Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1740-1759)
SIR KEVIN
TEBBIT KCB CMG, AIR
VICE MARSHAL
CLIVE LOADER
OBE AND MR
IAN LEE
17 DECEMBER 2003.
Q1740 Mr Hancock: Were you concerned
that the enemy would know what they were going to do?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, we were
satisfied that the Americans were unlikely to put our forces in
danger. We did not regard that as a fundamental issue. It does
not change our own position. In this particular conflict it was
unlikely to have made a difference. Once you do start publishing
rules of engagement in one country, you are more or less committed
to doing it in every other. We prefer to reserve to ourselves
the right to preserve confidentiality and therefore an element
of uncertainty. The Americans have chosen to be more transparent.
Q1741 Mr Hancock: Did they ask you to
do the same?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, they did
not. We respect each other's position on this one.
Q1742 Mr Hancock: But you talk about
it regularly.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We talked about
rules of engagement regularly, because when you are fighting next
to people and with people, it is important to know how each other
is going to react in various circumstances. That is part of the
co-ordination of military activity.
Q1743 Mr Hancock: When British troops
are with American units, under whose rules of engagement do they
operate? Do they ask their colleagues whether they can look at
their card to see whether they are covered?
Mr Lee: They operate entirely
under their own national rules.
Q1744 Mr Hancock: Despite the fact they
are under a unified command structure.
Mr Lee: Indeed and it applies
in other locations where there are groups of multinational forces
who have different ROE. They undertake actions and activities
in accordance with their own national authorisation.
Q1745 Chairman: Right. Our rules of engagement
are that 13 questions is a maximum.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It worked well
in practice. Let this rather guarded conversation, because I am
still worried about my poor American colleagues listening to this
conversation, not mislead anybody. Our marines operated with theirs
extremely effectively in al-Faw. We operated with them equally
as we provided engineering support. The fact that we do not publish
and they do, does not mean there is much difference between the
two sets.
Q1746 Rachael Squire: May I just pick
up on some of your comments about the embedded media, the lack
of context, the complications that caused at times, albeit only
temporary ones. Then there was your particular example of how
in Basra the military decision was left entirely to the military
commander as to when to move in and take Basra, in spite of any
pressures which might be coming from the media or representation
that there was some delay and particular problems. Would you like
to comment further on the extent to which you considered that
the media coverage of the conflict here in the United Kingdom
influenced the political priorities during the campaign and to
what extent, if that was the case, that fed back into influencing
the military decisions in theatre?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Surprisingly
little. This was a very professionally managed campaign, both
politically and militarily and although there was tremendous press
pressure, I cannot think of any particular political or military
action which was judged on the basis of anything other than the
achievement of the political and military objectives we had set
ourselves. That remained constant throughout, whether it was the
pressure over the pause before taking Baghdad, where there was
great criticism at the time, the thing having run out of steam
sort of stuff, or whether it was indeed over Basra, why were we
sitting there besieging Basra like a medieval city etc, when of
course Basra was not a specific military objective. The purpose
was to hold the area for rapid movement of American forces and
indeed to secure the southern oil fields before sabotage took
place, which was being planned and we got there just in time to
prevent it. Despite the difficulties, the campaign continued according
to the plans set rather than being blown off course or influenced
by the media. In these days, it does not mean to say it colours
the overall public attitude towards what is going on. It does
not mean to say we disapprove of or disagree with embedded media;
we think actually that it was a success and we think that is the
way it will need to go in future. We will need to find a way of—and
I put it this way honestly—helping the media understand
what is actually happening so that little pinpricks here or there
are not reported as strategic reverses. It is very difficult because
we ourselves are equally dependent on information from the theatre
as to what we can say to the press when they ask at four in the
afternoon for the perspective. When people are actually fighting
a battle, they are not terribly focused on a separate activity
purely based on briefing the media. It is always very difficult
to restrain the impulse to give instant news and then find three
or four hours later that it was not quite right. That is another
discipline which has to be sustained throughout these sorts of
operations when one is dealing with instant media. I genuinely
do not believe that the military or political aspects of the campaign
or the objectives were changed as a result of media pressure.
Q1747 Rachael Squire: Still on the massive
media coverage may I ask whether you believe, following your experience
of Op Telic, that advances in information technology and network
enabled capabilities present increased opportunities or temptations
for politicians or retired senior commanders or those who have
distance from the actual theatre to try to micro-manage the military
operations and comment at great length about what they think should
be done or should be happening?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The fact that
one has very rapidly operating technology these days does not
really change the basic issues. You must judge whether you thought
the Talking Heads were helpful or otherwise. I do not know
whether it was entertainment or not. A military campaign is not
there for entertainment, it is there for very fundamental, strategic,
political reasons. I simply do not know. All I would say about
network enabled capability is that it does enable us to deliver
precise military effect in a way which was impossible before and
to do much less collateral damage—that is an awful phrase—fewer
innocent civilian lives or indeed military lives lost than has
usually been the case in warfare. We must welcome and embrace
as an opportunity those sorts of advances. The fact that it also
means there is instant media is something again which we must
live with.
Q1748 Mr Cran: Two questions about the
extent of the UK's political influence. We keep on being told
that in fact the Brits are the bridge between the United States
on the one hand and our continental allies on the other. Indeed
Air Marshal Burridge, when he was before us, said for instance
that the United Kingdom, not infrequently, was able to influence
American targeting decisions, even in operations where we were
not involved, simply because we were able to point out to them
the effect that might have in Paris or Berlin. From your political
perspective, how great was that influence?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Two heads are
always better than one and in this campaign and in this policy
process the Americans invited us in fully at an earlier stage
than I can otherwise conceive of. I was in Washington in the Embassy
in 1991 and remember the first Iraq war when it was much later
that we had that level of an engagement with the United States.
I would not like to put it as plucky little Britain influencing
the United States. I would say that both Britain and the United
States had a shared interest. They believe it was in their own
national interest to do so. In those circumstances it is always
more likely that you get sensible planning, more balanced action
than if an individual has to do it without consulting others.
Having said that, many more countries were involved than just
the UK and the United States. We counted 20 countries. We have
nine with us now in the south of Iraq. We reckoned there were
20 who either provided us with basing facilities, facilitation
in various ways, or indeed came with us. The Americans counted
40 who were supporting in one way or another. There were many
more influences operating on the overall decisions than just the
US and the UK. There is no doubt that we had strong influence
on the United States. There is absolutely no doubt it had strong
influence on us.
Q1749 Mr Cran: I gave you the example
of targeting decisions. Would it be your view, so that the Committee
understands, that the influence we did exercise went way beyond
that?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Targeting was
one aspect where we were taking joint decisions, but so were many
aspects of the campaign. Military planners worked together, politicians
worked together, so there was a much wider influence than that.
Q1750 Mr Cran: You obviously are not
going to tell us about those issues where we were overruled by
the senior partner. You are obviously not going to answer that
one. But if you do want to, do please go ahead. Would you say,
if that were the case, that more often than not it was a compromise
where there was a disagreement?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The leading
assumption there is that there was a disagreement. I do not recall
that sort of thing occurring in that form. If you want to put
it the other way round, and I would do so, the Americans were
quite confident that it would be possible to secure success simply
by operating from the south and persuaded us to that position
and they proved to be correct.
Q1751 Mr Cran: The obverse of the coin
in talking about the US is that we now have to address our European
partners. Within your bailiwick was it the case that we had a
deal of influence with them too because of the influence we had
over the Americans? If you would like to change the language,
do please, but you know what I am trying to say.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes. I personally
do not see us as a bridge between Europe and the United States.
The middle of the Atlantic, as someone else said, is very wet
and lonely and that is not a great position into which to put
oneself. The US has its own bilateral relationships with all these
countries, just as we do. The fact that we often share views with
the Americans is only because we have an outward looking view
of the European Union and we do not see it in such an enclosed
European sense but as an influence for good in the world. It is
because of that attitude about Europe, and the view of the European
Union, shared by other European countries too, that we tend to
share a lot of positions with the United States; not all obviously.
Q1752 Mr Cran: Anybody listening to you
now who would probably wonder why it was that Paris and Berlin
did not recognise that we really had quite a lot of influence
on our American partners in that war and therefore they could
use that influence.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Opportunities
were missed on those scores. It would have been possible to exert
more influence on Saddam Hussein diplomatically had the international
community really tried.
Q1753 Chairman: The short remark you
made to Mr Cran's question led you to shoot two major principles
of my beliefs in politics: the bridge theory, boom, sunk; the
special relationship piles down immediately on top of it as it
sinks beneath the waves. I would not want to give you an opportunity
to talk at length on the special relationship, but do you not
think it exists any more or is your assessment just an interpretation
of it or a politically correct version of what the government
now actually believes in?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think we had
probably decided to abandon the phrase "special relationship"
in the late 1980s, but there is clearly a very close relationship
between the US and the UK, which exists because that is how both
sides perceive their own national interests, not because we are
poodling to the United States. It is based on a view of the world
where we have lots of points in common. To think that the UK simply
goes around doing US business is a grave mistake. There is no
doubt that another observation is correct, which is that it is
only by being strong in Europe that the UK can continue to exert
influence on the United States in a helpful way rather than just
as plucky little Britain and therefore both our relationships,
in Europe and the United States, are equally important.
Q1754 Chairman: I shall not pursue that,
except I shall read Baroness Thatcher's autobiography even more
carefully to know whether the concept had been abandoned by the
end of the 1980s. If it had been, then people kept it remarkably
free from her attention.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: At that stage
I was a diplomat and I remember a special instruction was sent
round from the Foreign Office at that stage that we did not call
it the "special relationship" any more; we used other
words like "natural".
Chairman: She would have beaten you around
the head if you had advised her to do that. Times change.
Q1755 Mr Havard: The overall size of
the forces which were deployed in Iraq were determined to a certain
degree both by military need and also presumably some political
influence in relation to that. What political determinations were
they given in terms of the size of the force? It was, as you said
earlier, relatively small packaging in terms of the overall plan,
but an effective one. What political considerations were given
to that?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Political considerations
were pretty general. The importance of having something which
was appropriate and was more than a token, in other words that
it could actually do a proper job in pursuit of joint objectives.
If there were political objectives about the size of force—and
I do not think we ever looked at it in that form—it would
have been that it should be appropriate to what the UK could provide
in the circumstances, while being sufficient to have a material
effect rather than just a paper effect.
Q1756 Mr Havard: If not then in relation
to the size of the force, was there for example a political perspective
about the British need to be both involved and seen to be involved
in key areas or particular activities, say as assault troops or
bombing activities? Were they needed to be seen to be and be involved
in particular key areas for political reasons?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Not particularly
for political reasons. In order to have a material effect as opposed
to a symbolic one, clearly it would be important to have serious
roles and that was clear from the start. The precise nature of
the force and size of the force was something which evolved as
a result of proposals from the military side in relation to a
political willingness to be involved. The final size was a result
of the interaction between the two elements and other things,
like we still had the firefighters' strike going on, and the need
to continue to hold back 19,000 troops against that contingency.
Q1757 Mr Havard: Was it, for example,
politically important that they were operating within their own
discrete areas?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think the
British military view—and the Air Marshal may have something
to say there—is that by and large, although we work in coalition
normally as a junior partner with the United States or in a rather
bigger role with European partners, nevertheless it is militarily
not terribly sensible to operate at much smaller than brigade
level. That is a general military view that the chiefs of staff
hold, so it is a question of how many brigades one was to contribute
on the ground. Our overall planning guidelines are for medium
scale and basically following the strategic defence review that
is broadly the sort of capacity we would expect to contribute
to a military operation. The air and maritime packages were about
that scale. The land package was slightly larger as it happened,
but those would be the broad parameters within which we work.
It was always going to be that the minimum would have been a brigade,
a self-supporting brigade; in the event it was larger than that.
I think that is fair, is it not? I do rely on my military colleagues.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: Absolutely
so.
Q1758 Mr Havard: I see the argument for
taking particular pieces of geography, having specialist tasks
given because we had particular expertise and size of forces,
but on the desire to influence US planning in some fashion were
there political considerations about the formation and deployment
of British troops in particular activities in particular areas
which were designed not only to be effective on the ground, but
also chime in with wanting to have our view of how the planning
and the process of the operation went forward?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is certainly
true that British military forces are designed for serious military
duties rather than simply peacekeeping and therefore it was quite
clear that if we were to deploy combat forces, they would be there
for that purpose. The decision to put our effort into the south
was quite late on, therefore we were not seeking a geographical
area for its own sake, that happened to become sensible in the
way in which the planning evolved after the discussions with Turkey.
We put our military capability where we could be most useful to
the overall operation.
Q1759 Mr Havard: So we bid for Basra,
did we?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We did not bid
for Basra, that came later.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: We were
asked to go there and we could put together a package of forces
which would achieve the desired and jointly planned effects which
were envisaged by the American and British planners. Part of that
was releasing some of the American combat forces to go on further
north and enable us to have enough forces left in MND South East,
as it has now become, to do plenty of very important military
tasks, in part war fighting still, in part—and I know we
will get onto this later—the aspects of aftermath as well.
It was a blend of all of these things, but primarily, it was very
much to produce the initial military effect in concert with American
forces and to allow them, as agreed by us of course, to take forward
the full plan all the way, as necessary, up to Baghdad.
| 
