Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1340
- 1357)
WEDNESDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2003
AIR MARSHAL
GLENN TORPY
CBE DSO AND AIR
COMMODORE CHRIS
NICKOLS
Q1340 Chairman: Does this analysis
of improvements cover air-to-ground, ground-to-air?
Air Marshal Torpy: Very much so.
We recognise it is one of the most challenging environments.
Q1341 Mr Havard: On the rules of
engagement issue and how land forces call in, one of your people
told us that they are being sorted out. There are procedures you
have described to us, if they are calling in Close Air Support;
but their complaint was that they were intending to try and use
it just as extended artillery. How do you deal with this communication
link between the people on the ground and the people in the air?
It seems to me to be absolutely crucial from both sides of the
equation. There is a hole here, is there not, and in terms of
what they are using it for as well?
Air Marshal Torpy: I go back to
the answer I gave on Kill-box Interdiction and Close Air Support.
Close Air Support is where there are friendly troops engaged who
need air support. Air support is only provided under direct control
of a ground-based controller, and also it is the responsibility
of the pilot to positively identify that the target he is about
to attack is the target intended. If he feels that that is not
the case, then he should not drop his weapon—unless he feels
the situation on the ground is so dire that the balance of risk
is that he should release the weapon. At the end of the day, it
comes back to the man in the loop. It is not a communication issue;
I think it is an inevitable and realistic appreciation of what
happens.
Q1342 Mr Havard: It seems to me that
the number of air-to-air incidents are infinitely less than the
number of ground to air incidents.
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes, because
it is much less complex. Air-to-air, you are dealing with a relatively
small number of aircraft in the battle space. It is much more
complex and more difficult to identify a small target. If every
vehicle had IFF, and we could see that in our aircraft, then that
would go a long way to reducing it.
Q1343 Mr Havard: But it would not
eliminate it. It comes back to the point I made earlier; that
at certain periods of time, no matter how sophisticated the targeting
policy is, at points of extremis it gets transferred to one individual
in one aeroplane.
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes.
Q1344 Mr Havard: No matter what you
do in terms of procedural arrangements or what you do in terms
of asset tracking, your training and experience of that individual,
in terms of where they are at that point in the conflict is absolutely
crucial. If they have no experience of being in these relationships
previously, then you are in dead trouble.
Air Marshal Torpy: Exactly, and
that is a point we have all hoisted aboard and why we are improving
our level of air-land communication. It is exactly the same as
the person pulling the trigger in a tank, against another tank;
it is his responsibility to identify the tank he is about to fire
against, whether it is an enemy tank or a friendly tank.
Q1345 Mr Cran: On something far less
controversial, were the air-to-air refuelling assets pooled?
Air Marshal Torpy: They were.
Q1346 Mr Cran: I understand 355 sorties
were flown by the RAF aircraft, which, without any doubt at all,
was quite an effort. The Committee presumes they were successfully
done, but we would like to hear you say so. What lessons did you
learn and, even more importantly, if there were lessons learned,
how will those be reflected in the replacement for the air tanker?
Air Marshal Torpy: One of the
capabilities that the American Air Force asked us to provide as
much as we thought we could do to support our own aircraft—as
I mentioned, 40% was offloaded to the US Marine Corps and US Navy.
I also mentioned that air-to-air refuelling effectively governed
the whole output of the air tasking order because of the range
the aircraft had to operate from deployed bases to the theatre
of operation, particularly as the land component started to coalesce
around Baghdad. The lessons out of it are the essential nature
of air-to-air refuelling. Whilst carrier-based air has a degree
of independence from host nation support by virtue of being a
carrier, it has to be supported because of the distance of the
carrier from the theatre of operations by land-based large tankers.
That is one of the factors which governed the need for so many
tankers around the region. That clearly then presents a potential
problem with finding suitable bases for tankers. They could be
deployed, and we even looked at deployed tankers into the bases
in Europe, operating towards the Iraq theatre; but that, clearly,
comes down to the amount of off-load of fuel that is provided;
so the closer you get the tanker to theatre the better as well.
Tankers are an essential feature of use of modern air power. Our
own tankers are very valuable because they have got the capability
to refuel US Marine Corps and US Navy aircraft.
Q1347 Mr Cran: But apparently not
the US Air Force.
Air Marshal Torpy: Correct, because
the American Air force have a different system; they have a boom
system, whereas we have a probe and drogue, which is what the
US Marine Corps have. As to lessons for our tankers—not
specific to any of our platforms. It really just emphasised the
utility and essential nature of air-to-air refuelling. We look
forward to receiving our future air-to-air refuelling tanker because
our VC10s and Tristars—VC10s in particular—are getting
expensive to continue to operate.
Q1348 Mr Cran: So there should be
no delay.
Air Marshal Torpy: The bids are
in the process of being scrutinised.
Q1349 Mr Cran: It is entirely appropriate
that a Scotsman of Aberdeen should ask the last question! What
were the financial arrangements for refuelling US aircraft, ie,
how did we get our money back?
Air Marshal Torpy: I cannot answer
that question.
Q1350 Mr Cran: If I might say so,
that is outrageous! Can we have a note?
Air Marshal Torpy: Yes, I will
provide a note.[6]
Chairman: Have we paid for the fuel that
we received—thanks to James raising this issue? It probably
cost the Ministry of Defence a lot of money for paying the maintenance
back.
Q1351 Mr Viggers: How does the 2,500
sorties flown during the campaign compare with the normal use
that aircraft would have had during the period, without hostilities?
Air Marshal Torpy: It clearly
peaked at the beginning of the campaign, so we always knew that
we would operate our aircraft at intensive rates of flying and
then we would ramp back activity to give us a sustainable position
for the long term. It is difficult, therefore, to judge that in
terms of particular snapshots, but if I took it over the length
of the campaign, they were operating at higher levels than our
peacetime rates, but within the levels that we have within our
defence planning assumptions for wartime operations.
Q1352 Mr Viggers: I was going to
ask if the increased use of the aircraft and the environment in
which they are operating has caused any revision in the expected
life of the aircraft?
Air Marshal Torpy: It has not
at all.
Q1353 Mr Viggers: And does that apply
to helicopters as well?
Air Marshal Torpy: I cannot speak
for the helicopter force, I am afraid.
Q1354 Chairman: The last question
is on media coverage. We took evidence from journalists who were
embedded within the system and almost all appeared to have been
looking at the land campaign and a lot of the people who appeared
to have been talking about the air campaign were those who were
in Baghdad which gave a peculiar perspective of how effective
the air campaign was. What was your assessment of media coverage
of the air campaign?
Air Marshal Torpy: We had embedded
media journalists on a number of our deployed operation bases,
particularly those ones in Kuwait. I think because the main focus
of the media activity was in Kuwait initially and then moving
forward with the land components, it was inevitable that there
would be a limited opportunity for air to be in the media forefront.
Also I think it is much easier obviously for embedded journalists
to get a flavour of the land component and the way that land activity
is conducted rather than the air component because all they see
is aircraft, ground planning, aircraft being launched and then
recovered and they do not have the opportunity to go and fly in
a Tornado, for instance, on an operation, so I think there is
a slightly different aspect to the way that coverage of the air
component is undertaken. I think we got pretty good coverage actually
and I think, from talking to my own people, they were very satisfied
with the coverage that they got. I know that Air Marshal Burridge
highlighted the fact that embedded media only have a very small
view of the bigger picture and that is one of the things that
we will also have to look at for the future to make sure that
their reporting is put into a wider context. I hope that answers
the Committee's question.
Chairman: Yes, well, if you are so happy
with the media coverage, maybe you could second one of your guys
to come along into the select committee system for its media coverage.
Q1355 Mr Viggers: If I can ask one
final question, was there any difference at all in the treatment
of male and female pilots? We have not raised this issue for some
time and I would be interested to know if there is any distinction
at all.
Air Marshal Torpy: No, there is
absolutely no difference between the treatment of RAF male and
female pilots. It is exactly the same.
Q1356 Chairman: How many female pilots
were operating?
Air Marshal Torpy: I do not know
that, but I can find out.
Q1357 Chairman: Yes, if you could
find that out and within different types of aircraft.
Air Marshal Torpy: Certainly.[7]
Chairman: Well, thank you both very much.
It has been a very easy morning, Air Commodore, Air Marshal, almost
like a day out of the office, so come again please! It was very
helpful and we appreciate your coming along.
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