Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1660-1672)
AIR VICE
MARSHAL MIKE
HEATH AND
WING COMMANDER
IAN CHALMERS
16 DECEMBER 2003
Q1660 Mr Cran: I entirely understand.
Are you able to say if there were any occasions when the Iraqis
attacked our computer systems, other than the one I have mentioned?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: I cannot
answer that question.
Q1661 Mr Cran: Therefore, you will not
be able to tell us whether we attacked any of their computer systems
either.
Air Vice Marshal Heath: I am afraid
not.
Q1662 Chairman: How far were information
operations in the major combat phase integrated with the post-conflict
information operations campaign plan? Was there such a plan?
Wing Commander Chalmers: The basis
for UK operations was the UK government's published strategic
objectives. When we started putting together our information campaign,
we had that in mind. Getting to Baghdad or Basra was not the end
state but only one stop on the road to the end state that we would
like to see. As the conflict moved on, our focus on various target
audiences changed, depending on the phase we were in. For example,
during the conflict phase, there was very much an armed forces
regime. As we moved away from that, the key audience became the
Iraqi people. In answer to your question, firmly, yes, we always
had a strategic objective and end state in mind when we started
crafting our campaign.
Q1663 Chairman: Did you anticipate that
there would not be a clean break between formal hostilities and
what went afterwards? If you answer that you did anticipate that
there would be a rather violent, post-conflict situation, though
not as bad obviously in the Basra region, why did you not tell
the Americans or did they not anticipate there would be a form
of warfare that was threatening to their personnel that would
take place?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: One of
the areas I am quite surprised we have not investigated further
this afternoon is the American position on this. The Americans
have a different approach to this whole concept and indeed all
of their operations. What I believe I have tried to explain to
you this afternoon in terms of what I passionately believe is
a success story is that the Americans envy our concept of joined
up, cross government activity in this area. It is something they
have been unable to replicate but they are moving towards it quite
rapidly in the States as we speak. The Americans broke this out
into separate parcels. Until the war was over, there was very
little information operations effort into the reconstitution and
the aftermath; whereas from our point of view, when we were getting
towards the end state, my staff were directed to lose complete
interest in the war fighting piece. We needed to start moving
into the reconstruction piece. That is not to say we just gave
up and stopped working, but the predominance of staff went into
what comes next. Did we sit round the table and say, "They
are going to carry on shooting at us"? I suppose the honest
answer is no, we did not. History and experience tells you that
we knew jolly well that that was going to happen, so one of the
targets was "Where is the main area of resistance going to
come from?" In crafting our messages for that reconstruction,
most of it went to the Iraqi people and a small element went to
where would be the residual resistance. We thought the residual
resistance would probably be the Ba'ath Party rather than external
terrorists, but nonetheless the concept of understanding that
there would be still activity going on was well understood. I
think we probably had the level of that activity running within
my department but not necessarily across the piece.
Q1664 Chairman: According to the MoD's
report on operations in Iraq, the "effectiveness and cohesion"
of the information campaign was diluted in the transition from
the campaign to post-conflict phase. Why do you think this occurred?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: First
of all, we were unable to counter the high level of cynicism and
hostility that we were meeting in open forum, predominantly in
the media. We had no eloquent answer to most of that. We believed
that unless we could have a demonstrator that confirmed our line,
we felt it was better to say nothing rather than to say, "They
are wrong; we are right." That largely undermined our position
in a number of areas. Subsequently, some of the shortfalls in
capability—I am thinking particularly of linguists and Arabists
here—meant that conveying some of these messages and themes
became quite difficult. Other than that, a stark realisation that
if you have hostile to your intent neighbours—I am talking
about across international boundaries here—those nations
are not going to be persuaded probably regardless of the weight
of your argument. I suspect we were slightly naïve in thinking
we would be more persuasive with some of those regional neighbours
than we were.
Q1665 Chairman: Given that information
operations have been identified for a number of years, certainly
since Bosnia, as a vital area for strategic direction and coherence,
why were the responsibilities and ownership for the information
campaign unclear to those who should have known in the vital transition
from combat to post-conflict operations?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: I do not
think that represents the UK position. We did recognise that we
needed to go through all this. I remember hearing my Secretary
of State saying quite clearly that one of the prices to pay to
go into this conflict was that we needed to know how we were going
to come out of it and how we were going to manage the aftermath.
I saw that as compelling direction from the most senior level
within the MoD that made sure we did not lose sight of the fact
that the aftermath was just as critical as the main piece.
Q1666 Mr Cran: You did refer to counter
information being under-utilised in the campaign phase and you
said there were lessons for the future. You said, if I understood
it, it was not as effective as it should have been, but I do not
think you said why that was. Could you tell us why?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: Simply
because it is not something that we have practised and developed
our themes, lines and messages in. It is an area that needs revisiting.
It is being revisited and frankly I will not quite say we were
too busy to do everything but there is an element of that in it.
We had to find the priorities within our capability and therefore
a human failing is that you tend to do what you know you can do
well, rather than try and patch together a capability somewhere
down the road. That particular area was not something that we
were well versed in or strongly capable of delivering. Although
a staff of 98 sounds grand, they were all specific practitioners
of parts of the art, which excluded that area.
Q1667 Mr Cran: I do not think any of
us on this Committee would even attempt to criticise what you
did. Far from it. Can we adduce from the answer you have given
that there is a utility, a potential use there, something you
recognise and it is something the MoD and all the rest of you
should look at?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: Very much
so, yes, to all of those. We are addressing it as we speak. It
is something that we need to make a judgment on. Without prejudging
the outcomes, I think the conclusion will be it is an area of
growth for the future.
Q1668 Mr Crausby: How do you measure
success in information operations?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: You have
just asked the most difficult question of the afternoon. It is
by some margin the most difficult and taxing element of the MoD's
task. If you cannot measure it and you cannot demonstrate that
you are delivering capability, you cannot demonstrate that you
are enhancing capability. You cannot demonstrate ultimately that
if you get it right you will avoid conflict. I had one individual
who was a reservist. This was his full time job in terms of trying
to analyse where we might see demonstrators of capability. He
trawled every resource he could: newspapers, the media, the internet,
reports coming out from prisoners of war, reports from people
on the streets. We are pulling together as much as we can in terms
of that human assessment. In terms of further assessment the PJHQ,
towards the end of the campaign, came back with an embryonic matrix
of trying to do a scientific analysis of where you think there
are indicators and what level of effect they were demonstrating.
It is embryonic but it was a jolly good start, albeit slightly
subjective in terms of trying to look for a qualitative answer
to your question. It is extremely difficult. If you are willing
to buy my line that all military activity is an information piece,
then dropping a bomb on somebody is an information piece and you
can quantify what your results are. Please do not think I am being
flippant. I do think this is a very important point that I am
trying to convey here, that every single military activity has
a potential outcome, not always positive, sometimes negative,
and those judgments need to be made so that, when you do things
that potentially have a negative impact, you understand how you
can manage the repercussions.
Q1669 Mr Crausby: Overall, how successful
were you? How do information operations planners deal with the
issue of unintended effects or unintended knock-on effects?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: I cannot
quantify the answer to that question. I have no doubt whatsoever
that we did have an effect. This is an inadequate answer. Had
we gone on during the persuasion stage for another year, would
we have avoided conflict? I do not know. I cannot see at the moment
how I can get my mind round conveying an answer to that. It is
the most difficult aspect of the whole information piece. You
need to find a way of delivering messages of effectiveness. The
directorate I have just left now has the best minds trying to
address this very issue because we see it as essential. There
is no doubt that we delivered an element of persuasion, an element
of dissuasion and an element that affected war fighting in terms
of regiments or battalions giving up and making sure that we did
not attack them. There is no doubt that we are having an influence
in the reconstitution of Iraq today, but I am not capable of quantifying
that in terms of is it very good; is it high or is it low. I am
very sorry. I am not evading the question. I just do not know
the answer.
Q1670 Mr Crausby: We understand that
a number of opinion polls were undertaken in multinational division,
south east, following the major combat phase. What did you learn
from them?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: We learned
that, to be brutal, 40% of the people had neither listened to
us on the radio nor read our leaflets. 60% had. Of that 60%, I
would judge that about 50% were moved to listen to what we had
to say. I will not say that they were swayed towards tacitly joining
the coalition. I would suggest to you they were already there.
What they needed was a demonstrator that we were not going to
stop short of Baghdad and leave Saddam Hussein in power. They
were wary of us but we encouraged them to be less wary than they
had previously been. We encouraged them, quicker than we would
have done on the street, to be trusting and we were then able
to give them the demonstrators that we were going all the way
to Baghdad and that regime change should now become a necessary
element of the conflict.
Q1671 Mr Crausby: Major General Gene
Renuart, the US director of operations, has said that one of Saddam's
miscalculations left him to begin the war with the oilfields in
the south relatively unguarded, in large part because of a deception
campaign that led him to believe that the war would start later
than it did by leaving the fourth infantry division in Turkey.
Was the northern option as a whole an example of an information
operation? What about the late decision to move the US fourth
infantry division?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: As far
as I am aware, no, it was not an information piece. There were
compelling military reasons for having two fronts of operation
and the north would be an entirely appropriate battle front. I
found the decision to move 4ID so late strange but I am unaware
of it being a positive attempt by the Americans at military deception.
Mr Crausby: I am sure if you say it is
so that is the absolute truth.
Q1672 Chairman: How do you see information
operations developing in the future as more work is done on effects
based planning and the lessons that you have transmitted to your
successors?
Air Vice Marshal Heath: I think
you have chosen the key words in phrasing your question. The sooner
we move away from information operations and kinetic operations,
the better. What we are trying to deliver now is effects based
operations that embrace the whole gamut of military and cross
government capability. I believe we have arrived and delivered
a force multiplier—not the MoD but Whitehall—and it
is important we understand that. The changes that have taken place
in the Foreign Office that I asked Wing Commander Chalmers to
outline earlier on I would not remotely suggest have been an outcome
of the information operations or the need for permanent engagement,
but it is an enormous step forward in the MoD's capability to
stay permanently engaged with our sister department. I think we
are in a position to go from strength to strength here. We now
have a permanent, free ranging dialogue across all of the media
operations and other government departments. We have a buy-in
from other government departments that they understand what we
are doing and do not see us as threatening; they see us as something
that helps the UK government. We can only now go from strength
to strength.
Chairman: Before we go into private session,
may I thank you most sincerely for the evidence you have given?
We have found it enthralling and it has been one of the most interesting
sessions I have ever attended, not because of the intrinsic merit
and interest of the subject, but by the coherent and very reasonable
way in which you have explained to us. I hope that you are setting
a trend. I decided many years ago to make an award for honesty
and integrity before the Committee. It was not awarded after 1983.
If it is going to be awarded, I think you are likely to be the
recipient. I hope it does not affect the rest of your career and
it will in no way damage your credibility amongst your employers,
but if we have such lucid expressions of views perhaps the relationship
between ourselves and the Ministry of Defence, which is quite
good, will be very good. Thank you.
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