Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1760-1777)
SIR KEVIN
TEBBIT KCB CMG, AIR
VICE MARSHAL
CLIVE LOADER
OBE AND MR
IAN LEE
17 DECEMBER 2003.
Q1760 Mr Havard: In this nexus between
effects based activity and the political considerations which
go with it, one of the areas we got involved in was delivering
cluster munitions, which is politically sensitive, contentious,
use whatever word you like. Nevertheless, were we, for example,
drawn into that for partly political reasons? Is this a form of
incorporation, as it were, that we were using these weapons and
the extent to which that would redress a balance against another
part of the plan we were trying to influence in terms of the political
influence we were exerting about how a conflict would be determined
afterwards? Are there these political relationships between the
declaration that we are involved simply and only in effects based
activity for the reasons which present themselves and we therefore
deploy munitions for those reasons? What are the political arguments
around deciding to do something like that?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think you
are exaggerating or putting too much weight on very careful political
judgments here. I shall come to your point on cluster munitions
at the end, if I may. The reason, for example, that our ground
forces were configured the way they were was partly because they
were expected to have to do some serious war fighting initially,
hence the armoured brigade, but also because it was uncertain
how quickly it would be possible to secure Iraq as a whole, but
there was still a hope that we could do it very rapidly and hence
the light forces were there to be flexibly deployed, quickly if
necessary. As it happens, we more or less stayed in the southern
area, but there was always uncertainty as to how quickly we might
have to move around the country. I am really only saying that
to illustrate that you can exaggerate this question of what we
were trying to do for political effect. The political effect was
the decision to go and to go with a significant capability. It
did not break down to these very fine judgments you are inviting
me to make. When it comes to cluster munitions, they are still
the only effective military way of dealing with a particular type
of target, that is to say massed lightweight forces.
Q1761 Mr Havard: But their use might
politically conflict with other things, might it not, in terms
of how it is going to be seen by the people of Iraq, how it is
seen domestically, how it is seen in a whole range of other audiences?
How do you balance those two political objectives?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Because you
have moved to a position of regarding cluster munitions as politically
sensitive or improper, when in fact they are still—
Q1762 Mr Havard: I did not say they were
improper, but I would say that they are contentious.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They are a military
tool for use on the battlefield and part of the UK inventory just
as much as they are part of the US own infantry, notwithstanding
their slightly controversial nature.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: They
have to be used sometimes if the effects required and the timescale
available demand their use.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Against massed
mechanised infantry there is no more effective weapon.
Q1763 Mr Havard: I understand that they
are militarily very useful, but they are not politically neutral.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The important
thing is to make sure that they do indeed detonate and a lot of
work is going into making sure that they detonate when they should
and do not lie around.
Q1764 Mr Blunt: You mentioned the problem
of withholding 19,000 servicemen to be available to deal with
the fire strike. Can you give us a general characterisation of
the effect that had on the preparation for the operation of putting
together the scale of effort otherwise required generally? Could
you then illustrate it with a specific example of the problems
it threw up?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: My recollection—and
I am not the expert on that—my recollection is that it did
not seriously affect the size of the military force which was
sent but it was beginning to have, and would certainly have had
if it had continued, a serious effect on our recuperation speed
and our ability to continue to roule forces were it necessary
to do so for a long campaign. The concern about the fire-fighters'
strike was potential, as it happened, rather than actual. I do
not believe we would have actually put together a different military
force had we not had that obligation, but it was certainly something
which affected consequence planning and recuperation times.
Mr Lee: It more or less put a
ceiling; it did not affect the package we had decided on. If the
fire-fighter strike had been continuing it would not have been
possible to put together anything much bigger that what we decided
on, but it was not a constraint. Some of the individual units
were shuffled—I cannot remember the date off the top of
my head, but certainly the parachute battalion which actually
went was taken off fire-fighting duties because it was thought
it might form part of the force which would go to Iraq. There
was some juggling of which people were actually designated fire-fighting
duties, as opposed to which were more likely to be deployed to
Iraq. There was that sort of specific consequence of it. In terms
of the overall size, we have covered that.
Q1765 Mr Blunt: What effect did it have
on the morale of the forces involved? How would you characterise
their view of those responsible for ensuring that they were dealing
with fires rather than being available for operations in Iraq?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The polite answer
is to say that as professional men they did whatever was required
of them. I did hear the odd statement of concern from one or two
individuals who said they would rather be in Iraq than on fire-fighting
duty.
Q1766 Mr Viggers: The decision was made
to deploy a large force on a tight timetable knowing that there
were some equipment—I will not say shortages—that
equipment was quite tight and the programme was very tight at
the last minute. The whole thing being, within the framework of
the allied operation led by the Americans, a judgment between
preparation and planning on one side and expedition on the other.
How was that ultimate decision made? What briefing was given to
ministers about the availability of equipment, any shortages of
equipment, about the readiness of the troops? How finally was
that decision taken? What briefing were ministers given?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: When the decision
was taken to deploy a force of this size, it included judgments
about the necessary equipment and sustainability and all of the
other factors. It is true that some equipment, including personal
equipment, either was not distributed to all the force before
the operation started or some of it in some cases was still on
the way. However, the arrangement for this is that the military
commanders declare when they have full operational capability
for the operational task they have and that was declared by all
the operational commanders. In other words, the armed forces told
us they were ready to go and it was on that basis that it was
possible; it was one of the factors, which enabled the Prime Minister
to agree to the commencement of operations on 20 March. In other
words, although there were shortages in particular areas, they
did not have an operational effect, they did not impede operations.
Q1767 Mr Viggers: Is the statement by
the operational commander yes, we are ready, or no, we are not
ready, or we have certain deficiencies and shortages but we could
go?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: He declares
full operational capability, no more, no less.
Q1768 Mr Viggers: He ticks a box.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: Yes.
The commander on the ground makes the judgment that his forces
are ready to engage in the pre-planned conflict.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That helps to
explain some of the confusion which has arisen from the Secretary
of State's comments about people having the requisite equipment
and materiel to go. In that sense they did. It does not mean to
say that we cannot improve our logistics planning and we are looking
at some of the things. You have seen our lessons learned report.
We are quite ready to look self-critically at what could be done
better, but it did not affect the operational effectiveness of
the force.
Q1769 Mr Viggers: How many operational
commanders are there? At what level is this operational command
decision taken?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: In this case
Robin Brims, the main operational commander on the ground, but
that would be based on reports from his subordinate commanders.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: There
is a collective responsibility of course, but the national contingent
commander, with all of his air, land and maritime commanders as
well. It is a corporate responsibility to confirm that they are
ready to go or any nuances they may have about continuing problems.
There has to be that collective responsibility, for which the
NCC, in this case Air Chief Marshal Burridge, has overall responsibility
on a national basis.
Q1770 Mr Cran: A couple of questions
on relations with other government departments. It has been alleged—do
not ask me by whom, because I do not have the source with me—that
there were delays, for instance in ordering equipment, caused
by the Treasury not wanting to authorise the expenditure until
it judged that the war was going to go ahead. Would you like to
comment on that and on whether other limitations were placed upon
you by just the way other government departments acted and their
own requirements?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am usually
pretty keen to rise to any opportunity to make some friendly criticisms
of Treasury colleagues, but unfortunately on this occasion I really
cannot.
Q1771 Chairman: Try a little harder.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is difficult
on this one. I really cannot. Relations with the Treasury on this
have been remarkably cordial and I really cannot say that they
have denied us the funding for any of the urgent operational requirements
we had. The problem was more a question of how to balance the
risk that overt preparations would prejudice the diplomatic process
against the need to be ready to take action if the diplomatic
process failed. That was the critical calculation of when we could
take the risk to go out to industry and let our planning become
transparent when we were still seeking to pursue a diplomatic
route. That was much more of a restraining, naturally and correctly
restraining, factor than Treasury attitudes towards funding the
urgent requirements.
Q1772 Mr Cran: So absolutely no problems
across government at all. You got what you wanted, you got the
authorisation, the support and everything else.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is right.
I am trying to find what I can usefully say to stake markers in
the ground. Some of the urgent operational requirements were met
and will have a continuing bill attached to them and we would
rather not have simply to destroy them for want of resources to
sustain them in our force structure. There may well be some areas
for discussion with the Treasury further on, particularly under
resource accounting and budgeting, when we also need the wherewithal
to pay the capital charge on this equipment and to depreciate
it over time. I would not say this was an area where I have no
advice for my Treasury colleagues whatsoever, although it is really
about the size of the budget. In terms of the management of urgent
operational requirements, I have to say the Treasury were helpful,
co-operative, mutual trust—
Q1773 Mr Cran: Goodness me, are you not
going overboard?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I know, but
it is just before Christmas.
Q1774 Mr Cran: We have at least got the
door ajar slightly, which if we had time we might like to push
upon, but we do not. Just a simple finishing question. What resources,
expertise and so on, did you draw, if you did draw, from other
government departments?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is a very
good question. I mentioned earlier on that the way we now structure
the chiefs of staff meetings we have other government departments
sitting present at those meetings. The Foreign Office is there
always and we worked hand in hand in the political and military
preparations. There was absolutely no water or light between us
as we moved forward together. DFID also became important to us
because of their role in the post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction
phase. Other government departments too were involved. There is
a lesson here still for the future, because, as we all know, when
it came to it, none of us is particularly happy about post-conflict
management, the speed with which we can get the civil organisations
and authorities into these sorts of societies for stabilisation
and reconstruction and we want to do some work on that and indeed
work is already being begun with my Foreign Office and DFID colleagues.
I should perhaps say the Department of Health was quite important
to us on this occasion. It was the first time we really tested
the new arrangements over reserves and particularly medical reserves.
We called up 1,000 of them, 100 doctors; not huge numbers in relation
to the size of the Health Service, but still quite important.
We therefore had pre-planning meetings with Nigel Crisp, the Permanent
Secretary there. There was a permanent unit at RAF High Wycombe
to plan for the reception of casualties, had we had large numbers
coming back from the theatre, which thank goodness, we did not
have and generally, to manage the whole question of relations
with the National Health Service trusts as we took people out
of hospitals who were benefits to them in peacetime in normal
circumstances but a problem for them otherwise. That worked pretty
well but we were right up against the margins and it is something
we shall have to work out very carefully in the years ahead. That
relationship has become very important to us.
Q1775 Mike Gapes: Before the conflict
I understand the United States had at least 22 studies into what
would happen in post-conflict Iraq. Could you tell us what preparations
were made in our government for what would happen? What information
was provided, what discussions did you have with other government
departments about providing the best possible information to our
forces about Iraqi society? Do you think with hindsight that far
more attention should have been paid to this so that when we had
the very quick victory, we did not have some subsequent unexpected
problems?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: As with the
other planning we have been talking about, the key for us was
to identify where the US system was actually going on its planning.
You are quite right, that there were lots of bits of the US system
making plans and then to plug into their mainstream. You will
remember the ORHA organisation which was established in January
on a contingent basis in the United States. We contributed to
that from the outset so that we were able to keep very close to
the Americans on the whole question of broader policy and post-conflict
planning and of course now do so with the CPA, the provisional
authority, where we have Jeremy Greenstock with Paul Bremer. We
certainly kept just as close to the Americans on the broader planning
post-conflict phase as we did on the other side of it. On the
second point on whether we got it wrong, could we have done it
better, it is fair to say that we all underestimated the extent
to which the Iraqi infrastructure and security apparatus, by which
I mean the police and those sorts of things, would collapse. The
speed and the extent of that collapse was not something we anticipated.
We did not think it was going to go quite as completely as it
did. I suspect we slightly underestimated the all-pervasive effect
of the Baathist control throughout Iraqi society and therefore
the task has been larger in terms of trying to help set up, to
foster the new Iraqi institutions and ministries than we expected
it to be initially. As far as cultural awareness is concerned,
we have put a lot of effort into educating our forces about the
sensitivities of societies in which they will be operating and
I should like to think that what we are doing in southern Iraq,
where we have re-opened the schools, re-opened the hospitals,
got the water and the power running again, broadly speaking up
to pre-conflict levels—very difficult to know what pre-conflict
levels actually were, but broadly speaking there—and the
way in which we are conducting ourselves there does reflect well
on British forces and it does show that British forces are not
just good at war fighting, they are also very good at stabilisation
and post-conflict work as well.
Q1776 Mike Gapes: Did you have discussions
with other government departments before the operation started,
or was it very much MOD/Foreign Office?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes. Foreign
Office certainly and DFID too. It was very much an open planning
arrangement, not with every single military detail, where obviously
operational security had to be maintained, but in terms of broad
co-ordination, yes, we were fully looped into everybody else.
Q1777 Chairman: We have to end at this
stage. Two questions which are not for answer now, because we
have another group of people we have to interview. Mr Hancock
raised the issue earlier in a private session of some allegations
that quite a number of reservists, TA people, have been fired
by their employers since their return from Iraq. We shall be writing
to you just to serve notice if you could perhaps investigate and
see whether you predicted this or what is happening. The idea
of men and women going out and fighting the war and then getting
the bullet afterwards that they avoided in Iraq is to us deeply,
deeply repugnant. Secondly, something we shall be raising later
and you could write to us. Could you please tell us what happened
to the 200,000 bullet-proof vests which were issued after Kosovo?
How many of them can you locate and if you can locate 50,000 of
them, were they all sent out to our troops? Two easy questions
for you to ponder over Christmas. We do not want an answer before
Christmas, but we would like you to ponder over that. Please do
not even think about answering that now. Thank you so much; it
was very helpful.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I promise you
there will be good answers to both of your questions.[4]
Chairman: Thank you, that is very kind.
4 Ev
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