Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1140-1159)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ANTHONY PALMER
CBE, BRIGADIER THE
DUKE OF
WESTMINSTER KG OBE TD DL, BRIGADIER
ANDREW FARQUHAR
CBE, AIR COMMODORE
DAVID CASE
AND CAPTAIN
CHRIS MASSIE-TAYLOR
OBE
22 OCTOBER 2003
Q1140 Mr Havard: I was thinking about
whether the compulsory call-out had had an effect in regard to
their attitudes?
Brigadier The Duke of Westminster:
Yes, of course it had because, first of all, we had a regime obviously
where employers did not know whether their employees were members
of the volunteer reserves. It came as quite a surprise to some
that suddenly rather a lot of key people disappeared to earn the
Queen's shilling. Again, we are working on that particular principle
and hopefully there will be some movement in the near future on
that particular point. We have worked very hard liaising with
our employer community. We have still got some way to go, but
we have made enormous strides over this last six to nine months.
Lieutenant General Palmer: On
the issue of the policy on follow-up, it is the policy that in
the Army Regular Reserve, and I think the other Services as well,
COs have got to follow up all reserves in six months, twelve months
and 20 four months on the subjects of health, welfare, employment
and all the issues, and so we are conducting a very methodical
follow-up process using the chain of command to do it.
Brigadier Farquhar: I will amplify
that and say that we are at the stage now where we are beginning
to review initial data, which we have not thoroughly analysed
yet. We see the capture of this data and the ability to learn
lessons as hugely important, both for the individual, be it the
regular or the reserve in Territorial Army Services, and indeed
for the employer because we are hugely conscious that the owner,
if you like, of our reservist is the employer, if that reservist
is employed, and our relationship with the employer community
is extremely important.
Captain Massie-Taylor: To return
briefly to your question about lessons identified and lessons
learnt, the strategic reserve lessons identified are, of course,
controlled through DRFC and all these different Services report
those to the DRFC. When it comes to the individual Services, in
the case of the naval Services, each individual reservist where
possible as he is demobilised and at that moment has been debriefed
is putting forward specific lessons that we see need to be learnt,
and that has been captured. On top of that, and the army call
them cap badge champions and we call them the heads of specialisation,
these people have also been directed to go out to their people
who have been mobilised in slower time to capture lessons identified,
the aim being that all this is brought together, certainly by
the end of this year.
Air Commodore Case: Clearly, we
are tied in with the centralised activity that is being conducted
by DRFC. We also initiated a survey by what is called a continuous
attitude survey team of our reservists and indeed their families.
We have been building a picture of the situation obviously all
the way through because there has been a lot of communication
both with individual reservists and employers through the investigation
process when we mobilise individuals.
Q1141 Mr Cran: I have a few questions
on the subject of training of mobilised reserves. The fact is
that the Committee has received this bit of evidence from an officer
in the Territorial Army who says this, a direct quote from his
paper: "The five days of brief training I received was little
more than a run-through of a number of issues. For example, I
only got to fire 10 rounds of ammunition for my weapon. I was
concerned that so many young reservists were being deployed so
poorly prepared. Nevertheless, the regular instructors did do
their best with the time allowed." How would you respond
to that? This is somebody at the sharp end, somebody who actually
took part in the whole thing and was not impressed.
Brigadier Farquhar: The first
thing I would say is that you are absolutely right that for TELIC
1, for the third time round this particular buoy, the timing was
tight. Some of the pre-deployment training at the RTMC was not
perhaps, in terms of time, as we would have wished because people
had to move through. As I have alluded to already, we were mobilising
the largest numbers since Suez and we had these critical time
lines to meet. We acknowledge that some of our training regimes
were not perhaps as robust as they could have been at the RTMC.
In addition, though, individuals when deployed to their units
all did an element of pre-operational training with their unit.
Not only did they have the RTMC package, as we call it, which
in the early days was brief, but they also did in-theatre training
with unit prior to being deployed on operation. There were two
bites of the cherry to train individuals and to integrate individuals
in the reserve into the army. In terms of the RTMC package, you
do expect the Territorial Army individuals and the majority to
come trained to a standard. On that five-day package with the
RTMC, we are there to ensure that they have the essential individual
skills prior to deploying to do their pre-op training: for example,
firing their weapon; the nuclear, biological, chemical and defence
aspects; and the law of armed conflict. These essential skills
are put into that package. We are looking now to making, as I
have alluded to already, and have done, some changes to that pre-deployment
package. I would like to think that example, which is helpful
in terms of making the process better, will not reoccur.
Q1142 Mr Cran: Just so that the Committee
is clear about this, in essence, you are therefore agreeing with
what this officer said?
Brigadier Farquhar: I have not
seen it.
Q1143 Mr Cran: Let me quote that
again. "I was concerned that so many young reservists were
being deployed so poorly prepared". These are very clear
words.
Brigadier Farquhar: I would dispute
"poorly prepared" but I would have to look at the case
in detail. We feel that whilst, as I say, the training was perhaps
not as Rolls-Royce as we would wish, it was adequate, particularly
with those being trained, when integrated with their units.
Q1144 Mr Cran: I suppose that is
a judgment the Committee, in the fullness of time, will have to
make because we have to set on one side of the scales the fact
that all were successful. The question is, and I come back to
the words I used: how close run was the whole thing? It is something
to ponder on.
Brigadier The Duke of Westminster:
Recognising what Andrew has said, I actually went to visit on
a number of occasions the pre-deployment training. I have to say
that those soldiers to whom I spoke during that period, and indeed
that process, recognised that there was a degree of haste that
had to be encouraged, or indeed had to be used. The point about
in-theatre training is very important, and indeed the training
that TA soldiers actually do get whilst in their drill halls.
I have to say that I do not recognise those words, with the over
hundreds of soldiers I spoke to, volunteers and so forth, who
went through that process of training.
Lieutenant General Palmer: On
the basis of one letter by one officer, clearly we cannot gainsay
the fact that he felt he was inadequately trained and he may have
felt that others felt they were, too. The fact is that I have
also talked to many reservists, I have been out there, and this
is not something which is a very common thread that runs through
my experience of discussing this issue with the reserves. As we
acknowledged, we would always have liked more time. Did we send
people there who were not trained to do the job and therefore
were in danger themselves or endangered others? No, I would categorically
deny that.
Q1145 Mr Cran: You will not put me
off because I am going to quote him again. He goes on to say:
"In terms of how we were treated in the dilapidated training
camp at Beckingham, we were effectively kept as prisoners. No-one
was allowed out of the camp, even for a run. One could not even
maintain personal fitness." Did you know about this?
Lieutenant General Palmer: No.
Q1146 Mr Cran: Does it concern you?
Lieutenant General Palmer: We
are training people for war, and he is saying that he was not
allowed out of the camp in the three days, or whatever, he was
there. If he is saying on the one hand there was not enough time
and then on the other hand he is complaining that he was not given
free time, then there seems to be a case of incompatibility in
what he is saying.
Q1147 Mr Cran: Did you know about
this?
Lieutenant General Palmer: No,
I did not know about that. This is the first time I have heard
it.
Q1148 Mr Cran: Should you have known
about it?
Lieutenant General Palmer: The
fact that one officer wrote to you?
Q1149 Mr Cran: No, the fact that,
in relation to this particular camp, in this particular time frame,
he says they were kept almost as prisoners and not allowed out
of the camp?
Lieutenant General Palmer: That
is not a common thread that is running through what reserves are
telling us. On the specific point, all I am saying is that if
people were not allowed out because there was training to do and
we were short of time to do it, it does not altogether surprise
me, if they are going off to war, that they were not allowed out.
I cannot comment on why he felt he was treated like a prisoner.
Q1150 Mr Cran: All the Committee
wants to know is if your explanation is the correct one, namely:
a short time frame in which to do the training, and that might
explain what he was saying. There may be another reason.
Brigadier Farquhar: I have been
up to Beckingham and also to the RHU, as we call it. I do not
recognise that at all. Individuals worked extremely hard to get
trained in the time. They still do, even now, but I do not recognise
a suggestion that he was not allowed to go out of camp and he
was treated like a prisoner at all.
Q1151 Mr Cran: Just so that the Committee
knows, are the regular troops treated in exactly the same way
a those who were employed? Were they, as it were, incarcerated,
to use that word?
Lieutenant General Palmer: All
I can say is that—
Q1152 Mr Cran: Do not get exasperated,
General. We are simply asking.
Lieutenant General Palmer: As
a policy, all I would say is that if the operational requirement
is that they are kept from going out for a very good operational
reason, which is explained to them, I would entirely accept that
is the decision of the commander. There is no reason why they
should not be allowed out, except for operational reasons. That
is the only criterion that should be used to determine whether
they go out or not, from a policy perspective.
Brigadier Farquhar: Having been
in a similar situation and having seen reserves training for other
theatres in the world, normally speaking, they are delighted that
they are fully focused on the training activities, particularly
when time is short, in order that they can perform properly in
operations. I am afraid I do not recognise that description of
incarceration at all.
Q1153 Mr Cran: All you have said
of course hangs together. The Committee, I think, is entitled
to listen to others who actually took part in it and who, it would
appear, were not particularly impressed by their experiences.
Just to finish this off: "I also raised concerns that there
were no toilet rolls and filthy and ancient latrines" and
so on and forth. Clearly there was a long catalogue of complaints.
Are you looking into this?
Lieutenant General Palmer: As
I have said, as they go through the RTMC and as they return from
theatre, we are talking to them and collecting that data. The
initial cut of that data is that the broad experience that our
reservists have had has been a good one. You would expect me to
say that but that is exactly what the data is saying. We know
that there were problems with some of the Ministry's support because
of the time constraints, and inevitably with the scale of the
operation of the army mobilisation, perhaps every "i"
was not dotted in the way we would wish, but we are learning all
the time from the lessons, and we hope that the perception of
an experience like that will not be repeated.
Q1154 Mr Jones: Can I ask about the
length of the call-out and the reasons for extending the call-out?
Could you describe what the process was and how it was communicated
to individuals? We understand that the length of time was six
months, with possibly two months' training. When we were in Iraq,
we heard that in a number of cases that had been extended longer
than that. To quote an article from The Daily Telegraph
of 29 May by Neil Tweedie, I think referring to an RAF driver:
"I couldn't believe it when my boss called me in and told
me that the vast majority of RAF reservists would be going home
soon, but that I and some other drivers would be kept on at the
base to provide cover for the firemen's strike." What was
the method of communicating to people how long they would be away
and, if it was changed, what was the method? Can I also ask another
question in terms of the individual remit in Iraq? They did not
know how long they were going to be out there.
Lieutenant General Palmer: If
I can give you the story on policy and then the others can come
in, you are quite right, the call-out basically was, according
to the rules, one year every three years. That is well known.
When the call-out happened, obviously we were not sure how long
the operation was going to last. We did accept that it was unreasonable
not to tell people, employers as well, roughly how long people
would be away. What we did was to set that at about nine months,
but we did say it might be twelve or it might be less. The nine
months is made up of six month deployment with two months' training
and leave, always in proportion to that effect. That is basically
what we did. By and large, that is what happened.
Brigadier Farquhar: What the General
says is absolutely right. We were unsure of the period of time
that the reservists would have to be mobilised. We said that the
planning figure was six months in theatre with a month either
side in terms of pre-deployment training, and then post-deployment
activities and leave. That eight to nine month period was the
period they were warned for. Everybody was then told that the
situation was fluid, that nobody really knew exactly how things
would go, and it could be that those time lines would change.
The six months in-theatre time was the standard brief that people
received.
Q1155 Mr Jones: I can recall one
Serviceman in Basra who did not know how long he was going to
be there. I was interested to know how that was communicated to
families and also to employers. He was very concerned, obviously,
that he had not been given a date or an indication of when we
would be going back to his employer. The concern was that his
employer would be rather concerned that this indeterminate length
or period would obviously make it difficult for the reservist
to return to his civilian job.
Brigadier Farquhar: All I say
to that is that his chain of command should be being updated on
the situation and the requirement for that individual or that
unit to stay in theatre. That information was then going, firstly,
to that individual, hopefully in a timely manner, and he then
as an individual can communicate it through a variety of mediums.
Q1156 Mr Jones: He would have to
tell his employer.
Brigadier Farquhar: That is one
chain, he himself as an individual having been informed of the
likely dates. The other chain is back through the chain of command
into the integrated mobilisation centre in theatre, which then
passes data about the likely return dates for units and reserves
who would be demobilised into the integrated mobilised centre
at land command, and that is then passed to the chain of command
in the United Kingdom. Through the chain of command talking to
family and the Employer Support Organisation talking to employers
we hope to cascade the information. In the early stages some of
that information was very fluid indeed but we tried the best we
could to get that information across. I would also make one final
comment on employers, at the moment we do not demand that our
reserves inform their employers about their reserve role so clearly
those who had not informed them or indeed those who did not wish
us to discuss dates with employers we did not do so. That was
another constraint.
Q1157 Mr Viggers: The system of financial
support for those who have been through it has been widely criticised
as intrusive and bureaucratic, what is now being done to review
this? What do you think has been the effect so far on goodwill
of the previous system?
Lieutenant General Palmer: First
of all I agree that it is bureaucratic, it has been an irritation
to the reservists and we are in the process of making it clearer
and more simpler so that they do not have to go through a very
bureaucratic and quite intrusive process. It has not cleared all
of the stages yet. I can reassure you that it is a major lesson
learned so far and one that is at the heart of what we are taking
forward immediately. I hope, because it will require some form
of legislation, that we will have something in place, all things
being equal, some time early next year.
Mr Viggers: Very good.
Q1158 Mr Jones: Have you also looked
at the effects that calling up reserves has? I can quote one example
of a woman in the North East who had a part-time bar job, her
husband was a former miner on incapacity benefit and it took her
husband out of certain benefits, is this an area you will look
at?
Lieutenant General Palmer: My
view in personnel is that we should look at all individual cases
where hardship has been caused.
Q1159 Mr Jones: Do you think because
a partner gets called up to serve for their country their other
half should lose out?
Lieutenant General Palmer: I do
not think that is good. We would certainly look into it, if you
would like to give me more details I will get back to you with
an answer.
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