Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1720-1739)
SIR KEVIN
TEBBIT KCB CMG, AIR
VICE MARSHAL
CLIVE LOADER
OBE AND MR
IAN LEE
17 DECEMBER 2003.
Q1720 Mr Hancock: I was very interested
to hear that you went to Turkey. When did you go to Turkey?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: In early January.
Q1721 Mr Hancock: You were obviously
asked what your political objectives were as well as your military
objectives.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Indeed; this
was being run as a political overall campaign.
Q1722 Mr Hancock: Absolutely. Some of
the Turkish Members of Parliament who were around at that time
are suggesting that one of the reasons why Turkey in the end was
persuaded not to agree was the political objectives which were
put to them. Can you tell us what you told them the political
objectives were? You knew what the military objectives were, but
when they asked you specifically to clarify the British Government's
political objectives and why it was important to go through Turkey
at that stage, in January, just weeks before you were ready to
go, what did you tell them?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The policy objective
was quite transparent and that was simply to bring Iraq into conformity
with the UN Security Council resolutions. It is not quite clear
but what we were trying to achieve was pretty transparent.
Q1723 Mr Hancock: Did you actually suggest
to them that one of the political objectives was the removal of
Saddam as the political head of state of Iraq? Not you, Mr Lee,
Sir Kevin, because he was at the meeting, I do not know whether
you were.
Mr Lee: I was there.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: He was there
as well.
Q1724 Mr Hancock: So you did not say
the removal of Saddam was one of the political objectives.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I certainly
do not recall having that conversation with the Turkish Government.
Q1725 Mr Hancock: I am sure they asked
you that question.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, I do not
think we had that discussion, because I do not think we had concluded
at that point that it was necessary.
Q1726 Mr Hancock: So at no time during
those deliberations with the Turks did you get asked whether part
of the political objective was the removal of Saddam Hussein.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, we did not.
I certainly did not and I cannot recall that coming up and I would
not have expected it to come up because we were still operating
then within the context of the UN discussion, where we were seeking
Saddam's agreement to the political proposals which were put to
him rather than his removal. It was only subsequently that we
concluded there was no choice. The problem the Turkish Government
had was not so much sympathy with the objectives, but the difficulty
of delivery in their own political climate.
Q1727 Mr Hancock: And obviously the political
aftermath. Did they mention then that one of their concerns was
what was going to happen, had they given you permission to go
in and Saddam was removed, about the governance of northern Iraq
post the conflict? Was that part of their problem?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is obviously
fair to say that the Turkish Government was and still is and always
has been extremely concerned about the integrity of Iraq, because
the Kurdish problem is a big problem for Turkey and Turkey wanted
to be satisfied that her own security interests would not be damaged.
Therefore any prospect of instability in Iraq was a concern for
the Turkish Government.
Q1728 Mr Hancock: Were you able to give
them assurances that you were in fact supportive of the integrity
of Iraq?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We were indeed.
Q1729 Mr Hancock: May I go a little bit
further on the crossover between the political and military objectives?
Most of us were clear that the military outcome was probably a
foregone conclusion, only the timing was probably the unknown
factor. The political objectives were somewhat more difficult
to deliver and sometimes the consequences of military actions
prevent political objectives being achieved as quickly as possible.
Was it possible for you to be fairly flexible about the crossover
between the military and the political objectives during the conduct
of the war?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes, in the
sense that the policy objectives were very much built into the
way in which the military campaign was conducted. Firstly, the
desire for speed so that it was hoped that it would be possible
to secure Iraqi infrastructure for the Iraqi people, including
their oil reserves, before there was destruction of them by Saddam's
forces. One of the reasons for looking for a very rapid approach
at the last minute, the collapse of an air component into the
land component so they both happened simultaneously for maximum
surprise, and the speed of the initial advance, was not exactly
determined by, but a major consideration in that was, a wish to
preserve as much of the Iraqi infrastructure as possible for the
Iraqi people in future rather than to engage in classic military
warfare. That is one example of the intertwining of these issues.
Similarly, reassurances to neighbouring countries were very important
to make good the point that this was not intended, quite the reverse,
to destabilise, but indeed to remove a source of instability from
the region. That diplomacy was by and large very successful. At
all stages the way in which the military campaign was carried
forward—and this was also connected to the information campaign
associated with it—was designed to say to the Iraqi people
that we had no quarrel with them whatsoever, this is about the
regime and that we would aim to achieve our military objectives
even though Iraq's military capability itself—I am not talking
about weapons of mass destruction—remained. This was the
way in which it was pursued.
Q1730 Mr Hancock: During the course of
the campaign did you see military action or maybe some of the
military actions, particularly in the American sector, making
the political objectives more and more difficult to achieve? Was
there a compromising of the political objectives by some of the
mistakes in the military action?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I do not think
so. I think there was an awkward period after the very rapid initial
success and it came from embedded journalism, which by and large
was successful, but it did have a rather difficult effect to manage
in terms of presentation, particularly to the Arab world. It looked
as though the embedded media were getting amazing pictures, something
which has never happened before, almost warfare as it occurred,
and it was therefore very difficult indeed for the media itself
to put this in context. It was difficult to know whether what
was one tiny little incident in one place was in fact representative
of the overall campaign. We found ourselves in a situation where
it looked much more brutal and much less successful than in fact
was the case. It was quite difficult for the media as well as
for us to put that in context. In that sense there was a complication.
It was only temporary.
Q1731 Mr Hancock: Complication as opposed
to a real political problem.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes; yes. A
complication in that this was not supposed and is not in any way
intended to have a negative effect on the Arab world, but some
of the reporting implied much, much more than in fact was the
case in terms of destruction and in terms of success. People were
very surprised when they went back into Iraq and saw how little
had actually been damaged when if we looked at al-Jazeera in the
first few days it looked as though the whole place was up in flames.
Not true, but it was the result of having this embedded journalism
which was very difficult to manage. I am not suggesting I criticise
it; I think it was a good thing. However, it was a new thing which
we have not yet fully come to terms with.
Q1732 Mr Hancock: How easy is it in a
fast-moving environment, as this was, for you to manage the military
success against what the political objectives were? Do you do
that through the rules of engagement, by tightening or slacking
them?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: You do indeed.
When I say "you" it is very important to be clear about
what we mean. It was very important that military commanders should
have maximum flexibility to carry out their task. For example,
the timing of the taking of Basra was a very good illustration
here. I think everybody would agree that this was handled extremely
well by the military commander on the ground. He was the one who
judged when it was safe to go into Basra and try to achieve that
objective with minimum casualties. He was not told he must go
now. He was told to make his own judgment with the overall objective
of minimising Iraqi casualties as well as his own. He did that
brilliantly. I put it like that because the intent of the politicians,
the political intent to achieve objectives with minimum damage,
permeated throughout the system, so it was not necessary for the
Secretary of State to exercise moment by moment control to that
extent. It was quite clear that was his intent and that was the
way the military conducted their campaign. Another example was
that many of our aircraft returned without discharging their weapons.
That was criticised as implying some sort of failure or some sort
of overkill. By and large it was because, if the pilot could not
absolutely identify the target he was supposed to go for, he was
not to take chances and was to return without discharging his
weapon; another example of the political control over the way
in which the operation was conducted. I am getting into trouble
as I have a uniformed colleague here who can tell you a lot more
about how it felt from their end.
Q1733 Mr Hancock: I am sure he could
but colleagues want to get in with their questions. The Americans
are now publishing their rules of engagement or they did so for
the conflict in Iraq. We still do not discuss or publish our rules
of engagement. I want to know whether or not it is easy for you
to be fairly flexible about those rules of engagement once the
conflict starts and how that is managed politically.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They are couched
in a form which makes clear the overall approach to be taken but
does leave it to the military commander on the ground to interpret
what this means in order to have maximum effect. On targeting,
for example, a Secretary of State will lay out the parameters
of what is acceptable and what is not and in a few cases say "These
sorts of targets I reserve to my own decision at the time",
but very few. Though broadly laying out categories of control
so that it was clear where the parameters lay, the military men
were given maximum flexibility within those parameters to go about
their task.
Q1734 Mr Hancock: That seems very clear
to me. As the Americans were very transparent and actually issued
flexible plastic cards to all their personnel making quite clear
what the rules of engagement were and they published them on the
internet so everyone, including the Iraqis were aware of their
rules of engagement, why is it that you are still declining to
be so transparent as they are with our rules of engagement? Are
ours so different that we are nervous of the public having a view
of them?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Not necessarily;
they are not necessarily different. Clearly we have concerns about
operational security which mean that we prefer not to do this,
but perhaps I could ask the Air Marshal to comment further.
Q1735 Mr Hancock: Do the Americans have
that view as well? Those concerns must be the same.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: It is
very important for our fighting men and women that they are not
put in a situation where those who are fighting against them know
precisely the circumstances when they will or will not be fired
upon under the rules of engagement. That is why we keep them on
suitable close hold. They have of course to be undertaken fully
in accordance with the law of armed conflict and they are. To
let your enemy know when you are or are not going to engage them
would not be a wise thing to do in conflict.
Q1736 Mr Hancock: Why do you think it
was the Americans who went down the road of publishing quite extensively
what they considered to be the right rules of engagement for this
conflict and we declined?
Mr Lee: You would have to ask
them that.
Q1737 Mr Hancock: I am sure Mr Lee has
asked them and I should be interested to know. Has none of you
three ever discussed it with the Americans?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes, we do have
a full exchange of discussions with the Americans.
Q1738 Mr Hancock: Tell us what you asked
them.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They have their
view on this and we have ours. I am afraid that is the position;
it is as simple as that.
Q1739 Mr Hancock: Were you concerned
about them publishing their rules of engagement?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: In terms of
the way they fight, clearly they felt satisfied about that.
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