Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1360-1379)
MR A PAWSON
AND COLONEL
PAUL BROOK
12 NOVEMBER 2003
Q1360 Chairman: What kind of level were
you meeting then?
Mr Pawson: The way in which the
media plan was being developed was an integral part of the overall
military plan. It was being developed, if you like, under the
chapeau of the senior military and ministerial exchanges that
were taking place. At various levels it was taking place including
with PJHQ and CentCom. The next major change and in some senses
the starting pistol for the practical arrangements occurred in
January when, as the Committee is well aware, we moved conclusively
to the southern option. The Secretary of State announced, I think
on 20 January, the land package. We could then see what slots
were available, what needed to be done to brief the editors, which
was our next stage, to set in train the implementation of the
agreed arrangements with the media which are set out in the so-called
Green Book and to have the discussions with the various societies,
the broadcasters, to try to get the practical arrangements in
place, to get people trained. We eventually got them out on about
12 March.
Q1361 Chairman: What kind of documents
would you have had on lessons to be derived from previous wars?
We did an inquiry into the Falklands, which was pretty awful.
The last Gulf War was much better and on the British side Kosovo
was very good; NATO was dreadful until half-way through. What
sort of documentation would you have had? What kind of historical
memory will have been within the system to ensure you did not
make the same mistakes that were made previously and you built
on the successes of previous campaigns?
Mr Pawson: There were two sorts.
One was the macro-memory of, rightly or wrongly, a major downturn
in relations between the Ministry of Defence and the media after
the Falklands War, when the media felt that they had been deliberately
misinformed. There was at the forefront of our minds that we were
not going to go down that route at all. The second type of memory
is the operational reports. Colonel Brook and his team keep those,
the most recent of which was on the media in Afghanistan. We looked
at that to see where we could improve in terms of the guidance,
training and so on to make sure we put those into what we were
planning for Op Telic.
The Committee suspended from 3.07pm to
3.18pm for a division in the House
Mr Pawson: I referred rather glibly
to the Green Book. For the record, I ought to say it is the working
arrangements for the media in times of emergency, tension and
conflict or war. This was instigated after the Falklands War and
revised after the Gulf war in 1991.
Q1362 Chairman: The first time the issue
was broached was at a level above your pay grade, it would appear.
Were there any people from your department there when the idea
of coordination was first broached at a higher level? If not,
when were the first meetings you had with government departments
or ministers? At what stage were politicians brought into the
process?
Mr Pawson: I am sorry to say I
am at something of a disadvantage here. We both are, in that I
only took up post on 27 January this year and Colonel Brook likewise.
I can certainly let you have a note.[1]
Q1363 Chairman: Please.
Mr Pawson: My understanding is
that the media operation planning was conducted in the framework
of the overall military planning and it was the same people right
at the top involved.
Q1364 Chairman: It is not a trick question.
Obviously, politicians bear the brunt. Number 10 is reputed to
have had a controlling hand over media relations across government.
This was before you took up your position but what input did they
have on your planning for Op Telic and at what stage?
Mr Pawson: As far as I am aware,
the sort of planning that I outlined was essentially the Ministry
of Defence plan. I am fairly confident in that. It was designed
in conjunction with what the coalition as a whole would do, obviously,
but we designed it to meet our own requirements of putting accurate
information in the public domain. It was designed on the basis
of the extant plan agreed with the media in the Green Book, and
we went ahead on that basis.
Q1365 Chairman: I just could not imagine
Mr Campbell would let you get away with a media strategy without
looking at it or getting involved with it because after all he
was very prominent in turning around NATO's disastrous, early
media relations during Kosovo. Maybe you could consult your records
as well and tell us at what stage did anybody in number 10 offer
advice or change the policy or whatever.
Mr Pawson: Yes.
Q1366 Chairman: The principal elements
of the UK and the US media strategies appear to be closely coordinated:
similar policies on embedding of journalists, joint briefings
at CentCom. How did you coordinate your planning with that of
the Americans and how much were you able to influence their strategy?
Mr Pawson: There was close coordination
at all levels. I think we were greatly helped by the decision
to devolve as a matter of our concept of operations decisions
as far down the chain as possible, both to PJHQ and to theatre,
where the liaison with the Americans was very close and constant.
In terms of ourselves, I went to Washington and met my opposite
number. There were telephone calls weekly or whatever was required
to resolve issues as they arose. The fact remains that Washington
did listen to what we had to say. There were areas where, in the
event, it is fair to say we were expecting more of them during
the conflict phase perhaps in Qatar than eventually happened,
for a whole series of reasons, but I have no complaints about
their willingness to cooperate with us. Indeed, it happened right
from the very first night of the conflicts with the helicopter
crashes as between the press office in London and Washington.
There was a very good spirited relationship.
Q1367 Mr Howarth: Were you obliged to
adopt the US approach in any areas where you might have preferred
not to do so?
Mr Pawson: I am not aware of any
in the sense that the approach we adopted was exactly consistent
with our doctrine.
Colonel Brook: There were detailed
differences in how we approached our business. For instance, the
American forces chose not to have press centres at divisional
level. They preferred instead to concentrate all their efforts
in their headquarters at Qatar but were completely happy for us
from a national perspective to have our own press centre in the
proximity of headquarters in the first armoured division. In terms
of where we coordinated our efforts, the Green Book suggests that
war correspondents will deploy in military uniform but, as a result
of dialogue between ourselves and the Americans where they were
choosing not to have their war correspondents in uniform, we chose
to do likewise. There was quite a lot of coordination and no areas
of dissent or concern.
Q1368 Mr Howarth: Did you find our people
were being invited to comment on American positions at the divisional
level, rather than going through CentCom, causing friction?
Colonel Brook: That is an inevitable
consequence where you have a journalist wanting to know a lot
about a large number of things. Our guidance given to everybody
is that they are free to talk to the media but they should stay
within their own areas of responsibility. I would like to think
that all of those such requests were met politely. It would be
better to ask the Americans.
Q1369 Mr Howarth: Were the Australians
in this loop at all?
Mr Pawson: They were in the loop
in Qatar. They had their own media to look after.
Q1370 Mr Howarth: Were they part of the
planning? You said earlier that you started this planning process
back in September and you said, "We had to work in the coalition
framework." Were the Australians part of that framework from
the outset?
Mr Pawson: My understanding is
yes.
Mr Howarth: Their command of English
was all right, was it? I am thinking in advance of the events
coming up in the next couple of weeks.
Q1371 Rachel Squire: Within the MoD,
do you have any role in contributing to the shaping of policy
across the board, based on your experience of what the media focus
is, or are the policy making and the media relations functions
of the Ministry of Defence entirely separate? In other words,
you never get a chance to influence anything in respect of policies.
Mr Pawson: It is a mixture. The
Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet and the necessary
Cabinet committees that preside over policies and structures.
He plays a role in that as do the policy and operational staff
in the Ministry of Defence. In relation to media, there is similar
coordination on a daily basis now, not just for Iraq, across Whitehall.
We play our role in that. Policy has a particular meaning in the
Ministry of Defence. We define it quite narrowly in terms of defence
policy. Much of what we do is execution of grand policy.
Q1372 Rachel Squire: Can I ask about
one specific example which was highlighted by the death during
operations of a soldier who had a long term relationship but was
not married to his partner? They had a child and there was a big
media focus on that at the time. Would you like to make any comment
on whether the media focus on the relationship or the position
of unmarried partners in any way helped to alter opinions in the
change of policy that we have now seen in the latest proposals
for pensions and compensation to include partnerships, relationships,
where there is not like a legal marriage but there is clearly
a long term relationship?
Mr Pawson: I guess, because the
media and the public are naturally interested in human interest
stories, the personnel questions always receive a very high level
of attention in the media. Secondly, part of our role is to try
to reflect back public opinion through the media but also in other
ways directly into the policy making organisations of the Ministry
of Defence. The fact that there was concern in the media and it
was sustained concern was and would in future be reflected into
the policy making on the personnel side.
Q1373 Mr Havard: Can I ask a supplementary
on the last two questions? The question was did the Americans
influence the way in which you behaved. I am interested to get
to what you were trying to do in the first place. This chap Sambrook
from the BBC has set this out in an article recently and he quotes
Professor Taylor from Leeds who talks about this question of perception
management which is a form of justification of what you do. Did
this approach, which seems to be very much an American approach
to the media, influence this doctrine and the way in which you
approach the whole relationship you had with the Americans about
what the intent was of what you were trying to do? Was it news
management? It is presumably part of news management but is it
also about what you were trying to get across and sell a product
or give accurate information.
Mr Pawson: As far as the operations
in Iraq and the operational armed forces were concerned, it was
quite clearly the latter. We have a long term interest in accurate
information being made available to the public about defence issues
because the public do not generally interact with defence on a
day to day basis, as they do with health and schools and so on.
For us, that is a constant theme that underlies everything we
do. We are quite clear to separate out media operations from,
if you like, information and deception type of work. There is
some American doctrine that tends to see the world as a global
whole. There is a conceptual view that might say if you are in
wars of national survival perhaps that is the right way to look
at things, but in our terms the relationship for us with the media
and the media in turn with the public, which we appreciate, it
is more important to be accurate and credible than it is to have
a particular line at a particular time on a particular issue.
Q1374 Mr Havard: None of that American
doctrine leaked into your activities?
Mr Pawson: I personally find it
a little bit difficult to see how doctrine leaks into practice.
For example, the fact that the opinion formers and decision makers
in Iraq would have access to satellite television meant they would
have seen the images from, shall we say, our embedded correspondents
and the press conferences. They would form their own view of what
was happening as opposed to what the Iraqi Information Minister
was saying. In that sense, you could say that having accurate,
trusted information is the best way of operating an information
campaign inside the hierarchy of, in this case, the Iraqi regime.
Q1375 Mr Havard: Can I ask the Colonel
what his perceptions were of it?
Colonel Brook: I fully agree with
Mr Pawson on this. The difference between the information operation
which aims to manage perceptions and our own responsibility which
is to present information, which will include stating what our
objectives are for any particular group of people, is a normal
business for us. What we must do however is make sure that we
do not, in the public presentation of information, including messages
about our policies and objectives, cut across anything that might
have a detrimental effect on perceptions perhaps in the area of
operations. There is coordination required for those people who
deliver psychological operations—and Professor Taylor is
an expert in psychological operations—and those people who
are conducting military activities which also send a message.
We have to be very careful that we do not divorce ourselves completely
from the American approach whilst at the same time maintaining
clear, blue water between the media operation and any other activities
to do with information.
Q1376 Mr Hancock: Arising out of the
guidelines laid down in the Green Book about the accreditation
of journalists, did the MoD at any time turn anyone down who was
seeking to be accredited to your organisation?
Colonel Brook: In this respect,
because we were setting up a limited number of accredited war
correspondents, we were obliged to turn away about 75% of the
applicants. We were hugely over-subscribed for the numbers of
slots that we had available with front line units. That said,
there were no limits placed on in theatre registration of journalists.
Provided the journalist was bona fide, in our case from the United
Kingdom, he could register in Kuwait or Qatar and become part
of the pool of journalists, the unilaterals, as they became.
Q1377 Mr Hancock: Did the British armed
forces refuse access to any journalists who sought it?
Colonel Brook: If a journalist
was an accredited war correspondent, he would not be turned away.
If he or she was registered in theatre and held a theatre registration
card, they would not be turned away. If they were unregistered
and the organisation did not know who they were, obviously, under
those circumstances security could be a concern.
Q1378 Mr Hancock: You had a meeting before
this of the editors and the major news networks. Did you lay down
guidelines to them about who was acceptable and who was not?
Mr Pawson: No.
Q1379 Mr Hancock: Were there any journalists
that the Ministry of Defence felt at any time they would not want
to be near British forces during these operations?
Mr Pawson: Not in terms of individuals
as opposed to individuals meeting certain standards. It is worth
my pointing out that we try to distance ourselves from that selection
process by using the Newspaper Society and the Newspaper Publishers'
Association to pick the people who are going, because obviously
it is a competitive industry. We take them, train them and move
them. We deliberately distance ourselves from that choice and
similarly with broadcasters.
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