Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1300
- 1319)
WEDNESDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2003
AIR MARSHAL
GLENN TORPY
CBE DSO AND AIR
COMMODORE CHRIS
NICKOLS
Q1300 Rachel Squire: Air Marshal,
can I pick up on some of your comments so far on precision-guided
munitions. Our information is, as you have already said, that
they were a particular success of the Iraq campaign. Can you say
whether the RAF involvement in the air campaign was restricted
by the limited UK stocks of precision-guided munitions?
Air Marshal Torpy: The simple
answer to your question is that it was not limited. We had good
stocks of our Enhanced Paveway, which was the new bomb. We had
good stocks of our older laser-guided Paveway II and Paveway III
weapons. We clearly had a limited stock of Storm Shadow, because
it was just coming on to the production line; but it was adequate
for the targets that the Americans particularly wanted us to fire
against. Overall, I was very satisfied with our weapons stocks
for the length of campaign that we envisaged.
Q1301 Rachel Squire: Just picking
up on your mention of Storm Shadow; although it was produced as
an urgent operational requirement, your view was that sufficient
numbers of Storm Shadow missiles were available for the use that
you required of them.
Air Marshal Torpy: That is correct.
If more had been available, we could probably have found suitable
targets to use them against, but they were predominantly used
in the first few days of the target where they were targeted against
particularly hard command-control targets, for which they were
highly suitable.
Q1302 Rachel Squire: Can you tell
us today, or provide us with information in writing, on the exact
number of Storm Shadow missiles that were launched and that were
considered to be successful?
Air Marshal Torpy: I can follow
that up with a note to the Committee. Twenty-seven were fired.
The detail of the weapons effects and such like are clearly classified,
and we would have to follow it up.[4]
Q1303 Rachel Squire: I was going
to ask you about the targeting criteria adopted, but you have
already referred to that, particularly the priority being given
to avoidance of collateral damage—and you also said you
would write to us on other things. Can I come on to the Brimstone
air-launched anti-armour weapon which was originally supposed
to be in service in October 2002. It would then have been available.
Can I ask you to comment on the impact of not having the Brimstone
for October?
Air Marshal Torpy: There is no
doubt that, as the air component commander, I would have liked
to have Brimstone as one of the weapons which the crews might
have had available. I think it would have had utility in certain
circumstances against certain target categories. It was a weapon
that, clearly, I would have liked to have used if it had become
available. We did look at the feasibility of accelerating the
programme, but we eventually took a judgment that with our other
weapon stocks and the types of targets, it was unlikely we would
be able to progress the programme sufficiently quickly to be able
to use it in theatre in the way that we would like to use it.
Q1304 Rachel Squire: If you had had
Brimstone, would you have dropped fewer cluster bombs?
Air Marshal Torpy: In likelihood,
we probably would have dropped fewer cluster bombs, yes.
Q1305 Rachel Squire: Can you comment
on the criteria you used to assess the need to use cluster bombs
in the operation?
Air Marshal Torpy: In judging
the weapons you use against any particular target, it is very
much a judgment left to the crew, who have the detailed knowledge
of the effect they are trying to achieve and the target make-up.
Cluster weapons are obviously particularly relevant in the context
of soft-skin vehicles, lightly armoured vehicles, and on occasions
against heavy armour light tanks as well, particularly if they
are grouped together. That is where cluster bombs offer a higher
likelihood of killing more vehicles than one precision-guided
weapon. Those are the sort of circumstances and considerations
that the crew would have when judging what weapon to use against
a target centre.
Q1306 Rachel Squire: We were talking
earlier about how the years of joint training and operations have
brought the RAF and the USAF very close together in terms of co-operation
and co-ordination. Can you therefore comment on the RAF's use
of cluster bombs as compared to the Americans' use of cluster
bombs? Are the criteria similar?
Air Marshal Torpy: We all go through
exactly the same thought process in terms of using the most appropriate
weapon against a particular target set, taking into account collateral
damage and such like as well. I think we use exactly the same
principles.
Q1307 Mr Havard: Are the cluster
weapons used by the RAF and Americans set up the same for the
munitions that are on the ground?
Air Marshal Torpy: I cannot speak
in detail about the American weapons, so I cannot answer your
question.
Q1308 Mr Havard: My understanding
is that you can set them in such a way that the things will degrade
quicker.
Air Marshal Torpy: I cannot speak
for the American weapons, I am afraid. Our weapons do not do that.
Air Commodore Nickols: On the
point about cluster weapons, you have to bear in mind the risk
to your own crews, and if, with a cluster weapon had the opportunity,
with a close-knit group of enemy vehicles, you are content with
only one pass of your own aircraft instead of ten passes. That
has to be taken into account because all the time you have got
to look at the risk to your air crews as well.
Q1309 Mr Viggers: You have explained
that Jaguar was not used and that reconnaissance carrying pods
were fitted to other aircraft instead. Why was Jaguar not used?
Air Marshal Torpy: It was purely
a factor of trying to find some additional room at various places
to locate this aircraft. I was quite keen to use them because
we knew that tactical reconnaissance is a very important capability.
It is a niche capability that the RAF has developed over the years.
I believe they would have had utility, as we had later in the
campaign, and why we put the Jaguar recce pod on to both the Harrier
and the Tornado. We were balancing the capabilities we needed
and looked at what we would have to displace if we brought Jaguar
in. Our judgment was that for that particular part of the campaign,
it was better to stick with the structure that we had decided
on, in the knowledge that we could put work in hand to bring the
Jaguar recce pod on to the Harrier and Tornado later on where
we always knew we were likely to need more surveillance as we
transitioned into Phase 4.
Air Commodore Nickols: You have
to remember that Jaguars were operating on Operation Northern
Watch, fully supporting that right up to the start of the main
campaign, so they would not have been available to switch to the
south until a very late stage anyway.
Q1310 Mr Viggers: In relation to
battle damage assessment, are there cultural differences between
the manner of assessing battle damage by the Americans and the
British?
Air Marshal Torpy: No, not at
all. Battle damage assessment is obviously a vital part of the
whole execution process, which really starts with finding a target,
identifying it as a target, and tracking it if it is a mobile
target. If you decide to engage it, you then go through the process
of deciding what you are doing to engage it with; carry out the
engagement and create the effect you want. The final part of that
equation is the battle damage assessment. You judge the effect
you have had—"do I need to re-visit that target; have
I created the effect I wanted?" It is a vital part of the
whole process. The areas in that process that remain a real challenge
are identifying the target, tracking it, it if it is a small target,
and then the assessment afterwards. We have a vast array of collection
platforms and collection capability. Joining that information
together remains a challenge. As we improve our technical means
in employing network-centric capabilities, then we will be able
to get a better fused product, which would provide to the commander
and his staffs the ability to improve both the speed and accuracy
of battle damage assessment. I do not think it was perfect by
any stretch of the imagination, and it is one of those areas we
have identified where we need to put a lot of effort.
Q1311 Mr Viggers: You anticipated
my question. I was going to ask whether lessons were learned in
terms of communication policy and communication between the Air
Force and the Army. Are the systems capable of informing troops
on the ground of the results?
Air Marshal Torpy: Communications
internally within the UK component is one of the major lessons
of the UK out of this whole operation, and I think Air Marshal
Burridge mentioned it in his evidence to the Committee. At the
moment, we do not have a system like the Americans have, SIPRNET,
which is used by all the components and allows very ready communication
at every level between every different component in the force.
We have discrete systems which are joined through suitable gateways,
but it is not as efficient or as robust as the US system. Again,
it has been identified as a major lesson, and indeed there is
already work in hand with the Defence Information Infrastructure
to provide the UK Forces with a system which will be comparable
and compatible with the American system.
Q1312 Rachel Squire: You mentioned
earlier about close air support and how the core skill is air-land
integration. You said that whilst there seems to be considerable
satisfaction with the US Air Force and RAF co-operation, there
does not appear to be the same level of peacetime exercise that
took place prior to Operation Telic between land forces and US
air forces. If that is the case, and there was a lack in that
land-air support area, did it contribute to the need for further
refinement and practice? Did even contribute to the friendly fire
incidents?
Air Marshal Torpy: As I mentioned
in my other answer, air/land integration is without doubt one
of those areas where we need to do more. We identified it before
the campaign started. I think we are probably victims of past
campaigns in that Operation Desert Storm was a discrete air operation
followed by a short land campaign, and very little integrated
air-land operation took place. Afghanistan was the first time
we saw closer integration between air and land, but on a relatively
small scale in terms of the land component. This was the first
operation that I have certainly seen for many years where we have
seen such close linkage between the air and land components. As
a consequence of the last ten years' experience, we have forgotten
some of the things that we were quite good at during the Cold
War, where we had a very closely integrated air-land battle. There
was an organisation called the Air Support Operation Centre, whose
job it is to co-ordinate air-land operations. We have probably
neglected the exercising of those over the years, for the reasons
I have explained. There is a lot of work going on now on both
sides of the Atlantic between our air forces and our respective
armies, to look at how we can refine our procedures and create
training opportunities where we can on a routine basis—I
would hope daily—with air crew working with our land colleagues,
doing all the things which we saw we would have to do during this
operation. Importantly, we also need to exercise the whole command
and control organisation from the Combined Air Operations Centre
through the ASOC at a tactical level, with air controllers, be
they on the ground, in the air or whatever. There is a lot of
attention going into that area as we speak; and it was going on
before the operation started.
Q1313 Rachel Squire: That is clearly
very good news, and I can take from that that some of your traditional
training exercises are actively being examined in the light of
the Iraq experience. Would you like to comment on whether you
will require additional funding to implement the lessons on close
air support that have been gleaned from Operation Telic?
Air Marshal Torpy: There are probably
two aspects to this. First, there are the processes—and
we can sort that out and that will not have significant cost implications.
Exercising may have some cost implications, depending on where
we have to go to do these sorts of exercises. I know that we will
be able to do some of that training in the UK. The British Army
already train in a place called BATUS. We sent aircraft last year
and this year to BATUS to start training in a more integrated
manner with the British Army. The United States Air Force and
Army have an exercise, and I hope we will be able to integrate
that training in the course of our normal exercise programme.
There may be additional resources required, but I do not know
yet. There is also an equipment element to this as well. I mentioned
in answer to another question about the need for more targeting
pods, and ideally every aircraft which is going to be operating
in a Close Air Support environment or Kill-box Interdiction environment
should have a targeting pod so that he can identify targets. As
we get increasing stand-off with our weapons, we will need improved
pods which can identify targets at greater stand-off ranges. So
there may be a resource bill in due course for that, but it would
have to sit within the priorities of the overall programme, clearly.
Q1314 Rachel Squire: Can I ask you
about the comments of General John Jumper, the USAF Chief of Staff,
who I understand has greatly increased US Air Force support to
the Army by using strategic B52s and B1s. Does the RAF intend
to follow his example?
Air Marshal Torpy: One of the
aspects which came out of the campaign was the utility of the
large bomber force, be it B1s, B2s, B52s. They have persistence
and they have a large payload, but they have to have the environment
to be able to operate. Our ability to gain air supremacy quickly
enables us to use those aircraft to the fullest extent. Whether
that will always be the case I do not know. We would like to be
able to create the conditions so you can use those sorts of assets,
but there will possibly be circumstances where they cannot be
used. As always, it is about having a balanced structure. The
United States Air Force clearly has the resources to have capabilities
that our Air Force will never be able to have. I do not think
probably our Air Force needs a squadron of B1s or a squadron of
B2s—
Q1315 Chairman: Can we dig up the
V bombers? The B52s are going to be older than I am before they
are retired.
Air Marshal Torpy: They certainly
will be, Mr Chairman.
Q1316 Mike Gapes: I want to ask you
further about how you allocated your forces to provide air support
to land forces, when air support was requested. Can you go through
how that process works?
Air Marshal Torpy: As I mentioned,
in constructing a day's flying activity—and we are talking
here about anything between 2,000 and 2,500 sorties—the
process would have gone through the CAOC planning. We would have
identified certain tasks and certain target sets which fall out
of that. A request will come up from each component—land
component, maritime component, special forces component, the air
component—"I need, in an ideal world, these targets
to be serviced in a 24-hour period". Inevitably, we will
not be able to service all those targets because there will be
insufficient resources, so we then prioritise. The staff in the
CAOC do that in consultation with the components, so we match
capability with resources and come out with agreed targets that
we are going to attack. It then comes down to allocating the most
appropriate platform to a particular target set. That is one of
the reasons why in the CAOC there are experts on each of our weapons
platforms, and they are involved in that target or that platform
allocation process where they say, "for that particular target,
a GR4 with Enhanced Paveway is the ideal platform." That,
in general terms, is the process that goes on. That is exactly
the same with Close Air Support and kill-box interdiction as well;
it is trying to match a particular platform and its capabilities
to the particular task. It may be that, for instance, a Harrier,
which is fairly short range and short endurance, will be used
closer to its base than, say, a Tornado GR4, which has a longer
range and can be used deeper into the battle space. It is impossible,
for instance, to say, "we are only going to use UK aircraft
to support the UK land force" because that would be an inefficient
use of air power. Inevitably, we would not have sufficient UK
assets to provide cover for instance to a UK land component 24
hours a day. That is why air power has always been used and planned
on centralised methodology; and then we decentralise the execution
of the operation. It is trying to make the best use of the resources
across the battle space and in time.
Air Commodore Nickols: The percentage
of sorties that go into any particular type of activity is decided
at the joint level—and that was General Franks in this case.
It is not decided by the Air Commander. He then gets on and allocates
that. The other point that is perhaps worth making is that of
those sorties that are allocated in direct support of the land
commander, he decides what they do; the Air Commander does not;
he merely sends them to where the land commander needs them to
do his business.
Q1317 Mike Gapes: There were liaison
cells with the land forces and an embedding of this network in
the Air Operation Co-ordination Centre; but how did they work
in practice? Do you think there are lessons you will have learned
from it? Will they be a regular feature of future operations?
Air Marshal Torpy: You are absolutely
right. I have already mentioned that I believe the Air Support
Operation Centres are one of the areas to look at where we could
train more appropriately and more regularly as well. There were
two distinct aspects to this in the execution of Iraqi Freedom,
in the use of US marine-air, and I would say other air. The US
Marine Corps has a highly integrated force structure, because
their air is used really to supplement their long-range artillery
that the US Army or our Army has. As a consequence of that, they
are highly integrated and used as long-range artillery. As a consequence,
their equivalent of the Air Support Operation Centre is exercised
on a very regular basis. I would not say that that was the same
for the 5 Corps ASOC which was controlling a lot of the other
air. We need to draw the lessons from the level of training and
integration that the US Marine Corps achieved and translate those
lessons across to the exercising procedures used by the other
ASOCs.
Q1318 Mr Cran: It is our understanding
that the US Marine Corps has its own close air support aircraft
and that these were not pooled during the campaign. Can you confirm
whether that was or was not the case? The more interesting proposition
is that Air Marshal Burridge told us that the Marine Corps model
was worth looking at for the British Air Force. I am bound to
say that that confused me, but I would like to ask what is your
view of that, and if that does not clear up my confusion, I will
tell you what it is.
Air Marshal Torpy: It leads on
from my previous answer. You are correct in saying that the US
Marine Corps—the first priority was to support the 1st Marine
Expedition Force. Any excess sorties were then offered to the
CFAC to be used throughout the battle space. We can argue as to
whether that is the way it should have been done, and we can have
a debate with our US colleagues on that. There are some very good
lessons to be learnt from the way that the US Marine Corps is
integrated together, and the way in which they operate their aircraft.
I do not think though, from the UK perspective, that we should
follow that model of having direct support allocated to a particular
army unit. I say that because of comments I made earlier about
the way that air is used across the complete battle space. We
need to make sure that those resources are used most appropriately
at a particular phase in an operation. If you attach a particular
piece of air to a particular ground formation, that will inevitably
lead to inefficient use of air. We need to pick out the good bits,
and there are some very good bits in the way the US Marine Corps
integrate their air together. We need to make sure that those
good lessons are translated into the good doctrinal practices
that I believe we do have for use and control of our air.
Q1319 Mr Cran: What are the good
bits?
Air Marshal Torpy: I think the
Air Support Operations Centre is well exercised. Predominantly
it is exercised on a very regular basis, and as a result of that,
their performance is good. That is one of the major lessons that
I would take out of the whole operation. In all other respects,
their procedures are exactly the same as those used throughout
the rest of the air operation—Kill-box Interdiction, Close
Air Support. They are exactly the same; it was just the efficiency
of the way the air was integrated together in the US Marine Corps.
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