Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1320
- 1339)
WEDNESDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2003
AIR MARSHAL
GLENN TORPY
CBE DSO AND AIR
COMMODORE CHRIS
NICKOLS
Q1320 Mr Cran: I am very pleased
to say that you have cleared up the problem in my mind. It seems
to me that if we had gone down the route that Air Marshal Burridge
was suggesting—and to be fair to him, if he had been asked
the right questions he would have perhaps cleared all this up—the
British Air Force would have had to give up all roles other than
support of ground forces, which simply does not seem to make a
lot of sense. We have got that right.
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes.
Q1321 Mr Cran: If we did go down
that route, it would mean, would it not, the most enormous change
to training and doctrine? Is there a real debate going on within
the MoD or your service that we should adopt this approach; or
do you think—
Air Marshal Torpy: I think we
have had the debate, and we realise that there are some good things
to be learnt from the US Marine Corps experience. One thing I
would point out about their structure is that they are enabled,
just as the US Navy are, by the United States Air Force. They
have very limited air-to-air refuelling capability and very limited
intelligence air surveillance reconnaissance; and they have very
limited command and control. Therefore, things like E3s—some
of the advanced, sophisticated intelligence-gathering aircraft—are
provided to both the US Navy and the US Marine Corps by the United
States Air Force. We would be in exactly that same position, of
having an air force which was then incoherent. I hope that answers
your question.
Chairman: It seems that those arguments
are well honed in officers' messes over the years, Air Marshal.
Q1322 Mr Havard: Can I return to
the air-land interface. One of your squadron leaders was telling
us that the difference this time was that the land forces were
already in, and the air support had to work around them, which
was different from the previous Gulf conflict. He said that at
times they were not able to drop munitions in support of ground
forces. Part of the reason for that was that they were moving
so quickly and could not identify it properly, so they were not
confident about it. He says there are people called Anglicos (Air
Liaison Officers/Forward Air Controllers) who were not practised
in working in land headquarters and then trying to work with aircraft.
Is this a specific area of difficulty in terms of integrating
land and air? If so, what are you doing about it?
Air Marshal Torpy: This comes
back to the same question, and it is the exercising of all of
the aspects—
Q1323 Mr Havard: Is it just training?
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes.
Q1324 Mr Havard: What about communications?
Can they do it?
Air Marshal Torpy: The communications
in general are adequate. I think we can improve them occasionally.
If we look forward a few years to the network-centric environment
that we will all be striving for, then we will have to improve
our communications to make sure we are completely interoperable
and have robust communications throughout the battle space. I
would not say at this stage that we are anywhere close to the
capability that we will need for the future. I think the basic
procedures and principles are correct; but we need to put more
effort into our day-to-day training.
Q1325 Rachel Squire: Air Marshal,
I want to come on to the Joint Helicopter Force and ask you what
the lessons are from the deployment of the Joint Helicopter Force.
Air Marshal Torpy: I should start
by saying that I am probably not the best person to answer this.
The Committee may be aware that the Joint Helicopter Command is
under the operational command of Headquarters Land. During the
campaign, as it would be under any operation of this type, then
tactical command is with the land component. Headquarters Land
was responsible for the deployment and the employment of Joint
Helicopter Command assets during the campaign.
Q1326 Rachel Squire: Therefore, are
you able to provide information about sortie rates and air crew
hours flown by Joint Helicopter Force as opposed to Harrier and
Tornado GR4 detachments?
Air Marshal Torpy: I would not
be in a position to provide that information to you at this time.
I can either provide a note.[5]
Q1327 Chairman: You can probably
write directly. So much for joined-up government! I thought you
would have a real handle on it if you—
Air Marshal Torpy: We have a complete
handle on integrating them into the air tasking order, so co-ordinating
it when it flies; but I do not have responsibility for how it
is used, deployed or recovered.
Q1328 Chairman: Is there any suggestion
that the RAF should take that role over?
Air Marshal Torpy: We actually
gave it to the Army a few years ago, for very good joint reasons.
Chairman: I am just being provocative!
Q1329 Mr Roy: Sadly, we know that
a number of UK and US service personnel were killed by friendly
fire, and an inquiry is still ongoing into that tragedy. Can you
tell us when that board of inquiry is due to report its findings?
Air Marshal Torpy: I cannot give
you a definitive date yet. There are still technical investigations
going on and we do not have a date. I anticipate that it would
be sometime in the New Year.
Q1330 Mr Roy: How much training took
place between coalition aircraft and US air defence systems, such
as Patriot, prior to Operation TELIC?
Air Marshal Torpy: We have always
been operating in the southern no-fly zones. As Patriot is deployed
into the theatre, then on a routine basis the airspace control
orders and special operating procedures which all air has to operate
under took account of all of the air defence assets being airborne
or ground-based air defence systems. So as a matter of routine,
our air crew have been operating under those procedures all of
the time that Operation Southern Watch has been going on. When
it looked as though the operation was going to be authorised,
additional assets were deployed into theatre and the number of
Patriots increased. It was not a case of whether we had to conduct
specific training; it was an ongoing process that had been going
on for months.
Q1331 Mr Roy: Do those Patriot systems
have identified friend or foe systems?
Air Marshal Torpy: They do, but
they do not rely just on IFF; there are procedural mechanisms
as well.
Q1332 Mr Roy: Are you confident that
lessons will be learned from the causes of the friendly fire incidents
that were witnessed and that proper remedial measures have been
identified and acted upon?
Air Marshal Torpy: I am confident
that we will do everything we possibly can to make sure that the
lessons are implemented. I think we also have to be realistic
that friendly fire incidents are obviously human tragedies and
they also have a negative impact on the campaign. It is in all
of our interests to make sure that we reduce fratricide to the
absolute minimum, whether fratricide between aircraft or between
ground units, or between air and ground units. I think technology
will to a degree assist us in this. Again, our aspiration of a
network-centric environment will give us better shared awareness,
and we will know where every asset is on the battle space, which
we do not at the moment. Just as technology will give us that
opportunity, it will also give us the opportunity to synchronise
our activity and make it more complex. The opportunities in an
increasingly complex battle space for fratricide are likely to
increase.
Q1333 Mr Roy: I would like to stick
to the human level. On the findings and measures, will they be
publicly released, both for the general public, for politicians,
and, most importantly, for the service personnel?
Air Marshal Torpy: They will clearly
be implemented throughout the service so that our operating procedures
are known to everybody who needs to know about them. I cannot
speak as to whether that would be released to the general public,
but some of it will not because it will be classified—the
method by which we identify targets.
Q1334 Mr Roy: It seems to me that
making a public clarification is very, very important for many
people's morale. We know for example that on March 23 Group Captain
Simon Dobb publicly stated: "Without pre-judging a board
of inquiry, we have resolved certain issues to obtain cast-iron
guarantees that a mistake like this cannot happen again."
This in relation to the incident we are talking about. "The
Americans have made a prudent and rapid improvement in the evaluation
of Patriot rules of engagement. I can categorically assure my
crews that there is no danger of inadvertent engagement."
However, from what you say neither the British nor the US Military
have publicly clarified what these guarantees were or how the
rules of engagement were changed, so how are we supposed to know
what they are, bearing in mind that that was March 23, and two
days later an F16 fired a missile on a Patriot radar after it
scanned his plane and then shortly thereafter a Patriot shot down
an American F18 near Kabala; and, again there was no public clarification.
If you hear someone talking about the measures that have been
taken, but two or three days later the same thing is happening,
do you not think that that is wrong, and that someone needs to
clarify to people on the ground the measures that were taken?
Air Marshal Torpy: Combat identification
is a very complex issue. We did make some adjustments to the rules
of engagement and the way that Patriot was being employed as a
result of the Tornado GR4 incident. I cannot speak in detail on
the circumstances and the other aircraft. It is difficult to say
that the adjustments made for the Tornado incident were directly
applicable to the other incidents. As I mentioned earlier, it
is in all of our interests to make sure that we minimise fratricide
on engagements. We take it extremely seriously. Group Captain
Dobb's statement that he can categorically say that it will not
happen again—he cannot really say that because whenever
there is a human in the loop, whilst technology will assist the
reduction in these incidents, inevitably, in the confusion of
a very complex battle space, errors will be made. That is a realistic
assessment of what will happen. It would be unrealistic to say
it would eliminate all—
Q1335 Mr Roy: I wonder how you can
come out with such statements because you are giving safety guarantees
that really you should not be giving; and therefore there is a
morale problem when another problem comes further down the line.
Then, invariably, the service personnel say "they are not
really looking at this problem in the depth they should",
because the same mistakes were still happening three, four and
five days later. That is why public clarification seems to me
to be—
Air Commodore Nickols: I think
Dobb was probably saying related to the particular sets of circumstances,
the loss of a Tornado, rather than a wider set of circumstances.
Q1336 Mr Roy: What use does the coalition
force make of the UK Rapier Missile System, and did its use highlight
any improvements or enhancements that you think were needed?
Air Marshal Torpy: We did use
one Rapier squadron to protect one of our deployed operating bases
because it was felt that that particular location needed a short-range
air defence system. It was deployed because it provides capability
that the United States Air Force does not have, and there were
no shortcomings for this operation that were needed to rectify.
There is a long-term programme, which had been underway on the
equipment programme side, to make improvements to Rapier.
Q1337 Mr Roy: Does Rapier have IFF?
Air Marshal Torpy: It does.
Q1338 Mr Roy: Was there a risk of
friendly fire from using Rapier in Operation Telic?
Air Marshal Torpy: No more than
any other system. We had the procedures, we had the equipment;
but we have humans in the loop as well.
Q1339 Chairman: I can remember asking
a parliamentary question on IFF in 1977, a quarter of a century
ago. Has there not been enough investment? Has there not been
enough co-operation between allies? The more allies we have involved,
the greater the problems; the more we go down the route of network-centric
warfare, the battle space is going to be infinitely more complicated.
Mr Webb would say everything is under control, but you have responsibilities,
as we do. What needs to be done? There must be other things that
could be done or things that could be done better, because it
is carnage out there sometimes.
Air Marshal Torpy: A significant
amount of effort is going into combat identification and I would
hate for the Committee to go away with the impression that we
are in any way complacent in this area. It is an enormous technical
problem. Just as we are not close to achieving a network-centric
environment, we are not close yet to identifying where every vehicle
is on the battle space. Until we can do that, and aircraft know
where every vehicle on the battle space is, we will never be in
the situation of having that shared situational awareness which
will give us the highest probability of not engaging a friendly
unit. There will be an awful lot of confusion out there as well—operating
at night under poor light conditions, poor climatic conditions.
It would be wrong to suggest that we could eliminate fratricide.
Personally, as a military commander, I regret to say that we will
continue to have fratricide just as we continue to have road accidents
with our deployed forces as well. It is one of the facts of life.
It is our job to make sure that those tragic incidents are reduced
to the absolute minimum.
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