Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1520-1539)
REAR ADMIRAL
DAVID SNELSON
AND BRIGADIER
JAMES DUTTON
CBE ADC
3 DECEMBER 2003
Q1520 Mr Jones: When you did the targeting,
did you have the US personnel on the ground with you for forward
air control?
Brigadier Dutton: Yes, we did.
Again, this is something that we set up actually before we left
England, the ANGLICO teams. You are familiar with the US Marine
Corps ANGLICO, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies teams,
these are multi-disciplinary fire teams that control air and naval
gunfire, artillery and indeed everything else. They were embedded
at every level, Company, Commando and Brigade level, before we
left UK, so some sailed with 40 Commando, the others flew with
me and with 42 Commando and the rest of the Brigade to Kuwait.
The fire control for the NSW was controlled from within my Brigade
Headquarters, where they had this command element, because that
is where they had the best situational awareness of what was going
on, and that was where the Predator was feeding to, and that was
where the AC130 was taking its targeting from as well. That was
part of close air support. I explained earlier on, that close
air support, as a whole, in the American Marine Corps system,
is centrally controlled, so the ANGLICO team I had in my Brigade
Headquarters launched lots, I cannot remember the exact numbers
now, I think nine pairs of Cobra attack helicopters, in order
to support the 42 Commando insertion. Because we were not under
pressure at that time only the last pair of those arrived on target.
They were launched from Ali al Salem, they checked in with the
DASC and they were taken away to a higher priority task, so we
got only one pair. I would stress that I believe we got our fair
allocation, in that it is allocated according to greatest need.
The last part of your question was heavy armour. No, we did not
suffer at all initially from not having heavy armour. I could
not have put heavy armour ashore initially. When eventually we
did get some heavy armour it was after we had established the
M3 amphibious ferry, well north of Umm Qasr, it must have been
on about day three, day four, of the operation, so heavy armour
would not have been of any value at that stage.
Q1521 Mr Roy: Brigadier, we saw at first
hand during SAIF SAREEA a great deal of time and effort being
put by the Marines on beach landings, and presumably the Iraqi
coastline was the same two years ago as it was earlier this year.
With hindsight, should more than just that simple one way of beach
landings have been part of that training course, and did SAIF
SAREEA help at all to get you ashore there?
Brigadier Dutton: I did not do
SAIF SAREEA, it was before I did this job. To widen the question
slightly, essentially there are only two ways of getting ashore
from ships, one is by helicopter, one is by landing-craft, whether
they be conventional displacement or air-cushion vehicles. My
understanding is that SAIF SAREEA practised both of those, there
were lots of helicopters around. We practise routinely all methods
of landing within the capability that we have, so I do not feel
that SAIF SAREEA in any sense was mistargeted, in terms of developing
our landing capability.
Q1522 Mr Crausby: Had the landing force
been faced by a chemical or a biological attack, in your opinion,
would it have been protected effectively and capable of prosecuting
offensive operations ashore? To what extent did you plan and expect
a chemical or a biological attack?
Brigadier Dutton: Perhaps the
second bit first. I was convinced that the enemy had the capability
to attack us with chemical and biological weapons at any stage.
There was a big debate as to whether it would be early or whether
it would be only when Baghdad was threatened, and there were varying
views on that. Certainly, we were expecting and were equipped
for a chemical and biological response to our assault. The first
part of your question is how we would have done. We were equipped
adequately with NBC protection equipment, in terms of suits, albeit,
as you know, some were not necessarily in desert camouflage. Also
we were equipped adequately in terms of respirator canisters,
albeit again some appeared, from the dates on them, to be out
of date, although I was assured at the time, and have been reassured
subsequently—
Q1523 Mr Crausby: Out of date by how
much?
Brigadier Dutton: In the event,
they were not out of date, but they said on them 1988 with a life
of ten years. As I said at the time, it is difficult to convince
a Marine, or frankly even a Marine Brigadier, that actually that
means they are still in date. At the time, we were told, quite
correctly, that their life had been extended in 1998. I am not
sure necessarily that message got round as fully as it should
have done and I am not sure necessarily it was 100% believed,
because it seemed extraordinarily convenient. Subsequently, I
do know now that instructions were put out in 1998, that indeed
the life of these had been extended five years, so, in fact, we
were using in-date protective equipment, although it was not apparent
to us necessarily at the time that was the case.
Q1524 Mr Crausby: Let me move on to the
co-ordination between the Royal Marine amphibious landing forces
and other coalition units. Did that pose difficult challenges,
working in such close proximity?
Brigadier Dutton: Certainly it
posed challenges. This is not an unusual environment for Marine
forces. We were on the boundary of three components, four if you
include the air, but three really, Land, Maritime and Special
Forces. That is where amphibious forces expect to operate. Did
it cause any difficulty? It caused a lot of challenges, in fact,
I would say I spent most of my time, between arriving in Kuwait
on 22 January and crossing the line of departure on 20 March,
resolving those challenges of cross-component issues. Who precisely
was responsible for what element, what the command and control
arrangements were going to be, how we were going to operate with
the SEALs, what was the role of 1 Division, who, of course, from
my point of view, came into the south rather later than we had
done. I had already got used to working direct into the 1 MEF
(First Marine Expeditionary Force), and indeed continued to do
so with the blessing of General Robin Brims, the UK Divisional
Commander, who was very happy to allow us to do that. I spent
a lot of my time doing this cross-component business, but actually
that is the environment in which we are used to operating and
trained to operate.
Q1525 Mr Crausby: Were you satisfied
with the command and control arrangements?
Brigadier Dutton: Yes.
Q1526 Mr Crausby: First Reflections
reported, in paragraph 4.15: "In the air and at sea, extra
"Identification Friend or Foe" (IFF) systems were procured."
Did these IFF systems work effectively, and was there any need
for any further IFF systems?
Brigadier Dutton: I can deal with
the land part of it. We spent a lot of time working on how to
minimise the chance of fratricide, both in terms of electronic
systems, visual identification systems and simply cross-knowledge
of vehicles. Indeed, the Commanding General of the Third Marine
Air Wing arranged for the majority of its pilots, I cannot say
whether it was all or not, to overfly British equipment so that
they would recognise them on the ground. Electronically, we were
provided with some Blue Force Tracker units, which, in fact, are
not IFF systems, or at least that is not how the Americans use
them, they use them as a command and control device, but they
are quite effective as an anti-fratricide device because then
you have icons on a computer screen. We did not have anything
like enough for every sub-unit—how far do you break this
down—but we were able to identify major unit headquarter
locations and tactical headquarter locations. In terms of visual
identification, we had a variety of means. We had the Glint tape,
which I think you are probably aware of, which shows up systems
from the air. We had the markings—pretty low-tech these,
but nevertheless quite effective—on the vehicles, and orange
panels. All our small boats carried the White Ensign. A considerable
amount of time was spent trying to minimise fratricide.
Q1527 Mr Crausby: What would you say
are the overall lessons for the future on fratricide?
Brigadier Dutton: We need to continue
to work in each of those areas. I do not believe there is any
simple, electronic, scientific solution to this completely, it
has to be dealt with at various levels. It has to be dealt with
electronically, it has to be dealt with in terms of visual identification,
and of course in terms of familiarity of coalition vehicles and
equipment so that we can recognise more readily each other's equipment.
I think it is a process that has to continue in each of those
areas to try to get better and better at it. I think we have got
better at it over the years and we are still not perfect, but
I would venture to suggest that I am not sure there is a perfect
solution.
Q1528 Mr Roy: Just to back up a point
of my colleague Mr Crausby. I have got a terrible habit of looking
in the food cupboards at the `sell by' dates on the bottoms of
tins, and if they are over their `use by' date I fling them out.
Quite frankly, unless Mr Heinz actually is going to come to me
and tell me that his soup is still okay, they are going to go
in the bin. Likewise, if you were in a position to look at the
`sell by' date of respirators and you saw that it was five years
out of date, what would it take to make you think that actually
they were okay?
Brigadier Dutton: I think, if
I saw documentary proof that indeed there had been a document
produced in 1998 that had extended the life then I would have
been happy with that. I understand this was in Material Regulations
for the Army. This is not a document I read regularly, but there
are people who do, of course. Maybe I simply did not get the message,
but perhaps it could have been made clearer that this was, in
fact, a genuine extension. I do now firmly believe that to be
the case, that these were still safe and in date, but we were
not certain at the time.
Q1529 Mr Roy: I can understand that,
but not only did you not look at the documentation, the documentation
obviously was not looked at over a five-year period. If it was
up to 1998, that was the time when something should have been
checked. It is not as though they were not checked just once,
it was over a five-year period, which suggests that there is something
very wrong with the documentation system. What I am interested
in also is, if there was a five-year extension to 2003, which
was really handy in this case, was it January 2003 or December
2003?
Brigadier Dutton: I do not know
the answer to that bit of the question. What I would say, if I
may, is that the respirator canister that we all had on our respirator,
i.e. the one we would have used in the event of a chemical attack,
was well in date, inside the ten years. I am talking about the
spare that was carried in the haversack. I cannot answer your
question on the months.
Mr Roy: I am sorry you cannot answer
it because I do think that someone is guilty of gross misconduct
not to have checked those dates. Quite frankly, if I had a son
or daughter in your charge I would not be too happy to think,
or to know, that they had a spare canister that I perceived, because
I can read the bottom and it says so, was of no use because it
was five years out of date.
Q1530 Mr Crausby: Can I ask how difficult
it would have been to change the label in 1998? Would not that
have been possible?
Brigadier Dutton: They are sealed
units, in a sealed plastic bag, presumably you would put it in
another plastic bag with another label on it. I would not imagine
it is that difficult, but I am not an expert.
Chairman: We will have to write further.
I do not think there is much point in flogging this one any more.
Mr Roy: It is not that I am flogging
it, Chairman. I am sorry but certainly it was raised by a constituent
of mine, by a family, and they were worried and it would be wrong
just to let it go unsaid.
Chairman: We are not letting it go unsaid.
We will write.
Mr Roy: If someone was guilty then really
it should be noted so that it does not happen again.
Chairman: We will write and elicit the
answer from the right people.[3]
Q1531 Mr Roy: How critical was the in-theatre
training for the amphibious landing force? For example, was there
sufficient time available to train properly?
Brigadier Dutton: Yes. 42 Commando
and the Brigade Combat Service Support Units that deployed with
me by air arrived by, roughly speaking, the end of January, so
there was adequate time for familiarisation, acclimatisation and
in-theatre training. The 40 Commando group that deployed amphibiously,
in the Amphibious Task Group, arrived in the middle of February,
of course having acclimatised coming through the Mediterranean,
the Suez Canal, round into the Gulf, and they had exercised already
in Cyprus, as you have heard, but then latterly in the UAE, so
that was important to them. 15 MEU, who sailed from the west coast
of the United States, from San Diego, on 6 January, arrived on
or about 12 February and deployed ashore almost immediately to
do familiarisation training with the other units of my Brigade,
and indeed acclimatisation training, and so on. I am content that
certainly there was adequate time, bearing in mind, of course,
at the time, we did not know that 20 March was going to be D-Day.
We were always aiming for 15 February, as you heard earlier on
from the Admiral, which we could have met just—just—but
we used the time available for more training in theatre.
Q1532 Mr Roy: Was that similar, for example,
for NBC, for Naval Gunfire Support and for air training as well?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Yes, it
was. That target of 15 February was always one we aimed to meet,
and for all of the maritime forces certainly they were in theatre
by that date. Probably it was the readiness of the Amphibious
Group which was the tightest, as the Brigadier has just said,
but for all the other forces they were ready.
Q1533 Mr Roy: What about the coalition
between the UK and the US forces, the Maritime Commando Units
especially, was that done in sufficient time, was that to your
satisfaction?
Rear Admiral Snelson: Talking
about the coalition command and control integration, shall I talk
about the maritime side first, yes, most definitely. It was one
of the reasons I said in my opening address that the fact that
we had established a maritime enclave, as it were, in the American
headquarters in Bahrain some 18 months before, as part of the
global war on terrorism, meant that we had a team already inside
the American Maritime Headquarters, so as soon as discussion started
about this we were embedded in it, and that went very smoothly.
I should make it clear, in command and control terms, that the
tactical command of our units at sea came under American commanders,
because we needed to operate in one integrated way. It is the
same in the air, you cannot have three different commanders putting
aeroplanes in three different places. It is just the same with
ships. But it worked well. There is a sub-issue about communications
but perhaps that is something we will come on to in a later question,
if you want to explore it.
Q1534 Mr Havard: The training was done
in Cyprus and the final training with the US forces in the Gulf,
as you have said. I have looked at an article that you have just
done, Brigadier, in the Royal United Services Institute Journal,
and in there you talk about things like, for example, "the
complexities of the Al Faw operation were exacerbated because
the planning was conducted by function rather than effect."
You talk about the various measures there are and you say there
are various doctrines and ways of approaching things, apparently
simple solutions used in high water, straight course lines, and
so on, but less useful, you say, in a complex estuary environment,
which is exactly where you found yourself, and you found yourself
deploying detached parties in small boats in that sort of environment.
I wonder what the problems were of command and control that you
experienced, therefore how did you ensure that these detached
parties that you had operating in this complex environment were
safeguarded sufficiently?
Brigadier Dutton: Really this
is the point I was making in answer to an earlier question about
the complexity of the inter-component business. Planning was done
by the Land Component for the land, by the Maritime Component
for the sea—this is very simplistic—by the Air Component
for the air, and Special Forces Component for Special Forces.
Because we crossed all those boundaries in this relatively restricted
battle space on Iraq's only coastline and up towards the south
of Basra, we had to bring all that together. There is a doctrinal
way of doing that in amphibious operations, in ATP8, called an
Amphibious Objective Area, in which case you have one commander
who controls everything within that area. That was unrealistic
in this scenario because everybody needed to be in that battle
space, including the fast jets travelling through, including some
of the TLAMs flying through, and so on. There was no one person
really who could control the whole lot, so the decision was taken
to make the High Water Mark the boundary between the Land and
the Maritime, and then the SF had their own JSOA within the Land
area. The complexity that I talked about in that joint talk that
I did with Colonel Waldhauser, who is the CO of 15 MEU, was exactly
that, how to bring all this together to make sure that we were
all operating from the same—
Q1535 Mr Havard: I am sorry to interrupt
you, but I believe these related partly to what was asked earlier
on about friendly fire incidents. I do not want to go into those
particular sorts of television programmes and other things about
various things that have happened. I do not want to go into that
at the moment, but it does raise this question about friendly
fire incidents. Were there any, in your perception, were there
difficulties in that regard as a consequence of operating in this
complex way in this complex environment?
Brigadier Dutton: Certainly there
were difficulties operating in that environment, but it is not
something that we can change, that sort of environment inherently
is complex. It is the sort of environment that amphibious forces
expect to operate in, we train for it and we practise in that
environment and we do everything we can, by doctrine and procedures,
pre-planning for the specific operation, war-gaming, rock drills
and a comprehensive orders process and a good, joint communications
system to minimise the friction.
Q1536 Mr Havard: Your perception is,
on this occasion, that this did not manifest itself, that we did
not end up in a situation where the complexity was such that we
ended up with friendly fire incidents and that it broke down in
some way, kept together maybe by a combination of people's ingenuity
on the ground, the planning and everything else? That is your
perception of what actually happened?
Brigadier Dutton: No, my perception
is that actually it all worked rather well. I am not saying that
it worked perfectly, because it never would and it did not in
this case, but it worked rather well. The arrangements that we
made with the SEALs and with the Maritime Commander to delineate
tasking, especially over the assault, seizure and then opening
of Umm Qasr, in which a huge number of people, not just military
but NGOs and humanitarian organisations and people, had an interest,
actually worked, I thought, remarkably well.
Rear Admiral Snelson: Can I add
something, just to say that this business of avoiding fratricide
and dealing with this complexity was something on which senior
commanders spent personally an awful lot of time. I have said
often to people that my own personal engagement in things in the
Bahrain headquarters frequently was over subjects of this nature.
The availability of modern e-mail communications, putting information
on websites and using chat-rooms, although there are complications
there, in terms of doing that with coalition allies, which is
a whole subject in itself, has made it much easier to pick up
the `phone or send an e-mail or deal with these sorts of issues
in a way which would not have been possible even just a few years
ago. You can deal with these boundary issues with modern communications
much better than you used to be able to, but it was something
to which we and other senior commanders gave personal attention
at very senior level. We worked hard at it.
Q1537 Rachel Squire: Can I apologise
for missing the first hour of your evidence. My flight was delayed
by three hours because of fog at Heathrow Airport. It just shows
that perhaps I should use maritime methods of travel. Focusing
on things that move in the air rather than on the sea, can I ask
you what the impact was of the United States' decision to down
all its helicopters, which then seemed to require the UK forces
to fill the gap?
Brigadier Dutton: In a sense,
you have answered the question. The impact was that we had to
use UK helicopters to do the insertion of 42 Commando several
hours later, in fact, at dawn on the 21st. What was the impact
on the overall operation? In fact, because of the situation on
the ground, it did not make a great deal of difference. 42's role
in the plan was to provide flank protection to 40 Commando. While
40 Commando was concentrating on clearing the Manifold and Metering
Station, the pipeline heads, the three strategic targets that
they had been allocated and then Al Faw town and the base of the
peninsula down to the Gulf, the plan was to put in 42 Commando
to block. I think it is important to remember that what we know
now about what the enemy was capable of and what they achieved
was not what we thought they were capable of and what they could
have achieved. We were fully expecting an armoured division, or
elements of an armoured division, to move out of Basra to attempt
to throw us off the Al Faw, so it was important to have sufficient
forces on the Al Faw to be able to prevent that happening. That
was 42 Commando's role, to put a block to the north and to the
west of 40 Commando, and they had other roles as well, but essentially
this was it, in case the Iraqi forces moved down and attempted
to eject 40 Commando from its main task, so that 40 Commando then
could concentrate on its main task. In the event, the enemy was
either unable or unwilling, and I suspect both, to do that, so
the fact that 42 Commando went in about six hours late did not
matter.
Q1538 Rachel Squire: Can I ask you about
the very tragic incident early on in the operation where we lost
two of the UK helicopters. What was the operational impact of
that tragic incident?
Brigadier Dutton: Is that the
two Sea King VIIs, or the American helicopter that was inserted?
Q1539 Rachel Squire: The Sea King VIIs.
Rear Admiral Snelson: The two
Sea Kings were operating from Ark Royal. Their main task was air
surveillance, they had been designed for surveillance over the
sea of ships and small boats, and so on. They have very new radar
and avionics in them, which we found was extremely good, at least
over flat land, at detecting land targets, and particularly vehicles.
They had switched role, through the ingenuity of the aircrews,
to support the Brigade and being able to tell the Brigade when
heavy armour was coming out of Basra, if I have got that right.
The sad loss of two of them clearly affected the number that were
available after that to support the Brigade, but by that time
the task was beginning to reduce, I think, and therefore we were
able to carry on without further significant impact, but that
was purely at the time when it occurred.
Brigadier Dutton: One of the reasons
I was able to be relatively relaxed about the fact that 42's insertion
was delayed by six hours was that the Sea King VII cover provides
a moving target indication picture, it does not define enemy and
friendly, but had we seen lots and lots and lots of white shapes
coming out of Basra we would have known that was a likely enemy
armoured counter-attack. That was not happening and we could see
that from the down link from the Sea King VII, which was why we
could be relatively relaxed. Of course, the accident with the
two helicopters happened the night after, or the night after that,
about 24 hours later, so we still had a full suite of them. They
did continue flying after the accident and we continued to get
a service from them, and certainly it is a technique that we want
to develop. Of course, it worked particularly well over the flat
Al Faw, it would not be so good in a mountainous area, but nevertheless
we want to develop that capability to see how good it could be
in other areas.
3 Ev Back
|
