the mission. I would have to say that logistics
only makes sense when the end user consumes the product. What
we create is confidence in that end user as well as assurance
within the operational command chain that this is the right answer.
Q1030 Mr Jones: Can I turn now to
deployment and the actual physical job of getting the kit and
everything out there in terms of sea-lift and air-lift. What was
the cost in terms of moving such a large amount of equipment at
relatively short notice and did the short notice that you got
create problems in terms of acquiring the type of sea- or air-lift
you needed? Did you have to pay a premium because of the short
notice?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Can I pass that over to Colonel Martin for the detail, but I would
like to make one observation. There are relationships and contracting
opportunities here that we took advantage of which prevented the
market charging us a premium. For that I commend some of the individuals
in the supply chain, going out for a small amount for surface
movement to a large fraternity and then accepting all the bids.
We are not as naive as perhaps some might conceive in the way
that we do business in the commercial environment, but in terms
of totals and costs I will pass you over to Colonel Martin.
Colonel Martin: The cost of sea-lift
attributable to Operation Telic was £70 million. The cost
of the air-lift was £53½ million. The sea-lift was obtained,
as the air-lift, from the Defence Transport Movement Agency working
in conjunction with PJHQ. They were kept very much within the
understanding of Chief Joint Operation's intent during the planning
cycle and as the operational plan unfolded they were able to anticipate
with some degree of accuracy exactly what the requirement would
be. When we were first looking at the northern option, because
of the timelines and distances involved we would actually have
required far fewer ships than we did for the southern option as
it unfolded, but as the Defence Transport Movement Agency understood
the intent of CJO they were able to approach the market and obtain
some very favourable rates for the shipping. Effectively they
approached the market for shipping in five tranches. The first
three tranches secured the majority of required shipping and the
contracts were signed I believe by 31 December. We then approached
the market for tranches four and five during January in order
to secure and adjust once we were able to anticipate exactly what
the force makeup was likely to be. The market responded favourably
to us thinking that what we wanted was in fact all we wanted and
so the prices that we were offered were very good. We were able
to take advantage of that and pay some very good rates for the
shipping. That is not to say that by the time we got to tranche
five the market had not woken up to what we were doing and we
probably paid a premium.
Q1031 Mr Jones: What is going to
be the long term answer to this because increasingly operations
are going to need transportation by air or sea? What is the long-term
solution? Is it to have a relationship with the market or is it
providing in-house equipment?
Colonel Martin: You will be aware
that after recent lessons learned we have now got access to four
C-17s and the six ro-ros, and both assets prove their worth. We
have an enabling contract through the market for heavy lift aircraft.
That gives us access to up to nineteen AN-124's, the big Antonovs,
which give us a unique capability in that we can load those with
containers which we cannot do by other means. We have a good relationship
with the market anyway. Really what we have is a good capability
which we have immediate access to and a well tried and tested
means of gaining extra capacity if we need it.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
There are also bilateral and multi-national arrangements with
several of our allies, with the NATO focus at Eindhoven.
Q1032 Mr Jones: In terms of the type
of shipping that you actually procured, was there a problem in
actually loading Chinook helicopters onto certain shipping that
you chartered? I think we were told that the ramp would not actually
take Chinooks therefore what you had actually procured could not
actually take Chinooks out.
Colonel Martin: I regret the anecdote
and I am afraid I cannot really comment. All I would say is that
we took a total of fifty ships from trade; we took up what the
market offered us and that was to support the land deployment.
We took up a further six ships from trade in order to support
the amphibious task group and inevitably there were some problems
in loading some of those ships.
Q1033 Mr Jones: When you say you
cannot comment, is it because it did not happen?
Colonel Martin: I do not have
any detailed knowledge of the incident to which you refer.
Q1034 Mr Jones: Could I ask you to
have a look into it because what we are coming across in this
inquiry are a lot of what are being called anecdotes—things
that people say happened—and I think as part of our process
we should de-bunk some of these? Could you possibly do some investigation
and let us have a note saying whether it did happen or it did
not happen?
Colonel Martin: Yes, we will let
you have a note.[4]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Even if true, we did not take that ship out specifically for Chinooks
so we would have changed the loading order.
Mr Jones: Always defensive, Air Chief
Marshall but it is important that we find out what did happen.
Q1035 Mr Hancock: It took them three
times as long to put them back because they had to dismantle so
much.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
What I am saying is that we would use the next ship in the queue
at Marchwood.
Mr Jones: We were told that because of
it, we actually lost a ship but I would like to find out whether
or not it is just another urban myth.
Q1036 Mr Hancock: It must be part
of the de-brief from the helicopter unit that went there. The
group captain who was in charge, was in charge of all UK helicopters
and part of his de-brief must have been the problems of the logistics
of taking his craft out there. That must have featured pretty
highly on his list. It is hardly somebody making that up or just
suggesting it might have happened; it was a fact.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
We will look at Group Captain Pulford's report. It has not been
raised through the gathering of evidence and for that reason we
will go back and see whether or not it was reported as described.
Q1037 Chairman: Has there been an
internal review of the use of ro-ro ships and whether we have
got it right. We have done endless enquiries—to no effect
until recently, I may say—on the decline of the merchant
marine and hardly any of them are British flag service boats,
there is not much sense of patriotism. This is a great opportunity
to see whether the pessimism has been realised or not. If there
is such a study we would like to have a look at it because as
our SDR is based on the principle of rapid reinforcement equipment
mobility, the ratio of aircraft and ships is really very important.
If there has been a study we would like to have a look at it.[5]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger:
Certainly.
Q1038 Rachel Squire: We have been
told that the main constraint on the airlift operation was the
limit on the total number of movements rather than the number
of aircraft. Would you like to comment on that and also say what
information you had in advance on the number of movements that
was available to you?
Colonel Martin: Taking up the
aircraft from trade is, at the risk of sounding flippant, the
relatively easy part. You have to provide the slots and the capability
to handle the aircraft at either end of the supply chain. Certainly
where we were flying into—Kuwait City International Airport—there
were a limited number of slots available to us and of course we
had to negotiate with the Americans to ensure that the flows of
both were uninterrupted. That was certainly an issue. Diplomatic
clearances to over-fly other countries was another consideration
that we had. Normally a diplomatic clearance to over-fly a country
would take us 10 days; we were able to reduce that considerably,
but there were still on occasions a number of problems that interrupted
the airflow. Then, of course, if we start using our own transport
fleet we have to bring into consideration other matters as well.
Have we the correct number of movement controls to handle the
aircraft. Can we provide crews and adequate engineering support?
We have all those considerations when we actually set up to run
the airbridge.
Brigadier Jeffrey: As a matter
of principle you will find that the larger the aircraft the fewer
number of aircraft is the key. You can probably hire eight Antonovs
a day but you can probably never actually use more than two or
three because of the kind of things that Colonel David has said.
For example, if a C-17 comes in with 200 pallets on the back of
it, it takes time to process them.
Brigadier Cowlam: The single most
critical factor in the deployment and sustainment of the airbridge
is the availability of landing slots in Kuwait which we had to
negotiate with the Americans who, of course, were doing their
own deployment sustainment. In terms of availability of aircraft
we would not see that as a difficulty.
Q1039 Rachel Squire: Can I just pick
up on the comments that Colonel Martin has made as well as Brigadier
Jeffrey about the C-17 and the Antonov. We have heard universal
praise for the C-17. Do you want to say a little more on how far
the use of the C17—and indeed the use of the Antonov—allowed
you to reduce the number of actual movements needed to deploy?
Colonel Martin: Obviously we fully
utilised the C-17 because it is a relatively large aircraft and
its turn-round time is very quick compared to the Hercules. I
think my team were probably loading 50 or 60 tons onto a C-17
and that would be compare to ten tons on a C-130. You can immediately
see the scale of advantage of using a C-17. We could not do without
the Antonovs because there were a number of occasions when we
were moving loads that were simply too large to put in the back
of a C-17 and the real advantage of the Antonov was that it enabled
us to fly 20 foot ISO-containers which many of our stores today
are stored in. There are some items which we had to move in a
20 foot container. That access to the AN-124 is absolutely critical
to us.
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