Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1900
- 1919)
WEDNESDAY 7 JANUARY 2004
LT GENERAL
ROB FULTON,
AIR VICE
MARSHAL STEPHEN
DALTON AND
MAJOR GENERAL
DICK APPLEGATE
OBE
Q1900 Chairman: So the one
or two you fired worked pretty well?
Lt General Fulton: Yes. Also,
in terms of equipment, the mine counter-measures capability, enhanced
by the UORs, was a success. It was definitely a strength of the
United Kingdom, and something that we were certainly able to bring
to the operation that the Americans were not. My third one in
the Sea area was the performance of the Sea King Mk 7, which was
alluded to in the last session, purchased initially for its Search
water radar and its ability to search across ocean, but actually,
its ability across the desert terrain was also a revelation to
many people and certainly provided the 3 Commando Brigade with
excellent visibility of the area round them. On land, I know that
you have heard from General Brims that he had a number of key
stars: Challenger 2 enhanced by the desertification UOR, Warrior,
AS90, and he also singled out Phoenix as a great success. To that
list I would add that we were delighted with the performance,
even though it was expected, of the SA80 A2 with which the force
was equipped. That was enhanced by the Dismounted Close Combat
capability, in particular the night vision capability, which we
were able to extend from what we had learned in Afghanistan, and
we were able to get some of that brought forward in time for some
of the forces, though not for everybody. Also in the land environment,
the Bowman personal role radio was a conspicuous success, to such
an extent that the United States Marine Corps have also purchased
some 5,000 of those. In the air, what the operation proved was
the success of the multi-role platforms GR4 and GR7 in particular.
The second area which we were very pleased with was the performance
of the air-delivered precision weapons. Storm Shadow in particular
was brought forward, but also enhanced Paveway and Maverick were
great successes. It was the performance of air power that enabled
us to achieve what we did with the numbers that we had, and I
know that you went over that with Air Marshal Burridge. I would
also point to the information-gathering capability Raptor. It
was Raptor's first exposure to an operation, and we were pleased
with the performance of that. Equally, the performance of the
Nimrod R1, much better known to us, was a great success, and finally
C17 proved its worth. In terms of shortcomings, we were not entirely
surprised, but nevertheless the availability of the Combat Engineer
Tractor, which was below 50%, was as I say, not unknown but was
a disappointment. There is a programme to replace that. The shortcomings
of Clansman are known, but nevertheless a number of people described
Clansman's ability to hold up pretty well, within its own limitations.
Of those that we had, that would be my summary. There are a number
of gaps which you may want to discuss in more detail, but at this
stage I would highlight the robust and resilient CIS, which has
been talked about in the past, inventory management and asset
tracking has certainly been talked about and I am sure we will
talk about that again, and I think also high speed data transfer
to tactical data links in order to make the best use of our reconnaissance
assets and get the information fed to our offensive platforms.
Q1901 Chairman: You put two
systems in that did not exceed your expectations. Clansman was
an easy one to throw in; everyone in the world knows that is almost
as old as we are. You have been very cagey in that list. You cannot
tell me all of your systems worked wonderfully well or well. This
is not a public relations exercise for British, German or French
companies, but there must have been systems that performed less
well, and I think we are entitled to have your response on those
that you felt should have done rather better.
Lt General Fulton: I am not sure
that I could add to that list, but I will ask my two colleagues
if they can in a moment. We do have to remember that the equipment
was being used in very particular circumstances. There were very
particular characteristics of this operation, which in some cases
did not test the equipment to the extent that we might have expected
it to be tested had we been fighting a more capable enemy or an
enemy which fought us in a different way. We also have to remember
that we were fighting in conjunction with the United States, and
therefore there are also aspects of operating in a coalition which
mean our equipment was not tested to the extent that it might
have been had we been fighting on our own. What I am saying is
that the parameters within which we conducted the operation were
less than the most testing parameters against which we would specify
equipment.
Chairman: We would have been in a more
advantageous position to rationally comment on weapons system
performance if we had been given access to the reports sent to
the Ministry of Defence by the senior officers, who I am sure
would have told you very frankly. However, despite being a Committee
representing the taxpayer, and being a Committee of the House
of Commons, we have been denied such access. We are seeking answers
in something of a vacuum based on innuendo, part-information and
reading newspapers, all of which is a pretty unreliable guide
to what really happens. Through you, I must express on behalf
of the Committee our immense irritation at being denied proper
information upon which to make a judgment. I now ask my colleagues
to add their own "bête noirs".
Q1902 Mike Gapes: Can I put
to you perhaps two other systems that should be on your poorly
performing list and see what your reaction is? I understand that
some chemical weapon detection devices were not particularly good
performers and gave false readings. Would you like to comment
on that?
Lt General Fulton: I am aware
that there were difficulties over the supply of NAIAD, the nerve
agent detector, which is not normally held in units but was issued.
It is in the process of being replaced by a new system which is
due in service now. We have a programme to replace that, and the
equipment will be coming into service very shortly. Yes, it did
not work as well as the new equipment will when that comes into
service.
Q1903 Mike Gapes: As a result,
there were false readings, and some of our people thought they
might be under a chemical attack when they were not.
Lt General Fulton: I have read
that, yes.
Q1904 Mike Gapes: Would you
confirm that that is the case?
Lt General Fulton: I have read
that.
Q1905 Mike Gapes: I take that
as confirmation. It may be other people will come back on that.
The second one is the mortar, the LH40. Were there problems with
that?
Major General Applegate: Not that
I am aware of, no.
Lt General Fulton: Not that I
am aware of either.
Major General Applegate: Could
you tell me the sort of problems you have heard about?
Q1906 Mike Gapes: I understood
that it did not work properly and that the thermal sight brackets
did not fit properly on the weapons. Is that correct?
Major General Applegate: Are you
really talking about a mortar? Thermal sights on a mortar sounds
not what I would expect.
Q1907 Mike Gapes: Were there
problems with brackets on other equipment?
Major General Applegate: Not that
I am aware of.
Lt General Fulton: Did this come
out of one of your visits?
Q1908 Mike Gapes: I am not
revealing my source.
Lt General Fulton: We are not
aware of it.
Q1909 Mike Gapes: I am just
asking you whether you had any problems with any of your other
equipment.
Lt General Fulton: Not that we
are aware of.
Q1910 Mr Blunt: I am slightly
surprised that, as a Royal Marine, you did not list the hovercraft,
in light of the information we received yesterday, when we went
to visit HMS Ocean. They contrasted the very high availability
of helicopters for transporting Royal Marines on to the Al Faw
peninsula with the extremely low availability and reliability
of the hovercraft on the ship. What was slightly more alarming
was that they then informed us that these hovercraft were quite
old and were being replaced, but you had just had to refuse the
replacements because they are not delivering the reliability that
should be expected of new hovercraft. Were you aware of this as
an issue?
Lt General Fulton: I think you
are referring to the small personnel landing craft, not the hovercraft.
I am aware that there have been problems over the acceptance of
the new landing craft to replace those on HMS OCEAN, yes.
Q1911 Mr Blunt: Were there
issues around the availability of hovercraft in the Gulf, or was
it just these landing craft that were inadequate?
Lt General Fulton: The only issue
that I am aware of in terms of the use of hovercraft on the Al
Faw peninsula were the large American cushioned air vehicles which
were to have landed some of the Commando Brigade.
Q1912 Mr Blunt: Are you saying
we do not have any; we just have landing hovercraft?
Lt General Fulton: We did not
have any out there, no.[8]
Q1913 Mr Blunt: I meant the
landing craft, not the hovercraft, for purposes of clarity. Can
you reiterate whether you were aware of their inadequate availability?
Lt General Fulton: I am aware
that the current generation of landing craft are very old and
are in the process of being replaced, and I am also aware that
there are difficulties with the acceptance of the new landing
craft, yes.
Q1914 Mr Blunt: Did they not
appear on your list because you knew they were not any good when
you went out there, and therefore they performed to expectation,
which was not very high?
Lt General Fulton: Correct.
Q1915 Mr Blunt: What other
equipment falls into that category that you have not told us about?
Lt General Fulton: I have cited
the CET as one that had availability lower than expected. I do
not think I can put my finger on any others that were conspicuous.
I think there were problems with the availability of helicopters;
dust affected helicopter availability. Once again, that was to
be expected, and that is why I did not put them on the list.
Q1916 Chairman: What about
combat identification? We had a few disasters. I do not know whether
Boards of Inquiry have been concluded, but are you in a position
at this stage to say whether the failures and the loss of life
or accidents were due to equipment failure or human error or any
other factors? I obviously do not want you to say anything that
would be premature, but as we are asking about equipment, combat
identification is clearly a sensitive area.
Lt General Fulton: It is clearly
a very important issue. It is one that we had been working on
before the operation. It is one that great attention was paid
to during the operation, and indeed, a lot of work has gone on
since the operation to identify the causes. I will ask Stephen
Dalton to answer the question.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Mr Chairman,
we are currently doing four Boards of Inquiry into the various
incidents that happened, and none of them have completed their
inquiries yet. A lot of that is due to the detailed nature of
the technical evaluation on equipment which is, of course, quite
badly damaged, as you can imagine from the nature of the accidents.
What we can say is, of course, that combat ID is a range of factors
from technical equipment through techniques, procedures, tactics
and human intervention, and all those need to be investigated
before we can finally say what was necessary if there was a single
cause of any of them, or whether it was a combination.
Chairman: Do you have any idea when these
inquiries are going to be concluded? I am asking because we will
be producing our report in a couple of months, and it would be
quite helpful. We are not trying to speed up the process but we
would be grateful if you would arrange that, when each of them
is published, it is made available to us as quickly as possible.
A follow-up question on helicopter availability. The National
Audit Office report says the total fleet averaged 66%. We will
be coming on to helicopters later, so bear in mind that we will
be looking at figures: Sea King 66%, Puma 65, Lynx anti-tank 52.
The figures do not look very impressive, unless you tell us they
are what is to be expected in that kind of environment. I am just
flagging up what we will be asking later. If you have any further
inspiration or willingness to confide in us, you know our address.[9]
Q1917 Mr Viggers: What about
the OSCA strategic communications system? Did that perform as
planned?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The system
that you are talking about was effectively bought by the Ministry
for an exercise requirement rather than an operational requirement,
therefore the system was not designed and we did not buy it to
be put into operational use. Because it was a success in the exercise,
it was then pressed into operational use because it filled a particular
niche capability, and did produce some good results but also some
unsatisfactory results. Part of the cause of that would be the
fact that it was not design-tested to the extremes which might
be used operationally as opposed to in a straightforward exercise
training need.
Q1918 Mr Viggers: I was reading
today's Jane's Defence Weekly, which says that the OSCA strategic
communications system was procured for Operation Telic under an
£80 million Urgent Operational Requirement.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: That
is not technically correct, as I understand it.
Q1919 Mr Viggers: Can you
please say what is being done to rectify the poor availability
of the Combat Engineer Tractor and the Lynx anti-tank helicopter?
Major General Applegate: Really,
with the Combat Engineer Tractor, as was mentioned, that is an
old piece of equipment, which came in the seventies. At the moment
we are planning to introduce Terrier, which I think you are aware
of, with an in-service date of 2008. It causes us concern, certainly,
that the availability of the current system is not what we would
wish but we have plans, and that is the timescale in which we
are planning to introduce the replacement for that particular
piece of equipment. As far as the Lynx is concerned, clearly,
we have a fleet which is ageing, and one of the things we are
hoping to do to meet the requirement that the Lynx is fulfilling
for attack—and you are aware that we fired a number of Lynx
TOW—is to replace it with the Apache, which will be taking
on that particular task. So the remaining Lynx we have will be
conducting utility tasks in a less stressing environment. Obviously,
we have other programmes which we are hoping to bring on as a
replacement for the light-utility helicopter, and are considering
the future helicopter mix.
8 Note from Witness: Asslt Sqn deployed with
four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (Light) LCAC (L) Back
9
Ev 431 Back
| 
