Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1099-1119)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ANTHONY PALMER
CBE, BRIGADIER THE
DUKE OF
WESTMINSTER KG OBE TD DL, BRIGADIER
ANDREW FARQUHAR
CBE, AIR COMMODORE
DAVID CASE
AND CAPTAIN
CHRIS MASSIE-TAYLOR
OBE
22 OCTOBER 2003
Q1099 Mr Crausby: Good afternoon
and thank you for coming. The Chairman, Bruce George, is away
on other business and so I am standing in today. We intend this
session to run to about 4.30. For our part, we will try to keep
our questions brief on the understanding that you will try to
keep your answers equally brief. I will start the questioning.
We have a figure of 5,600 reservists in Operation TELIC. Could
you tell us how that figure was arrived at?
Lieutenant General Palmer: May
I tell you who we are? I am the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
(Personnel). I cover all personnel matters across regulars and
reserves. The person who is responsible for all reserve forces
and cadets, who works for me, is sitting on my right, the Duke
of Westminster. Then we have the three Services representatives:
one from the Royal Air Force, Air Commodore Case; Brigadier Farquhar;
and Captain Massie-Taylor from the Navy. Basically, I am policy
and strategy and they are the deliverers of the policy on the
ground. That is how we divide up and why we have brought five
people. The question of the size and scale of the reserve contribution
to TELIC obviously derives from the start point, which is the
CDS's mission, followed by PJHQ's interpretation of that into
a full structure. Then the three commands decide, on the basis
of the requirement which has been defined, whether or not regulars
or reserves will be used, and so it is a relatively straightforward
process.
Q1100 Mr Crausby: Could you have
called out a significantly larger force of reservists and, if
so, how much larger?
Lieutenant General Palmer: We
could have done, obviously. The force that was assembled was the
one doing that particular task. There were considerable numbers,
and I will ask each of the Services to give you the exact numbers
that were deployed and the exact numbers that were left. Obviously,
at the initial stages for the war-fighting operation predominantly,
though not exclusively, they were logisticians, signals, et cetera,
and we did not bear too heavily on the fighting arms within the
reserves, the infantry and the armoured corps. Perhaps I could
ask each of the Services to give you the exact figure.
Captain Massie-Taylor: I am Director
of Naval Reserves and responsible to the Second Sea Lord for,
recruiting and training Naval Reservists In Operation TELIC, I
was responsible for the mobilisation of naval reservists. I am
also here today representing the other part of the naval Services
the Royal Marines Reserves, who were also mobilised The Royal
Naval Reserves, number just over 3,000. In TELIC, we called out
initially 355 naval reservists, and out of that actually mobilised
294.
Brigadier Farquhar: I am Chief
of Staff of Regional Forces and responsible for the execution
of the policy for Land Command, who own the reserve component
of the land area. In terms of the initial TELIC requirement, we
deployed 3,762 reservists, of which 249 were regular reserves
and the remainder Territorial Army.
Lieutenant General Palmer: There
were about 35,000 left, bearing in mind the TA is about 40,000.
Air Commodore Case: I am Director
of Plans and Reserves, Headquarters Personnel and Training Command,
responsible to the Air Member for Personnel, for the policy as
far as the Reserve Air Force is concerned, hence mobilisation,
adjudication and the like. From the Royal Air Force reserves,
and talking just about the volunteers, out of a total of about
1,600 personnel, we deployed 810 for the initial phase, some 48%
of the total. Overall, for phase 1 of TELIC, we deployed 1,030
personnel. To date, that number has risen obviously, since the
initial phases, to 1,134.
Q1101 Mr Crausby: Was there a planned
call-up with a view to the subsequent stage of TELIC or did everybody
come in all at the beginning? Can you tell us something about
that?
Lieutenant General Palmer: Initially
there was an offensive operation in Iraq, which we describe as
TELIC 1, and the plan was made of that. As I said, then the commands
worked out force level requirements with PJHQ. The force structure
that was actually deployed was derived from that plan. It was
a fairly conventional deployment, a fairly conventional assessment,
of what was required because it was well within our capability
to produce it, bearing in mind that we plan always to conduct
a brigade level offensive operation. Since the SDR, we have always
planned that the reserves will be a part of that organisation,
and so it was planned to that extent. Then the call-up proceeded
along the lines which we may discuss later. I do not know whether
any of my colleagues want to add anything to that.
Q1102 Mr Crausby: My final question
is simply: could Operation TELIC have been effectively carried
out without the contribution from the reserve forces?
Lieutenant General Palmer: Unequivocally
not, nor did we ever plan to do so. The reserves now are an integral
part of the United Kingdom armed forces and, since the SDR, any
war-fighting operation of any scale will involve the reserves.
Q1103 Mr Howarth: If we could turn
to the army in particular, there has been a big debate going on
over the last few years as to whether the reserves should be used
for deployed units or whether for individual back-filling. I think
that the reserve forces have been particularly keen to preserve
the former, namely the deployment in formed units, rather than
taking people and sticking them in ad hoc positions. It
is our understanding that, in respect of TELIC, an initial plan
was for the reserves to be deployed on the basis of formed units
involving something like 20 TA units in all, but that did not
happen. Perhaps you could explain why that did not happen? Can
you tell us something about the reason why it is not the case
of the original SDR intention of back-filling regular forces with
other regular forces and why the TA has been deployed instead?
Is this all to do with overstretch and the lack of people available
to reinforce regular brigades from committed brigades?
Lieutenant General Palmer: I will
pass that to Brigadier Farquhar in a second. I think it is important
to remember what was actually going on while we were planning
operations in terms of the firemen's strike and the requirement
to keep regular soldiers available to cover that contingency.
To a certain extent, that did skew the plans because we had not
anticipated in the SDR when we were looking at contingency planning
that a large proportion of regular forces would have to be kept
back for a contingency against a firemen's strike.
Brigadier Farquhar: I might start
by saying that the organisation required for Operation TELIC in
Iraq was constantly changing in the planning phase, as you are
probably aware. When the Turkish option was denied, then there
was another major shift of planning. Some of the aspirations to
use formed units of the TA had to be put on hold because of the
time line but formed units were used on TELIC 1: for example the
Port Regiment, a Royal Yeomanry Squadron, a Field Hospital and
an amphibious engineer troop as well and then a large number of
individual reserves, as you have identified. What we wished to
do, though, and it is very much what we have done for subsequent
mobilisation, was to use the TA in formed sub-units, often of
a composite nature, and so a unit would generate a formed sub-unit.
That is the way we wished to proceed.
Lieutenant General Palmer: I think
the principle is well taken that we would rather deploy formed
units because reserves, like everybody else, would rather be with
the people whom they have trained with and they know than as individuals.
As you have heard, circumstances did not allow us to do that to
the extent that we would have liked, but, since the war-fighting
bit has finished, then we certainly have deployed formed units
much more.
Q1104 Mr Howarth: You have certainly
revealed the very tight constraints that we have if we cannot
go to war because we have a firemen's strike and, when we did
go to war, notwithstanding the firemen's strike, there was, as
you will recall, very considerable concern that we would not be
able actually to carry out the military operations in Iraq if
the firemen had decided to resume their strike activities.
Lieutenant General Palmer: That
is true but we did go to war, we did fight, it was successful,
and we managed it. Although there was one major constraint, which
was the firemen's strike, which you could say had not been predicted
at the time of the SDR that we would actually be doing those two
activities together, it worked. I think that does pay tribute
to the structure that was put together at the time of the SDR.
Q1105 Mr Howarth: Generally, I think
I would like to suggest that it pays tribute to the fact that
the firemen did not call the strike, but let us not pursue that
further. Formed operational units: it would be helpful to us if
you could explain how you arrived at the decision between which
formed units would be deployed, how you would resort to specialist
skills and how you would deploy those.
Brigadier Farquhar: What we have
identified is that where there is a capability and the Territorial
Army formed units can fill that capability, then they have deployed
as a formed, often composite, sub-unit. Where there is no capability
gap but there is a numbers gap, again in terms of reinforcing
the regular units, what we attempted to do was to use the Territorial
Army in groups with its own chain of command and they reinforced
as individuals. In terms of a balance where we have chosen a composite
unit, a unit or individuals, it has been to meet the capability
requirement.
Q1106 Mr Howarth: I dare say you
are bound to say that. By putting in composite units together,
did it work or did it lead to friction? What about , for example,
a regiment like the Parachute Regiment, which has a very strong
ethos and where basically 4 Para is a much reduced shadow of its
former 10 Para?
Brigadier Farquhar: It has worked
extremely well. I will touch on 4 Para, if you like. As you know,
120 or so individuals from 4 Para were deployed and they were
very well integrated into the regular component and I think that
is a great success story. If you look at our other experiences
of generating composite sub-units, as we have done for the second
phase of TELIC, where we have used a unit that has provided a
chain of command for soldiers, it has integrated extremely well
and deployed very effectively. We have been particularly pleased
with the way that integration has worked.
Q1107 Mr Howarth: Turning to the
specialists, what sort of specialists have been in most demand
in that recent operation?
Lieutenant General Palmer: Shall
we ask the Royal Air Force?
Air Commodore Case: From the Royal
Air Force perspective, clearly medical personnel have been key
and they certainly were key during Operation TELIC. We have also
had a need to use our movements specialists, and of course I would
be remiss not to mention the meteorological Services which has
Sponsored Reserves in our mobile meteorological unit, who are
pretty well always involved in any operation. There are some examples.
Q1108 Mr Howarth: And the Royal Navy?
Captain Massie-Taylor: The naval
reserves, tend not to mobilise as formed units but generally as
individuals for their particular specialist skills. During TELIC,
we mobilised people across the board from, Fleet Air Arm, RNRr
, Allied Warning navigation and information systems, a Maritime
Trade organisation. These are specialists which guide and advise
shipping and have been very useful in the Gulf advising British-registered
shipping on the risks and threats that might exist. Defence Intelligence
Staff were mobilised as were Ship Protection Parties on board
the chartered shipping interrogators/linguists and logistics personnel.
Logistics personnel are specifically trained in the RNR, to man
Forward Logistic sites There were also media relations and of
course medical personnel. The majority of Medical personnel actually
went to the field hospitals, and not to the naval requirement.
Q1109 Mr Howarth: Can I go back to
Air Commodore Case? Can you tell us whether there were any air
crew deployed? After all, we do have an RAF Reserve nowadays.
If so, how many of them were deployed?
Air Commodore Case: Out of a total
of 59 part-time reserve air crew, 23 were called out to Operation
TELIC, and this was across the range of aircraft types. Certainly,
I think four were from the fast jet fleets (various) and others
supported Hercules operations and the E3D Sentry and the Nimrod
aircraft.
Q1110 Mr Viggers: I would like to
ask about sponsored reserves. In which areas have you created
sponsored reserves?
Lieutenant General Palmer: I think
there are some in each area, but we will start with the army.
Brigadier Farquhar: We have a
sponsored reserve organisation to drive our heavy equipment transporters.
We have not yet used any of those sponsored reserves in Operation
TELIC in Iraq, although there are plans to look at using them
in the future. In fact, 11 have received notice to be mobilised
in the next phase of TELIC and they are all from 8 Transport Regiment
Royal Logistic Corps (V). These are really civilian contractors,
as you are aware, who change from their civilian uniform, which
they wear on a day-to-day basis with us, into a military uniform.
Captain Massie-Taylor: 64 sponsored
reserves were mobilised during TELIC. These were all members of
AWSR. They man the ro-ro ships; these are strategic lift ships
of which three were utilised for Operation TELIC. All these people
were enrolled into the RNR and mobilised when required. The figure
was 64 because the crews rotated during the operation.
Air Commodore Case: In the Royal
Air Force, I mentioned earlier on that the mobile meteorological
unit and 31 MMU personnel have been called out. That is the most
we have deployed around various parts of the Middle East for this
operation. The MMU supported six forward operating bases and with
a standard team of four at each: two forecasters and two controllers
as support staff. We also deployed four members of Number 32 (the
Royal) Squadron as technicians in support of the BAe125 communications
aircraft. There are plans for further expansion of sponsored reserves,
notably on 32 (the Royal) Squadron and across into BAe146 aircraft
support and also, as part of the acquisition programme, for the
future strategic tanker aircraft.
Q1111 Mr Viggers: I understand that
in Operation TELIC for the first time sponsored reserves have
been deployed in the theatre of operations and yet the deployments
that you have just described to us seem very modest indeed. What
lessons did you learn about sponsored reserves being deployed
in Operation TELIC?
Captain Massie-Taylor: Certainly,
from the point of view of the sponsored reserves in the strategic
lift ships, it was hugely successful, these are very large ships
and only three of them were used or were required. Merchant ships
of course are leanly manned. The figure of 64, as I said, was
arrived at because they were rotating crews every couple of months.
There were more than adequate. They worked very well indeed.
Lieutenant General Palmer: I have
not heard of any specific problems associated with sponsored reserves
as such. In fact, I think they were very successfully integrated
into the force.
Q1112 Mr Viggers: One of the acknowledged
areas of greatest weakness in the armed forces is medical personnel
where recruitment may be quite satisfactory but retention is still
very poor and there are very serious shortfalls, which are some
of the key factors. It would seem to me that sponsored reservists
might be very appropriate in the field of general medical Services.
I wonder whether consideration has been given to that?
Lieutenant General Palmer: If
I can, could I defer the question to the eminent medical people
who are sitting behind me and who will be coming up next because
they have that speciality and I do not? I think the idea, of course,
is that because it has now been proved successful, it could be
extended. We certainly will be looking at that on the policy.
Q1113 Mr Howarth: General, you did
not actually answer Mr Viggers's question as to whether there
are lessons to have been learnt from these sponsored reserves
in this operation. This Committee is actually quite concerned
at the extent to which we are moving towards increased use of
sponsored reserves. I was recently talking with an engineering
company which does a lot of heavy earth-moving equipment and that
is something that is about to go out to PFI. I was specifically
asked: what the implications are for sponsored reserves there.
Was it successful? Do you think that you can deploy a lot more
people by way of sponsored reserves? Is there a limit to the sponsored
reserves?
Lieutenant General Palmer: I am
sure there is a limit because sponsored reserves are not something
that we would wish to put too far forward and the balance between
where they are and the danger in which they stand must be very
clear. Apart from anything else, we have to write the contract
with the civilian firm which ensures that these people can be
transferred, if you like, from the private sector into the reserve
forces: (a) able to do the job; and (b) at the right readiness.
What I am saying is that so far—and this is very recent—the
experience from Op TELIC has been that this was done successfully.
Whether there are any detailed lessons to be learnt, I am not
sure. I am sure it will be examined, but strategically the concept
proved itself to be successful. I am sure there are small areas
where we can learn lessons; there are in practically every area.
I take your point that there is going to be a limit to their use.
Where you can use them successfully and you can achieve this effective
balance between what they do in terms of the danger, et cetera,
it seems to me to make sense to use them.
Q1114 Mr Jones: General, can I try
to clarify that? We have asked this question before but we have
not had the answer to it. What would you say the limitations and
the danger is in that? I think we had it once before—I cannot
remember who it was giving evidence—in trying to define
what the front line would be. What is your definition of the limit
to which sponsored reservists can actually be used?
Lieutenant General Palmer: In
terms of TELIC, as you heard, the people we did use were, in effect,
reserves and therefore, although we would not have used them in
the front line, we do acknowledge that, even if you are at the
rear, you can obviously come into some sort of danger, but it
has to be proportionate. The balance of risk has to be assessed.
That would have been assessed by the command before calling for
the sponsored reserves.
Q1115 Mr Jones: That is a very good
answer you gave me there but surely, if you are actually going
in, as Mr Howarth said, with PFI contracts, the position needs
to be quite clear to those individuals and also to the company
what that line is going to be in terms, as you said, of the danger
of what the front line is? I have never yet had a definition of
what the front line is.
Lieutenant General Palmer: It
is very difficult to define a front line because each situation
is going to be different and each operational deployment will
have different risks associated with it. Then, within the operational
field, there will be different risks associated with whether you
are right at the front with one bit further back doing the logistics
or whatever. It seems to me that it is perfectly possible to consider
having sponsored reserves in those areas that are not the highest
risk, although there are going to be no areas where there is no
risk at all. A balance has to be struck. Perhaps Air Commodore
Case can tell us, from the Royal Air Force perspective, where
these people were deployed?
Air Commodore Case: In the main,
the Mobile Meteorology Unit would have been deployed on many occasions
all over the world supporting operations very successfully, as
they have again in Operation TELIC. Generally speaking, they operate
from deployed operating bases where we operate our aircraft, That
is natural. There have been no difficulties and we have seen no
difficulties in continuing to operate with them in that way. As
far as the members of 32 (the Royal) Squadron are concerned, on
a day-to-day basis they provide technical support for the aircraft
type, and those selected to be sponsored reserves have been given
the appropriate training so that they can don the uniform and
operate in the environment which we expect them to operate in,
and again that is being deployed to operational bases. We see
no difficulty with that whatever.
Q1116 Mr Jones: So you can have sponsored
reservists right in the thick of the action?
Air Commodore Case: They can be
deployed to wherever they are required to operate with the equipment
and aircraft on which they are trained.
Q1117 Mr Jones: That is very revealing
because therefore there is no limit to PFI in terms of using sponsored
reserves in the armed forces, right up to the front line.
Lieutenant General Palmer: From
a policy perspective, there clearly is a distinction between the
very front-line troops. Obviously the reserves and the regulars
will be working and the sponsored reserves will be providing a
slightly different role. I think it is very unlikely you will
see a sponsored reserve infantry battalion, whereas it is perfectly
possible, as we have done, to conceive ro-ros and met officers,
et cetera, who generally speaking are not at the front line, but
whom we can use in that context.
Q1118 Mr Jones: I will give you an
example. What about a unit to recover vehicles from the battlefield:
would that be open to PFI-sponsored reserves?
Brigadier Farquhar: You could
look at the army example of our heavy equipment transporters.
We have yet to use them. As I said, we are intending that we will
learn lessons from that deployment, but our view is that this
is a very good use of the sponsored reserves because, once mobilised,
they are doing a job where the threat, I think this is what you
are looking at—is that you could perceive there would be
a threat management problems. I have to say that in the battlefield
of today you are never going to be, as Mr Jones has suggested,
away from all risk, and so the sponsored reserves will, on the
delivery and recovery of some of this equipment—that is
not the battlefield recovery but the recovery of the equipment
transporter for the removal of kit—be at some level of risk,
but we believe that is a controlled risk and suitable for a sponsored
reserve.
Captain Massie-Taylor: In the
case of the ro-ro ships, of course, they are transporting ammunition
as well being well forward in the amphibious area of operations,
so relatively close to the front line. There was concern both
by myself and Andrew Weir (Shipping) about the chemical risk to
personnel operating the ships. These personnel were trained in
basic personal protection on board the ships, and they also had
reservists, that is normal RNR reservists, on board who were more
trained in the use of personal protection against chemical attack.
There is the requirement that if there came a chemical attack,
because are not chemically sealed, like warships, that they would
actually be pulled out of the area pretty quickly. There is a
concern and there have been a number of lessons identified over
this one, and we need to do more in terms of protection of sponsored
reservists.
Lieutenant General Palmer: These
are volunteers; they are reserves. They are told what commitment
they are making when they join the sponsored reserves. The contractors
know and understand what the implications of being sponsored reserves
are. They have to meet the criteria for entry into the reserves,
so these are not people who are being, as it were, co-opted to
do a job that they are not briefed about or trained for; they
are trained and that is why they are called reserves. They are
just a different form of reserve.
Q1119 Mr Jones: I think there is
an onus on the MoD, and I have not yet heard it, actually to define
what you referred to as the danger area and what is acceptable
to put PFI or sponsored reserves in. I was interested to find
out clearly that there is not this definition line yet. I still
think this is something the MoD needs to look at.
Lieutenant General Palmer: It
is very difficult to define a front line as opposed to a back
line. In the old days of the Cold War, it was relatively straightforward.
These days, it is much more complex.
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