Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1260
- 1279)
WEDNESDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2003
AIR MARSHAL
GLENN TORPY
CBE DSO AND AIR
COMMODORE CHRIS
NICKOLS
Q1260 Mike Gapes: What kind of targets
were they?
Air Marshal Torpy: They were command
and control targets which were likely to cause a significant amount
of collateral damage, either in terms of damage to infrastructure,
civilian infrastructure, or civilian casualties.
Q1261 Mike Gapes: Mainly because
of their location in cities.
Air Marshal Torpy: Correct.
Q1262 Mr Cran: First Reflections,
a document which I am sure you have read and to which may even
have contributed, for all I know, made it very clear that a key
element in the overall performance of British air forces was the
"considerable experience of coalition operations with the
US in the Gulf region". I wonder if you would talk us through
that and say why that is important.
Air Marshal Torpy: To those people
who are not familiar with air operations, I think it sometimes
comes as a surprise at their very high level of integration. We
have—and we have had ever since we started operations under
the NATO umbrella in the Cold War—packages of aircraft flying
around the skies, where we would have, for instance, RAF Tornados
flying with American fighters, being controlled by an American
E3D, talking to maybe British controllers on the ground. So it
is a very sophisticated and highly coordinated exercise. Trying
to bring aircraft together in the same piece of sky and then putting
a package of aircraft against a particular target needs very close
coordination. Air is also used across the battle space according
to the priorities of the overall commander, and, as a consequence
of that, it is impossible to say we are going to use UK air in
this particular area of Iraq. It is spread. Our particular capability
may be used in a particular 24-hour period in one particular part
of Iraq in a particular time as well. So it needs very close coordination.
As a result of that requirement, from our experience in NATO,
then our experience in the first Gulf war, then in Kosovo, all
the exercises that we have done on a very, very regular basis
with the United States' Air Force, we have forged a very close
relationship at every single level, from the 4* level right down
to the pilots on the front line. We understand and we try wherever
possible to make sure that our doctrine is exactly the same and
wherever possible we are inter-operable in terms of equipment,
communications and also the mindset of the way that we approach
a problem as well. Where there are likely points of conflict,
my job, as the UK Air Contingent Commander, was to make sure that
I highlighted those to the American 3* and we made sure we could
work round them. Targeting is one of those issues on which there
will inevitably be conflicts, because there could be subtle differences
between the delegation that he is given and the one that I am
given, and we needed to make sure that we both understood where
that friction may occur.
Q1263 Mr Cran: With the exception
of targeting which you have just explained, do you feel there
were any areas where the level of integration was not as high
as it might have been? You have already given the general picture,
put against that the particular, would you have any comments to
make?
Air Marshal Torpy: No, I think
across all of the roles we used the same procedures, the same
doctrine—except for very minor differences and for good
reasons. I have touched already on air-land integration and the
American Air Force had exactly the same experience that we had
had as well, and we are now working very closely with our American
colleagues to see how we can improve that level of integration,
improve the procedures, improve the training. So I think the lessons
are exactly the same for all of us.
Q1264 Mr Cran: Because there is a
likelihood that the Americans will be involved in quite a lot
of future actions, such as the one we are talking about, your
view is that a pre-requisite of being able to take part in that
is the sort of integration you are talking about. Do I deduce
from what you have said that there are not many countries that
do have that close level of integration with American practice
other than ourselves and maybe one or two others?
Air Marshal Torpy: I think that
is very fair comment. Indeed, we are very conscious that we are
likely to lose the opportunity that we have had for the last 12
years to fly so closely alongside the American Air Force in the
no-fly zones and somehow we have to replace that opportunity with
mutual training opportunities, be it in Europe, be it in the United
States.
Q1265 Mr Cran: And that is actively
being pursued?
Air Marshal Torpy: That is actively
being pursued.
Mr Cran: Thank you.
Q1266 Mr Viggers: The degree of integration
you describe is very impressive. May I ask how a nation which
is not an integrated military structure, namely France, would
integrate in this manner? Could you comment on the practical effects
of not being in the integrated military structure?
Air Marshal Torpy: I think on
the command and control side it makes life slightly more difficult.
There is no doubt that we benefited not just in terms of our structures
but also in terms of our personal relationships with senior American
air force officers, most of us have known each other for many
years, from when we were young pilots, squadron commanders, base
commanders, and that has been very helpful. But on a tactical
level, in terms of physically flying together, because of our
NATO experience and because in the air NATO doctrine is very similar,
if not exactly the same, as the RAF doctrine and the United States
Air Force doctrine, then we rarely have any difficulty in operating
alongside other nations' air forces in an integrated package of
aircraft. I think Kosovo is a prime example of that, where we
had actually very little difficulty integrating a large number
of different air forces together in a very complex air operation.
In general, I think air is better placed than the other two environments
by dint of the character of our operations and the highly integrated
nature of our operations.
Q1267 Mr Viggers: That is the positive
side. I am interested in the negative side as well. What is the
practical implication of not being in the integrated military
structure from the air point of view?
Air Marshal Torpy: I do not think
there are many disadvantages, to be quite honest, in that we still
have regular exercises with, for instance, the French air force,
with the other NATO nations. As I have said, I think at a tactical
level, we do not have any difficulty in doing that. We make sure
we maintain our links with a variety of different European air
forces to make sure that, if there are subtle differences between
our doctrine, we understand where those differences are. When
it comes to planning an operation, we have done it under a NATO
umbrella and we understand the potential problems that that may
or may not introduce. When it comes to a coalition of the willing—which
is effectively what we were operating under in these particular
circumstances—it requires nations to be integrated into
the command structure as comprehensively as possible, so that
they can contribute and have visibility of the planning and the
execution of the operation. I think we saw that during Operation
Enduring Freedom, where nations were invited down to Headquarters
Centcom in Tampa to make sure that people had visibility of how
the planning and execution was going to be conducted and how it
was conducted.
Air Commodore Nickols: May I just
add, I think, outside the NATO arena, a classic example of that
is Australia. Really the air environment, while it is not worldwide,
most of the procedures are very similar, and it is not difficult
to integrate into a coalition for a nation like that.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q1268 Mr Roy: Can we turn now to
aspects of the campaign itself. We know that the initial stages
of an air campaign would normally be aimed at suppressing enemy's
air defences. However, it was slightly different in Iraq, in the
sense of the timing. Were there problems because the ground campaign
had started so quickly?
Air Marshal Torpy: This was, I
think, one of the major evolutions in the campaign plan. When
we started doing the initial plan, we constructed it in a similar
manner to that seen during the first Gulf war and during Kosovo,
with a discrete phase, in which air was going to be used to shape
the battle space so that it would set the conditions for the land
component and the maritime component as well. As we developed
our thinking, gained more intelligence, there was a shortening
of that phase and it came down in the early part of this year
from approximately 16 days down to a matter of five days. I think
that was driven even closer together, as we got closer to the
likelihood of the operation being executed, for three factors
really. First of all, there was a growing realisation that we
needed to secure the southern oil fields as swiftly as possible
to prevent any subsequent damage, because we always realised that
the southern oil fields were going to be key to the long-term
future of Iraq. There was a nervousness by the American land component
and by General Franks over the vulnerability of having a very
large land contingent in a fairly small area in Kuwait and the
likelihood of a threat from Iraqi forces, possibly an asymmetric
threat. Also, I believe that General Franks felt that if he had
the ability to synchronise the components together as comprehensively
and coherently as possible then he would have the highest possible
chance of dislocating the regime as swiftly as possible and getting
the campaign over and done with as quickly as possible. As I say,
as our thinking matured and as the plan developed, we believed
that we could bring what was commonly known as A and G day closer
and closer together. We also always need to remember that the
enemy have a vote in this and you have to be able to respond to
something the enemy does, and that is exactly what we did in those
last two days.
Q1269 Mr Roy: You started by describing
it as the evolution of the campaign. Would that evolution have
been different if the Iraqis had a more sophisticated air defence
system? Would you have been allowed to carry on the way you did?
Air Marshal Torpy: That would
certainly have had to be factored into our thinking. The risk
of bringing A and G day together basically left the air component
with five simultaneous tasks and there then would have to be a
prioritisation on resources. The five tasks really were: to counter
the theatre of ballistic missile threat throughout Iraq, particularly
to the west; to service the strategic attack targets (which were
deemed to be those targets which were most likely to deliver the
regime downfall as quickly as possible) and the security forces
command—so command and control in general; to secure air
superiority as quickly as possible, and that meant we had to prevent
the Iraqi air force from flying; to reduce the effectiveness of
the integrated air defence system; to support the land component
with his operation against the oil fields, and we also had to
degrade the Republican Guard divisions, so that once the land
component started his move towards Baghdad, momentum would not
be halted as he proceeded towards Baghdad; and then, finally,
we had to support special forces' activity throughout Iraq as
well. So the air component's nervousness in compressing the campaign,
was (a) would he have the resources to carry out those tasks?
and (b) would he be able to execute, for instance, gaining air
superiority in sufficient time for him to be able to do some of
the other tasks?
Q1270 Mr Roy: Were any of you surprised
that the Iraqi air force did not deploy? Do you think you prevented
them flying or do you think another decision was made by the Iraqis?
I do not want you claiming some honour that you did not really
deserve here! Did they decide they just were not going to deploy?
Air Marshal Torpy: To be quite
honest, we still do not know. I think we were surprised that they
did not fly at all. We had a very robust air defence plan in anticipation
that they may fly. We also had a very robust plan to keep closed
those air fields from which we knew they were likely to operate
as well. They had also obviously been watching the way we had
been operating in the no-fly zones for 12 years, so they had a
good knowledge of our capability and they inevitably also knew
what we had brought into theatre as well.
Q1271 Mr Roy: What difference would
it have made if they had deployed?
Air Marshal Torpy: I do not think
a lot would have been different. Part of the plan was a significant
amount of effort in making sure that the five main airfields were
going to be closed. We achieved that on the first night. As I
say, we also had a very robust defensive counter air plan, with
fighters deployed 24 hours of the day to ensure that, if an aircraft
did fly, we would be able to make sure it did not fly for very
long.
Q1272 Mr Roy: This campaign obviously
was a significant effort by yourselves and by the people you command.
I know the RAF flew 2,500 sorties. Did you have sufficient aircrew?
Air Marshal Torpy: We did have
sufficient aircrew. When we go into combat operations, we work
on the premise that we need 2:1 manning, and that is in our defence
planning assumptions.
Q1273 Mr Roy: That is 2:1 aircrew
to air frames?
Air Marshal Torpy: That is correct.
But we also put some military judgment on that, knowing what the
campaign plan is, the likely rate of effort, we may say, "Actually,
our judgment is we do not need quite as many as that," or,
indeed, "We may need more than that." Broadly speaking,
though, on our tactical platforms, like Tornados and Harriers,
our manning was 2:1.
Q1274 Mr Roy: On the significant
effort, was the operational tempo affected by any manning shortages?
Air Marshal Torpy: Not at all,
and the whole way that we constructed our force structure was
to make sure that it was sustainable, in material terms and in
personnel terms as well. We clearly have a say in how often our
aircraft are tasked on the air tasking order. We know the tasks
which are out there, we know what capabilities are most needed,
and we pace the use of those aircraft to make sure that we can
sustain them over a long period.
Q1275 Mr Roy: On the subject of pace—and
I am sorry to hypothetical—how long could you have sustained
that campaign you were carrying out?
Air Marshal Torpy: As long as
it was required.
Q1276 Chairman: Come on.
Air Marshal Torpy: I mean, in
all seriousness—
Q1277 Chairman: You have been attending
the Simon Webb school of evasion and obfuscation.
Air Marshal Torpy: No, we had
looked at the plan and we had said, "We may have to conduct
this operation for six months." We were more than able to
sustain our level of activity over that period.
Q1278 Mr Roy: That is slightly more
clear. What are the long term implications of the current manning
state?
Air Marshal Torpy: I am not quite
sure I understand your question.
Q1279 Mr Roy: With regards to the
tempo, for example, you said how long it could last. I am trying
to think long term.
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes. We are
obviously in the recuperation phase at the moment. We only have
a small number of aircraft committed to the operation at the moment,
so we are able to reconstitute fairly swiftly. In terms of our
operational capability, we are virtually now at the stage we were
before the start of the campaign. The only thing we are looking
to do now is to replenish weapons' stocks.
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