Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1480-1499)
REAR ADMIRAL
DAVID SNELSON
AND BRIGADIER
JAMES DUTTON
CBE ADC
3 DECEMBER 2003
Q1480 Mr Havard: How that balance works
obviously puts pressure on you as to how you manage that given
situation at any particular time, so what lessons have you learned
which might be useful in that regard?
Rear Admiral Snelson: It puts
pressure on the Joint Commander at a level above me, frankly,
in the delivery of combat power to the region. In this particular
operation, part of the combat power, represented by the Royal
Marines, was delivered almost entirely in our own shipping and
early. Then you have to judge whether you are going to hire the
commercial shipping in time to get the rest there. I am sorry
I cannot answer all of the questions but part of it is outside
my area of competence.
Mr Havard: You can only answer the questions
you can answer.
Q1481 Chairman: Very often the MoD does
not bring the people who can answer all the questions. However,
I will be very fair and say that the Defence Committee, over the
years, has complained about what my colleague has been complaining
about, the lack of British ships. They are unavailable. You have
mentioned, Rear Admiral, that a lot has been done. What we would
like to know and we will be writing to you about later, or writing
to whoever is responsible, because this was a great testing ground
for the new strategies that have evolved following the collapse
of British merchant shipping, and we will look at the evidence
that we have received previously to ensure we have had all the
information, I think it would be a good opportunity to see how
well the policy has worked?
Rear Admiral Snelson: I think
the people who are best qualified to answer that question, Mr
Chairman, probably are the Defence Transport and Movements Agency
in the Defence Logistics Organisation, who were responsible for
looking at both ends. I think one of the lessons the Department
has learned is that perhaps more of that coupling bridge, as we
call it, in getting things from A to B should be run by the Permanent
Joint Headquarters in the future. The Defence Logistics Organisation
is where you will get the answers from.
Chairman: Also policy above, because
they would not make the kinds of strategic decisions that would
have had to be made. Certainly we will evaluate the evidence we
have received and we will write in due course. Thank you.[1]
Q1482 Mr Hancock: Can I ask you to confirm
that it was not a manning problem which prevented some of the
ships you might have wanted to deploy being a significant player
in why they were not there? The second part of that is, in the
six months that led up to the eventual action taking place, was
there a request made at any time by you or your predecessor to
have a second carrier actually ready for sea and in action? Was
the fact that there was not a full complement available to man
that ship in any way a factor in that ship not being made available?
Rear Admiral Snelson: First of
all, I can confirm that the key factor in a second carrier not
being available and the two LPDs was the refit programme or the
building programme, in the case of both sorts of ships, and not
the manning. Had we had the second carrier available, the manpower
could have been challenging to find to 100%, but, given that,
at the moment, as I speak, we have HMS Invincible and HMS Ark
Royal running, that demonstrates that probably we would have found
the manpower. It was completely an effect of the build and refit
programme and it is something we will have to watch very carefully.
Q1483 Mr Hancock: Was there a serious
request for that process to be sped up so that a second carrier
would be available?
Rear Admiral Snelson: There was
not, because the timescales could not have been moved all that
much, given the timescales we had, to make the request to commercial
organisations. Probably you will recall that the Secretary of
State announced that contingency planning was being made, I think,
about 24 September, is the date I recall. Given that the amphibious
task force, if it was to be there by mid February, had to sail
in January, there was not the time between 24 September and the
beginning of January to make that sort of request, or for that
request to have any effect. In actual fact, I had requested already
for the refit of HMS Ocean to be speeded up. She was in a small
refit in Portsmouth Dockyard at the time we were doing the planning,
and that was a concern to me, that she would not be ready, but
the tail end of her short refit was speeded up.
Q1484 Mr Hancock: It took place at sea,
the tail end of it?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Yes. It
was finished off, in terms of trials, and so on. Some speeding
up was done for those units that it was possible to speed up.
This is one of the problems, if you want to keep options open,
or actually if you do not want to make public your decisions over
options until fairly late, then you need relatively high-readiness
forces, and this is one of the things the Department conjures
with.
Q1485 Mr Hancock: Were you satisfied
that all of the ships that were deployed were manned up to their
full complement?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Yes.
Q1486 Mr Jones: Can I ask about urgent
operational requirements. I visited 42 Commando a few weeks ago
and I think the main concern that was raised with me was about
the arming of the MVs, in terms of mounting machine guns, etc.,
on top. I saw examples of some ingenious work involving carpentry
and I think a bit of spot welding by somebody's brother-in-law
that came in. I was told also that actually there were brackets,
etc., available already, which I think the Norwegians use. Why
were they not used and why was it left to, as I say, the ingenuity,
I think, of the Marines to come up with that, and is something
being done to put that right? You made a point earlier about the
shortage of spares, etc. Are those shortages still there and is
there an action plan being put in place to address those deficiencies
that were shown throughout the operation?
Brigadier Dutton: The weapon mounts
for vehicles, there is a weapon mount for the Land Rover called
a WMIK (weapon mount installation kit), of which we do have some,
we would like a lot more of them. I think we have got something
like 20 in the Brigade, we would like in excess of 90. There are
problems with fitting those, they make the vehicle go overweight,
which gives it problems with roadworthiness. Those problems are
being tackled. We would like more WMIKs. We have asked for more
WMIKs, one day we may get some more WMIKs. I think the lash-ups
you are referring to probably were on the BV206 rather than on
the Land Rover. There is no Ordnance Board-approved weapons mount
for a MILAN or a heavy machine gun on a BV206, the adverse-terrain
vehicle, and for a number of years we have done what you could
describe as a lash-up, it is not a bad description really, on
those vehicles, in order to mount those weapons. It is quite successful
and it has worked and, on the grounds that one can take risks
on operations which would not be acceptable on ranges in peacetime
in the UK, we have done that quite successfully for a number of
years. I think the second part of your question was to do with
what we are doing about it. One of the things we are doing about
it, as far as the Royal Marines are concerned, is bringing into
service a vehicle called the Viking, in fact, coming into service
now to be fully in service within the next two years, and that
will have a much more capable weapons mount. This is a constant
balance of air portability and therefore lightness, against heavy
weapons mounted on vehicles which means that they are not air
portable. This is a balance with which, for many years, we have
had constantly to juggle, and I am sure we will continue to, between
the requirement to do things light, in helicopters, and heavier,
therefore not by helicopter.
Chairman: Thank you. We will come back
to some of these questions later. Thank you very much.
Q1487 Mr Viggers: My understanding of
the procurement programme for the three through-deck cruisers
was that having three meant we would always have two available
and only one would be in refit at any one time. I think, Mr Chairman,
the Committee would want to know why the procurement programme
had it that two were in refit at the same time. This is not a
fair question to ask to our witnesses at all. I would like to
ask a different question. In arranging the transit of the chartered
merchant ships, and indeed the Royal Naval vessels, over, I believe,
a 5,000-mile route, some planning must have been put in hand to
ensure that you were protected against threats, most of which
must have been asymmetrical, in the sense that they were terrorist,
unforeseen threats. How do you prepare against unforeseen threats
and how do you work out what equipment you will need to prepare
against those unforeseen threats?
Rear Admiral Snelson: The threat
was, as you describe, Mr Viggers, an asymmetric threat and it
was a significant concern to me and the American Maritime Commander.
We had seen the example of USS Cole and also the French ship Lindberg
being attacked at sea off the coast of Yemen, so it was very much
in our minds. There are two ways to deal with the problem. One
is to equip the ships themselves with weapons, night-vision goggles,
and so on, to be able to provide a degree of defence themselves.
The other, of course, is to make sure that warships are fairly
close by, if not actually escorting. If I may, I will deal only
with the question of the Red Sea and the transit round to the
Gulf. What was done in the Mediterranean was not done under my
operational command, although measures were taken in the Mediterranean,
I know, to protect the ships. In terms of what was done in the
transit down the Red Sea, past the Horn of Africa into the Strait
of Hormuz, a combination of UK and US warships were available
to protect part of that transit, although the UK frigates and
destroyers, of course, were moving with the Amphibious Group.
Once the Amphibious Group and its merchant ships had transited
through, those frigates and destroyers stayed in the Gulf, protecting
them there. Then we had the train of follow-on merchant ships
to be protected. This was done partly by American ships which
were stationed down that route, because they were placed there
already for both escort and possible Tomahawk-firing duties, and
a degree of protection was provided by the fact that a separate
coalition, working in the global war on terrorism, a wider coalition
of maritime nations, had warships in that region looking for terrorists
and weapons of mass destruction being moved in those waters. So
there was quite a significant coalition maritime presence which
provided a degree of protection and safety to our merchant ships
moving through that area, and for the follow-on merchant ships,
effectively, it was that protection upon which we relied. Had
that coalition force not been there then I may well have wanted
more frigates and destroyers in that situation, but we did not
need them.
Q1488 Mr Viggers: Do I understand that
Royal Navy and merchant shipping vessels were proceeding under
an umbrella of surface ships provided by other forces, in other
words, are we rather overstretched, in terms of our own surface
force capacity?
Rear Admiral Snelson: There was
an umbrella of protection provided by the coalition there, that
is right, they were moving under that coalition protection. Whether
then you should conclude, from that, that we were overstretched
is a matter of opinion. The facts are, that umbrella provided
the protection and I could concentrate the six frigates and destroyers
I had on the protection of the vital units in the northern Gulf.
It is hypothetical to say had the other coalition not been there
then would we have needed more frigates and destroyers; yes, we
would, but that is a hypothetical situation and it did not occur.
That is always the judgment the Department has to make, is it
going to invest in that level of escorts that it might need for
the full amount of protection needed for an operation like this,
or is it going to take the view that other allies or the degree
of threat will allow you to keep your own protection forces at
a relatively limited level.
Q1489 Mr Viggers: Were you involved in
the training and equipment given to Royal Fleet Auxiliary and
merchant ship crews, in training them against the threat of asymmetric
terrorist attacks?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Not directly,
but training was provided before they left the UK by the Flag
Officer Sea Training organisation and in transit by the Flag Officer
Sea Training organisation. There were some Reservists, and I have
not got the full details to hand but I could provide them afterwards,
Mr Chairman, who were trained and provided for the purpose of
merchant ship protection. Part of the judgment that we made was
whether the merchant ship looked as though obviously it was carrying
military equipment or whether it looked like any other benign
merchant ship. One could take a degree of risk over whether the
ship looked like a target or not, and that affected on which ships
we put force protection squads.
Q1490 Mr Viggers: Are you able to speak
as to the value of the naval base at Gibraltar and the Sovereign
Base Area in Cyprus, or was this outside your area?
Rear Admiral Snelson: It was outside
my area of responsibility. There was protection provided through
the Straits of Gibraltar, I know, but I do not know the detail
of how that was based. From my knowledge of the operation, the
Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus did not contribute specifically
to the task that we are talking about, particularly merchant ships,
but it was used by the amphibious force for training on the way.
Perhaps I will just defer to Brigadier Dutton to describe that
briefly.
Brigadier Dutton: I am not sure
I have got more to say than that. The element of the Brigade that
sailed, 40 Commando Group, trained in Cyprus, a relatively low
level amphibious exercise to get up to speed on certain aspects
of operating the helicopters and boats alongside the ships, and
then trained again in UAE as they came into the Gulf.
Rear Admiral Snelson: The Sovereign
Base provided a significant air head for those stores that had
not caught up, as it were, with the initial sailing of the Group
but managed to catch up with them in Cyprus before then they sailed
for the Suez Canal. Again, you could argue, was that specific
to the Sovereign Base or could we have done that through some
other nation's facilities, and that would depend on the political
situation at the time.
Q1491 Mr Viggers: In fact, were there
any attacks made on vessels carrying personnel or equipment?
Rear Admiral Snelson: No, there
were not. My view is, that was because of the deterrent effect
of having warships in the vicinity. It was because the American
Maritime Commander and I had gone on the record, in interviews,
saying that we were concerned about the threat and we were doing
something about it. To an extent, the information operation to
let the terrorists know that we were ready for them I think may
have played a part. While not for an open session, there were
various indications that we had available to us of what the terrorists
thought about attacking at sea, sufficient to indicate that they
very well might but also sufficient to indicate that they knew
how difficult it might be for them. Definitely we were right to
pay attention to that threat.
Q1492 Mr Viggers: Very good. I was going
to ask, how do you know when you do not have enough surface ships
and support?
Rear Admiral Snelson: It is a
question of judgment.
Mr Viggers: The answer is, you were not
tested, and no doubt the action you took was helpful in deterring
this. Thank you.
Q1493 Chairman: Perhaps you could look
to see the evidence submitted as to the other naval forces available
for protection, and certainly, I know there are not any Soviet
submarines operating in the Mediterranean any more, it would be
interesting to know what you perceived the threat to be in transiting
the Mediterranean? Certainly I would like to know who is responsible
for security when transiting the Suez Canal. Is it the Egyptian
Government? It must be a fairly vulnerable time for transiting
ships, especially as there is still a substantial Islamist terrorist
organisation operating in and around Egypt. Any additional information
really would be very helpful?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Yes, Mr
Chairman.[2]
Chairman: Thank you so much, and we will
drop you a note.
Q1494 Mike Gapes: Can I ask you about
force protection operations in the northern Arabian Gulf. Was
there an aircraft or missile threat to the Royal Naval task force
in that area?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Yes. There
was a significant potential missile threat. Theoretically, there
might have been an Iraqi aircraft threat, but everything we had
seen about Iraqi Air Force operations in the years of what we
called Operation Southern Watch led us to believe that the Iraqi
Air Force would not operate that far south. Of course, right up
to the outbreak of conflict the coalition dominated that airspace
because of Operation Southern Watch under the UNSCR regime. However,
the Iraqis had Silkworm anti-ship missiles in the area of Basra
and south and on the Al Faw peninsula, and these missiles were
designed specifically to be able to fire at and attack ships.
Also they had mine stocks, which, we had seen from the 1991 Gulf
war, they were likely to lay in the northern Gulf, and, of course,
we were concerned about the potential use of chemical or biological
weapons in those waters. We thought it was likely that there would
be a small boat, suicide boat, asymmetric-type threat as well,
and that threat certainly did exist because some of the Brigadier's
people found suicide boats rigged ready to be used when they were
on the Al Faw peninsula, although they were not used. Yes, there
was a significant threat, therefore we needed to keep escorts,
frigates and destroyers between the heavy ships, as it were, the
amphibious ships, and the coast. Those ships were there anyway,
in the run-up to the operation, because they were doing the anti-Iraqi
oil-smuggling operations under UNSCR 661. They were operating
inside Iraqi territorial waters, which gave us the opportunity
to see what was happening right up to the front-door, as it were.
That was significant in preventing the mine-laying in the open
Gulf which the Iraqis attempted. Of course, this was a coalition
operation and there were US frigates, Australian frigates and
UK frigates all operating under a single, US tactical command
in that area, all contributing to the same job of protection.
Of course, it was not just UK heavy ships in those northern waters,
the US amphibious ships were there as well.
Q1495 Mike Gapes: You have said already,
in answer to a question the Chairman asked you early on, that
there was only one aircraft carrier rather than potentially two,
or even, I suppose, in an ideal world, three, and that was deployed
as a platform for helicopters. Consequently, there was no deployed
organic air defence on that carrier. Did not this make the situation
rather vulnerable, and could you enlarge upon how you dealt with
the situation and the fact that you did not have that air defence?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Certainly.
From the point of view of air defence, the air defence was provided
very adequately by missiles on coalition ships, American ships,
that is anti-air missiles on our own ships and on coalition American
ships and Australian ships. The only threat we were facing was
the Iraqi missile threat, that was the only threat that was going
to come through the air towards us, and missile systems almost
certainly would have coped with that threat. What would have been
ideal, in terms of aircraft carrier capability, was perhaps more
ground attack, fixed-wing, close air support, but again we judged,
in the run-up to the operation, that, because there were significant
fixed-wing capabilities in the five American carrier groups that
were there, three in the Gulf and two in the Mediterranean, we
had call on plenty of fixed-wing support. When it came to the
operation, we had not always got the fixed-wing support ideally
we would have used, but that is your area, not mine, Brigadier.
Do you want to pick up on that?
Brigadier Dutton: I can do, yes,
in terms of close air support. Close air support was centralised.
I was working to 1 UK Division, which was working to the First
Marine Expeditionary Force. The American system, certainly the
American marine system, of allocating close air support is to
control it by a thing called the DASC, the Direct Air Support
Cell, and then it is allocated according to greatest need, so
all close air support was pooled. When it is in the air it checks
in with the DASC and the DASC allocates it to the area of greatest
need at that time, so you get your apportionment based on your
requirement, rather than when you ask for it.
Chairman: We will move on. Mr Viggers
will ask some questions on Ark Royal, please.
Q1496 Mr Viggers: Can I ask about the
reconfiguration of Ark Royal as a helicopter landing platform
rather than an air defence platform. Was this a matter of great
complication?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Not huge
complication. It is a role which is practised by the Navy, it
demonstrates the flexibility of a carrier which can be used as
a platform for a number of different tasks. Indeed, Ark Royal
carried predominantly Royal Air Force helicopters, not Navy helicopters,
which shows the joint flexibility those ships bring. Although
it involved significant effort, in terms of shifting spares ashore
before she sailed for one sort of helicopter, or aircraft, and
embarking other sorts of spares, it is a role which we practise
and do on a number of occasions.
Q1497 Mr Viggers: Mainly, it is a matter
of changing the equipment rather than changing the configuration
of the ship?
Rear Admiral Snelson: It is, yes.
Q1498 Mr Viggers: The Ark Royal carried
five Chinooks, I think. What other ships did you have that were
Chinook-capable?
Rear Admiral Snelson: The Chinooks
are capable of operating from HMS Ocean, and I think they did,
but Ark Royal and Ocean were the only two ships capable of operating
the Chinook.
Q1499 Mr Viggers: We have learned the
lesson with Atlantic Conveyor, have we not, how necessary it is
to have larger ships capable of taking heavy helicopter lift?
Was it your view that it might have been helpful to have further
Chinook-capable ships there?
Rear Admiral Snelson: I think,
the landing platform docks, the LPDs, had they been in service
and available, we would have wanted them for a whole lot of reasons,
and their flight-decks would be capable of operating Chinooks
also. Yes, I believe we have learned that lesson, and equipment
either in service or coming into service provides that capability.
1 Ev Back
2
Ev Back
|
